Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
TT
TT
Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
At first glance, Tehran’s retaliation for Israeli attacks in Lebanon might seem like a reckless act that risks rekindling a devastating regional war.
For Iran, those strikes were necessary — part of a more aggressive posturing that marks a strategic shift by its new rulers. For them, the lesson of the war has been that forceful retaliation has allowed them to survive, and even emerge with leverage against their more powerful enemies, reported the New York Times on Monday.
“Iran wants to project strength, and that they have the power to escalate,” said Omid Memarian, an Iran expert at DAWN, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank. “They are sending the message that they are ready to resume war if necessary.”
For the past decade under Iran’s previous supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, Tehran had been more cautious about striking Israel and the United States. In 2020, Tehran pursued only limited retaliatory strikes against Washington after the United States assassinated one of its most powerful military leaders, Qassem Soleimani. And it limited its entire retaliation to strikes on a single US base in Qatar during the 12-day war last June.
In recent weeks, Iranian officials largely tolerated Israeli strikes on its most important ally, the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah. It criticized those attacks, warning that the group should be included in the regional ceasefire it agreed upon with Washington in April. Yet as long as Israel’s strikes were contained to southern Lebanon, Iran did not respond.
Iran warned that calculus would change if Israel expanded those strikes to the southern outskirts of Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, where Hezbollah is dominant. On Sunday, Israel did just that.
“Iran’s attack in defense of Lebanon was not merely a military response; it was the formal declaration of a strategic doctrine,” said Sadegh Larijani, the chairman of Iran’s powerful Expediency Council, which advises Iran’s supreme leader.
“If any component of the Axis of Resistance is attacked, the response will extend beyond geographical borders and will alter the regional balance of power,” he said, using Iran’s term for the network of allied armed groups in the region that includes Hezbollah.
With its actions, Iran wants to show it is serious about defending its regional armed allies. That position had been undermined by its former leaders when they refrained from retaliating against Israeli attacks in 2024 that badly degraded Hezbollah and killed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, reported the New York Times.
Since the US-Israeli war began in February and killed much of Iran’s top former leadership, including Khamenei, Iran’s new rulers believe their willingness to act more aggressively — from blockading the vital Strait of Hormuz to attacking its Gulf neighbors — has been a major success, continued the report.
To them, analysts say, being more aggressive allowed them to not only survive Washington and Israel’s attacks, but to inflict economic pain and emerge with strategic leverage through control of the strait, a crucial global shipping route for oil and gas.
Iran’s new leaders have also found US President Donald Trump more responsive to their more aggressive strategy. Last week, he convinced Israel not to strike Beirut. On Monday, after Israel’s strikes on Beirut’s outskirts and Iran’s retaliation, he called for both sides to step back.
After his comments, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps quickly announced that it would halt its attacks but said it may attack again if Israel pursues strikes in southern Lebanon, a near certainty.
Such strikes may also offer Iran the opportunity to test the relationship between Trump and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said Memarian, the analyst.
“They understand there’s a gap between Israeli and US objectives,” he said, “and they want to put pressure on Trump to contain Israel.”
But the defense of Hezbollah is not only about testing or posturing. Iran assessed the group’s ability to continue attacking northern Israel during the recent war as critical to giving Iran room to focus its attacks on its Gulf neighbors, said Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian security expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Allowing Israel to weaken Hezbollah further, he said, would therefore be militarily costly for Iran in a future conflict, which it deems inevitable.
Iran also saw its retaliation as necessary, he said, because it views Israel’s attacks as part of an apparent US-Israeli strategy to try to quietly erode its strategic gains in the recent conflict even as it tries to negotiate a deal to end the war with Washington.
For weeks, US forces have been quietly escorting vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. Many analysts describe this as a US attempt to alleviate pressure on the global economy while it tries to increase the economic pressure on Iran by reinforcing its own blockade of Iranian vessels. Iran worries that Israel’s efforts to weaken Hezbollah are another facet of that strategy.
The Iranians believe the United States and Israel “are using the ceasefire to shape the realities on the ground in a way that would erode the leverage Iran has achieved during this war,” Azizi said.
Tehran’s willingness to retaliate forcefully also shows how unlikely Iran thinks it is Trump, who is about to host the World Cup games, and faces a deepening global economic crisis ahead of midterm elections this fall, to rejoin the fray.
“They don’t think Trump is going to go to war,” said Farzan Sabet, an Iran analyst at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland. “But even if he does, they’re fairly confident they can manage it.”
Israel Is Tightening Its Grip on East Jerusalem with Evictions of Palestinians, Demolitionshttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5282340-israel-tightening-its-grip-east-jerusalem-evictions-palestinians-demolitions
This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
TT
TT
Israel Is Tightening Its Grip on East Jerusalem with Evictions of Palestinians, Demolitions
This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
Fakhri Abu Diab fought for decades to save his home. But when Israeli authorities arrived with bulldozers two years ago, he was powerless to stop them.
He and his wife now live among shards of memory: a bicycle where his bedroom stood; the garden where he planted tomatoes as a boy; a portrait of his late mother painted on a wall, based on a photograph lost in the demolition. Their mobile home, set up amid the rubble, is also marked for removal.
They are “trying to erase my memories, my childhood, my history,” he said, wiping away tears.
For decades, Israel has worked to expand the Jewish presence in annexed east Jerusalem — the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and home to major Jewish, Christian and Muslim sites. Settlers have exploited discriminatory policies and archaeological claims to evict Palestinians far from the region's war zones.
Activists say those efforts have gone into overdrive in recent years, as Israel is no longer constrained by US pressure and attention has shifted to Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.
Over 260 homes and other structures were demolished in 2025, a 70% increase from three years earlier, with some neighborhoods seeing the most evictions in decades, according to Ir Amim, an Israeli anti-settlement group that closely tracks such policies. There have been at least 116 demolitions so far this year, it said.
It’s “an intensity and scope that we have never seen,” said Aviv Tatarsky, a researcher at Ir Amim. “Israel can decide, yes, this neighborhood, we want to erase it ... No one is going to stop us.”
People look from a rooftop at the rubble of a Palestinian building demolished by Israeli military in the town of Jabaa in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, near Jerusalem June 3, 2026. (Reuters)
Israeli government supports settlement growth
Israel captured east Jerusalem, along with the West Bank and Gaza, in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians want all three territories for their future state, and the UN and much of the international community consider them to be illegally occupied.
Israel considers all of Jerusalem to be its unified capital and says residents are treated equally by law.
Palestinians in annexed east Jerusalem are eligible for Israeli citizenship, but unlike Jews, they must apply for it — a long, uncertain process. Most choose not to because it would recognize Israel’s claims to the city. That leaves them with few ways to challenge housing policy, largely set by Israel’s Parliament.
Rights activists say that in addition to supporting the development of major Jewish settlements, which many Israelis view as ordinary neighborhoods, authorities have severely limited the growth of Palestinian neighborhoods, making it virtually impossible to obtain housing permits.
Last year, nearly 9,000 permits were approved for Jerusalem’s Jewish residents and fewer than 700 for Palestinians, according to Bimkom, an Israeli rights group. Palestinians make up some 40% of Jerusalem's population and are concentrated in the east.
Israeli officials say the discrepancy exists because Palestinians rarely apply for permits. Many Palestinians say it’s futile.
When Palestinians build without permits, they face the threat of demolition. Settler groups meanwhile exploit an array of laws to purchase or take over Palestinian properties.
Previous US administrations have pressed Israel to slow or suspend settlement projects, viewing them as an obstacle to resolving the conflict. US President Donald Trump broke with that tradition in his first term, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital.
The US State Department said in a statement that it's up to Israeli authorities to set policy in Jerusalem, and that it expects them to respect due process and the rule of law.
The neighborhood is near major religious sites
Abu Diab's neighborhood, al-Bustan, extends through a valley just outside the Old City, with the dome of the Al-Aqsa Mosque visible above the towering walls. Named for the orchards that once grew there, the neighborhood is now a crowded jumble of low concrete blocks and demolition sites.
It's part of the larger district of Silwan, home to some 20,000 Palestinians and coveted by settlers because it is near major religious and archaeological sites. The mosque is the third holiest in Islam, and the hilltop where it stands is the holiest site for Jews, who refer to it as the Temple Mount because it was where the two Jewish temples stood in antiquity.
The Jerusalem municipality said the homes in al-Bustan are being demolished because they were built without permits in areas not zoned for housing. A park and public parking lot will be established there for the benefit of all residents, it said in a statement.
The municipality said it put forward plans for alternative housing in the neighborhood but that residents did not show “serious intentions” to reach an agreement.
Abu Diab has been battling demolition orders in court since 2004. Part of his home was built before 1967, but his growing family expanded it without permits because it was impossible to get them, he said.
In February 2024, police gave him and his wife minutes to pack before demolishing their home. Since then, they have lived in the mobile home, their suitcases packed.
They are among some 1,500 Palestinians in al-Bustan whose homes could be demolished at any time.
People walk past the rubble of a Palestinian building demolished by Israeli military in the town of Jabaa in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, near Jerusalem June 3, 2026. (Reuters)
Settlers move in as Palestinians are evicted
A short distance away, in the congested Batan al-Hawah neighborhood, settlers are moving in as Palestinians are evicted.
Zuhair al-Rajabi and dozens of his extended family were ordered out in January, when Israel's Supreme Court ruled against them after more than a decade of legal action.
Thumbing through papers in his living room, he pulled out a document from 1966 saying the property is his. He says he has to leave by July but has nowhere to go, as rents are high in Jerusalem. “The problem, in short, is that they don’t want us here,” he said.
March marked the highest rate of state-led evictions in the neighborhood in decades, with 15 families forced out and hundreds more people at risk, according to B'Tselem, an Israeli rights group.
Israeli laws allow settlers to reclaim properties that were owned by other Jews before the 1948 war surrounding Israel's creation. Palestinians who fled or were driven from their homes in what is now Israel during that conflict are barred from returning. Authorities have also transferred state-held land to settler groups.
The Batan al-Hawah evictions show “the cooperation between settler organizations and state institutions, based on discriminatory laws, toward a shared goal — the Judaization of east Jerusalem and the replacement of Palestinian residents with Israeli settlers,” said Yair Dvir, a spokesperson for B’Tselem.
The Israeli judiciary, in a statement, said courts rule on the merits of each case based on the circumstances, applicable law and established precedent, and denied colluding with private organizations.
Daniel Luria, the executive director of Ateret Cohanim, one of the main settler organizations in east Jerusalem, said it was working to correct a “monumental historical injustice” by helping Jews to return to what had been a Yemenite and Sephardic Jewish neighborhood up until the early 20th century, when he says they were expelled by Arabs and then again by the British.
Since 2004, around 50 Jewish families have moved into the neighborhood and more are eager to join them, he said. “There's never going to be a Palestinian state,” he added.
An Israeli flag waves above the home where Khalil Basbous was evicted in January. The 68-year-old moved into a relative's house around the corner but walks past his former home every day.
“It’s mine,” he said, wiping tears from his face and softly touching an olive tree he had planted by the door. “I have no doubt that I will return.”
Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changedhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5282016-drones-vs-airstrikes-how-deterrence-equation-between-israel-and-hezbollah-changed
Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP).
Israel is pressing forward with firepower, evacuation warnings, and limited ground incursions, while Hezbollah is responding with drones and direct engagements along advanced positions north of the Litani River.
Yet behind this reciprocal escalation, the deterrence equation that governed the border throughout the years following the 2006 war appears to be facing an unprecedented test, as military operations expand and reach areas that until recently were considered beyond the immediate danger zone.
Airstrikes that now reach as far as Zahrani, clashes around Zawtar al-Sharqiya, and Israel’s gradual advance toward the outskirts of Nabatieh all indicate, according to Lebanese military assessments, that the confrontation has entered a different phase.
In this new stage, drones alone are no longer capable of maintaining a deterrent balance, while Israel is pursuing a policy of mounting military pressure aimed at reshaping realities on the ground ahead of any potential settlement or negotiations.
Drones Do Not Create Deterrence
Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies argued that the drones used by Hezbollah do not achieve genuine deterrence against the continued expansion of Israeli air and ground operations.
He maintained that Israel’s ongoing airstrikes and ground incursions demonstrate that the deterrence equation is no longer functioning.
Jaber also linked battlefield developments to the erosion of the deterrence that had existed after the 2006 war, arguing that “the deterrence that lasted from 2006 to 2023 was real and effective.” However, he said Hezbollah’s entry into a war of attrition after opening its support front for Gaza led to the collapse of that equation.
He further warned that Israel’s objectives may not be limited to Zawtar and its surroundings but could expand farther north.
A Policy of Depopulation and Prolonged Attrition
Jaber said Israel’s policy of warnings and evacuations is designed to empty areas of their civilian populations.
“Once Israel evacuates an area of its residents, it becomes able to strike any movement within it,” he explained. “At that point, anyone traveling by car or motorcycle becomes a potential target.”
He added: “My greatest concern is that southern Lebanon may already have entered a prolonged war of attrition, because current battlefield indicators do not suggest a quick path toward ending this escalation or returning to the previous rules of engagement.”
Assessing both the military and political landscape, he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “will not stop the war in Lebanon at this stage, regardless of the losses incurred,” noting that Israel “has not yet achieved any of its declared military or political objectives.”
He added that “Tel Aviv has failed to disarm Hezbollah and has also been unable to impose the conditions it seeks on Lebanon.”
According to his assessment, current developments indicate that “things will not return to the way they were,” arguing that the conflict has entered a new phase that will have lasting consequences for southern Lebanon and the balance of power there.
As for Hezbollah, Jaber said the group also “cannot simply halt the war midway through, given the complexities of the battlefield and the interwoven regional and international calculations.”
No Deterrent Balance Exists
For his part, retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou argued that “the drones used by Hezbollah have failed to establish a deterrent balance against Israel’s intensive air campaign,” stressing that “Israel is inflicting far greater damage and losses than it is receiving.”
He explained that fiber-optic-guided FPV (First-Person View) drones suffer from technical limitations related to both range and payload capacity.
“In practical terms, the range of these drones is between three and 15 kilometers and may reach around 20 kilometers as a reasonable upper limit,” he said. “The cable connecting the drone adds weight and affects its operational capabilities.”
Helou argued that claims of their use at distances of up to 60 kilometers are “militarily unrealistic.”
He added that “Hezbollah is attempting to achieve battlefield effects and inflict casualties through drones, but developments on the ground show that Israel is imposing far greater damage on both Hezbollah and Lebanon.”
Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?https://english.aawsat.com/features/5281999-have-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-drones-changed-rules-engagement-israel
Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
The “support war” waged by Lebanon’s Hezbollah in backing Hamas in late 2023 shattered the doctrine of “deterrence” that the Iranian-backed group had embraced and promoted for nearly two decades in its confrontation with its traditional adversary, Israel. Israel, for its part, also helped reinforce this assumption, which proved entirely mistaken the following year. The new round of fighting in 2026 then offered both sides an opportunity to establish a new set of rules governing the conflict.
Israeli patience and cunning
Israel did not rush into a direct war with Hezbollah after the group launched a wave of largely “performative” attacks, beginning with rockets fired at the outskirts of Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms. Instead, it quietly steered the confrontation in a different direction, displaying notable restraint and considerable strategic calculation.
This approach was reflected in diplomatic efforts undertaken by Tel Aviv through Washington to persuade Hezbollah to separate the Lebanese front from the Palestinian one. In July 2024, then US envoy Amos Hochstein reportedly told Lebanese officials that he was prepared to deliver what would amount to a political victory for Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah if the group halted its operations.
Nasrallah immediately rejected the proposal. According to those who relayed the message to him, he replied that the war in Gaza would first have to end. After that, other matters could be discussed.
This was not Hezbollah’s first strategic misjudgment. The shape of the new conflict unfolding in Lebanon’s border villages quickly revealed a clear Israeli technological and military advantage. A senior Hezbollah official later disclosed that in previous confrontations, fighters could launch a rocket, calmly gather their equipment after informing command that the launch had been successful, and leave the site before Israeli aircraft arrived.
People react while attending the funeral of an Israeli soldier Captain Doctor Ori Yosef Silvester, a 30-year-old army doctor for the Givati Brigade's Shaked Battalion, who was killed in southern Lebanon, at the Segula Cemetery in Petah Tikva on June 2, 2026. (AFP)
In the new conflict, however, the window between launch and retaliation had narrowed to between five and twenty seconds. As a result, the official said, fighters often dug into the ground and sought immediate cover after firing in the hope of surviving. Every launch effectively became a near-suicidal operation.
Subsequent developments underscored Israel’s superiority even more clearly. Israeli forces carried out a series of precise assassinations targeting Hezbollah military commanders, culminating in a strike that eliminated most of the leadership of the Radwan Force, the group’s elite unit.
Israel then killed Hezbollah’s military commander and launched the “pager operation,” which put thousands of Hezbollah operatives out of action at the push of a button. This was followed by the assassination of Nasrallah in a massive airstrike on Beirut’s southern suburbs and, later, the killing of his successor, Hashem Safieddine.
Instruments of war
According to field sources, the weapons and tactics employed by both sides suggest that they prepared for a prolonged war of attrition rather than a decisive battle.
Beginning in the first week after the latest ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah reduced its reliance on rockets, scaled back the use of suicide drones, and curtailed the deployment of guided anti-tank missiles, whose operators were often vulnerable to detection. Instead, it introduced first-person-view (FPV) drones.
These drones are typically operated within a range of 10 to 15 kilometers in southern Lebanon and are guided through fiber-optic cables linking the aircraft directly to its operator. A thin wire connects the control station to the drone carrying the explosive payload, allowing it to evade electronic jamming.
An Israeli self-propelled howitzer artillery gun fires rounds towards southern Lebanon from a position in the upper Galilee in northern Israel near the border on March 15, 2026. (AFP)
Hezbollah in 2026: A war of drones
Hezbollah sought to regain the initiative in the latest conflict, which erupted in March and coincided with the war with Iran. Israel conveyed a message that it was not interested in opening a front with Lebanon so long as Hezbollah remained on the sidelines.
The group reassured officials in Beirut that it would not initiate hostilities. It nevertheless surprised observers by launching rockets toward northern Israel, prompting a fierce Israeli response.
Unlike the image it initially projected through the launch of six rudimentary rockets, Hezbollah appeared far more organized and capable in the fighting that followed, revealing capabilities that had remained concealed during 15 months of relative calm. The group claimed to be carrying out as many as 100 operations a day against Israeli forces and introduced new weapons systems to the battlefield.
Its ground strategy also evolved. Rather than relying on static defenses or attempting to halt Israeli advances outright, Hezbollah focused on inflicting the greatest possible damage on advancing forces.
Rise of drones
Rockets no longer dominate the battlefield between Israel and Hezbollah. After weeks of fighting that erupted in the spring of 2026, a notable shift emerged in the military operations, with attack and suicide drones moving to the forefront and becoming one of the most influential factors shaping combat on both sides of the border.
For years, Hezbollah’s military identity was closely associated with its vast rocket arsenal, which represented Israel’s primary security concern. The current conflict, however, has shown that the group no longer relies exclusively on rockets. Instead, it has expanded its use of drones on a large scale.
According to Israeli assessments, a substantial share of Hezbollah’s recent attacks has involved attack and suicide drones, while conventional rockets have assumed a less prominent role than before.
Israeli researchers argue that this shift reflects lessons drawn from recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, where inexpensive drones demonstrated their ability to inflict significant losses on technologically superior forces.
According to Israeli reports and military studies published since the outbreak of the war in March, Hezbollah’s principal weapon is no longer its rocket arsenal alone but the attack and suicide drones that have become the primary threat facing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.
Israeli soldiers operate a drone. (Israeli army)
Foremost among these are FPV suicide drones guided by thin fiber-optic cables, making them effectively immune to electronic jamming. Their small size, low-altitude flight profiles, and erratic maneuverability pose additional challenges for Israeli radar and air-defense systems.
These drones carry relatively small explosive payloads, typically weighing no more than five kilograms. A Lebanese security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah employs three different types of warheads depending on the intended target—whether a tank, a conventional vehicle, or personnel.
Former Israeli officers say the threat posed by these drones extends beyond fixed military targets. They are also capable of tracking moving forces and striking tanks, vehicles, and field command centers, placing continuous pressure on Israeli ground units in southern Lebanon.
No definitive figures are available regarding the number of suicide drones Hezbollah has used since the beginning of the war. Unofficial Israeli estimates, however, suggest that the number may range from several hundred launches to more than a thousand.
Israel recently stated that Hezbollah had launched more than 120 drones of this type. The group, meanwhile, has released dozens of videos purporting to show drones striking vehicles, armored platforms, electronic systems, and personnel in the field.
Israel says Hezbollah’s operations have killed 20 soldiers and wounded dozens more since March.
In addition, Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for detonating explosive devices against Israeli vehicles deep inside operational areas and for repelling Israeli incursions using light and medium machine guns, as well as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).
A screengrab image taken from a handout video released by the Israeli army and created on April 27, 2026, shows Israeli army footage of what it says is the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon, where a ceasefire has been in place since mid-April. (Israel Army / AFP)
Anti-armor missiles
Anti-armor missiles remain the backbone of Hezbollah’s ground warfare capability and have been used against Israeli tanks, vehicles, and fortifications.
Israeli sources point in particular to the Almas missile family, derived from Israel’s Spike missile system. According to those sources, Iran reverse-engineered the weapon after Hezbollah fighters captured an Israeli missile during the 2006 war. Russian-made Kornet systems and other anti-tank platforms also remain in service.
A third category of weapons consists of short- and medium-range rockets and artillery projectiles used extensively against military positions, troop concentrations, and bases in the Galilee and northern Israel. Their use, however, declined relative to drones during many phases of the 2026 conflict.
Reconnaissance and attack drones
Reconnaissance and attack drones rank fourth among Hezbollah’s principal battlefield systems.
Not all of them are suicide drones. Some are used for surveillance, fire correction, and target acquisition, while others carry small munitions and return to base after completing their missions.
Israeli sources have also reported limited use of anti-aircraft missiles and air-defense fire directed at Israeli aircraft.
Nevertheless, these systems have not proven as decisive as drones and anti-armor missiles in the current conflict.
A photograph taken from the southern area of Marjeyoun shows flares fired by the Israeli military descending over the village of Arnoun late on May 13, 2026. (AFP)
Evolving tactics
Israel, too, has adapted its methods of warfare.
Rather than relying primarily on armored formations advancing under air cover, it has sought to reduce casualties and increase mobility.
Lebanese security sources said the Israeli military has adopted tactics centered on small special forces teams moving along unpaved routes to avoid mines and ambushes. At the first sign of resistance, these units withdraw while combat aircraft strike hostile firing positions.
Alongside heavy air raids conducted by fighter jets and precision strikes carried out by drones against individuals traveling in cars and motorcycles, Israel has introduced two additional systems to the battlefield.
The first consists of loitering munitions, which have appeared in footage targeting motorcycles and personnel in the field.
The second is the extensive use of guided artillery rounds in 155 mm and 240 mm calibers, according to field sources in southern Lebanon. These systems have been employed against villages located well beyond the border zone.
The sources described the rounds as laser-guided, providing greater accuracy and enabling strikes at distances reaching up to 30 kilometers inside Lebanese territory.
According to Israeli statements and observations by military research centers during the 2026 war, unmanned aerial systems have been among the most heavily utilized assets in Lebanon. Israel maintains an extensive drone network covering both front-line and rear areas, including the Hermes 900 and Hermes 450 platforms, as well as smaller Skylark reconnaissance drones.
These systems have been used for surveillance, target acquisition, fire direction, and precision strikes against both mobile and fixed targets.
A beachgoer stands in the water against the backdrop of smoke rising from the site of an Israeli strike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of al-Mansouri on May 22, 2026. (AFP)
Precision munitions and guided missiles
Israel has also employed long-range missiles from the Spike NLOS family, as well as precision-guided aerial munitions launched from aircraft and drones against command centers and launch sites.
Tanks and armored units remain central to Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon, although many have come under attack from drones and anti-armor missiles.
Israel has also employed artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns to strike targets deep inside Lebanon, along with precision ground-to-ground missiles against preselected objectives.
Air-defense systems
Israel possesses several major air-defense systems, most notably Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow.
Yet Israeli reports themselves acknowledge that these systems have faced difficulties countering the small suicide drones used by Hezbollah, particularly those guided through fiber-optic cables.
Israeli media previously reported that the military had introduced the Ro’em artillery system into service in southern Lebanon. The Israeli-made 155 mm system is wheel-mounted for enhanced mobility, features automatic loading, requires a crew of only three rather than seven personnel, offers a firing range of up to 40 kilometers, and incorporates advanced command-and-control capabilities.
Heavy machinery clears the rubble at the site of an overnight Israeli strike in the southern city of Tyre, Lebanon, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)
Rules of engagement
Since the ceasefire took effect, Hezbollah has sought to establish rules of engagement that would confine the fighting to occupied territory by refraining from targeting Israeli towns and settlements in the north. The Israeli military, however, gradually expanded the battlefield through sustained airstrikes and bombardment reaching the outskirts of Sidon.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, retired Brig. Gen. Said Kozah said Hezbollah has been attempting since the ceasefire to establish a new operational equation with Israel based on the principle that every Israeli strike should trigger a response. However, he argued, Israel continues to work against this.
Kozah noted that describing the situation as “rules of engagement” is not entirely accurate because the term is generally used between regular armies or within a clearly defined military framework.
“In practice,” he said, “Hezbollah is attempting to entrench a new set of rules under which any Israeli attack would be met with retaliation—whether through strikes against Israeli positions in occupied Lebanese territory or through rocket fire directed into Israel.”
He added that Hezbollah had recently carried out operations against Israeli positions in the border area, some involving drones and others consisting of infiltration attempts or direct attacks.
He also remarked that rocket launches into Israel had declined in recent days and that many had been intercepted because of the relatively limited numbers employed.
According to Kozah, Hezbollah seeks through these operations to reinforce the legitimacy of retaining its weapons under the banner of resisting occupation within Lebanese territory. At the same time, the group avoids addressing the factors that led to the current level of escalation and occupation.
As for whether Hezbollah has succeeded in imposing this new equation, Kozah said the situation suggests Israel remains the one setting the rules.
“The Israeli military is not limiting its operations to the buffer zone or the so-called ‘Yellow Line,’” he said. “It continues to conduct operations, clearing activities, and strikes against villages north of that line, effectively rejecting the balance Hezbollah is trying to establish.”
لم تشترك بعد
انشئ حساباً خاصاً بك لتحصل على أخبار مخصصة لك ولتتمتع بخاصية حفظ المقالات وتتلقى نشراتنا البريدية المتنوعة
