Tunisia’s Ennahda Proposes Smaller Cabinet

Rached Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia's Ennahda, speaks to supporters after the party gained most votes in the parliamentary election, in Tunis, Tunisia October 6, 2019. REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi
Rached Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia's Ennahda, speaks to supporters after the party gained most votes in the parliamentary election, in Tunis, Tunisia October 6, 2019. REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi
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Tunisia’s Ennahda Proposes Smaller Cabinet

Rached Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia's Ennahda, speaks to supporters after the party gained most votes in the parliamentary election, in Tunis, Tunisia October 6, 2019. REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi
Rached Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia's Ennahda, speaks to supporters after the party gained most votes in the parliamentary election, in Tunis, Tunisia October 6, 2019. REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi

Ennahda supports the formation of a cabinet with less members than that of Youssef Chahed’s government, member of the party's executive council Mohammed al-Qomani, told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.

The government would be tasked with carrying out certain government programs. It would consist of qualified partisan and non-partisan figures as well as new members with innovative ideas.

Talk about a smaller cabinet is the result of a series of meetings chaired by Tunisian President Kais Saied with heads of parties that will be part of the coalition government.

The objective of the meetings was to bring closer the standpoints on the government formation.

Qomani considered that the new government’s level of success depends on the figures who will join it.

He said the political figures will be chosen based on certain standards, including their names not being linked to corruption and being accepted by the people and politicians alike.

Qomani affirmed that Ennahda sticks to assigning the premiership to one of its leaders, describing this matter as “non-negotiable”.

He also criticized attempts by some parties to give priority to the “president’s government” proposed by the People's Movement at the expense of political talks.

This proposal represents a “weakness” in democratically dealing with the results of the elections given that Ennahda won the polls and is tasked with forming the government, Qomani added.

Tunisian analyst Jamel Arfaoui told Asharq Al-Awsat that any attempt to repeat the elections might cause the downfall of several political parties and reduce the number of parliamentary seats earned by Ennahda (51 seats).



Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
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Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 

Following a series of intensified Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and the airports in Homs and Hama, as well as a ground incursion into the city of Nawa near Daraa, Israeli officials on Thursday escalated their rhetoric, issuing fresh threats to the Syrian leadership and warning of further military action—this time citing concerns over Turkish military activity in the region.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar voiced particular alarm over Türkiye’s growing role in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in Paris, he said: “They are doing everything they can to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. That is clearly their intention.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz echoed this sentiment, stating that Israel “will not allow Damascus to become a security threat” to Israel.

Rising Concern Over Türkiye’s Military Footprint in Syria

Military officials in Tel Aviv confirm that Israel sees Türkiye’s growing military presence in Syria as a serious concern. Their fear stems from two key issues: first, Ankara’s reported efforts to rebuild the Syrian army along the lines of its own modernized military model; and second, its apparent goal of establishing a long-term military foothold inside Syrian territory.

Israeli defense sources point out that Türkiye’s armed forces operate based on a traditional ground warfare doctrine, featuring large-scale armored divisions and well-equipped infantry units—similar in style to the Russian military. This stands in contrast to the Israeli military, which relies heavily on air superiority and has long underinvested in ground forces.

Given this disparity, any significant Turkish deployment in Syria could pose a direct challenge to Israeli operations and raise the risk of confrontation.

While the recent Israeli airstrikes targeted mostly long-defunct Syrian military sites—many of which have been hit repeatedly over the years—the attacks signal a broader strategic shift.

In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel, the Israeli military has moved away from a defensive posture of deterrence and containment. In its place, the army has embraced a more aggressive doctrine built around preemptive action.

This shift was further underscored by the appointment of a new chief of staff from the Armored Corps—the first in three decades—signaling a renewed emphasis on ground operations and offensive initiatives.

Not Just a Message to Türkiye

Despite the messaging around Türkiye’s presence, analysts say the recent wave of Israeli military action also serves broader geopolitical aims.

After failing to persuade Washington to pressure Ankara to scale back its involvement in Syria, Israel now appears determined to assert its own red lines militarily. The airstrike on the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus—a facility already destroyed multiple times since 2018—was widely viewed as symbolic.

Israeli officials say the intended audience for that particular strike was Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom Israeli intelligence continues to refer to by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. By launching the attack during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Israel aimed to send a clear message: there will be no return to normalcy in Syria without accounting for Israeli interests.

Among those interests is normalization. Last month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his desire to see Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel.

Hardline figures within Netanyahu’s coalition believe Israel currently holds a strategic upper hand. As right-wing think tank head Meir Ben-Shabbat recently wrote: “Israel is in its strongest position ever. It is transforming the Middle East, expanding its military capabilities, and pushing back the Iranian axis—while Syria is at its weakest.”

For many in Israel’s ruling right, this is an ideal moment to push for a peace agreement with Syria, possibly even one involving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

The Real Audience: Domestic Israel

Still, perhaps the most significant message behind the military campaign is directed not at Ankara, Damascus, or even Tehran—but at Tel Aviv.

As protests against Netanyahu’s leadership have grown louder in recent months, military escalation has served as a convenient political shield. The wars in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon dominate public attention and have largely sidelined anti-government demonstrations.

“Netanyahu’s government must go, but we won’t take to the streets while our sons are fighting,” has become a common refrain among many Israelis who oppose his leadership but remain reluctant to protest during wartime.

By maintaining a state of conflict, Netanyahu is not only securing his coalition’s survival but also enabling his allies to advance a hardline agenda—particularly on the Palestinian issue—that would have faced greater resistance in peacetime.

Critics warn that this strategy, while politically expedient, comes at a steep cost to Israel’s democratic institutions, its judiciary, and the long-term stability of the region.