How Damascus, Beirut and Tel Aviv View Trump's Call for Syrian Intervention in Lebanon

US President Donald Trump welcomes his Syrian counterpart Ahmed al Sharaa at the White House (file photo - Reuters).
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How Damascus, Beirut and Tel Aviv View Trump's Call for Syrian Intervention in Lebanon

US President Donald Trump welcomes his Syrian counterpart Ahmed al Sharaa at the White House (file photo - Reuters).

US President Donald Trump's repeated remarks in recent days that he had asked President Ahmed Al-Sharaa to have Syria intervene against Hezbollah in Lebanon have been met with rejection in Damascus, concern in Beirut, and little serious consideration in Tel Aviv.

Syria, which dominated Lebanon after sending its forces there in 1976, appears to have no intention of repeating that experience today. "We view our role through supporting the Lebanese state's exercise of its authority," Ahmed Zeidan, media adviser to the Syrian president, told Asharq Al-Awsat in an exclusive statement.

Israel, meanwhile, views Trump's proposal as unserious and as a pointed jab at Benjamin Netanyahu's government, which has been unable to conclude the war against Hezbollah without inflicting widespread destruction on Lebanon. Although Tel Aviv does not appear concerned about an imminent Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, it believes that any such move would also mean an expansion of Turkish influence. According to Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli, Syria and Türkiye "pose a far greater concern than Iran."

By contrast, Beirut moved quickly to reject any Syrian or foreign involvement in the Hezbollah situation, stressing that dealing with the issue remains exclusively the responsibility of the Lebanese state and its institutions.

Asharq Al-Awsat examines the implications of Trump's call for Syrian military intervention in Lebanon through three reports from Damascus, Beirut and Tel Aviv.

Syrian Official: We Have No Desire to Enter Lebanon

Damascus has reiterated that it has no desire to intervene militarily in Lebanon. At the same time, it called on Lebanon's Hezbollah to cease its involvement in Syria, whether "through direct intervention or through supporting and sheltering remnants of the former regime, the killers of the Syrian people," according to Ahmed Zeidan, media adviser to the Syrian president, in an exclusive statement to Asharq Al-Awsat.

He also stressed that "the doors of Damascus and the People's Palace remain open to all Lebanese groups."

Zeidan said: "We reaffirm once again that we see our role through supporting the Lebanese state's exercise of its authority." He added that "those who remain governed by the mentality and thinking of 1976, the year Syrian forces entered Lebanon, should understand that today we are in the moment of December 8, 2024, the date of the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime, the moment of a new Syria."

The new Syrian approach toward Lebanon is based on "enabling the state to exercise its authority and sovereignty over all Lebanese territory, far removed from the mentality and practices of militias, whose interventions have imposed a heavy cost on Lebanon, Syria and the region," Zeidan said. He explained that Damascus is working "toward strengthening the Lebanese state's authority and sovereignty."

The second pillar of Syria's approach toward Lebanon, he added, is "a development-oriented approach, because development strengthens the state, reinforces social cohesion, and keeps away those who seek to exploit or prey upon Lebanon."

Responding to Trump's repeated calls for Syria to intervene militarily in Lebanon against Hezbollah, Zeidan said: "We have already stated and explained our position. Our role lies in supporting the Lebanese state and supporting development that will bring benefits to Lebanon and the region."

He added: "What Syria wants for Lebanon is what any neighbour wants for another neighbour. Lebanon, as a state, must exercise its authority and assume responsibility for restraining Hezbollah's militias from interfering in Syrian affairs. As we say, if your neighbour is well, then you are well. Thank God, Syria is doing well, and everyone can see that. Therefore, our neighbours after December 8, 2024, are doing well too. In return, we hope that our brothers in Lebanon will live in prosperity under the authority of a single state."

Since the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime, Damascus has opened a new chapter in relations with Lebanese state institutions, ending the era of tutelage over Lebanon. During that period, a complex network of political, security and economic relationships emerged, built around the intertwined interests of the ruling classes in both countries as a result of Syria's 29 year military presence in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005. During those years, Lebanese state institutions weakened while Hezbollah's influence expanded. The group later became deeply involved in the Syrian conflict alongside Bashar al Assad's regime as part of the Iranian axis.

There are widespread concerns within Syrian circles about the prospect of intervention in Lebanon after breaking free from the Assad regime and embarking on a path of balanced policymaking within a regional alignment that supports Syria's aspiration to preserve its territorial unity and establish stability. This approach, by definition, entails distancing itself from the region's conflicts.

One of the principal risks of intervention in Lebanon would be the rekindling of sectarian tensions and civil strife, particularly given the possibility that Shiite militias in Iraq could launch attacks against Syria, or that Iran and Hezbollah could activate their networks inside the country, political and military researcher Rashid Hourani told Asharq Al-Awsat. He noted that Iran and its allies "have succeeded in building extensive networks across Syria because of the length of their involvement there."

Regarding the potential impact of intervention on the new framework of Syrian-Lebanese relations, Hourani said that Syria's relationship with the Lebanese state "is separate from its relationship with Hezbollah. The Lebanese government has disavowed the party's security and military actions and movements, and has declared them illegitimate."

According to Hourani's analysis, Trump's repeated statements that he had asked the Syrian President for help against Hezbollah appear to conceal "an American desire to separate the Hezbollah issue from the relationship with Iran after reaching an agreement with Tehran, while indirectly or unofficially capitalizing on the consequences of Hezbollah's military intervention in Syria."

He argued that Syria could intervene if "there were a greater interest in doing so than in staying out," citing as an example the possibility of securing an Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria. He pointed to reports by the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation that "Washington is pressuring Syria and Israel to resume negotiations after several months of deadlock."

Hourani said that the possibility of negotiations resuming alongside Trump's statements "suggests the possibility of reaching some form of agreement, in addition to the likelihood that any mission would be clearly limited in time, from start to finish."

He added that Syria could also enter Lebanon if "Iran continues its attempts to restore its influence in Syria, with Hezbollah assisting in those efforts." He noted that the Syrian Interior Ministry has, over recent months, blamed Hezbollah for acts of sabotage in several Syrian cities.

In light of these considerations, Wael Alwan, a researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies who is close to the Syrian government, did not rule out a future Syrian role in Lebanon, sooner or later. However, he stressed that it would not be in the manner suggested by the American president's remarks.

He predicted that any such role would take place in coordination with the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army, and would be "limited to what is necessary, both geographically and in duration, for the purpose of protecting Syria's borders and the areas adjacent to them."

US President Donald Trump points his finger towards Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as they shake hands during a press conference after meeting at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida, US, December 29, 2025. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst/File Photo

Israel Does Not Take Seriously the Idea of Tasking Syria With Dismantling Hezbollah

At first glance, Israel was taken aback by the US president's remarks about assigning Syria the task of disarming Hezbollah. However, after brief consultations with intelligence chiefs, Israeli officials concluded that the idea was detached from reality and should not be taken seriously. Nevertheless, experts and some politicians argued that the political significance of the proposal should not be underestimated.

In their view, it amounted to a "a pointed jab" from the US administration, which has grown weary of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's policies and his efforts to drag the region from one long war into an even longer one. The United States has never been fond of protracted wars, viewing them as a burden, and believes that every war should have a clearly defined endpoint.

This position has been expressed openly and without ambiguity in recent weeks. The Wall Street Journal published a report stating that Trump has grown weary of Netanyahu's repetition and persistence. The report explained that during the many phone conversations between the two men, the same tedious scene kept recurring: Netanyahu repeating his positions while Trump listened. Hebrew language media went further, reporting that "from time to time Trump would raise his voice, refuse, rebuke, berate and curse.

Maariv added that Trump had previously tended to believe what Netanyahu told him, but in recent months he has begun taking notes and asking his aides: "Is what he said true? Is what he is saying accurate?"

For the sake of precision, Trump's comments about Syria's role in Lebanon consisted of a single statement: "If Israel can't do the job without killing everyone else, Syria should do the job." The media focused on the second part of that statement and largely ignored the first, which is the more important point.

The US president was criticizing Netanyahu for continuing to pursue war, for failing to achieve his objectives, and for what he viewed as excessive killing and destruction. He reinforced that criticism later when he asked: "Why do you have to destroy apartment buildings?" He then noted that many of the Lebanese killed in Israeli operations were neither members of Hezbollah nor connected to the group.

Writing in Haaretz, Middle East analyst Dr. Zvi Bar'el, the newspaper's Arab affairs editor, dismissed the notion of drawing Syria into Lebanon. He said Israel should understand by now that Trump does not share its view of the Lebanese arena, which is rapidly being transformed from an Israeli battlefield into a diplomatic bargaining chip for Iran, in a game that Trump has effectively already conceded. In addition to Iran's desire to preserve Hezbollah's standing and authority, Lebanon has also become an integral part of the tangible guarantees Tehran is seeking from the United States to demonstrate its ability to honor its commitments.

Bar'el argued that the proposal to transfer responsibility for dealing with Hezbollah from Israel to a Syrian contractor is reminiscent, to some extent, of the far fetched idea of activating Kurdish militias to help overthrow the regime in Iran, a proposal that collapsed only days after it was floated. He pointed out that although Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa has a strong motive to crush Hezbollah, given his long history of hostility toward the group, he has already stated that he has no interest in such a project.

Bar'el added that military involvement in Lebanon is not a realistic option for the Syrian president at a time when Syria continues to suffer from violence and has yet to achieve military and administrative stability. He noted that Al-Sharaa recently made clear that the era of Syrian military intervention in Lebanon is over.

At the same time, Israelis generally view the new leadership in Damascus with suspicion, seeing it as part of a Turkish project that threatens Israel. They believe that if Damascus were to accept Trump's proposal, it would gain additional support from Washington, potentially at Israel's expense.

Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli has even gone so far as to threaten war against Syria "sooner or later," claiming that Syria and Türkiye "pose a far greater concern than Iran." Although Chikli occupies a relatively minor position in Netanyahu's government, the remarks he made on Thursday to Radio 103FM, affiliated with the Hebrew newspaper Maariv, reflect a broader political mood within the government and help explain its obstruction of negotiations with Damascus.

Syrian army soldiers patrol along the Syrian Lebanese border in the rural area of Al Qusayr on April 1, 2026. (Photo by Bakr ALKASEM / AFP)

Beirut: Dealing With Hezbollah's Weapons Remains Solely the Responsibility of the Lebanese State

Trump's remarks about discussing Hezbollah with Al-Sharaa have raised questions in Lebanon about the possibility of assigning Damascus a role in confronting the group. However, Lebanese official and political positions have largely aligned with Syrian opposition to the idea.

Beirut moved quickly to reject any Syrian or foreign intervention in the matter, stressing that addressing the issue remains exclusively the responsibility of the Lebanese state and its institutions.

Speaking during the G7 summit in France, Trump said he had discussed Hezbollah with Al-Sharaa. When asked whether the Syrian president was prepared to confront the group, he merely replied that he would speak about the matter later.

An Attempt to Accommodate Israeli Realities

In this context, former Lebanese Deputy Speaker Elie Ferzli argued that Trump's remarks cannot be understood as part of a coherent strategic vision. Rather, they should be viewed within the framework of short term political considerations linked to recent developments in the region.

Ferzli told Asharq Al-Awsat: "I place these remarks by President Trump in a tactical rather than a strategic context. You cannot interpret them strategically after the agreement that was signed with Iran, nor can you interpret them strategically in light of everything that has taken place across the region."

He added: "Nor can you understand them strategically when Türkiye has already expressed a specific position regarding what is taking place in southern Syria."

Ferzli said that the reading closest to reality is to view these statements as part of managing the postwar political landscape. "This is a tactical statement aimed at accommodating the Israeli reality and avoiding the appearance that Israel has paid a price or made concessions voluntarily," he said.

He added that the current regional climate does not encourage the creation of new flashpoints of tension in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Army and Internal Stability

Ferzli did not limit himself to questioning the practicality of the American proposal. He linked it directly to Lebanon's domestic situation and the role of its official institutions, warning of the consequences of any approach that bypasses the Lebanese state.

"I believe that the most important issue of all is that the Lebanese Army cannot stand by as a spectator in this matter, because it affects the very structure of the Lebanese entity and the foundations of the political system," he said. "Therefore, it cannot be treated as a passing detail, given the direct repercussions it could have on Lebanon and its stability."

Disarmament Is the Responsibility of the Lebanese State

In contrast to the proposal hinted at by Trump, Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar took a firm position in support of keeping security decisions exclusively in the hands of the Lebanese state. Nassar said in an interview with CNN that the disarmament of Hezbollah is the responsibility of the Lebanese state, not foreign forces.

What We Did Not Accept Under Assad, We Will Not Accept From Any Other Regime

Nassar's position aligns with that of Richard Kouyoumjian, former minister and head of foreign relations for the Lebanese Forces party. Kouyoumjian dismissed the idea that Syria even has an interest in playing such a role and rejected in principle any Syrian intervention in Lebanese affairs.

Kouyoumjian told Asharq Al-Awsat: "The information available to us, whether through our meetings with the Syrian side, our contacts with the Syrian ambassador in Lebanon, or through the public statements of President Ahmed Al-Sharaa and Syrian officials, indicates that this is simply not under consideration."

He added: "The Syrian side neither wants, nor is enthusiastic about, nor is fundamentally convinced of becoming involved in Lebanon's internal affairs, especially on an issue as sensitive and dangerous as Hezbollah's weapons."

He stressed that "there is a firmly established conviction on the Lebanese side, particularly within the Lebanese state, that it bears responsibility for the weapons issue." He noted that "decisions on this matter were taken during the past year, and this was also clearly reflected in the ministerial statement of the current government."

 

Rubble from buildings destroyed by Israeli airstrikes during a press tour organized by the Hezbollah media office in the Ruwais neighborhood, southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 May 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

He said the Lebanese sovereignty is not something that can be infringed upon or compromised. As for Syria, despite the long history between the two countries, and regardless of the fact that the current government is not hostile toward Lebanon, quite the contrary, we are doing our best to put relations with it in order following the end of the former regime. Nevertheless, there appears to be neither a desire, nor a will, nor a decision on the Syrian side to intervene in Lebanon. In fact, the opposite is true.

He also stressed that "the Lebanese state, the Lebanese people, and Lebanese political parties all reject any Syrian intervention in Lebanon, regardless of the nature of the government in Damascus."

Kouyoumjian argued that the issue of Hezbollah's weapons must be handled through Lebanese institutions, saying: "We call on the Lebanese state to settle this matter and assume responsibility for addressing the issue of disarmament. If it requires Arab or international support, then it is the Lebanese state that should request such support, whether through the United Nations or through the appropriate international mechanisms."

He concluded: "We believe that the Lebanese state, through its own capabilities, institutions, and agencies, is capable of carrying out this responsibility. Therefore, there is no need for any external intervention. What is required is for the Lebanese state to be decisive, willing, and determined to exercise its full authority and ensure Lebanese sovereignty over all its territory."

The Kataeb Party has also joined those rejecting any Syrian role in addressing Hezbollah's weapons issue, stressing that "placing all weapons exclusively under the authority of the Lebanese state and extending its full authority over all Lebanese territory remain the fundamental gateway to resolving this issue."

In a statement, the party said that any proposal based on "direct Syrian intervention to achieve this objective is unacceptable." It argued that the process should take place "within a clear framework that respects Lebanese sovereignty, strengthens the role of legitimate institutions, and is accompanied by support from Lebanon's regional and international partners in a manner that serves only the interests of the Lebanese state."

The party also welcomed the position previously expressed by Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa rejecting military intervention in Lebanon, considering that stance to "reflect respect for Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and to lay the groundwork for healthy relations between the two countries."

For its part, the Free Patriotic Movement rejected any proposal that would assign a security or military role within Lebanese territory to a foreign state, including suggestions that Syrian authorities could be tasked with confronting Hezbollah inside Lebanon. The movement also praised the Syrian President's rejection of any military or political intervention in Lebanon, stressing that "Lebanon's sovereignty, stability, and security are the sole responsibility of the Lebanese state," and that "any foreign interference in its internal affairs is unacceptable, regardless of its source or justification."



Gaza’s Diabetes Patients Face a War Without Respite

Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Gaza’s Diabetes Patients Face a War Without Respite

Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Diabetes patients in the Gaza Strip are fighting two battles without respite - the fallout from an Israeli offensive that began nearly three years ago despite a ceasefire announced almost a year ago, and a daily struggle to secure medication as Israel tightens restrictions on the entry of drugs and other medical supplies, despite appeals from UN and health organizations.

The war has forced people with chronic illnesses to use expired medication as access to safe treatment has dwindled.

Habib Abu Daqqa, 11, who was diagnosed with diabetes a year before the war, has spent more than three months at Nasser Medical Complex after falling into a coma following an injection of expired diabetes medication.

His mother, Maysaa Abu Daqqa, who also has diabetes, told Asharq Al-Awsat that her son has become severely distressed and needs regular, safe treatment before he can leave the hospital.

She resorted to the expired injection because of his condition, despite warnings from some doctors, while others had told her it could still be used. He subsequently developed diabetic ketoacidosis and was admitted to intensive care.

Before the war, she recalled, both had reliable access to medication and appropriate food and followed regular treatment and dietary plans. She attributed their deteriorating health partly to the period of famine in Gaza.

In 2024, the Palestinian Health Ministry estimated that around 350,000 people with chronic illnesses in Gaza lacked necessary healthcare, including about 71,000 diabetes patients, 225,000 people with hypertension and 45,000 with cardiovascular disease.

Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, 14, who has Type 1 diabetes, also required intensive care after medication shortages forced him to take expired drugs.

“Before the war, I had access to all kinds of medication, especially insulin,” Abdel Aal told Asharq Al-Awsat. Suitable food was also readily available.

“I spent eight days in intensive care. I saw death,” he recalled, adding that expired medication and substitutes left him severely fatigued.

Wafaa Washah, 36, a Jabalia refugee camp resident displaced to Khan Younis who has had diabetes for 13 years, explained that economic hardship and her husband’s unemployment had deprived her of suitable food and even clean drinking water.

She recounted that she nearly slipped into a coma several times after using expired medication because no alternatives were available. During the famine, shortages of food, particularly flour, left her suffering frequent dizziness and fever.

Farah Lafi, 19, noted that the crisis extends beyond insulin to glucose test strips needed for frequent blood-sugar monitoring. She estimated that expired medications retain only about 30% of their effectiveness, undermining patients’ daily activity and ability to function.

Ibrahim Dhair, a diabetes consultant at hospitals in southern Gaza, described diabetes patients as among those hardest hit by severe drug shortages. Much of the available medication is expired and can lead to complications including diabetic ketoacidosis and admission to intensive care.

Even when insulin is available, proper refrigeration poses another problem, he explained. Many residents live in tents without basic services, while extreme heat can spoil medicines that must be stored at specific temperatures.

Dhair added that doctors sometimes issue guidance on how to manage available medicines, but with stocks continuing to run out, he described the current situation as a crisis beyond the healthcare system’s capacity to handle.


From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
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From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)

Libya depends on oil for nearly 98% of its income. Yet a central question persists: How are those revenues collected and spent in a country divided between rival governments? And why do Libyans complain of poverty when their country holds Africa’s largest oil reserves and produces and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day?

The process starts with the National Oil Corporation, which collects proceeds from crude oil and gas sales in US dollars and deposits them in accounts at the Libyan Foreign Bank. The money is then transferred to the Central Bank of Libya's accounts in Tripoli, recorded as state budget sovereign revenue, and converted into Libyan dinars.

The dollar trades at 6.36 dinars at the official rate, compared with 9.12 on the parallel market.

The Finance Ministry in Tripoli then issues spending authorizations under approved financial arrangements, after which the central bank releases funds to ministries and other state bodies through the main budget chapters.

Libya’s oil export revenues have swung sharply in recent years, ranging between $18 billion and $22 billion. They rose to about $18 billion in the first half of this year, nearly double the level in the same period last year, according to the Economy Ministry in the interim Government of National Unity.

Libyan oil expert Mohamed al-Shahati attributed the increase during that period to the war involving Iran.

Where is the breakdown?

Economists say Libya’s dependence on oil as its near-exclusive source of income lies at the heart of the crisis.

Ayoub al-Farsi, an economics professor at the University of Benghazi, said Libya showed how excessive reliance on natural resources could turn into a complex financial crisis when combined with political fragmentation and a lack of economic diversification.

“The Libyan economy is a clear example of how excessive dependence on natural resources can become a complex financial crisis,” he said, adding that political fragmentation and the absence of diversification had created conditions that directly affected people’s lives.

Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Monetary Policy Committee, said the economy was built around a rentier-state model that depended almost entirely on oil exports to fund the treasury and provide foreign currency.

That dependence, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had created deep structural distortions.

Agriculture and industry had been marginalized, the state bureaucracy had expanded to absorb workers into unproductive public-sector jobs, and the country had grown heavily dependent on imports for most consumer goods, he said.

Industrial activity remains limited, largely confined to the private sector and small-scale production. Critics also point to a market dominated by a small number of traders and importers, helping imported goods crowd out local production.

At protests across Libyan cities, the question is often the same: Where is the oil money going? Why are people struggling in an energy-producing country?

Al-Shahati said part of the answer lies in the difference between the value of the oil Libya produces and the amount that actually reaches the state treasury.

“Not every barrel produced in Libya is converted directly into a dollar entering the public treasury, because foreign partners have a share,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Foreign companies have become production partners under various contractual arrangements, he said.

He also pointed to a stark contradiction: Libya produces oil, yet depends heavily on imports of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products to meet domestic demand.

That means a growing share of the country’s resources is converted into foreign currency to pay for fuel imports.

Al-Shahati said another problem was the lack of a regularly published, unified, and easy-to-read account that answers basic questions, such as: What was the total value of the oil produced? How much went to foreign partners? How much was exported for the state? How much went to the domestic market? And how much net revenue was actually available for public spending?

“The figures in circulation provide parts of the picture,” he said, “but they do not always show the full flow of revenues from the wellhead to the state’s public accounts.”

Libya’s oil fields are concentrated mainly in the eastern Sirte Basin, which holds about 82% of its oil reserves, as well as in the Murzuq Basin in the southwest and offshore areas along the coast.

Fuel and power crises

Those weaknesses in the oil revenue chain are unfolding as Libya grapples with a severe electricity crisis.

The country has suffered several “blackouts” in recent days, with some areas going without electricity for more than 17 hours a day.

Researcher Ezzedine Mokhtar sees the power cuts as one part of a wider pattern of recurring financial failures, including fuel shortages.

He blamed the hardship facing many Libyans on “corruption” and “unlimited spending” by two rival governments competing for power in the country’s east and west.

He also cited “oil smuggling through Arkenu, whose revenues go to specific individuals rather than the state treasury.”

Mokhtar said Libya’s subsidy system was another core problem, with more than 60% of the country’s budget going to fuel subsidies.

He called on the Tripoli government to phase out those subsidies gradually and to draw up a national plan to develop the workforce.

“We have no industrial skills in anything,” he said. “We import everything — yogurt, dairy products, fruit, vegetables, frozen fish, and even underwear. Everything comes from abroad.”

Libya ranks 10th globally in proven oil reserves, with about 48.3 billion barrels, according to Worldometer.

The UN Panel of Experts said in its latest report on Libya, covering October 2024 to February 2026, that Arkenu had moved at least $3 billion in oil revenues to bank accounts outside Libya between January 2024 and November 2025.

According to the report, Arkenu was established in 2023 as a private company and is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army. It faces accusations of “oil smuggling.”

Reuters previously investigated the company and concluded, based on shipping documents, London Stock Exchange Group data, and information from Kpler, that some oil revenues were being diverted away from the Central Bank of Libya.

How are revenues distributed?

Oil revenues are distributed across the four main chapters of the state budget, according to experts and economists.

Chapter One, salaries and wages, takes the largest share. It covers public-sector employees across eastern, western, and southern Libya through the unified national identification number system.

Chapter Two covers operating expenses for ministries and public institutions.

Chapter Three covers subsidies, including fuel, water, and electricity.

Chapter Four covers development and projects, including infrastructure, as well as allocations to the National Oil Corporation to sustain and increase production.

Al-Shahati said 26% of oil revenues went toward importing fuel products, equivalent to about $7 billion if crude traded at $70 a barrel.

This year, he said, the figure could rise to between $8 billion and $9 billion because oil prices had climbed above $85 a barrel and the gap between crude prices and diesel and gasoline prices had widened amid shortages.

He also pointed to higher domestic consumption driven by economic growth and a rise in smuggling.

A second problem, al-Shahati said, is the absence of an approved national budget, which would make it possible to determine how spending should be allocated among population groups and regions.

“What is clear is that the main cities control most spending,” he said.

He also pointed to “a large and obvious imbalance” in salaries across Libya’s three regions, job grades, and types of employment.

Those gaps, he said, risk widening financial divisions between social groups.

Even an agreement to unify development spending did not appear to be properly implemented because there were no clear standards and no comprehensive budget.

“There are no criteria for distributing oil revenues,” al-Shahati said. “The distribution process is random and unsustainable.”

Libya fell to 177th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, from 173rd out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting worsening corruption and no tangible improvement over the past two years.

Pressure on the local economy

A report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Libya highlighted deep structural strains in the economy, driven by high public spending, near-total dependence on oil and gas revenues, and mounting pressure from food, fuel, and electricity prices.

The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Aug. 17, covers the period from April 1 to July 28.

Citing the International Monetary Fund, it said Libya’s fiscal deficit reached 30% of gross domestic product last year, while public debt climbed to 146% of GDP.

Inflation also rose into double digits, eroding purchasing power.

The UN report noted unjustified increases in fuel consumption by military and security agencies and the energy sector, as well as repeated double purchasing.

The cost of institutional division

Libya’s political and institutional split and the presence of multiple authorities have made the economic crisis worse, al-Farsi said.

The distortions, he said, were no longer merely structural.

They had created parallel public finances and pushed consumer spending higher to meet the demands of rival authorities, sending salaries and subsidies to unprecedented levels.

Repeated shutdowns of oil fields in previous years, combined with lower actual revenues, pushed financial authorities toward deficit financing and higher public debt, al-Farsi said.

That flooded the market with money without a corresponding rise in domestic production.

Oil revenues reached $21.9 billion in 2025, according to the National Oil Corporation, up from $18.6 billion in 2024, an increase of 15%.

Al-Farsi said the deterioration in public finances had left monetary authorities in a difficult position and forced them into emergency measures to protect reserves and contain the deficit.

The result, he said, was a weaker national currency, liquidity shortages and a collapse in confidence.

Development tools had also been paralyzed.

“Monetary policy shifted from an instrument for stimulating growth and investment into a tool for managing daily crises,” he said.

Why has the crisis not been solved?

Economists point to several reasons.

Al-Shahati put “corruption spreading on an unprecedented scale” near the top of the list.

“Corruption is no longer confined to the margins,” he said. “It has come to dominate the core of public finances in key sectors, obstructing any attempt at reform.”

He also blamed the absence of an institutional vision following the breakdown of middle management, which had once linked fiscal and monetary policy to economic realities and provided unified political backing.

Policies, he said, had become detached from the economy and lost their ability to restore balance.

Conventional reforms that had worked elsewhere would not work in Libya, al-Shahati said, because the country lacked a central political authority capable of building an institutional vision and curbing corruption that had spread through both the state and private sector.

Al-Farsi said Libya could not escape its fiscal and monetary crisis without addressing the roots of the problem.

That meant unifying the management of public finances, curbing government spending, and launching genuine structural reforms that would gradually shift Libya from consuming oil rents to building a diversified economy.

Mokhtar also called on the Tripoli government to develop a strategic plan to make better use of human resources and support small and medium-sized industries.

For him, breaking Libya’s dependence on oil revenues is part of the way out.

Masoud Suleiman, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, said in media remarks last week that the country needed between $30 billion and $40 billion in investment to develop untapped oil and gas resources.

The corporation, he said, aims to raise production to 2 million barrels a day by 2030.


Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

With a long shoreline on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's southern trade hub of Bandar Abbas has found itself at the frontlines of the war with the United States, with residents struggling to revive livelihoods battered by months of fighting.

Like elsewhere in Iran, economic strain has squeezed households since US-Israeli strikes triggered the Middle East war on February 28. But unlike much of the country, the port city of around half a million people has remained exposed to fighting even after an April 8 ceasefire brought relief elsewhere.

But despite a lull in hostilities in July, residents still feel squeezed. Saeed Tajik, 42, used to work at a shipyard before losing his job and turning to driving a taxi.

"The prices of housing and food have become extremely high. Almost all the basics -- rice, yoghurt, and oil -- have doubled," said Tajik.

Fuel shortages have long been common in southern Iran, where authorities restrict supplies in an effort to curb widespread fuel smuggling.

But now, "the queues have become longer ... it happens that we wait in the long line for fuel only to get told 'there is none' upon arriving," Tajik said as he drove past a station where motorists waited under the punishing summer heat.

Hormuz has emerged as a central flashpoint after an April ceasefire and June framework deal failed to resolve disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the future management of the strait.

During the war, US strikes hit bridges, highways and railway infrastructure around Bandar Abbas until mid-July, in what analysts saw as attempts to cut off the city and disrupt Iranian military logistics in the south.

- 'Nothing left' -

Inside the city, under a towering concrete statue of two armed men with their arms trained towards Hormuz waters, economic strains play out in long queues snaking outside petrol stations and soaring prices squeezing shoppers in local markets.

The city's repeatedly hit airport remained largely closed until August 15, leaving travelers facing arduous road journeys, sometimes combined with flights and boat crossings.

Outside the city, construction crews still toil under the sweltering summer sun to repair the Gachin bridge, split by a US strike, as cars rumble along a dusty detour below.

Along the waterfront, traditional wooden vessels known as lenjes sit moored alongside fishing and commercial boats, part of a centuries-old trading network linking southern Iran with Arab states across the Gulf.

Arash Tondro, 45, used his lenj to carry Iranian fresh and dried fruit to the United Arab Emirates and return with household goods and other imports.

"My income dropped to zero at the beginning of the war," said Tondro, who later rerouted some trade through Oman's Khasab port as regional seaways were disrupted and "many of the lenjes were hit by drones".

After the UAE suspended trade with Iran on Tuesday following a missile attack on a ship that Tehran denied carrying out, Tondro said he was again unsure how his work would be impacted.

"People in the south mostly rely on trade or fishing. If you take the sea and trade away from them, there is practically nothing left. We don't have agriculture here; whatever there is comes from the sea," he said.

- 'No sales' -

As night falls and August's oppressive heat begins to ease, fish vendors set up along a busy street, laying out shark, tuna and shrimp as the smell of the day's catch hangs in the humid air.

Among them is 22-year-old Anoush Mallah, who recently moved onto the street after soaring rents forced him to close his shop in one of the city's bazaars.

"Business has been terrible since the war started. There are no sales, it's very weak," he told AFP.

"People are short of money. The fishermen aren't going fishing either."

Many fishermen around Bandar Abbas only began returning to sea in recent weeks, after months ashore for fear of being caught in the crossfire of US-Iran fighting.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end the war. For Mallah, the uncertainty only adds to the strain.

"Let it (the war) start and get some result; right now, we're just left in limbo," he said.