The Vanishing Act: How Assad’s Top Henchmen Fled Syria, and Justice

A portrait of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP via Getty Images)
A portrait of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP via Getty Images)
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The Vanishing Act: How Assad’s Top Henchmen Fled Syria, and Justice

A portrait of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP via Getty Images)
A portrait of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP via Getty Images)

Not long after midnight on December 8, 2024, dozens of people gathered in the darkness outside the military section of the Damascus International Airport. Carrying whatever they could pack, they piled into a small Syrian Air jet.

Only an hour earlier, they were part of an elite cadre that formed the backbone of one of the world’s most brutal regimes. Now, in the wake of President Bashar al-Assad’s sudden fall and escape from the country, they were fugitives, scrambling with their families to flee.

Among the passengers was Qahtan Khalil, director of Syria’s air force intelligence, who was accused of being directly responsible for one of the bloodiest massacres of the country’s 13-year civil war.

He was joined by Ali Abbas and Ali Ayyoub, two former ministers of defense facing sanctions for human rights violations and atrocities carried out during the conflict.

There was also the military chief of staff, Abdul Karim Ibrahim, accused of facilitating torture and sexual violence against civilians.

The presence of these and other regime figures was recounted to The New York Times by a passenger and two other former officials with knowledge of the flight.

As a whirlwind opposition offensive encroached on the Syrian capital, Assad’s furtive flight out of Damascus earlier that night took his innermost circle by surprise and became the symbol of his regime’s stunning fall.

His henchmen quickly followed suit. In a matter of hours, the pillars of an entire system of repression had not simply collapsed. They had vanished.

Some caught flights. Others rushed to their coastal villas and roared away on luxury speed boats.

Some fled in convoys of expensive cars, as opposition fighters at freshly installed checkpoints unwittingly waved them on. A few hid out in the Russian Embassy, which assisted in their escapes to Moscow, Assad’s most important ally.

To the thousands of Syrians who lost loved ones, or were tortured, imprisoned or displaced by the Assad regime, their homeland had become a crime scene from which the top suspects disappeared en masse.

Ten months after the regime’s collapse, a nation shattered by war not only faces the immense challenge of rebuilding, but also the daunting task of scouring the globe to find and hold to account the people who committed some of the worst state-sponsored crimes of this century.

Former opposition fighters and Syria’s fledgling government are trying to locate them through informants, computer and phone hacks, or clues gathered from abandoned regime headquarters. Prosecutors in Europe and the United States are building or revisiting cases. And Syrian civil society groups and United Nations investigators are collecting evidence and witnesses, preparing for a future in which they hope justice can be served.

Their targets are some of the most elusive people in the world. Many of them wielded immense power for decades, yet remained public enigmas: Their real names, ages and, in some cases, even appearances were unknown.

The dearth of information has repeatedly led to inaccuracies in media reports, and on sanctions and law enforcement lists. It likely has helped some of the regime’s most notorious bad actors evade Syrian and European authorities since Assad’s fall.

The means to disappear

Over the past several months, a New York Times reporting team has been working to fill in the blanks about 55 of these regime officials’ roles and true identities, all former high-ranking government and military figures who appear on international sanctions lists and are linked to the deadliest chapters of Syria’s recent history.

The investigation has involved everything from tracing digital trails and family social media accounts, to scouring abandoned properties for old phone bills and credit card information.

Reporters interviewed dozens of former regime officials, many of whom spoke on condition of anonymity for their safety, as well as Syrian human rights lawyers, European law enforcement, civil society groups and members of the new Syrian government. They visited dozens of abandoned villas and businesses connected to regime figureheads and reconstructed some of their escape routes.

The current whereabouts of many of these 55 former key officials who enabled Assad’s dictatorship remain unknown, but among the dozen The Times has found, their fates vary widely.

Assad himself is in Russia and appears to have cut off contact with most of his formal circle, according to former Syrian officials, relatives and associates.

Maher al-Assad, who was second only to his brother Bashar in power over regime-era Syria, has been spending time living a life of exiled luxury in Moscow, along with some of his former senior commanders, like Jamal Younes, according to accounts by regime-era officials and business associates in contact with them, as well as video evidence verified by The Times.

Others, like Ghiath Dalla, a brigadier general whose forces were involved in violent repression of protests, are among several former officers plotting sabotage from Lebanon, according to ex-military commanders, who also shared text message exchanges with The Times. Dalla is coordinating with former regime leaders like Suhail al-Hassan and Kamal al-Hassan from Moscow, the same commanders said.

Some officials have struck murky deals to remain in Syria, according to an ex-military commander and people working with the new government. And one official, Amr al-Armanazi, who oversaw Assad’s chemical weapons program, was discovered by Times reporters to still be living in his own home in Damascus.

A cutout caricature shows the former Syrian President Assad sells soft drinks in the old city of Damascus, Syria, Thursday, Oct. 2, 2025. (AP)

Keeping track of such a large group of figures poses a massive challenge for those seeking justice. There are criminal cases to build and the daunting task of finding a way to actually prosecute such cases.

But at the heart of this challenge lies the question of how best to coordinate global search efforts for people who don’t want to be found.

Many of them had easy access to government offices that enabled them to obtain genuine Syrian passports with fake names, according to former employees and regime figures. That, in turn, enabled them to obtain passports to Caribbean countries, they said.

“Some of these individuals have purchased new identities by acquiring citizenship through real estate investments or financial payments. They use these new names and nationalities to hide,” said Mazen Darwish, head of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, a Paris-based group at the forefront of justice efforts on Syria.

“These people have the financial means to move freely, to buy new passports, to disappear.”

‘He’s gone.’

The mass exodus began late on the night of Dec. 7, 2024, after a moment of stark realization.

For hours, several of Assad’s top aides waiting near his office in the presidential palace had confidently fielded calls from their colleagues and relatives, several regime-era officials in contact with them that night said. The palace officials assured them the president was there, hashing out a plan with his military and Russian and Iranian advisers to confront the advancing opposition forces.

But that plan never materialized. And neither did Assad.

Realizing he was gone, the senior aides quickly tracked him to his home, according to three former palace officials. Shortly after, guards outside the president’s house informed them Russian officials had whisked Assad away in a convoy of three SUVs, along with his son and personal assistant.

According to the former palace aides, the only officials the president would summon to flee with him were two financial advisers. Assad would need their help, two regime insiders later explained, to access his assets in Russia.

The erstwhile president and his entourage got on a jet that flew them to Hmeimim, a coastal air base controlled by Russia, which had been his most critical backer in the war.

When they learned of the flight, the abandoned aides began frantically calling security officials and loved ones. The opposition fighters had reached the suburbs of Damascus and there was not a moment to lose.

“He’s gone,” was all that one senior aide said when he called a close relative, recounting that night to The Times. The aide ordered his family to pack their bags and go to the defense ministry in the capital’s central Umayyad Square.

There, the senior aide and his family joined several other security officers who had gathered with their families, and linked up with Khalil, the air force intelligence director. Khalil had arranged an escape flight, the one transporting many high-ranking officials, to Hmeimim. The plane, a Yak-40 private jet, left the Damascus airport around 1:30 a.m. on December 8, a passenger, who was one of the former palace officials, said.

Satellite-imagery analysis comports with this, showing that a Yak-40 was on the tarmac in Damascus in the days prior, vanishes on the night in question and seems to have reappeared at Hmeimim soon after.

The passengers who packed into the plane “were freaking out,” the former palace official recalled. The flight is only 30 minutes, he said, “but that night, it felt like we were flying forever.”

In another part of the city, Assad’s brother Maher, head of Syria’s feared 4th Division, was rushing to arrange his own escape. He called a family friend and one of his business cronies, according to two close associates. Maher al-Assad urged the men to leave their houses as quickly as possible and wait outside. Shortly after, he careened up the street in his car, then sped off with them to catch his own flight.

Swiping safes, dodging ambushes

Back in Damascus, some 3,000 members of the General Intelligence services were still inside the sprawling security compound in the capital’s southwest, unaware that regime elites had already fled. They nervously waited on high alert under their director, Hossam Louka — an official who oversaw mass detention and systemic torture.

One of Louka’s senior officers described him as someone extremely deferential to Assad. “He wouldn’t even move an ashtray from here to there without asking Bashar for permission,” he said.

The officer recalled that they had been ordered to ready themselves for a counterattack. The order never came.

A friend of Louka said he repeatedly called the intelligence director that night for updates and was always reassured that there was nothing to fear. Then, at 2 a.m., he said, Louka hurriedly answered the phone only to say he was packing to flee.

An hour later, Louka’s officers entered his office to discover he had abandoned them without uttering a word — and that, on his way out, Louka had ordered the intelligence service’s accountant to open the headquarters safe, according to one of Louka’s officers present at the time. Louka then took all the cash inside, an estimated $1,360,000. Three former regime officials say they believe Louka has since made it to Russia, though The Times has not yet verified their account.

In that same security compound, Kamal al-Hassan, another high-ranking former official, also raided his office headquarters. He took a hard drive as well as the money inside his administrative office’s safe, according to a friend and a senior regime-era figure in contact with one of al-Hassan’s deputies.

Al-Hassan, the head of military intelligence, is accused of overseeing mass arrests, torture and the execution of detainees.

His escape did not go as smoothly as the others. Al-Hassan was wounded in a gunfight with opposition fighters as he attempted to leave his home in a Damascus suburb formerly known as Qura al-Assad, or “Assad’s Villages,” an area where many regime elites lived in lavish villas.

He fled by hiding from house to house, the friend and regime-era official said, before eventually making his way to the Russian Embassy, which took him in.

The Times contacted al-Hassan through an interlocutor, who spoke to him by phone, but he would not divulge his location or agree to an interview. He did, however, recount his escape under fire, and said that he was sheltered at “a diplomatic mission,” before departing Syria.

Another official who sought refuge at the Russian Embassy was the retired national security director Ali Mamlouk, who helped orchestrate the system of mass arrest, torture and disappearance that was emblematic of five decades of Assad rule.

According to both a friend who said he had been in touch with him, and a relative, Mamlouk only learned of the regime collapse from a phone call around 4 a.m. As he attempted to join other officials fleeing to the airport, his convoy of cars was attacked by what the sources described as an ambush.

Though it was unclear who attacked him, they said he would have had many enemies.

As an intelligence director not only for Assad, but the dictator’s father and predecessor, Hafez, he knew the government’s secrets.

“He was the black box of the regime — not just since the days of Bashar, since the days of Hafez,” one of his friends said. “He knew everything.”

Mamlouk managed to get away unscathed and raced to the Russian Embassy, according to three people familiar with his escape.

Mamlouk and al-Hassan hunkered down there until Russian officials arranged a guarded convoy to get them to the Hmeimim base. Both men later reached Russia, the three people told The Times.

Syrian refugees return to their homeland from Lebanon in October. (AFP)

Close encounters

Several ex-regime figures said that, in an effort to minimize the regime’s resistance, there was a tacit understanding that opposition commanders would turn a blind eye to most Assad loyalists fleeing toward Syria’s Mediterranean coast, home of the Alawite minority sect to which Assad belonged, and where the Assad regime had recruited many of its security forces.

But it is unlikely such leniency would have been granted to the former Maj. Gen. Bassam Hassan. Few from Assad’s inner circle were more feared than Hassan, accused of a litany of crimes, including coordinating the regime’s chemical weapons attacks to the kidnapping of the American journalist Austin Tice.

Yet Hassan managed to escape undetected, despite sleeping through the first hectic hours of the regime’s fall. He was alerted sometime before 5 a.m., when one of his top commanders roused him from sleep, according to three people familiar with his story.

Hassan quickly arranged a convoy of three cars carrying his wife, adult children and bags stuffed with money, according to two of the people familiar with his story. He was so concerned about an attack that he had his wife and children ride in different cars, one associate said, to avoid the entire family being struck at once.

When their convoy approached the city of Homs, about 100 miles north of Damascus, fighters waved down the first car, an SUV, and forced Hassan’s wife and daughter out. They were ordered to leave everything, even their purses, inside the vehicle, according to a witness.

The fighters, apparently satisfied with their loot, paid no mind as the women got into the second car, joining one of the Assad regime’s most notorious henchmen.

The fighters had a scant chance of recognizing him. Bogus photos of Hassan have long circulated in the media. Even the United States and British governments do not use the right name or birth year for Hassan in their sanctions documents. The Times has obtained and verified perhaps the only recent photograph of Hassan.

Having cleared the checkpoint, Hassan eventually made his way to Lebanon and then Iran with the help of Iranian officials, according to interviews with officials from the Assad regime, Lebanon and the US.

He has since returned to Beirut as part of a deal to provide information to American intelligence officials. Associates said he had been spending his time at cafes and fancy restaurants with his wife. When reached on a Lebanese WhatsApp number, he declined to give an interview.

A bitter reality

For the tens of thousands of Syrians who were victims of the Assad regime, the pursuit of justice looks aimless.

It remains an open question whether the current government, under Ahmed al-Shara, has the capacity, or the will to aggressively pursue Assad officials accused of war crimes — that would, in turn, put some of his own officials’ alleged crimes under the spotlight, too.

And with foreign powers long divided over the war in Syria and the uprising against its former dictator, there is little hope for an international tribunal either.

For those fighting to ensure the regime’s crimes are not allowed to fade into history, a bitter reality remains: Assad’s top enforcers are still living large, and still one step ahead of their pursuers.

 

*Erika Solomon, Christiaan Triebert, Haley Willis, Ahmad Mhidi and Danny Makki for The New York Times



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.