Houthi Summer Centers: A 'Mandatory' School Passage to the Front Lines

“School trip” for children at a Houthi-run summer camp in Amran (Asharq Al-Awsat)
“School trip” for children at a Houthi-run summer camp in Amran (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Houthi Summer Centers: A 'Mandatory' School Passage to the Front Lines

“School trip” for children at a Houthi-run summer camp in Amran (Asharq Al-Awsat)
“School trip” for children at a Houthi-run summer camp in Amran (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In a corner of the courtyard of a public school in Sanaa, a woman dressed in black stands, once used to seeing her son in the morning assembly line. Today, she returns to the same place not as a mother, but as a cleaner trying to keep what remains of her life intact. She wipes the ground in heavy silence, as if whispering to the courtyard gravel: I had a son here. He left a child and came back a corpse.

She sees her son’s face in the student lines, hearing chants and slogans that were once unfamiliar. Quietly, she realizes many of them may follow the same path, but she says nothing. Two years ago, Umm Amer lost her only son. He was 17. He was returned to her a lifeless body, his image raised atop a coffin. They told her: “Ululate, he has attained martyrdom.”

She recalls how he began to change gradually after joining that summer camp. He became quieter, sometimes sharper, shouting and repeating phrases she had never known, about “jihad” and “victory,” as if they were his only path. She did not understand what was happening, but she saw in his eyes a look that was carrying him away from her.

Today, she does nothing but wipe her tears in secret and continue cleaning, in a job she obtained as the “mother of a martyr,” to support her three daughters after losing the family’s provider.

From Summer Activity to Mobilization Apparatus

The Houthi summer centers did not emerge with the group’s takeover of Sanaa in 2014. They are an extension of a historical trajectory tied to the group’s origins. Their beginnings date back to the early 1990s, specifically 1991, when activities were organized under what was known as the “Believing Youth” in Saada. These included youth programs and seasonal courses aimed at transmitting ideological messaging through study circles and summer camps, serving as early tools to build a social and organizational base by combining education with ideological formation.

With the outbreak of the Saada wars in 2004, these activities underwent a qualitative shift. They were no longer limited to religious or educational aspects but became tools of mobilization and recruitment, benefiting from public sympathy during the conflict and expanding their reach among youth.

By 2008, the group began spreading these activities beyond Saada using nontraditional means, including distributing digital materials on SD cards and USB drives. These contained Houthi doctrinal lectures and lessons tied to the summer centers, as well as what is known as the “Malazim” - Houthi doctrinal lectures delivered by the group’s founder, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, transcribed into booklets.

A supervisor in Sanaa said he received such memory devices in 2008, distributed among selected students. Upon reviewing their contents, he found recordings and Houthi doctrinal lectures by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, noting that these materials marked a turning point in his adoption of the group’s ideas and support for it.

He attended closed gatherings to listen to these Houthi doctrinal lectures in private meeting spaces with individuals close to the group in Sanaa and nearby areas such as Bani Hushaysh, Khawlan, and Sanhan.

Following the developments of 2011, particularly the February protests and sit-ins and the broader moment of political opening, these activities expanded to a number of provinces. More organized centers and courses appeared outside the group’s main stronghold, with clearer administrative oversight under the appealing slogan “regime change.” They moved beyond narrow circles to fill libraries and kiosks with the Malazim, establishing stalls in multiple locations to distribute booklets, posters, and slogans free of charge, and installing loudspeakers to continuously broadcast chants.

The most significant transformation came after the takeover of Sanaa in 2014, when summer centers shifted from limited activities into a wide-ranging program formally administered through state institutions, within an organizational structure that includes central, technical, and supervisory committees, with the involvement of multiple ministries.

A security source said the group had, in earlier stages, relied on what it called “cultural courses” and religious seminaries to attract youth, gain their sympathy, and integrate them into its project before the current model of summer centers emerged. The source added that these centers “are no longer limited, but have become an institutional program managed within an integrated organizational structure,” noting that they are used as a tool to influence youth orientations, ultimately pushing some toward the front lines.

Students in a classroom perform a military salute and chant the Houthi slogan (al-sarkha) (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Types of Summer Camps

According to available information, the group divides these centers or camps into three types: closed, model, and open. Closed camps function as ideological military courses. They are held in military barracks and focus primarily on preparing participants to become fighters within the group. They are trained both militarily and ideologically for this purpose and are considered reserve forces. Once enrolled, their phones are confiscated, contact with their families is cut off, and they are transported at night between training camps that change periodically.

All participants are high school students who have completed weapons dismantling training in schools. Their trainers nominate them for military courses as a reward for excellence and distinction, in addition to some members of school scout groups whose activities have been shifted from scouting to military.

In these camps, participants are trained to use light and medium weapons, RPGs, mortars, grenades, and camouflage and concealment techniques.

Model camps, typically for those over the age of 10, are considered “specialized camps.” Top-performing students in various school activities are recruited to them. These are closed camps where students remain throughout the week, but they are allowed to communicate with their families and their phones are not confiscated. They may return home weekly or every two weeks.

These camps are usually held in provincial capitals, where students receive intensive ideological lectures from senior group leaders, watch films on “jihad,” and study the biographies of the group’s leaders, Hezbollah, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. They also receive limited training in dismantling and using certain types of weapons.

Open camps are for children aged 5 to 10. They begin in the morning and end at noon, appearing to the public as Quran memorization centers and summer activities. As a result, the group spreads them across schools and mosques to make them widely accessible. However, children in these camps are taught the “pledge of allegiance,” to chant the Houthi slogan (al-sarkha), and to obey the group’s leader.

Girls are not excluded. There are dedicated centers for females, managed by the General Women’s Cultural Authority, which designs and implements programs, recruits students through field networks, supervises female staff, and prepares unified guidance materials.

These centers are presented as educational and recreational spaces, but they also include intensive religious programs, mobilization-oriented lectures, and group activities that reinforce discipline and belonging.

Embedding a “Conspiracy Theory” Narrative

In its messaging, the group promotes the idea that the summer centers are a fortress against “conspiracies” targeting religion and the nation. They are presented as a means of instilling what it calls “Quranic culture” in younger generations and building a generation armed with knowledge and awareness.

The group also emphasizes that the “battle with the enemy” is not limited to the military dimension but extends to “targeting awareness.” These centers are framed as a safeguard against what is described as “soft war” and “cultural invasion,” and as part of a long intellectual struggle aimed at preparing a generation capable of confrontation.

Alongside this messaging, educational sources indicate that organizers rely on a set of material and moral incentives, such as providing meals, basic supplies, organizing trips, and offering activities, to attract as many students as possible each year.

According to one of the Malazim, a Houthi doctrinal lecture by founder Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi titled “Lessons in Knowing God,” delivered at the Believing Youth forum in Saada, the overarching objective is to “develop students’ knowledge of God and entrench doctrine within their souls and consciences, in a way that propels them toward fighting and confronting enemies.”

Lessons Outside the Official Curriculum

In this year’s season, which began on March 28, the group distributed its own curricula for the summer centers, printed in high quality with a distinct visual identity. This reflects the scale of resources allocated to these programs compared to formal education, which continues to suffer from declining support and capacity.

Students are often forced to purchase their official textbooks from the black market, while teachers struggle to obtain their salaries. Each year, as preparations for the summer centers begin, the group’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, delivers an annual speech calling for enrollment, a call that has itself evolved significantly over time.

These materials carry no reference to the Republic of Yemen or the Ministry of Education. Instead, they are issued under the title “The Quranic March – General Administration of Summer Courses.”

This extends to the naming of the centers, which are not attributed to the schools hosting them but are instead given symbolic names such as “Al-Hadi,” “Al-Hussein,” “Fatima,” “Martyr Taha al-Madani,” and “Martyr Saleh al-Sammad.”

Morning assembly for children in uniform at Houthi summer camps (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Administrative Structure with a Ministerial Character

The administrative structure of the summer courses and activities in areas under Houthi control reflects a multi-level system, led by the Ministries of Education and Youth and Sports, alongside the General Mobilization Authority, which plays a central role in mobilization and guidance, and the Ministry of Endowments, responsible for religious content.

At the executive and technical levels, local authorities in Houthi-controlled provinces oversee field implementation and coordinate activities within districts and centers through education offices and supervisory committees. Daily activities are managed, staff are assigned, and program implementation is monitored, reflecting a system that extends from central leadership down to neighborhoods.

Other ministries participate as technical partners in sectoral programs: the Ministry of Interior runs “Aware Youth... Safe Society,” Agriculture oversees the “Green Army,” Health manages “Health Ambassadors,” the communications sector supervises “Awareness in the Age of Communications,” and Technical Education and Vocational Training oversees “My Profession is My Future.”

The Ministry of Information plays an ongoing supporting role through annual coordination ahead of the launch of the courses, setting the framework for media coverage, including promotion and field reporting, as part of a plan to strengthen the centers’ presence in society.

These centers are managed by the “Supreme Committee for Summer Courses and Activities,” chaired by the prime minister in the Houthi administration, with membership including the ministers of education and youth and sports, a representative of the Endowments Authority, and representatives from the group’s mobilization and cultural apparatus.

Subcommittees are headed by provincial governors, with mobilization officials as deputies, and include directors of education, youth and sports, and endowments offices.

A Turning Point in 2026

While expansion of the summer centers had occurred gradually in previous years, 2026 marks a decisive turning point. Summer schooling is no longer optional; the group has moved to a new phase in which attendance is effectively compulsory. According to testimonies from students, parents, and teachers, a network of direct and indirect pressures is being applied, at times reaching the level of threats, placing families before a stark equation: comply or risk their children’s future.

Although this shift has not been officially announced, it has become a daily reality. Multiple sources confirm that, with preparations for this year’s summer centers underway, the group has escalated practices linking school procedures to participation in these programs.

For example, student results and admission for the next academic year are tied to participation, alongside pressure on school administrations to push students into the camps under threat of penalties. If a student wants their academic record to remain free of marks that could affect their future, including university admission, they must register in these centers.

In some schools, the release of results or acceptance into the following year is tied to a certificate of attendance from the summer center. Messages circulated on communication groups include implicit warnings that absence may negatively affect academic progression.

One message sent by a school administrator to mothers in a WhatsApp group contains a veiled threat that any student who does not attend the summer centers will be denied enrollment next year: “Dear mothers, please be informed that registration will not be accepted without a certificate from the summer center. We ask that students who have not yet registered do so and join the center to benefit.”

In another group, a teacher urged students: “Come early tomorrow, those registered and those not yet registered should register. The administration will not accept them at the start of the school year without the summer center certificate.”

A message attributed to a school principal in northern Ibb indicated that attendance at the summer centers is a condition for receiving exam results, while failing students are enticed with additional marks if they join the courses.

Extracurricular activities titled “My Profession is My Future” at a Houthi-run summer camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Declining Participation and Criminalization

According to sources, these measures were introduced out of concern that the summer centers might face declining turnout, as families are increasingly aware of their outcomes. Teacher A. Abdul Karim, who works in these centers, said that despite the group’s efforts to mobilize as many students as possible, participation has recently declined.

He noted that turnout has become very weak, and that recruiting students now requires significant time, sustained persuasion, and financial incentives.

The Yemeni Teachers’ Syndicate warned of the dangers posed by these centers, stating they have become organized tools for sectarian ideological mobilization and the recruitment of children and youth, as part of a systematic targeting of national identity and the education system in Yemen.

In a statement dated Sunday, April 12, 2026, the syndicate said the group has expanded these centers since taking control of Sanaa to attract the largest number of students, using them to instill doctrinal ideas based on concepts of lineage-based selection that conflict with national and religious values and serve a political project threatening Yemen’s security and stability.

Neglected Schools, Flourishing Centers

In its messaging, the group describes the summer centers as an “educational support channel” to compensate for gaps caused by war. However, according to many teachers, this is nothing more than a worse excuse than the offense itself. Schools themselves could serve that role if there were genuine intent to reform education.

Teachers argue that the group’s insistence on these centers reveals that the goal is not education, but the production of a generation prepared for early recruitment and ideological mobilization. They pose a central question: if the group holds full control over formal education and has successfully inserted its ideology into school curricula, why deliberately neglect schools, leaving them in a state of near collapse, without teachers, salaries, or basic educational resources?

This contradiction between stagnating schools during the academic year and their sudden revival in summer raises serious questions.

While significant attention, funding, and effort are directed toward summer centers that quickly turn into active and crowded spaces, formal education remains in a state of severe stagnation and resource deprivation, with thousands of schools lacking even the most basic requirements for learning.



Lebanon-Israel Deal May Entrench Stalemate Rather Than End War, Analysts Say

An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
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Lebanon-Israel Deal May Entrench Stalemate Rather Than End War, Analysts Say

An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)

A security deal between Lebanon and Israel risks entrenching a stalemate rather than resolving Israel's underlying conflict with Hezbollah by tying Israel's pullout from southern Lebanon to the Iran-aligned group's disarmament, a condition regional analysts and politicians say is unattainable.

At its core is a bargain few see as workable: Hezbollah has flatly rejected disarmament, and no Lebanese government has the power to enforce it.

With Hezbollah unlikely to disarm, analysts say Israel has political cover to keep an open-ended military presence in southern Lebanon, which it invaded after Hezbollah fired at Israel on March 2 in solidarity with Tehran over the war in Iran.

The deal leaves the Lebanese state trapped between obligations it cannot meet and sovereignty it cannot fully reclaim, the analysts say.

The framework deal also collides with Lebanon’s political realities, asking a fragile sectarian state to confront the most powerful armed faction in the country despite a post–civil war system built on power-sharing rather than coercion.

"This is not an agreement, it is an imposed settlement," said a senior Lebanese politician who ‌declined to be ‌named, according to Reuters.

The Lebanese army, he said, was neither structured nor equipped to disarm Hezbollah, and expecting it ‌to do ⁠so ignored both the ⁠group’s entrenched military capacity and the fragile sectarian balance on which Lebanon's stability rests.

'BURDEN' PLACED ON LEBANON

Political analysts say the imbalance is built into the agreement’s design, with sweeping obligations placed on Lebanon but no reciprocal guarantee of Israeli withdrawal.

"This agreement has put all the burden on Lebanon," said Michael Young, a Beirut-based analyst, adding that it "creates a structure that allows the Israelis to remain (in southern Lebanon) indefinitely."

Fawaz Gerges, a Lebanese scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science, said the deal was "born dead" and is structurally flawed, hinging on a condition that is impossible to meet in practice.

Gerges said Israel had already occupied a buffer zone in southern Lebanon about eight to 10 km (five to six miles) deep while tying any future withdrawal to Hezbollah’s ⁠disarmament.

The terms of the deal risk the buffer zone becoming long-term and giving it diplomatic legitimacy, he ‌said, describing it as a political "gift" to Israel.

The conflict in Lebanon has been a ‌central part of diplomacy towards ending the wider US-Iran war.

Gerges said Washington’s deliberate decoupling of the conflicts gave Israel greater freedom of action in Lebanon.

FEAR OF ‌CIVIL CONFLICT

The framework agreement signed in Washington affirms that Israel has no claim to Lebanese territory and makes Lebanese army authority in the ‌south contingent on the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, including Hezbollah.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu portrays the deal as a historic achievement that could lead to broader peace, while Israeli troops remain deployed in a so-called security zone which Israel says is designed to protect its north from potential attack.

"We will continue to hold it (territory in the security zone) until Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations are disarmed, and until no further threat to Israel is posed from Lebanon," Netanyahu said on Saturday.

Three senior Israeli ‌officials said Israel has little faith in Lebanon's ability to disarm Hezbollah but sees the deal as a vital diplomatic step towards building peace with Lebanon in the long run.

About 4,000 people have been ⁠killed in Lebanon and a ⁠million displaced during Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed the agreement as a first step towards restoring Lebanon's sovereignty, saying it should allow Lebanese people to return to fully liberated land.

Parliament Speaker and key Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri said it amounted to an "agreement of dictates, not one that preserves Lebanon's rights" and said it would not be implemented.

Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem declared the deal "null and void" and a "surrender" and said his group would keep fighting until Israel is forced to leave. Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah warned of "internal conflict" in Lebanon.

Any attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah would risk deepening sectarian tensions.

Young said the deal "won't lead us anywhere except to civil conflict, and maybe an insurrection by the Shiite community."

DEAL'S IMPLEMENTATION IN QUESTION

Danny Citrinowicz, a regional analyst and former Israeli military intelligence officer, said Hezbollah's dismantlement was "something that would never happen" and the deal in effect legitimized an open-ended Israeli military presence.

"Nothing will happen. Israel won't withdraw, and Hezbollah won't dismantle," he said.

Citrinowicz said no Israeli prime minister has the domestic political space to withdraw while Hezbollah is still armed and northern Israeli communities remain displaced.

A narrower pact focused on Hezbollah's pullout from south of the Litani River, an expanded Lebanese army deployment and an extension of state authority, would have stood a better chance of success, he said.

Pro-Hezbollah analyst Mohammed Obeid also said the deal was unlikely to be implemented, adding that its provisions were "like explosives", capable of detonating Lebanon's internal stability, as they hinge on state action to disarm Hezbollah.


13 Years Since 'June 30' in Egypt... The Muslim Brotherhood Has Suffered Severe Setbacks

The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
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13 Years Since 'June 30' in Egypt... The Muslim Brotherhood Has Suffered Severe Setbacks

The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)

Thirteen years after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood's rule in Egypt during the events of "June 30" 2013, the group has suffered major setbacks locally and internationally.
The group, whose rule lasted for one year since its member Mohamed Morsi ascended to the presidency in 2012, is now experiencing a domestic blow amidst judicial and security prosecutions.

Its international presence has also shrunk due to decisions by Western countries to pursue and label it as terrorist, with observers and analysts predicting that "the organization and its ideology will soon disappear.”

A Pivotal Day

June 30, 2013, is considered a pivotal day in modern Egyptian history. One year after Morsi assumed the presidency, massive demonstrations erupted across Egypt's governorates demanding the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power and Morsi's ouster. On July 3 of that year, his removal was announced in response to these demands.

In the same year, Egyptian authorities banned the Muslim Brotherhood and placed it on the list of "terrorist entities." Now, hundreds of its leaders and supporters are imprisoned, headed by its Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie.

Some have received sentences of execution, harsh imprisonment, and life in prison. The group's presence is now only known in cyberspace through platforms abroad, mainly in Türkiye and the United Kingdom.

Disappearance Domestically

Egyptian researcher specializing in extremist groups Munir Adib states that when discussing the disappearance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the thirteenth anniversary of the June 30 events, "it is necessary to differentiate between two things: the disappearance of the organization and the disappearance of the ideology."

"In both cases, the Egyptian state and its security agencies have succeeded over 13 years in dismantling, neutralizing the organization, and refuting many of its ideas to the extent that it no longer has the influence it had before 2013 or even before 2011,” he adds in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat.

He predicted that the organization would disappear soon, saying: "The organization, which is now 98 years old, has only two more years left, for its hundredth year to be its last... to become merely a line in history books."

Ahmed Ban, an analyst specializing in religious and extremist groups, states that the group has shifted from a tangible existence to a mere presence on media platforms, specifically non-traditional media such as social media platforms, digital platforms, and artificial intelligence technologies to spread messages of frustration and chaos.

International Moves

Internationally, the organization's situation is no different than in Egypt, with official movements in Austria, Germany, France, and the Netherlands witnessing radical shifts in their stances over the past years, moving from a phase of monitoring and caution to prosecution.

In May 2026, the administration of US President Donald Trump unveiled a new national counter-terrorism strategy, which at its core focused on the Muslim Brotherhood as the ideological source of modern "militant terrorism."

This was preceded last January by Washington's designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as its branches in Jordan and Lebanon, as "terrorist organizations." This was followed in March by placing its Sudanese branch on the same list.

Moreover, a majority in the French Parliament agreed last January to call on the European Commission to add the Brotherhood and its leaders to the list of terrorist organizations. This was followed in March by the Dutch Parliament's approval of a proposal calling for a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations, though it has not yet been implemented.

Adib believes that these international moves are "an essential part of the confrontation that will lead to the disappearance of the organization, especially since the international community, Europe, and the United States represented the lifeline it breathed from."

He noted that the situation has now changed with the European move to re-evaluate the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its institutions, which has tightened the noose on the group, contributed to its neutralization, and consolidated predictions of its complete disappearance, along with its ideology, within the coming years.


US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
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US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)

The fifth round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations ended in Washington on Friday with the signing of a framework agreement that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said could help lay the foundation for “lasting peace and security” between the two countries.

At a ceremony where the flags of the United States, Lebanon and Israel stood side by side, Rubio announced a framework agreement between the sovereign government of Lebanon and the government of Israel, mediated and supported by Washington.

The US-sponsored talks shifted the discussion from a ceasefire to a field-based model under which Israel would gradually withdraw from areas it occupies in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army would then take control of those areas and prevent the return of Hezbollah’s military presence.

Behind closed doors, and despite talk from Tehran and its allies about “victories” and “resistance,” leaks from negotiating rooms in Washington and Switzerland point to a different picture: firm US pressure, Israeli efforts to secure substantial security gains, and Iranian concessions that could reshape Tehran’s regional influence from Beirut to Baghdad.

Before the agreement was announced, Rubio said Israel and Lebanon had made progress and were close to a “declaration of intentions.” Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the talks focused on security measures needed to restore stability and extend state authority to Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders. Israeli and Lebanese officials, however, denied US claims that Israel had withdrawn from part of the “buffer zone” as a goodwill gesture.

What emerged on Friday was an initial understanding on direction, not an agreement on implementation. The talks therefore appear to mark the start of a new political and security track rather than the end of the current military phase.

The Lebanese track has also become connected, though not fully merged, with US negotiations with Iran. Washington insists Lebanon’s future is being discussed with its government, while also holding Tehran responsible for restraining Hezbollah and ending its funding and armament. The round has thus become part of a broader test of a regional order that did not exist before the war.

Israeli military APCs parked in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon, Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

Army deployment

The main outcome was preliminary acceptance of “pilot zones.” The plan calls for selecting a defined area from which Israeli forces would withdraw after Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is removed. Lebanese Army units would then deploy and secure the area before the model is repeated elsewhere.

The formula combines Lebanon’s demand for withdrawal and restored sovereignty with Israel’s demand that evacuated territory not become a platform for Hezbollah to rebuild its capabilities.

But Rubio’s phrase “commitment of intentions” also reveals the limits of the achievement. It signals agreement on the broad goal, not on maps, timetables or monitoring rules.

Disagreement also remains over the location of the first zone: whether it begins north of the Litani River, as Lebanese information suggests, or inside the buffer zone established by Israel.

Another unresolved question is whether withdrawal would be part of a comprehensive roadmap or decided case by case according to Israeli security assessments.

The confusion over withdrawal underscored that these questions remain unsettled.

A US official said Israel had pulled forces from part of the area without specifying where. An Israeli security official noted that the army had not withdrawn, while a senior Lebanese official stressed that Beirut knew nothing about such a step.

This may mean Washington announced Israeli political approval before implementation, or that a limited redeployment took place that Israel does not consider a withdrawal and that Lebanon has no information about.

Either way, Washington appears to be trying to prevent the talks from collapsing under the pressure of skirmishes and strikes.

Southern Lebanon remains, in practice, a war zone for tens of thousands of displaced residents unable to return because of Israeli forces or widespread destruction. The success of the agreement will be measured by whether it produces the first clear, documented handover of land to the Lebanese army.

A security wall in northern Israel on the border with Lebanon , Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

‘Pilot zones’

The plan means different things to each side. For Lebanon, a pilot zone should be the first step toward full Israeli withdrawal, an end to strikes and assassinations, the return of residents, and the deployment of the state up to the international border.

For Israel, it is a test of the Lebanese army’s ability to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure, control supply routes and prevent the group’s fighters from returning under civilian cover.

Israel is therefore insisting on a “zone-by-zone” approach. It does not want to commit in advance to a comprehensive withdrawal before seeing the results of the first phase.

It is also linking any pullback to Hezbollah’s disarmament, or at least to clearing the relevant area of military infrastructure and weapons capable of threatening northern Israeli communities.

Beirut fears the plan could yield another form of the occupation: withdrawal from secondary positions while Israel keeps a narrower security strip.

This leaves a central question unanswered: what does Hezbollah’s disarmament actually mean? Does the first phase only require removing weapons and fighters from areas where the state deploys, or does it include Hezbollah’s arsenal across Lebanon? Which weapons come first: precision and long-range missiles, drones, air defenses, anti-tank missiles, tunnels or command centers?

Nothing announced so far proves there is a final agreement on the type of weapons to be collected or the timetable.

Washington appears to be trying to break the problem into stages: first establishing areas free of military presence, then moving to heavy and strategic weapons, while leaving small arms and organizational structures to a longer Lebanese process.

Israel fears this approach will give Hezbollah time to regroup. Lebanon fears a domestic confrontation the army cannot contain.

The US guarantee

This is where the US guarantee becomes essential. The model requires a verification mechanism that determines who decides an area is weapons-free, how violations are monitored, what happens if Hezbollah tries to return, and what limits are placed on Israel’s right to act.

Without agreement on these rules, every violation could become a pretext for renewed Israeli strikes, and every strike could trigger a return to fighting.

Separating Lebanon from Iran’s influence

At first glance, US policy toward Lebanon appears dual-track. Rubio says Lebanon-Israel negotiations are separate from talks with Iran because Lebanon is a sovereign state with a government Washington deals with directly.

In parallel, Vice President JD Vance is leading talks with Tehran that include ending the fighting in Lebanon, while President Donald Trump has threatened to strike Iran again if it fails to stop Hezbollah from “causing trouble.”

Rubio’s track identifies the legitimate decision-maker: the Lebanese government, not Iran or Hezbollah. Vance’s track deals with the actor capable of obstructing the US efforts.

In that sense, Washington is negotiating Lebanon’s future with Beirut, while negotiating with Tehran over support for the force that could derail any arrangement. It is using Iran’s need to stabilize the ceasefire and ease sanctions to pressure it on Hezbollah without granting it guardianship over Lebanon.

Trump’s warnings are therefore more than just threats. They shift responsibility for Hezbollah’s actions to its sponsor, Iran, suggesting that continued violence in Lebanon could carry a direct cost for Tehran.

The strategy is risky. Including Lebanon in a US-Iran understanding could allow Tehran to claim that any Israeli withdrawal resulted from its pressure, not from the Lebanese track.

It also raises fears in Beirut and Tel Aviv that Lebanese security details could become bargaining chips in talks over the nuclear file, sanctions and the Strait of Hormuz.

That is why Rubio insists publicly on separation, even as he acknowledges that Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah cannot be ignored.

Washington may be unable to separate the two tracks completely, but it is trying to prevent their political merger.

Its success depends on using Iranian influence to restrain Hezbollah without turning Iran into a partner in shaping the Lebanese state or its arrangements with Israel.

Israeli tank maneuvers as United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy drive between destroyed houses in the south Lebanon village of Mais al-Jabal, as seen from the Israeli side of the border in the upper Galilee, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Israeli concerns

Israel’s concern is that a US-Iran understanding could save Hezbollah from the consequences of the war. Israeli officials fear Washington’s priority may shift from dismantling the group and reducing Iranian influence to simply preserving a ceasefire and preventing conflict, while pressuring Israel to withdraw before durable security guarantees are in place.

Israel therefore is insisting on freedom to act against what it sees as rearmament or imminent threats and has not offered an unconditional commitment to return to the border. The buffer zone has become both a negotiating card and a security guarantee. Giving it up without disarmament would expose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to domestic criticism.

The Lebanese army, meanwhile, faces a test that goes beyond entering territory vacated by Israel. It must prove it can remain there, control it, prevent Hezbollah’s return, deal with weapons depots and tunnels, and avoid being dragged into civil strife.

It also needs manpower, equipment, funding and political cover, all of which remain uncertain, especially amid widespread destruction and the need to protect returning residents and secure the border.

The United States is studying training for Lebanese units and ways to verify their readiness and reliability. Reports have suggested a possible role for US Central Command, or CENTCOM, in supervision or monitoring, but no final announcement has clarified whether CENTCOM would directly vet personnel or limit itself to support and coordination.

Analysts say the deeper problem is that army deployment is not the same as disarmament.

The army may be able to control a specific area after an Israeli withdrawal if it receives enough support. But dismantling Hezbollah’s network across Lebanon requires a national political decision, a gradual mechanism, guarantees for the Shiite community and steps to prevent Iran from rebuilding funding and weapons channels.

If Washington burdens the army with more than it can carry, the model may turn from a test of state sovereignty into a test that exposes the limits of the state.