How Oct. 7 Attack Led Abbas to Reshape the Palestinian Authority

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas waves during a ceremony marking the 55th anniversary of Fatah's founding in Ramallah in the West Bank in 2019. (Reuters)
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas waves during a ceremony marking the 55th anniversary of Fatah's founding in Ramallah in the West Bank in 2019. (Reuters)
TT

How Oct. 7 Attack Led Abbas to Reshape the Palestinian Authority

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas waves during a ceremony marking the 55th anniversary of Fatah's founding in Ramallah in the West Bank in 2019. (Reuters)
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas waves during a ceremony marking the 55th anniversary of Fatah's founding in Ramallah in the West Bank in 2019. (Reuters)

Soon after becoming Palestinian Authority president in 2005, Mahmoud Abbas met Fatah cadres in Bethlehem. They had accused a particular official of corruption over his support for Israeli projects. Abbas asked for any evidence so he could hold the official to account at once.

His message was clear: he had come to reform the authority, which he too had accused of corruption as prime minister. And he had his own way of doing it.

Over the years, Abbas repeated that pledge to leaders near and far, to the Fatah movement he leads, to other factions, to the international community and to local civil society groups. He set up an anti-corruption commission, but there were no clear results on the ground.

Reform was underway, without doubt. But it was long, slow, difficult and complicated, like everything else in the Palestinian territories. Then came Oct. 7, 2023, after 18 years of Abbas's rule. Everything changed.

Palestinians walk along a street surrounded by buildings destroyed in Israeli military strikes during the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza City, Tuesday, Oct. 6, 2026. (AP)

Reform as the price of survival

Abbas had spoken of reform thousands of times and promised it thousands more. After Oct. 7, he faced a different demand for the first time: sweeping, difficult reforms as the price of survival.

"They asked for a lot of reforms," a senior Palestinian official told Asharq Al-Awsat. "After the war in the Gaza Strip, they used that label — reforms — to include demands that had nothing to do with real reform ... cutting salaries and changing curricula. They also demanded presidential and legislative elections. All of this was a condition for engaging with the authority and supporting it ... and we said ‘yes’."

"We have a thousand objections to US President Donald Trump's plan for the Gaza Strip, and we said ‘yes’. We have a thousand objections to the reform plan linked to it, and we said ‘yes’," he added.

"They treat us as if we are the only country that needs reforms. And we accepted. We went ahead because we want to stop the war, remove the pretexts and launch a political process. This was not a situation we chose. But we agreed and moved forward. Will they now move forward and fulfill their obligations?"

Abbas needed little pressure. He understood the implications of Oct. 7 and soon launched sweeping reforms that began to reshape the entire Palestinian Authority.

After the war, everyone disagreed on everything except one thing: the authority had to be reformed.

A source familiar with the matter said Abbas began making major changes early, seeking to present the Palestinian Authority as a new administration and a credible political partner in a changing region.

Children watch as Israeli security forces deploy nearby in the Palestinian village of al-Mughayyir, near Ramallah in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on September 29, 2026. (AFP)

Securing a role after the war

The question of the day after the war loomed large. According to the source, everyone told Abbas that without reform and change, he would have no role as a partner or participant in anything. No authority. No Gaza. No future state.

That was precisely what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wanted. After Oct. 7, he sought to get rid of Abbas, the PA and Oslo Accords.

Abbas understood this from more than his conversations with others. Netanyahu's war against the PA and in the West Bank, followed by his declaration that the Oslo Accords were "Israel's big mistake," confirmed it. Since Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has effectively treated the PA as if it did not exist.

Israel escalated its operations in the West Bank. The army attacked cities, refugee camps and towns, permanently occupying some. It killed Palestinians in airstrikes, made arrests and destroyed infrastructure. Settlers were given free rein to kill, attack and seize vast areas by force.

Israel then withheld funds from the PA and amended laws on control, governance and jurisdiction in several areas in the heart of the West Bank. The aim was to eliminate its role and reshape control of the territory.

The PA was at its lowest point. Its very survival was at stake. Abbas had few choices: fight Israel, dissolve the authority or respond to the world and his allies.

A makeshift tent camp for displaced Palestinians who lost their homes during the Israel-Hamas war stretches across Gaza City, Tuesday, Oct. 6, 2026. (AP)

From 'authority' to 'state'

War was off the agenda. The PA was not considering dissolving itself. Abbas set about changing what he could. In February 2024, just four months after the war began, he accepted the resignation of Mohammad Shtayyeh's government. He later formed a government headed by Mohammad Mustafa.

It immediately pledged institutional reform, a fight against corruption, greater transparency and accountability, and reforms of the judiciary, public finances and security. It also promised to unify institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

That was Abbas's first step toward reform. It soon grew into a broader transformation of the PA.

He issued a decree reconstituting the Central Elections Commission, then a constitutional declaration governing the transfer of the PA presidency if the post became vacant.

Next came a decree-law restructuring social assistance, including ending salary payments to Palestinian prisoners and fighters. He then created the posts of deputy chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization's Executive Committee and vice president of the State of Palestine.

He formed a committee to draft an interim constitution for the transition from "authority" to "state."

A new constitutional declaration followed. It stipulated that, if the PA presidency became vacant, the deputy chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, who also serves as vice president of the State of Palestine, would temporarily assume presidential duties.

Abbas then initiated local elections in the West Bank and Gaza, called for Palestinian National Council elections and set legislative elections for Nov. 28. Presidential elections were scheduled for the first quarter of 2027.

A general view shows the Palestinian city of Ramallah in the Israeli-occupied West Bank on September 28, 2026. (AFP)

Fatah elections and sweeping change

Fatah's elections were part of the wider push for change. One of the most significant steps came last year, when Abbas elevated Hussein al-Sheikh to vice president of the State of Palestine and deputy chairman of the PLO Executive Committee.

This year, he also elevated Sheikh to Fatah's deputy leadership after the movement held its eighth congress and elected a new Central Committee.

His rise to all these posts in just two years established Sheikh as a potential successor to Abbas. He is acceptable to the Americans, who contact him regularly. He is also very close to influential Arab officials and leaders and has channels of communication with Israeli officials.

His rise followed major changes within the PA. The heads of almost all its security agencies were replaced, and hundreds of officers holding the rank of brigadier general were retired by presidential decree.

Work is also underway to change Palestinian school curricula.

"Abbas wanted to put the internal house in order while responding to demands for reform," a source familiar with the matter said. "To put the PA's affairs in order and ensure a peaceful, smooth transition. That serves everyone — those at home first, then others.”

If Abbas follows through and holds legislative and presidential elections, he will have kept his promises on democratic renewal and reform. But whether the elections will be held or postponed remains unclear.

Sources said any postponement would be agreed through consultations with the Arab group.

"It would not be an open-ended postponement, but one tied to another specific date," the sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

A photograph taken from the Israeli kibbutz of Nahal Oz shows part of the northern Gaza Strip on October 6, 2026. (AFP)

‘We kept our promises. What about you?’

Whatever happens with the elections, the PA is trying to make its case: it has met every demand for political and financial reform and the transfer of power, down to salaries and curricula. What more is required?

In a recorded address to the United Nations last month, after the Americans barred him from entering their country, Abbas told the world: “We completed the national reform program to which we had committed before our people and the international community. We strengthened institutional governance, public financial management, transparency, accountability, anti-corruption measures, and the rule of law.”

“We established a unified needs-based national system for social protection and social welfare, abolished the previous laws and regulations on this matter, and obtained an independent international audit confirming the validity of our measures,” he added.

“We also continue to reform the education system and develop criteria and curricula in accordance with international standards and in cooperation with UNESCO in a manner that promotes the values of peace, tolerance, and respect for others while preserving our national identity and the rights of our people,” he said. “We also proceeded along the path of democratic revival and the empowerment of women and youth.”

“We have held local council elections and elections for the General Union of Palestinian Students. We are headed towards our legislative elections on November 28. And this will be followed by the completion of the renewal of the institutions of the Palestinian National Council, followed by the Palestinian presidential elections.”

It was as if Abbas were saying: “I have done everything you asked. Will you now give me something I am asking for?”



Xi-Putin-Trump Summit: What Comes Next?

19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
TT

Xi-Putin-Trump Summit: What Comes Next?

19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)

An unprecedented summit between Chinese, US and Russian leaders this week in Shenzhen was light on substance but immensely symbolic, analysts say.

From nuclear weapons to reforming the United Nations and cancelling international arrest warrants, AFP looks at what was announced, its significance and what might come next:

- Substance or hot air? -

The three leaders jointly declared lofty goals to "reduce nuclear risks" and reform the United Nations, as well as commitments to immunity for state officials.

Their "Declaration toward Peace" also said the countries plan to boost oil supply and reaffirmed the importance of "stable energy flows".

The promise of dialogue on nuclear risks and non-proliferation "creates an opening for cooperation despite disagreements over arsenal reductions", said Sun Chenghao, senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.

"Implementation is now the main test," he told AFP.

Progress could be signaled by dates for nuclear talks or the appointment of designated officials.

Beijing previously rebuffed Trump's invitations to nuclear arms talks, arguing the US and Russia should first cut their giant arsenals before it agreed to discuss its smaller stockpiles.

The four-point declaration contains few details on future actions, with Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz calling the meeting a "photo op".

The "fairly sparse" points were "least common denominators" among the leaders, said Ryan Hass at the Brookings Institution.

Trump told reporters he would give a press conference on Friday, where he may provide more details.

- A new Yalta? -

The symbolism of three powerful leaders gathering to discuss global security issues -- including Putin's invasion of Ukraine and Trump's war with Iran -- had raised comparisons to the 1945 Yalta Conference.

Then-leaders of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union met to hash out the post-World War II settlement and re-draw European borders.

Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky and European powers worried Thursday's summit would push for a peace settlement favorable to Moscow without them at the table.

The format "suggests the creation of conditions where Beijing, Moscow, and Washington call the shots for the rest of the world", said Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore.

But "a functioning 'G3' would require much greater agreement among the three countries and cooperation from many other governments," Tsinghua University's Sun told AFP.

"The Yalta analogy also overlooks today's economic interdependence and the influence of regional actors," he said.

- Should Europe, others worry? -

Other US allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan -- which unlike China and Russia are vibrant democracies -- will also have eyed the summit with unease.

"From South Korea's perspective, this inevitably raises questions about whether it can continue to rely on its alliance with the United States," said Lee Jae-mook, a political science professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

"The pillars of South Korea's foreign and security policy that it has long taken for granted are being shaken," Lee told AFP.

Japan, too, may reconsider its relationships with China and the US.

"If China and Russia really draw the United States together, I think Japan will have a huge pressure to... make a better relationship with China," said Tzeng Wei-feng, an associate research fellow at Taiwan's National Chengchi University.

However, Tokyo and Washington maintain a bilateral defense pact, so there will likely be "no substantial change" in their ties, he added.

The US has roughly 54,000 military personnel stationed in Japan -- whose relations with China are poor -- and 28,500 in South Korea.

Despite the bonhomie between Xi, Trump and Putin displayed in Shenzhen, major strategic differences remain between their countries.

Washington has curbed Beijing's access to US technologies, while Moscow is fighting a Ukraine that still relies in large part on American intelligence.

Diverging national interests between China, the US and Russia means the rest of Asia won't be "overly concerned" yet, according to Dylan Loh of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

The format may not stick, especially after Trump leaves office in two years, he said.

- What next? -

"Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect is the absence of any commitment to reconvene or continue meeting at the leader-level," said Brookings' Hass.

With no follow-up announced, eyes will turn to next month's G20 summit in Miami, where Xi and Trump are due to hold their fourth meeting of the year, and Putin could make his first appearance at the grouping since his war in Ukraine began.

He has been shunned by most Western leaders since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.

Still, "there is little chance that such a meeting will be held again", said Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based scholar of international relations.

International Criminal Court (ICC) members -- which exclude the US -- are obliged to detain Putin if he travels to their territory after the court issued a warrant for him for war crimes associated with the Ukraine invasion.

"Putin has been ruled an international criminal by the ICC, and most APEC and G20 members are signatories to the Rome Statute. So, there are few opportunities for the three countries' leaders to convene," said Shen.


Turkish Investments in Egypt Strengthen Ties Despite Political Differences

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
TT

Turkish Investments in Egypt Strengthen Ties Despite Political Differences

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)

Growing Turkish investment in Egypt is strengthening economic ties between Cairo and Ankara despite ongoing disagreements over a maritime deal between Türkiye and Libya, according to analysts.

The Egyptian government highlighted the expanding Turkish business presence in the country on Wednesday, releasing figures that analysts interpreted as a sign of both sides’ determination to deepen economic cooperation while managing political disputes.

According to the Egyptian Cabinet’s Media Center, Turkish investment has expanded across manufacturing, trade, services and other economic activities in recent years. Turkish companies have contributed around $921.5 million in investment through 1,869 businesses established in Egypt, creating around 43,900 jobs.

Annual Turkish investment inflows surged 393.2% over eight years, reaching $175.1 million in the 2024-2025 fiscal year, compared with $35.5 million in 2016-2017.

The increase came despite a period of strained relations before Cairo and Ankara restored ambassador-level diplomatic ties in 2023.

Bilateral trade rose 44.7%, reaching $6.8 billion in 2025, up from $4.7 billion in 2016, according to the government figures, which highlighted major Turkish projects in the garment and food-processing industries.

Economic interests

Bashir Abdel Fattah, a Türkiye affairs specialist at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said the growth in Turkish investment reflects Ankara’s determination to strengthen its strategic partnership with Cairo.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Fattah described economic cooperation as a key component of the rapprochement, adding that Türkiye is seeking to capitalize on investment opportunities in Egypt while broadening the partnership across multiple sectors.

Egypt also provides Turkish companies with access to Arab and African markets through trade arrangements, including the free trade agreement with members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), enabling businesses to manufacture goods in Egypt for export across the continent.

Hani al-Gamal, deputy director of the Tafkir Center for Political Affairs, said that the government figures demonstrate how closely Turkish capital has become integrated into Egypt’s economy, particularly in manufacturing, employment and exports, generating benefits for both countries.

While acknowledging the importance of investment in strengthening bilateral cooperation, al-Gamal cautioned that economic ties alone could not resolve geopolitical disputes.

He attributed the broader improvement in relations to political and regional circumstances that have also facilitated closer military cooperation and notable progress in defense industries.

Military cooperation

Egyptian and Turkish naval forces participated in the Sea of Friendship exercises this month. The Egyptian military described the drills as part of growing cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces, aimed at sharing expertise and strengthening naval coordination.

The exercises took place despite Cairo’s repeated rejection of the Libyan parliament’s ratification in October of a maritime boundary agreement with Ankara.

Egypt and Türkiye have nevertheless continued consultations aimed at reducing regional tensions.

Abdel Fattah identified the separation of contentious political issues from areas of cooperation as a key factor behind the recent improvement in relations.

Disagreements over maritime boundaries and the Libyan crisis have not prevented Cairo and Ankara from developing ties in other sectors, he explained.

He viewed this approach as evidence of political maturity and a shared determination to avoid a return to tensions.

He said that rapprochement and cooperation could build confidence, narrow disagreements and create more favorable conditions for resolving outstanding issues.

Al-Gamal similarly emphasized that translating political rapprochement into tangible economic interests could deepen mutual trust and broaden the foundations of cooperation.


Al-Mirghani: A Statesman of Peace

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
TT

Al-Mirghani: A Statesman of Peace

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.

November 16 was no ordinary date in Sudan’s collective memory. It was the day Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani was laid to rest in Khartoum North. It was also the anniversary of the Sudanese Peace Initiative he signed 38 years earlier with Dr. John Garang in Addis Ababa, an accord known as the Mirghani-Garang Agreement.

It was as though history had chosen the day of his farewell to remind Sudan of the defining conviction he carried throughout his life: that the country could not be saved through war, but through dialogue.

This is not to place al-Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, beyond criticism or to dismiss the disputes and disagreements that marked his political career. But fairness demands recognition of his unwavering commitment, at decisive moments, to peace, consensus and national unity. That is why he deserves to be called a man of peace.

On November 16, 1988, al-Mirghani and Garang made political history with a remarkably brief document: barely a page long and fewer than 400 words. But its significance was immense.

The agreement called for a ceasefire, the suspension of the provisions on hudud punishments and related articles of the September 1983 laws pending a national constitutional conference, the lifting of the state of emergency, cancellation of military agreements affecting national sovereignty, and formation of a national committee to prepare for the constitutional conference.

Its central premise was fundamental: the war was not an isolated southern problem, but a manifestation of a broader Sudanese crisis that could be resolved only through dialogue on equal terms among all political and social forces.

The agreement faced open opposition from the National Islamic Front before the Constituent Assembly approved it on April 3, 1989. Then came the June 30 coup, cutting short the process before it could be completed.

It would be wrong to attribute the coup solely to the Mirghani-Garang Agreement, just as it would be impossible to assert that peace was guaranteed had democracy been allowed to run its course. But it is entirely reasonable to say that Sudan lost a genuine opportunity for peace, one that would not be forgotten.

Instead of the swift peace envisioned in a single-page document, the war continued for roughly another 16 years after the coup. It claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, forced millions from their homes and into exile, and saw the proliferation of armed groups and militias.

Ultimately, Sudan needed years of negotiations and volumes of protocols and agreements to reach the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That accord, in turn, opened the way to self-determination, the 2011 referendum and the secession of South Sudan.

This contrast is what makes the Mirghani-Garang initiative a living document to this day. One page had outlined a broad political vision for a united country. Years later, Sudan required seemingly endless documents to reach an outcome in which it lost a cherished part of its territory and people.

Jaafar Hassan, a leading figure in the Unionist Alliance and spokesman for the Sumoud coalition, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the late al-Mirghani was “one of Sudan’s pillars and one of the few men of sound judgment.”

Hassan said al-Mirghani had pursued peace early on, drawing on his position as head of the Democratic Unionist Party and leader of the Khatmiyya Sufi order.

Al-Mirghani had put his considerable popularity among his followers at the service of peace, recognizing early the dangers of allowing the war in South Sudan to continue. He was behind the landmark agreement between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang.

“Had it not been for the National Islamic Front’s coup in 1989, Sudan would still be united today,” Hassan said.

He stressed that al-Mirghani’s commitment to peace and national unity was not a fleeting political position, but of principles on which he refused to compromise.

Milestones in the pursuit of peace

The 1988 initiative was not the only landmark in al-Mirghani’s record. At least six major milestones can be identified in his pursuit of peace.

The first was his agreement with Garang. The second was his leadership of the National Democratic Alliance after the coup, bringing together political parties, trade unions and armed movements of differing orientations under one umbrella.

The third was the 1995 Asmara Conference on Fundamental Issues, which placed war, democracy, identity and the relationship between religion and the state at the heart of the national dialogue.

The fourth came at the alliance’s second conference in Massawa in 2000, when it affirmed that Sudan’s problems could be resolved only through “serious and sustained dialogue among all Sudanese political forces” in a democratic environment.

The fifth milestone came through negotiations in Jeddah and Cairo, culminating in the 2005 Cairo Agreement between the government and the National Democratic Alliance under al-Mirghani’s leadership. The agreement opened the door to ending a prolonged political confrontation and allowing opposition forces to return to political life.

In Darfur, al-Mirghani sought to narrow differences between the government and armed movements that had not signed peace agreements. He encouraged those movements to unify their positions so they could join negotiations from a stronger position.

In 2022, he again proposed an initiative for comprehensive national dialogue and returned to Khartoum after a long absence, making another attempt to bring Sudanese factions together before the country descended into its current war.

Not everyone agreed with all his political choices. But at the time of his passing, there was broad agreement that his name had been closely associated with national unity and dialogue.

Political analyst Mohamed Latif told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Mirghani’s political record might be a subject of disagreement for some, “but it is difficult to dispute that he was one of the leaders of Sudan’s two largest religious communities.”

“He succeeded in preserving the cohesion of the Khatmiyya order inside and outside Sudan, as well as its peaceful religious mission, far removed from violence and extremism,” he added.

The Mirghani-Garang Agreement was among the most significant moments not only in al-Mirghani’s life but also in Sudan’s modern history, he went on to say.

The agreement came after more than five years of fierce war between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudanese army, despite repeated attempts to bring the fighting to an end.

Latif said Sudanese collective memory preserves two contrasting images from that period: the enormous crowds that welcomed al-Mirghani upon his return to Khartoum after signing the agreement in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, and the subsequent attempt to assassinate him at his home in the Khartoum 2 neighborhood.

The two episodes seemed to offer early signs of the struggle between the desire for peace and the path of violence that would later come to define Sudan.

The most meaningful tribute to al-Mirghani lies not in words of mourning alone, but in drawing lessons from his life and Sudan’s recent history.

Whenever the door to dialogue has been closed, the doors to war have opened wider. Whenever the illusion of a military solution has prevailed, the Sudanese people have paid the price in bloodshed, displacement and division.

Sudan once squandered the opportunity presented by a brief agreement that might have opened a different path. It must not squander today’s opportunity to end this devastating war.

Peace is not weakness. Negotiation is not betrayal. Ending the war is not merely one political option among many, but a national and moral duty to save what remains of Sudan.