Mohammed bin Salman to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Don’t Want War but We Won’t Hesitate in Dealing with Any Threat

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor in Chief Ghassan Charbel. - Photographer Bandar Al-Jaloud
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor in Chief Ghassan Charbel. - Photographer Bandar Al-Jaloud
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Mohammed bin Salman to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Don’t Want War but We Won’t Hesitate in Dealing with Any Threat

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor in Chief Ghassan Charbel. - Photographer Bandar Al-Jaloud
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor in Chief Ghassan Charbel. - Photographer Bandar Al-Jaloud

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, said that Saudi Arabia does not want a war in the region, but stressed that it “will not hesitate in dealing with any threat against our people, sovereignty and vital interests.”

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, the Crown Prince said that the Kingdom “supported the re-imposition of US sanctions on Iran out of our belief that the international community needed to take a decisive stance against Iran.”

He hoped that the Iranian regime “would opt to become a normal state and cease its malign behavior.”

The Crown Prince told Asharq Al-Awsat that the attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf, oil facilities in the Kingdom and Abha airport “underscore the importance of our demands for the international community to take a decisive stance against an expansionist regime that has supported terrorism and spread death and destruction over the past decades not only in the region, but the whole world.”

He criticized Iran for using the nuclear deal’s economic benefits “to support its hostile activities in the region through its tools of chaos and destruction.”

While stressing that the Kingdom’s hand is always extended for peace, he said that “the Iranian regime did not respect the (Japanese) prime minister as a guest (in Iran) during his visit and in effect responded to his efforts by attacking the two oil tankers in the Gulf, one of which was apparently Japanese.”

“It also employed its militias to carry out a heinous attack against Abha Airport. This is clear evidence of the Iranian regime’s policy and intentions to target the security and stability of the region.”

The Crown Prince said that Saudi Arabia “places great importance on the strategic ties with the US,” considering it a “main factor in achieving regional security and stability.”

He also expressed confidence that “our strategic relations with the US will not be affected by media campaigns or arbitrary stances.”

The Kingdom constantly seeks to “clarify facts and misconceptions by some parties in the US and other countries. We listen to various views and we welcome constructive and rational advise, but ultimately our priority is our national interest.”

He said Saudi Arabia backed all efforts to reach a political solution to the Yemeni crisis but “the Houthi militias prioritize Iran’s agenda over the interests of Yemen and its people.”

“The Kingdom cannot accept the presence of militias operating outside the apparatus of states on our borders,” he said, adding “we not only seek to liberate Yemen from the Iranian militias, but achieve prosperity and stability for all of the people of Yemen.”

The Crown Prince said in the interview that his country is greatly concerned with the security and stability of Sudan, “not only due to the strategic importance of its location and danger of the collapse of its state institutions, but also the strong brotherly ties that bind us.”

He pledged to “continue to support our brothers in all fields until Sudan achieves what it deserves in prosperity and progress.”

On the Syrian crisis, he said Riyadh is working with its allies to achieve its objectives, including “defeating ISIS, preventing the re-emergence of terrorist organizations, dealing with the destabilizing Iranian influence in Syria and using all possible means to achieve political transition in line with Resolution 2254, in a manner that preserves Syria’s unity.”

The Crown Prince described the murder of Saudi citizen Jamal Khashoggi as a “very painful crime.”

The Kingdom is seeking to “achieve full justice and accountability, without getting distracted by positions taken by some for their own domestic considerations that are known to everyone,” he said. “Any party seeking to politically exploit the case must cease doing so and present whatever evidence it has to the courts in the Kingdom to help achieve justice.”

He also pledged to “continue to forge forward in our unwavering approach in confronting all forms of extremism and sectarianism, and the policies that support them.”

“We will not waste our time in offering partial solutions to extremism as history has proven the futility of such efforts,” said the Crown Prince.

On the economy, he expressed commitment to “the initial public offering of Saudi Aramco given it is under the appropriate circumstances, and in a timely manner.” But said “setting the location of the IPO now is premature.” And he noted the completion of several preliminary measures in preparation for the offering.
 
He said that Saudi Vision 2030 has “moved from planning and design to implementation on all levels, and started finding results.”
 
“What is happening in the Kingdom is not simply a set of financial and economic reforms aiming to realize specific figures,” but a comprehensive restructuring of the Kingdom's economy aimed at transforming economic and development performance in the medium and long terms.
 
“We are now shifting from a rentier economy to one that is characterized by productivity and global competitiveness,” he said.
 
He expressed that “Vision 2030 and its programs, like all strategic plans has to be reviewed and updated according to circumstances that may arise during implementation, without compromising its foundation or objectives.”

“I am proud that Saudi citizens are driving change at a time many feared the vision will face resistance due to the size of the change it entails,” he added.

Here is the full text of the interview:

*The region has recently witnessed dangerous developments that threaten the security and stability of the region and world. What is Saudi Arabia’s stance towards these developments and how does the Kingdom deal with this escalation?

-Saudi Arabia’s stance is clear as stipulated in its official statements. It does not want a war in the region, but we will not hesitate in dealing with any threat against our people, sovereignty and vital interests. Our priority is our national interest and achieving the aspirations of our people through the economic and social goals of the Kingdom’s vision 2030 and through development, and economic and social reform. This demands a stable and enabling environment within the Kingdom and region. This is why you will find that the role of the Kingdom, whether in the Arabian Gulf, North Africa, Horn of Africa or other regions, is supporting stability and peace. This is a policy that the Kingdom has adopted since its establishment whereby it has always sought to shun division, sectarianism and extremism and instead preserve unity and stability in the region and international peace.

The Kingdom also plays an important role in the international community through its efforts to ensure that oil supplies pass through vital routes that surround it with the aim of protecting the stability of the global economy. The world witnessed how we dealt with the Iranian tanker in the Red Sea. It was handled based on what our morals and principles and what international treaties and norms demand. In return, we see how the Iranian regime and its proxies have carried out sabotage operations against four oil tankers near Fujairah port. Two of the tankers were Saudi. This confirms the approach followed by this regime in the region and entire world. Plenty of evidence supports this and which has accumulated over many years.

We must not forget that this regime had openly declared since 1979 that its priority and main goal is to export the revolution. It seeks to achieve this at the expense of the aspirations of its people and the peoples of the region. This explains the behavior of the Iranian regime. The export of the revolution and Wilayat al-Faqih principle demand the destabilization of countries and the region, stoking sectarianism, spreading extremism and dedicating the resources of the Iranian people towards financing and arming terrorist militias.

Despite this, the Kingdom has constantly extended its hand for peace with Iran to avoid the horrors of wars and destruction on the region and its people. Saudi Arabia even supported the nuclear deal with Iran because the Kingdom has throughout history never spared an effort to resolve any crisis through diplomatic and peaceful means. We had hoped that the Iranian regime would have taken advantage of this initiative to change its behavior towards the countries in the region and see it as a first step towards Iran’s return to the international community as a normal state. Unfortunately, Iran misused the economic benefits of this deal to support its hostile acts in the region. It continued to violate international resolutions. It was better off dedicating the economic benefits in improving the lives of the Iranian people, developing infrastructure and achieving economic development instead of continuing its destructive behavior in the region.

Iran’s recklessness has reached unprecedented levels. After the nuclear pact, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ budget increased and it intensified its support for sectarian militias in the region and even the whole world. We have all seen how terrorist and hostile Iranian operations were recently thwarted in Europe. This is why the Kingdom supported the re-imposition of US sanctions on Iran. It did so out of our belief that the international community needed to take a decisive stance against Iran. It must also take the necessary measures to limit the regime’s ability to spread chaos and destruction in the whole world.

Recent developments in the region, including the targeting of Aramco oil pumping stations by the Iran-backed Houthi militias, underscores the importance of our demand for the international community to take a decisive stance against an expansionist regime that has supported terrorism and spread death and destruction over the past decades not only in the region, but the whole world.

The choice is clear before Iran. Does it want to be a normal country that plays a constructive role in the international community or does it want to be a rogue state? We hope that the Iranian regime would opt to become a normal country and cease its malign behavior.

*You have pointed to the American stance on Iran, which coincides with the Saudi stance, as is the case with the majority of strategic issues. Recent months have, however, seen criticism directed at the Kingdom from within the United States over a number of issues, especially the Jamal Khashoggi case. Has this criticism affected the strategic cooperation between the two countries?

- The Kingdom places great importance on the strategic ties with the US. They are relations that extend to more than 70 years during which this strategic partnership has defeated several challenges that have targeted the security, stability and sovereignty of our countries. Our ties with the US are important and pivotal, not only for achieving joint interests, whether economic, on the security level or others, but they are a main factor in achieving regional security and stability. Together with the US, and in cooperation with several countries in the region and world, we seek to achieve sustainable stability in the region that would establish the necessary environment to meet the aspirations of its people to live in dignity and real development. We do so by confronting the forces of chaos, destruction and instability embodied in terrorist organizations and their state-sponsors, starting with the Iranian regime, and confronting all forms of extremism.

As for media campaigns or some stances in the US, they certainly do not serve the joint interests of our countries. Throughout the Kingdom’s history, however, we have previously faced such campaigns that are often biased and not based on accurate information. We constantly seek to clarify facts and misconceptions by some parties in the US and other countries. We listen to various views and we welcome constructive and rational advise, but ultimately our priority is our national interest. Our priority is the citizen in Riyadh, Jeddah, Jazan, Tabuk, Dammam and other regions in the Kingdom, not the beliefs or views of others about the Kingdom. Throughout the Kingdom’s history, we have managed to work with our main allies, despite natural differences that exist between all countries, by respecting the sovereignty of nations and avoiding meddling in their internal affairs. We expect nothing less than reciprocal treatment when it comes to our sovereignty and internal affairs. I am confident that our strategic relations with the US will not be affected by media campaigns or arbitrary stances.

As for the murder of citizen Jamal Khashoggi, as I have previously said, this is a very painful crime that is unprecedented in the history of the Kingdom. Such acts are alien to our culture and contradict our principles and values. The Kingdom has taken the necessary measures, whether through the judiciary to hold the perpetrators to account or through taking procedural measures to prevent such unfortunate crimes from taking place again in the future. These measures stem first and foremost from the importance we place, in the Kingdom, on the lives of every Saudi citizen, irrespective of their views. These measures have not and will not be affected by any other factors. We are a state governed by the rule of law and it is unacceptable for the life of a citizen to be violated in such a painful way under any circumstance. Unfortunately, the suspects are government employees and we seek to achieve full justice. Any party seeking to politically exploit the case must cease doing so and present whatever evidence it has to the courts in the Kingdom to help achieve justice.

*Does the agreement with the US on Iran apply to the situation in Syria, especially in wake of the American decision to withdraw from the country?

- We are in agreement on the objectives in Syria, which are the defeat of the ISIS, preventing the re-emergence of terrorist organizations, dealing with the destabilizing Iranian influence in Syria and using all possible means to achieve political transition according to Resolution 2254, in a manner that preserves Syria’s unity. We are working with friendly countries to achieve these goals.

*How do you interpret the Japanese Prime Minister’s recent visit to Iran and his meeting with the supreme leader?

- We thank the (Japanese) prime minister for his good intentions and the Kingdom’s hand is always extended for peace to achieve security and stability of the region.

The Iranian regime, however, did not respect the (Japanese) prime minister as a guest (in Iran) during his visit and in effect responded to his efforts by attacking the two oil tankers in the Gulf, one of which was apparently Japanese. It also employed its militias to carry out a heinous attack against Abha Airport. This is clear evidence of the Iranian regime’s policy and intentions to target the security and stability of the region. Iran is the party that is constantly escalating tensions in the region. It carries out terrorist attacks and immoral acts of aggression directly or through its militias. The problem lies in Tehran, not anywhere else. As I have previously stated, Iran must choose between becoming a normal country that plays a constructive role in the international community or remain a rogue state and assume the international consequences of its choice.

*The Turkish president and other Turkish officials have recently escalated their rhetoric in questioning the credibility of the Kingdom’s judiciary and held the Kingdom and its leadership responsible in Khashoggi’s case. How do you respond to such accusations?

- Jamal Khashoggi is a Saudi citizen and there is no doubt that what happened to him was painful and unfortunate. The Kingdom has taken all measures to hold the perpetrators accountable and the accused have been referred to the judiciary. The judiciary in the Kingdom is an independent authority and no one can meddle in its affairs. We confront any development firmly and without hesitation, by taking the steps that are necessary to achieve justice, rectify any flaw and prevent mistakes from taking place again, while disregarding any claims and accusations.

As for the statements by some Turkish officials towards the Kingdom, the Kingdom, as the home of the two holy mosques, seeks strong ties with all Islamic countries, including Turkey. This is important for the interest of the region and joint Islamic work in particular. In the Kingdom, we work in service of the holy mosques and their visitors. We work on achieving the security and stability of our nation, not becoming embroiled in disputes that harm the interests of our nation and Islamic world. We will forge forward in achieving these goals, without getting distracted by positions taken by some for their own domestic considerations that are known to everyone

*Four years have passed since the Arab coalition kicked off its operations in Yemen. How do you assess the political and military progress that has been achieved and what are the prospects for resolving the crisis in Yemen, especially in wake of the Stockholm deal and terrorist Houthi attacks on Saudi oil pumping stations and its Najran and Abha airports?

- Many parties forget or claim to forget how the crisis in Yemen first broke out. The coalition operations began after the international community had exhausted all political solutions between Yemeni parties and the Houthi militias. One must be reminded that the Kingdom is the pioneer of the political solution. It presented the GCC initiative and worked on achieving peaceful political transition in Yemen in 2011. It supported the national dialogue and presented over 7 billion dollars in economic support for Yemen between 2012 and 2014. Since 2011, the Kingdom’s efforts have sought to achieve smooth political transition in a manner that preserves the country’s independence and sovereignty and unity of its political and security institutions to prevent it from slipping into chaos.

Indeed, the Yemeni parties met in Riyadh and signed the GCC initiative and its implementation mechanism. All Yemeni parties, including the Houthis, were present at the comprehensive national dialogue.

Unfortunately, Iran obstructed the political process in Yemen through its proxy houthi militias, which started to occupy Yemeni cities and seize the state’s various resources and capabilities. The Kingdom offered all possible opportunities to resolve the situation through peaceful means, but Iran was following a policy of imposing a new reality in Arab countries by force of arms. Unfortunately, the international community at the time did not confront Iran’s expansionist and sectarian agenda. Iran therefore, continued to try, through its militias, to impose its control in Yemen. The Yemeni people and leadership, however, made a historic stand against this Iranian interference. Along with our brothers in the coalition, we responded immediately to the appeal of the legitimate government to protect Yemen and its people and our national security. The Kingdom cannot accept the presence of militias operating outside the apparatus of states on our borders.

Most Yemeni territories have been liberated and we have supported all efforts to reach a political solution to the crisis. Unfortunately, the Houthi militias prioritize Iran’s agenda over the interests of Yemen and its people. We have recently witnessed the terrorist attack on oil facilities and Najran airport, which the Houthis boasted of claiming. This once again demonstrates that these militias do not care for the interests of the Yemeni people or any political process to resolve the crisis. Their actions reflect the priorities of Tehran, not Sanaa.

The Arab coalition’s stance is very clear about resolving the crisis. We support efforts to reach a political solution based on UN Security Council resolution 2216, the GCC initiative and its implementation mechanism, and national dialogue outcomes. We accept the participation of all Yemeni parties in the political process, but according to the three references. The Kingdom will not accept the militias to remain outside state control. We will pursue this ultimate goal and maintain our operations and continue on offering support to the Yemeni people in their effort to protect their independence and sovereignty despite our sacrifice. The Kingdom will also maintain its humanitarian and economic relief in Yemen. We not only seek to liberate Yemen from the Iranian militias, but achieve prosperity and stability for all of the people of Yemen.

*You have spoken of a dream to transform the Middle East into the new Europe. How do you confront obstacles in reaching this dream given the major regional political upheaval and economic and development challenges?

- We must not become hostages of temporary conditions that prevent us from fulfilling our primary duty, as leaders in the region, of reviving our states. Today’s challenges must also not prevent us from working promptly to achieve a better future for the coming generations.

You mentioned political upheaval. This is undoubtedly taking place in the region. At the same time, however, we must look at the overall Arab region and realize that the majority of the countries are unanimous in prioritizing a dignified life for the people and achieving security and stability. The people do not want to be hostages to ideological conflicts that waste their potential. We are before a precedent in that everyone shares one goal. Competition between the majority of our countries focuses on reaching the best standard of living for the people, attracting investment and achieving development in all fields.

The source of political upheaval is well known. They are terrorist groups, such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood and policies of the Iranian regime, the top sponsor of terrorism and extremism. We will not waste our time in offering partial solutions to extremism as history has proven the futility of such efforts. God willing, we will continue to forge forward in our unwavering approach in confronting all forms of extremism and sectarianism, and the policies that support them.

The Kingdom is the home of the Two Holy Mosques. It has been blessed with natural resources, a strategic location, and wise leadership since the days of its founder and until the present reign of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. It is also blessed with its great and innovative people. Today, it is living in security, stability and prosperity. It is unbecoming for this great nation not to occupy leading positions in all fields regardless of the conditions and challenges. We will not rest until we first achieve this goal for our nation and then our brothers in the region.

*How do you assess the upheaval in Sudan and the political changes?

- We are greatly concerned with the security and stability of Sudan, not only due to the strategic importance of its location and danger of the collapse of its state institutions, but also the strong brotherly ties that bind us. Our brothers and sisters in Sudan have been and continue to be a part of our social fabric, they have contributed greatly to our progress in all fields. We will not spare any effort to achieve the security and stability for Sudan and its people. The Kingdom has taken measures to support the brotherly people of Sudan, including an economic aid package and depositing 250 million Dollars in its Central Bank. We will continue to support our brothers in all fields until Sudan achieves the prosperity and progress it deserves.

*Three years after launching Saudi Vision 2030, where are we at?

- We moved from the planning and design phase to implementation on all levels, and started seeing results on the ground. On developing the financial sector, for example, we have seen noteworthy progress after the launching of the Vision as the Saudi market joined three global indices, the FTSE, the Morgan Stanley (MSCI) Emerging Markets Index, and S&P Dow Jones Indices. This will pump capital worth billions into the market. The Kingdom has seen a 40 % increase in investors in investment funds, a first since 2006. The Kingdom has recently achieved the greatest leap among some of the world’s most competitive countries in the IMD World Competitiveness Rankings 2019, ranking 26th, moving up 13 ranks compared to last year, and ranking 7th among G20 member states.

In the telecommunications and information sector, we witnessed remarkable development. The contribution of the digital economy to the GDP increased both directly and indirectly, with the Kingdom becoming one of the top 10 fastest e-commerce growing countries worldwide with a rate of 32%. Simultaneously, Internet speeds have improved fourfold to accelerate digital transformation. The Kingdom was also the first country in the Middle East and North Africa region to roll out 5G network services back in 2018 in the Eastern Province for trial. Today, we have 1,000 communication towers in the Kingdom that are offering this new service and expanding.

In the field of energy and industry, non-oil exports increased by 22% in 2018 compared to 2017, and we launched many industrial cities in different regions across the Kingdom. This confirms the keenness of the government of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to achieve balanced and comprehensive development in various cities and regions, including the King Salman Energy Park (Spark), Jizan, and Waad Al Shamal where the first phase of the production of phosphates and phosphate fertilizers has been achieved, laying down the foundation for the second phase, which will make the Kingdom, God willing, the second largest producer of phosphate fertilizers globally.

I would like to note that what is happening in the Kingdom is not simply a set of financial and economic reforms aiming to realize specific figures, but a comprehensive restructuring of the Kingdom's macro-economy aimed at improving economic and development performance in the medium and long terms. We have undertaken major economic and structural reforms that contribute to fiscal balance and financial control and the diversification of income sources, while maintaining a continuing macroeconomic growth, sustaining public finances, supporting social expenditures, raising government spending efficiency and stimulating the private sector, which is considered a key partner in growth and development, and achieving the Vision’s objectives.

*But there are claims about setbacks in some of Vision 2030’s initiatives?

- What is happening in the Kingdom is a comprehensive structural change in the economy aimed at creating a shift in medium- and long-term economic performance. The Vision 2030 and its programs, like all strategic plans has to be reviewed and updated according to circumstances that may arise during implementation, without compromising its foundation or objectives and with the aim of achieving top results, especially at a time we have gained a higher quality of decision-making based on studies, analyses, figures, facts and data.

Responding to your question about some Vision-related initiatives that might be in decline: We do not expect this. The Vision’s programs are effectively contributing to the economic transformation process and we are now shifting from a rentier economy to one that is characterized by productivity and global competitiveness.

*Some may argue that the Public Investment Fund (PIF) is giving the private sector a run for its money with its direct investments and mega projects. What role does it play in achieving the Vision and how can negative effects be avoided?

- In line with Vision 2030 and in order to achieve its objectives, it was important to review the role of the PIF and transform it into a state sovereign fund. In 2015 we re-launched PIF with a new vision and mission aimed at developing new sectors in Saudi Arabia, investing in leading international partnerships and the formation of a new board of directors under my leadership. Between 2016 and 2018, the number of staffers increased from 40 to nearly 500 employees. Meanwhile, PIF assets have increased from SR500 billion to SR 1 trillion, nearly doubling within two years.

The PIF is now a vital state instrument for economic diversification, and targets both domestic and international investments. Domestically, it targets major project investments that the private sector alone cannot finance, such as NEOM, the Red Sea project and Qiddiya, that will offer dozens, if not hundreds, of good investment opportunities for the private sector.

For PIF and the government, it is of utmost importance to involve the private sector. We have earmarked 13 programs for privatization, giving the private sector a greater opportunity to participate in investment, achieve profitable returns and improve spending efficiency and services.

In terms of foreign investments, apart from achieving attractive returns on its assets, PIF will play an important role in establishing economic partnerships that will help boost knowledge exchange, stimulate high-efficiency investments and enhance local content, generating long-term returns for future generations. The PIF also targets new strategic sectors such as tourism and entertainment. These sectors have an important dimension in stimulating foreign investment, regional development, creating a large number of jobs and improving overall quality of life.

The PIF operates under an outstanding level of corporate governance and transparent investment strategy, which were approved after completing its reform and governance process in 2015. It operates within a system that includes a board, executive committee and investment committee that play clear roles in guaranteeing distinguished levels of professionalism in performance. The PIF also has investment portfolios distributed according to development priorities, such as in Saudi companies, promising sectors and major projects.

*What are the latest developments in the privatization program?

- We now have an exceptional and global center specialized in privatization that is built on the best practices drawn from experiences of more than 20 countries that have undertaken privatization in the past. When establishing the center, it was taken into account that it contains a legal structure ensuring the rights of both the state and investors. We have identified promising opportunities for privatization in 12 sectors. Our goal from the privatization program is for it to strengthen the effectiveness of the role of government and to maximize the contribution of the private sector to GDP.

In 2019, the National Center for Privatization (NCP) supported the signing of five agreements with a total value exceeding SR 12.5 billion, inked by local and international companies in various fields and with 70% foreign financing from six countries. These agreements include projects that focus on sewage treatment, desalination plants and health services, through dialysis centers.

The NCP is currently working on finalizing agreements totaling over SR2 billion and that cover flour mills and medical and shipping services. These agreements are expected to be completed by the end of 2019. Work is also underway for privatizing education sector projects, expected in 2020 with investments adding up to about SR1 billion.

In the future, the private sector will also have the largest investment share in electricity sector projects, especially power generation plans and including major renewable energy projects previously announced.

*Amidst such economic transformation, what is your Highness's message to citizens?

- I am proud that Saudi citizens are driving change at a time many feared the Vision will face resistance due to the size of the change it entails. Many have told me that the most difficult part I will face in realizing this strategic transformation is resistance. But I saw this as a very small factor when looking at Saudi youth that is now leading change.

I would like to pay tribute to the role of young people in the transformation currently taking place in the Kingdom. It is a young Vision with a young spirit.

Discussions have shifted from a change desired from the state to the change we all make together.

*When following news about the anticipated Saudi Aramco’s IPO in global markets, we find there is a lack of information about the issue and the timeline. Where are matters now? And what actions have been taken in this regard?

- We are committed to the initial public offering of Saudi Aramco, but under the appropriate circumstances and in a timely manner. As I mentioned previously, I expect that it will happen between 2020 and the beginning of 2021, and setting the location of the IPO now is premature. Much of the work has been successfully completed, and the timeframe for the offering will depend on several factors including: market conditions for the IPO, given its size, and Aramco's acquisition of a majority stake in SABIC from PIF.

The latter is a deal which would create a stellar transformation through establishing a fully integrated national energy and petrochemical company that will lead the global energy sector and further enhance Saudi Aramco's growth potential and profitability in volatile oil markets.

As for preparations for Aramco’s IPO, several important actions have been taken, including the issuance of the hydrocarbon tax system, the re-issuance of an exclusive franchise agreement, the appointment of a new board of directors and the first-ever releasing of Aramco’s annual financial report and audit of its oil reserves. All these measures reinforce transparency, which is a core principle of Saudi Vision 2030, which is committed to protecting the Kingdom’s interests and those of potential investors.

Saudi Aramco, for its part, has also logged several achievements within its internal program in preparation for the IPO. One of the most important features of the program was amending internal rules and regulations, the transformation into a joint stock company and releasing its financial report, meeting requirements of potential financial markets for the IPO.

This has left investors satisfied worldwide, as we have seen through the recent bond offering.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.