Yemen: Triple Terrorist Threat under Iranian Cover

People stand next to wreckage at the site of a car bomb attack in Yemen's capital Sanaa June 29, 2015. (Reuters)
People stand next to wreckage at the site of a car bomb attack in Yemen's capital Sanaa June 29, 2015. (Reuters)
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Yemen: Triple Terrorist Threat under Iranian Cover

People stand next to wreckage at the site of a car bomb attack in Yemen's capital Sanaa June 29, 2015. (Reuters)
People stand next to wreckage at the site of a car bomb attack in Yemen's capital Sanaa June 29, 2015. (Reuters)

The developments in Yemen in recent days have revealed that the terrorist Iran-backed Houthi militias are providing cover for the al-Qaeda and ISIS groups in the war-torn country through Tehran’s direct backing.

The Yemeni Interior Ministry had revealed the arrest of a Houthi terrorist cell that was operating under ISIS and Qaeda guise to destabilize Yemen and target state leaderships. The Yemen military also announced the launch of a wide-scale security operation to crackdown on ISIS and remaining members of al-Qaeda who are present in the western countryside of the southern Taiz province.

This raises the question on whether the Houthis have paved the ground for the spread of terrorism throughout Yemen.

Experience has shown that terrorism and its various affiliates thrive in unstable conditions. This is why, since the Houthi coup of 2014, terrorist organizations in Yemen have sought to take advantage of the poor security on the ground in order to impose their influence in the country.

Experts have, however, pointed to the deep ideological and organizational differences between al-Qaeda and ISIS that have sometimes led to clashes between them. Moreover, Iran also adopts different ideologies than these two groups, so what could possibly bring all three of them together?

Observers of the situation in Yemen would explain that the Houthis are keen on working with ISIS and al-Qaeda in order to ultimately further Iran’s interests in the country.

In an article in the Washington Post last year, Oxford University researcher Elisabeth Kendall details how al-Qaeda was able to bolster its presence in Yemen, saying it “increased its numbers and war chest by staging a massive jailbreak, seizing military hardware and robbing the central bank.”

“The key to al-Qaeda’s success was not direct recruitment. Even at its peak, its core fighters numbered no more than 4,000. Rather, it worked to secure buy-in from key city and tribal leaders and to win passive toleration from local populations,” she explained.

“Unlike the ISIS, al-Qaeda decided on a gradualist approach to governance and struck a local power-sharing deal,” she went on to say.

Yemen is very valuable for al-Qaeda, especially after its greatest competitor, ISIS, suffered severe blows there.

Al-Qaeda realizes that Yemen lies in a strategic location where it could pose a threat to regional and international security. The group could also expand north into other parts of Yemen and even into neighboring Saudi Arabia.

ISIS, meanwhile, did not enjoy a prominent presence in Yemen before the Houthi coup. As the organization suffered blows in Iraq and Syria, many of its fleeing members sought refuge in Yemen, especially in advanced positions that were held by the Houthis. Moreover, defections within al-Qaeda also fell in ISIS’ favor. The group had gained enough ground in 2015 and 2016 to even declare the establishment of alleged “states” in Yemen.

Ultimately, however, ISIS could never compete with al-Qaeda, which wields greater influence in Yemen. Furthermore, a merger between the two groups was never an option. One senior Qaeda member had once said that ISIS’ ideology seemed too “alien” to the group.

On the ground, ISIS failed in winning over the people. It was unable to come up with a specific cultural vision that appeals to the Yemeni people. It also did not take part in development projects in the country and came under criticism from former ISIS members, who had defected from the group to al-Qaeda.

In contrast, al-Qaeda appears more ideologically cohesive than ISIS, which, in turn, posed a greater threat to Yemen through its operations. A sign of this bloody agenda was ISIS’ claiming of 2015 bombings of two Sanaa mosques that left 142 people dead. Al-Qaeda had, at the time, distanced itself from the attacks, saying that ISIS found it easy to shed blood.

Tensions between the rival groups escalated into clashes on the ground, notably in the southern provinces in what was seen as al-Qaeda feeling threatened by ISIS’ infiltration into the area. The group sought to confront its rival and bar it from seeping into a region where it has for years sought to entrench itself.

Again, what could possibly bring together such seemingly different groups under the same umbrella?

The Houthis and al-Qaeda may have ideological differences, but a close reading of United Nations Security Council reports on Yemen since 2014 reveal the ties between slain former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and al-Qaeda. They also implicate the Houthis in planting explosives in Yemeni cities and blaming the attacks on ISIS. This underscores the complicity between the Houthis and al-Qaeda, revealing that they are ultimately two sides of the same coin and that they are both products of Iran. It also demonstrates the double role played by Iran, in that it has forged ties with each of al-Qaeda and the Houthis.

What about ISIS? Is there evidence of Iran’s backing of the group in Yemen?

On the surface, Tehran had launched a religious edict to combat ISIS, but in reality, it has benefited the most from the group’s emergence in the region. Iran, which has not ceased its verbal condemnation of the group, has never fought it on the ground. In turn, ISIS, which openly claims enmity to Shiites, avoids attacking Iranian interests, confirming that the two sides have common goals.

Iranian-American researcher at Harvard University, Dr. Majid Rafizadeh revealed that Tehran had used ISIS to bolster its regional power. He explained that it had used the emergence of the group in Syria and Iraq to justify the presence of its militias in these countries. Iran will not actually act on its claims that it wants to eliminate ISIS because it is in its interest for the terrorist group to remain. Some observers have even described ISIS as Iran’s Trojan Horse.

Returning to Yemen, does the evil of alliance of the Houthis, Iran and ISIS appear to be gaining ground against the international coalition? The Arab coalition has scored major victories against the terrorist militias. It has also managed to capture 85 percent of regions that were on the verge of falling in Houthi clutches.



Lebanon's Army Chief Joseph Aoun, a Man with a Tough Mission

Lebanon's Armed Forces Commander General Joseph Aoun attends a cabinet meeting in Beirut on November 27, 2024, to discuss the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. - AFP
Lebanon's Armed Forces Commander General Joseph Aoun attends a cabinet meeting in Beirut on November 27, 2024, to discuss the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. - AFP
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Lebanon's Army Chief Joseph Aoun, a Man with a Tough Mission

Lebanon's Armed Forces Commander General Joseph Aoun attends a cabinet meeting in Beirut on November 27, 2024, to discuss the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. - AFP
Lebanon's Armed Forces Commander General Joseph Aoun attends a cabinet meeting in Beirut on November 27, 2024, to discuss the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. - AFP

Lebanese army chief Joseph Aoun, who is being touted as a possible candidate for the presidency, is a man with a tough mission following an Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire that relies heavily on his troops deploying in the south.

Aoun, 60, was set to retire last January after heading the army since 2017, but has had his mandate extended twice -- the last time on Thursday.

The army, widely respected and a rare source of unity in a country riven by sectarian and political divides, has held together despite periodic social strife, the latest war and a crushing five-year economic crisis.
A fragile ceasefire took effect on Wednesday, ending more than a year of war between Israel and Hezbollah that has killed thousands in Lebanon and caused mass displacements on both sides of the border.
Under its terms, the Lebanese army and United Nations peacekeepers are to become the only armed presence in south Lebanon, where Hezbollah enjoys strong support and had been launching attacks on Israeli troops for months, and fighting them on the ground since late September.

The move averted a military power vacuum as the army, which boasts about 80,000 Lebanese servicemen, seeks to bolster its deployment in south Lebanon as part of the nascent truce.

But it will be a difficult task in an area long seen as Hezbollah territory, and risks upsetting the country's already delicate social balance as tensions run high over the war's course and devastation.

- 'Integrity' -

Aoun "has a reputation of personal integrity", said Karim Bitar, an international relations expert at Beirut's Saint-Joseph University.

The army chief came into prominence after leading the army in a battle to drive out the ISIS group from a mountanous area along the Syrian border.

"Within the Lebanese army, he is perceived as someone who is dedicated... who has the national interest at heart, and who has been trying to consolidate this institution, which is the last non-sectarian institution still on its feet in the country," he told AFP.

Aoun has good relations with groups across the political spectrum, including with Hezbollah, as well as with various foreign countries.

Mohanad Hage Ali from the Carnegie Middle East Center noted that "being the head of US-backed Lebanese Armed Forces, Joseph Aoun has ties to the United States".

"While he maintained relations with everyone, Hezbollah-affiliated media often criticized him" for his US ties, he told AFP.

An international conference in Paris last month raised $200 million to support the armed forces.

The military has been hit hard by Lebanon's economic crisis, and at one point in 2020 said it had scrapped meat from the meals offered to on-duty soldiers due to rising food prices.

Aoun has also been floated by several politicians, parties and local media as a potential candidate for Lebanon's presidency, vacant for more than two years amid deadlock between allies of Hezbollah and its opponents, who accuse the group of seeking to impose its preferred candidate.

Aoun has not commented on the reports and largely refrains from making media statements.

- President? -

A Western diplomat told AFP that "everyone has recognized Aoun's track record at the head of the army".

"But the question is, can he transform himself into a politician?" said the diplomat, requesting anonymity to discuss politically sensitive matters.

Bitar said that "many, even those who respect him are opposed to his election as president, because he comes from the army mostly", noting a number of Lebanon's heads of state, including recently, were former army chiefs.

Most "left a bittersweet taste", Bitar said, noting any election of Aoun could also perpetuate the idea that the army chief "systematically becomes president".

This could end up weakening the military as it creates "an unhealthy relationship between political power and the army, which is supposed to remain neutral", he added.

Hage Ali said that the idea of Aoun's "candidacy for the presidency did not receive much enthusiasm from the major figures in the political class, even those who are opposed to Hezbollah".

Aoun, who speaks Arabic, French and English, hails from Lebanon's Christian community and has two children.

By convention, the presidency goes to a Maronite Christian, the premiership is reserved for a Sunni Muslim and the post of parliament speaker goes to a Shiite Muslim.

He is not related to the previous Lebanese president Michel Aoun -- also a former army chief -- although the two served together in the military.