Zohran Mamdani’s Rise: From Queens Lawmaker to New York City Mayor 

Democratic candidate for New York City mayor Zohran Mamdani waves to his supporters after winning the 2025 New York City Mayoral race, at an election night rally in the Brooklyn borough of New York City, New York, US, November 4, 2025. (Reuters)
Democratic candidate for New York City mayor Zohran Mamdani waves to his supporters after winning the 2025 New York City Mayoral race, at an election night rally in the Brooklyn borough of New York City, New York, US, November 4, 2025. (Reuters)
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Zohran Mamdani’s Rise: From Queens Lawmaker to New York City Mayor 

Democratic candidate for New York City mayor Zohran Mamdani waves to his supporters after winning the 2025 New York City Mayoral race, at an election night rally in the Brooklyn borough of New York City, New York, US, November 4, 2025. (Reuters)
Democratic candidate for New York City mayor Zohran Mamdani waves to his supporters after winning the 2025 New York City Mayoral race, at an election night rally in the Brooklyn borough of New York City, New York, US, November 4, 2025. (Reuters)

When he announced his run for mayor last October, Zohran Mamdani was a state lawmaker unknown to most New York City residents.

But that was before the 34-year-old democratic socialist crashed the national political scene with a stunning upset over former New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo in June’s Democratic primary.

On Tuesday, Mamdani completed his political ascension, again vanquishing Cuomo, as well as Republican candidate Curtis Sliwa, in the general election.

The former foreclosure prevention counselor and one-time rapper becomes the city’s first Muslim mayor, first born in Africa, and first of South Asian heritage — not to mention its youngest mayor in more than a century.

“I will wake up each morning with a singular purpose: To make this city better for you than it was the day before,” Mamdani promised New Yorkers in his victory speech.

Here’s a look at the next chief executive of America’s largest city:

Mamdani's progressive promises for New York City

Mamdani ran on an optimistic vision for New York City.

His campaign was packed with big policies aimed at lowering the cost of living for everyday New Yorkers, from free child care, free buses to a rent freeze for people living in rent-regulated apartments and new affordable housing — much of it funded by raising taxes on the wealthy.

He’s also proposed launching a pilot program for city-run grocery stores as a way to combat high food prices.

Since his Democratic primary win, Mamdani has moderated some of his more polarizing rhetoric, particularly around law enforcement.

He backed off a 2020 post calling to “defund” the New York Police Department and publicly apologized to NYPD officers for calling the department “racist” in another social media post.

While Mamdani is a member of the Democratic Socialists of America, he’s said he’s running on his own distinct platform and does not embrace all of the activist group’s priorities, which have included ending mandatory jail time for certain crimes and cutting police budgets.

NYC’s first Muslim mayor

Mamdani leaned into his faith amid the anti-Muslim rhetoric that marked the campaign’s final weeks.

Outside a Bronx mosque in late October, he spoke in emotional terms about the “indignities” long faced by the city’s Muslim population and vowed to further embrace his identity.

“I will not change who I am, how I eat, or the faith that I’m proud to call my own,” he said. “But there is one thing that I will change. I will no longer look for myself in the shadows. I will find myself in the light.”

Famous filmmaker mother

Mamdani was born in Kampala, Uganda, to Indian parents and became an American citizen in 2018, shortly after graduating from college.

He lived with his family briefly in Cape Town, South Africa, before moving to New York City when he was 7.

Mamdani’s mother, Mira Nair, is an award-winning filmmaker whose credits include “Monsoon Wedding,” “The Namesake” and “Mississippi Masala.” His father, Mahmood Mamdani, is an anthropology professor at Columbia University.

Mamdani married Rama Duwaji, a Syrian American artist, earlier this year. The couple, who met on the dating app Hinge, live in the Astoria neighborhood of the city's borough of Queens.

Once a fledgling rapper

Mamdani attended the Bronx High School of Science, where he cofounded the prestigious public school’s first cricket team, according to his legislative bio.

He graduated in 2014 from Bowdoin College in Maine, where he earned a degree in Africana studies and cofounded his college’s Students for Justice in Palestine chapter.

After college, he worked as a foreclosure prevention counselor in Queens, helping residents avoid eviction, a job he says inspired him to run for public office.

Mamdani also had a notable side hustle in the local hip-hop scene, rapping under the moniker Young Cardamom and later Mr. Cardamom. During his first run for state lawmaker, Mamdani gave a nod to his brief foray into music, describing himself as a “B-list rapper.”

Early political career Mamdani cut his teeth in local politics working on campaigns for Democratic candidates in Queens and Brooklyn.

He was first elected to the New York Assembly in 2020, knocking off a longtime Democratic incumbent for a Queens district covering Astoria and surrounding neighborhoods. He has handily won reelection twice.

The democratic socialist’s most notable legislative accomplishment has been pushing through a pilot program that made a handful of city buses free for a year. He’s also proposed legislation banning nonprofits from “engaging in unauthorized support of Israeli settlement activity.”

Mamdani’s opponents, particularly Cuomo, dismissed him as woefully unprepared for managing the complexities of running America’s largest city.

But Mamdani framed his relative inexperience as a potential asset, saying in a mayoral debate he’s “proud” he doesn’t have Cuomo’s “experience of corruption, scandal and disgrace.”

Viral campaign videos

Mamdani used buzzy campaign videos — many with winking references to Bollywood and his Indian heritage — to help make inroads with voters outside his slice of Queens.

On New Year’s Day, he took part in the annual polar plunge into the chilly waters off Coney Island in a full dress suit to break down his plan to “freeze” rents.

He interviewed food cart vendors about “Halal-flation” and humorously pledged to make the city’s beloved chicken over rice lunches “eight bucks again.”

In TikTok videos, he appealed to voters of color by speaking in Spanish, Bangla and other languages.

During his general election campaign, the viral clips were joined by talked-about television commercials — with on-theme ads that aired during “The Golden Bachelor,” “Survivor” and the Knicks' season opener.

Pro-Palestinian views

A longtime supporter of Palestinian rights, Mamdani continued his unstinting criticism of Israel — long seen as a third rail in New York politics — through his campaign.

Mamdani has accused the Israeli government of committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, and has said Israel should exist as “a state with equal rights” for all, rather than a “Jewish state.”

He was hammered by his opponents and many leaders in the Jewish community for his stances, with Cuomo accusing Mamdani of “fueling antisemitism.”

After facing criticism early in the race for refusing to denounce the phrase “globalize the intifada,” Mamdani vowed to discourage others from using it moving forward. He also met with rabbis and attended a synagogue during the High Holy Days as he courted Jewish voters.

In his victory remarks Tuesday, he pledged that under his leadership, City Hall will stand against antisemitism.



What’s at Stake in Iraq’s Parliamentary Election?

A young Iraqi worker walks past election campaigning posters ahead of the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, 07 November 2025. (EPA)
A young Iraqi worker walks past election campaigning posters ahead of the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, 07 November 2025. (EPA)
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What’s at Stake in Iraq’s Parliamentary Election?

A young Iraqi worker walks past election campaigning posters ahead of the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, 07 November 2025. (EPA)
A young Iraqi worker walks past election campaigning posters ahead of the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, 07 November 2025. (EPA)

Iraqis will elect a new parliament on November 11, in a key test for Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and for a system seen by the country's young population as merely enriching those already in power.

WHAT IS THE MOOD AMONG IRAQIS?

Many ordinary voters are disillusioned with Iraq's 20-year-old experiment with democracy, saying it has brought only corruption, unemployment and poor public services, while parties, politicians and armed groups divide the spoils of their country's vast oil wealth and distribute jobs to loyalists.

Iraq began voting for its politicians in 2005, after the 2003 US invasion which toppled logtime ruler Saddam Hussein.

Early elections were marred by sectarian violence and boycotted by Sunni Muslims as Saddam's ouster allowed for the political dominance of the majority Shiites, whom he had suppressed during his long rule.

Sectarianism has largely subsided, especially among younger Iraqis, but remains embedded in a political system that shares out government posts among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians and other ethnic and religious groups.

WHO IS RUNNING?

Roughly 40% of the registered candidates are under 40, highlighting attempts by the new generation to challenge the political domination of older power networks.

Sudani, who took office in 2022 and is seeking a second term, leads the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, which groups several Shiite parties and is campaigning on improving services, fighting corruption and consolidating state authority.

He has been a rare strong prime minister who has pushed through reconstruction projects and fostered cordial ties with both Iran and the US, Iraq's main foreign allies.

The State of Law Coalition, led by former premier Nouri al-Maliki whose sectarian policies critics say helped the rise of ISIS in 2014, remains influential and competes with Sudani's camp for dominance within the Shiite establishment.

A collection of parties with ties to Iran and with their own armed groups are running on separate lists.

The main Sunni political force is former parliamentary Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi's Taqaddum (Progress) Party. It draws support from Iraq's mainly Sunni west and north. It calls for rebuilding state institutions and empowering Sunni communities after years of conflict and marginalization.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of veteran leader Masoud Barzani dominates the semi-autonomous government of Iraq's northern Kurdistan Region. It seeks a greater share of the oil revenues that shore up the national budget.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani, rivals the KDP. It traditionally advocates closer ties with Baghdad and has often allied with Shiite factions. It aims to defend its traditional strongholds.

The influential populist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's movement is boycotting the vote, ostensibly over corruption, leaving the field open to others. Sadr's movement still controls large parts of the state through key civil service appointments.

HOW WILL THE VOTE AFFECT IRAQ?

Turnout will be a key measure of Iraqis' confidence in their political system, amid public frustration over endemic graft and poor services.

Low turnout would signal continued disillusionment, while a stronger showing could give reform-minded and younger candidates limited leverage in parliament.

The election is not expected to drastically alter Iraq's political landscape. Negotiations to select a prime minister are often protracted, ending in a compromise among the richest, best-armed and most powerful parties.

Under Iraq's sectarian power-sharing system, the prime minister will be Shiite, the speaker of parliament Sunni, and the president a Kurd.

But Iraq's next government will face intense pressure to deliver tangible improvements in everyday life and prevent public discontent over corruption spilling into unrest.

HOW WILL IT AFFECT THE REGION?

Iraq's next prime minister will need to navigate the delicate balance between US and Iranian influence, and manage dozens of armed groups that are closer to Tehran and answerable more to their own leaders than to the state, all while facing growing pressure from Washington to dismantle those militias.

Iraq has so far avoided the worst of the regional upheaval caused by the Gaza war, but will face US and Israeli wrath if it fails to contain militants aligned with Iran.

WHAT'S NEXT?

Preliminary results are expected within days of the vote, but talks to form a government could take months.

After results are certified by Iraq's Electoral Commission and Supreme Court, the new 329-member parliament meets to elect a speaker, deputies and then a president, who tasks the largest bloc with forming a government.

The nominee has 30 days to win approval for a cabinet - a feat never guaranteed in Iraq.


West Bank’s Ancient Olive Tree a ‘Symbol of Palestinian Endurance’ 

Salah Abu Ali, 52, official guardian of Palestinians alleged oldest olive tree, between 3,000 and 5,000 years old poses for a portrait under it in Al-Walajah, occupied West Bank on November 4, 2025. (AFP)
Salah Abu Ali, 52, official guardian of Palestinians alleged oldest olive tree, between 3,000 and 5,000 years old poses for a portrait under it in Al-Walajah, occupied West Bank on November 4, 2025. (AFP)
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West Bank’s Ancient Olive Tree a ‘Symbol of Palestinian Endurance’ 

Salah Abu Ali, 52, official guardian of Palestinians alleged oldest olive tree, between 3,000 and 5,000 years old poses for a portrait under it in Al-Walajah, occupied West Bank on November 4, 2025. (AFP)
Salah Abu Ali, 52, official guardian of Palestinians alleged oldest olive tree, between 3,000 and 5,000 years old poses for a portrait under it in Al-Walajah, occupied West Bank on November 4, 2025. (AFP)

As guardian of the occupied West Bank's oldest olive tree, Salah Abu Ali prunes its branches and gathers its fruit even as violence plagues the Palestinian territory during this year's harvest.

"This is no ordinary tree. We're talking about history, about civilization, about a symbol," the 52-year-old said proudly, smiling behind his thick beard in the village of Al-Walajah, south of Jerusalem.

Abu Ali said experts had estimated the tree to be between 3,000 and 5,500 years old. It has endured millennia of drought and war in this parched land scarred by conflict.

Around the tree's vast trunk and its dozen offshoots -- some named after his family members -- Abu Ali has cultivated a small oasis of calm.

A few steps away, the Israeli separation wall cutting off the West Bank stands five meters (16 feet) high, crowned with razor wire.

More than half of Al-Walajah's original land now lies on the far side of the Israeli security wall.

Yet so far the village has been spared the settler assaults that have marred this year's olive harvest, leaving many Palestinians injured.

Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967, and some of the 500,000 Israelis living in the Palestinian territory have attacked farmers trying to access their trees almost every day this year since the season began in mid-October.

The Palestinian Authority's Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, based in Ramallah, documented 2,350 such attacks in the West Bank in October.

- 'Rooted in this land' -

Almost none of the perpetrators have been held to account by the Israeli authorities.

Israeli forces often disperse Palestinians with tear gas or block access to their own land, AFP journalists witnessed on several occasions.

But in Al-Walajah for now, Abu Ali is free to care for the tree. In a good year, he said, it can yield from 500 to 600 kilograms (1,100 to 1,300 pounds) of olives.

This year, low rainfall led to slim pickings in the West Bank, including for the tree whose many nicknames include the Elder, the Bedouin Tree and Mother of Olives.

"It has become a symbol of Palestinian endurance. The olive tree represents the Palestinian people themselves, rooted in this land for thousands of years," said Al-Walajah mayor Khader Al-Araj.

The Palestinian Authority's agriculture ministry even recognized the tree as a Palestinian natural landmark and appointed Abu Ali as its official caretaker.

Most olive trees reach about three meters in height when mature. This one towers above the rest, its main trunk nearly two meters wide, flanked by a dozen offshoots as large as regular olive trees.

- 'Green gold' -

"The oil from this tree is exceptional. The older the tree, the richer the oil," said Abu Ali.

He noted that the precious resource, which he called "green gold", costs four to five times more than regular oil.

Tourists once came in droves to see the tree, but numbers have dwindled since the start of the war in Gaza in October 2023, Abu Ali said, with checkpoints tightening across the West Bank.

The village of Al-Walajah is not fully immune from the issues facing other West Bank communities.

In 1949, after the creation of Israel, a large portion of the village's land was taken, and many Palestinian families had to leave their homes to settle on the other side of the so-called armistice line.

After Israel's 1967 occupation, most of what remained was designated Area C -- under full Israeli control -- under the 1993 Oslo Accords, which were meant to lead to peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

But the designation left many homes facing demolition orders for lacking Israeli permits, a common problem in Area C, which covers 66 percent of the West Bank.

"Today, Al-Walajah embodies almost every Israeli policy in the West Bank: settlements, the wall, home demolitions, land confiscations and closures," mayor Al-Araj told AFP.

For now, Abu Ali continues to nurture the tree. He plants herbs and fruit trees around it, and keeps a guest book with messages from visitors in dozens of languages.

"I've become part of the tree. I can't live without it," he said.


French Migrant Unit Faces Quiet Standoff With Damascus

A circulated image shows the Ghuraba camp in Harem in Idlib’s countryside
A circulated image shows the Ghuraba camp in Harem in Idlib’s countryside
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French Migrant Unit Faces Quiet Standoff With Damascus

A circulated image shows the Ghuraba camp in Harem in Idlib’s countryside
A circulated image shows the Ghuraba camp in Harem in Idlib’s countryside

The latest clashes in Idlib’s countryside between a French armed faction known as the Ghuraba and Syrian government forces have revived one of the most sensitive and contentious questions in Syria’s new landscape.

In the Harem area north of Idlib, the fighting was not a standalone security incident. It appeared instead to be a test of Damascus’s approach to thousands of foreign fighters who remained on Syrian territory after years of war.

The clearest reading among analysts is that the events marked the start of a more serious engagement with the foreign fighters file.

The issue has returned to the forefront after the emerging Syrian state moved to build trust with the international community by preventing foreigners from assuming leadership posts in the new Syrian army.

How the Story Began

The incident began on October 22 when internal security forces moved into a camp in the town of Harem, where French fighters under the command of Omar Diaby, known as Omar Omsen, live.

The raid was carried out after complaints of serious violations, including the kidnapping of a girl by a group led by Diaby. Officials said Diaby refused to surrender. The operation, according to the official narrative, aimed to enforce the law and assert state authority over the camp.

Diaby’s Response

Diaby, a French commander of African origin, denied the accusations. He accused French intelligence of orchestrating what he described as political targeting. Paris views Diaby as one of the main recruiters of French-speaking jihadists. Washington designated him a global terrorist in 2016.

Ceasefire and Mediation

The clashes ended after a reconciliation meeting mediated by Uzbek, Tajik and Turkestan faction leaders inside the Harem camp. The Ghuraba announced on Telegram that it had reached a ceasefire and thanked what it called migrant and local brothers who supported them.

The Ghuraba’s Composition

The Ghuraba comprises about 70 French fighters living with their families in a fortified camp directly on the Turkish border.

This made the security raid difficult. The six-point agreement reached after the clashes required a ceasefire, opening the camp to the government, referring Diaby’s case to the Sharia court under the justice ministry, withdrawing heavy weapons and guaranteeing that participants in the clashes would not be pursued.

Foreign Fighters in the New State

The number of foreign fighters is estimated at more than five thousand. Most have joined the ministry of defense within the 84th Division. The Syrian government faces pressure from western capitals to keep them away from senior positions. Officials have sought to reassure global partners that these fighters pose no threat to regional or international stability.

Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharaa said fighters who once fought with the opposition are part of the new society and that Syria will deal with them through reconciliation rather than exclusion.

A number of them have already received military ranks and official posts in the army as part of an integration policy. Military officials later stressed that the Harem incident does not signal a change in this policy.

The Military’s Position

A Syrian army official, who requested anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that what happened in Harem did not target foreign fighters who stood with the revolution. He said relations with them are based on mutual commitment. Many of them have formally joined the ministry of defense.

He denied that the operation was a campaign against them. It was simply enforcement of the law. He added that the new Syrian army operates under a clear system of discipline and military orders that applies to all personnel, whether Syrian or migrant.

The Debate Over Terminology

Away from the official version, observers and former military commanders said the crisis reflects deeper questions about state-building and identity.

Abu Yahya Al Shami, a former commander in an Islamic faction, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the core issue is terminology. He argued that describing the fighters as foreigners is neither accurate nor fair because the term carries negative implications.

He prefers calling them migrants, saying this acknowledges the legitimacy they earned through their sacrifices. He believes they have already integrated socially and politically, and that their concerns mirror those of Syrians.

He said the handling of the Harem incident was flawed. The media and security escalation was a mistake. Reconciliation prevented the situation from sliding into a dangerous confrontation. He stressed the need for calm, noting that migrants have legitimate fears of prosecution, deportation or marginalization after the war.

Al Shami rejected describing what happened as a revolt. He said the French fighters are part of the Syrian army. Dialogue and mediation, he added, strengthen state authority more than armed confrontation.

Structural Challenges

Researcher Wael Alwan said the episode revealed deep structural challenges for the Syrian state. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that integration of migrants into state institutions remains incomplete and that the coming phase will test whether the integration is genuine.

Some foreign fighters may never integrate. The state may have to either facilitate their organized departure or prevent them from becoming a threat to stability. Alwan said the authorities will need to balance security and stability with the goals of integration and disbanding armed formations.

He said the government has no option but to dismantle armed groups, Syrian or migrant, because this is necessary for reasserting state authority. The reconciliation approach in Harem, he said, was deliberate and meant to contain the crisis with minimal cost.

Alwan added that some segments of fighters, Syrian and migrant, are dissatisfied with state policies. He said the state now needs a new religious narrative that speaks to these groups, and that steps in this direction have recently begun.

Diverging Views Among Migrant Fighters

To understand the ideological differences among migrants themselves, Asharq Al-Awsat interviewed two commanders serving under the defense ministry. Their views reflected a clear divide.

Abu Muhajir, an Arab national, said he is part of the ministry and fights under its banner. He said migrants came to defend Syrians, not to rule them. With the revolution victorious and the new state established, he said their role is now to follow state policy. They are now part of the Syrian army and abide by all ministry decisions.

In contrast, Abu Muthanna, also a ministry member, expressed reservations about the state’s direction. He said the state had kept regime loyalists in influential positions and tolerated public wrongdoing.

He said this is the opposite of the goals for which many fighters died. Still, he insisted they would not rebel. Their duty, he said, is to advise and warn from within, not to bear arms against the state.

The Ideological Layer

Abdullah Khaled, a former Sharia official in Hayat Tahrir Al Sham and now an adviser in the new Syrian army, explained the divide between these two camps.

Migrants, he said, are driven by convictions deeply rooted in their faith. This commitment is what led them to leave comfortable lives in Europe for what was once one of the most dangerous places in the world.

During the war, factional religious discourse was emotional and mobilizing, suited to fighting and confrontation. But after the fall of the regime and the transition from revolution to state, the discourse of governance naturally changed.

Khaled said the new approach fits the logic of governing a population rather than commanding a fighting group.

This shift, however, clashes with the deeply held beliefs of many migrants and some Syrians. For those who reject the new direction, the options are limited. According to Khaled, they must choose between confrontation, withdrawal into silence, or acceptance and adaptation. The state will not permit a return to the old factional model.