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Brian Hook to Asharq Al-Awsat: Ghaani Faces Soleimani’s Fate if he Follows Similar Path

US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook. Reuters file photo
US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook. Reuters file photo
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Brian Hook to Asharq Al-Awsat: Ghaani Faces Soleimani’s Fate if he Follows Similar Path

US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook. Reuters file photo
US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook. Reuters file photo

The US special representative for Iran, Brian Hook, has said that the successor to Iran's Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani would suffer the same fate if he followed a similar path of killing Americans.

After Soleimani’s killing on Jan. 3, Tehran swiftly appointed Esmail Ghaani as the new head of the Quds Force. He pledged to pursue Soleimani’s course.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat in Davos, Hook also said the UN Security Council should condemn the September attacks on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais.

Here’s the transcript of the interview:

- The Europeans have activated the dispute mechanism with Iran, but say that they don't adhere to the US maximum pressure campaign. Doesn’t the dispute mechanism count as part of the maximum pressure campaign?

We were pleased to see the E3 initiate the dispute resolution mechanism. The regime has now violated the deal so many times that there isn't much left to preserve in the deal. British Prime Minister (Boris) Johnson called for a replacement of the deal with the Trump deal. We think that is the best path to deny Iran a nuclear weapon. It's a better path than the Iran nuclear deal.

By getting out of the deal, it puts countries in a position of strength to ensure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon, but it also allows countries to, as we have, not address Iran's threats in a silo. You need to take a comprehensive approach to this problem set. And that's the nuclear program, the missile program, the regional aggression, the expansionist foreign policy, the hostage taking.

We aren't going to make a difference in the Middle East unless we take a comprehensive approach, and the big mistake of the Iran nuclear deal, among many, is that it was very narrow.

- After the strike on Soleimani, there was a feeling that Washington was disappointed with the European’s response. There were also news reports about the US pressuring the EU and threatening to impose tariffs. Is that true?

I don't have any comment on bilateral discussions with Europeans, but we did enjoy wide support for the defensive actions we took, to both protect American diplomats and soldiers, and to prevent an imminent large-scale attack on American diplomats and soldiers in the region, that Soleimani was plotting. We took the world's most dangerous terrorists off the battlefield ... And as a consequence, the region is going to be safer because Solemani was the glue that held together the proxies, and his death will create a void that the regime will not be able to fill.

- The JCPOA is entering its fifth year and there's one particular issue that you mentioned many times before which has to do with the arms embargo that’s going to be lifted in October 2020. What do you intend to do before that date?

This is really a collective problem. The world's leading state sponsor of terrorism will have the UN arms embargo lifted in 9 or 10 months, and the only way to stop it is for either the deal to collapse, or for the UN Security Council to pass a resolution renewing the arms embargo, and it is hard to know what is going to come first. But it is the case that the council needs to act before October.

We've been raising the issue for well over a year. It's one of the great deficiencies of this deal, that in year 5 it lifts the UN arms embargo. I don't know who thought this was a good idea. Perhaps the theory was five years into the deal, the moderates would be in charge. That's foolish. This is a regime that does not have moderates. The supreme leader is in charge. He's called the supreme leader for a reason, and he's not a moderate. He's a hardliner. He makes the decisions and we judge the regime by what it does, not by what (Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad) Zarif says.

- You mentioned the Trump deal, what does it look like it?

It ensures that Iran has no path to a nuclear weapon by restoring no enrichment. That was the UN Security Council standard prior to the deal, and they gave it away. Another huge deficiency in this deal, was that it ended a unanimously passed resolution prohibiting Iran from enriching. Well more than half of the nations in the world that have peaceful nuclear power don't enrich. So if Iran wants peaceful nuclear power, it can have that, look no farther than then UAE … That's the right standard, not just for Iran, but for the whole region given its volatility.

Also (…) Iran's ballistic missile testing was prohibited by the UN Security Council, that ended under the (nuclear) deal. We need to restore it.

Iran also needs to stop funding these terrorist proxies, and it needs to stop supplying them with rockets and missiles. And then they need to end the hostage taking, It has been a tool of statecraft for 40 years, and it's got to end.

- There is a new leader of the Quds Force. What do we know about him? Is he going to follow a similar path to that of Soleimani? and have you been threatened by him?

If he follows a similar path of killing Americans, he will meet the same fate, because the President has made clear for years that any attacks against American Personnel or interests in the region will be met with a decisive response, and the President demonstrated that on January 2nd. So this is not a new threat. The president has always said that he will act decisively in defense of American interests. And I think the regime now understands that they cannot attack America at will, and expect to get away with it. So we will hold the regime and its proxies accountable for any attacks on Americans, or on American interests in the region.

- Only American interests, what about the allies?

No, we've also talked about our partners in the region. And we work very closely with our partners, so it's not limited to that.

- What are the updates regarding the investigation into the attack on Saudi oil facilities?

There is a role for the UN Security Council to play, to condemn Iran for violating the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. That was an unprovoked attack by the regime against Saudi Arabia on September 14th, and the council needs to condemn it. And we continue to work with the Council on that. I believe Saudi Arabia is close to concluding its investigation and doing all the site exploitation, so that we can present the facts and demonstrate that this was an attack that came from Iran.

- If all diplomatic efforts and the maximum pressure campaign fail to change the regime’s behavior, will regime change become an option?

Well, we already have changed the behavior of the regime by denying them the money they need to execute attacks, and by denying their proxies many of their operations because we have enhanced our troop presence. We have enhanced our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. We have now an international Maritime Force patrolling the waters in the Strait of Hormuz.

So, Iran is not able to get away with the kind of terrorist attacks that they used to. That doesn't mean that we've eliminated Iran's ability to conduct asymmetric attacks, but our new policy is making a difference. The regime has never been weaker financially in its 40-year history, and it has never been under more domestic political unrest than it is now. And this is a consequence of the President's new approach to Iran.

- The US has voiced support for Iranian protesters. Do you think they welcome the support?

We know they welcome it. The President's recent tweet in Farsi broke Twitter records. And when you look at the November protests as we have, you see brave Iranian women climbing poles to tear down “death to America” banners. You also see brave protesters burning the image of the supreme leader, and tearing down posters of Qassem Soleimani. The global media does a very bad job of conveying the true beliefs of the Iranian people. They hate this regime and they love America, and they would like to see greater cooperation between Iran and the United States. The American people and the Iranian people have so much in common. And this regime has kept us apart for 40 years.

So we're going to continue to stand with Iranian people. Nations around the world are not doing enough to stand with the people of Iran who are the longest suffering victims of the Iranian regime, and we would like to see more people follow our example and stand with the people (of Iran) and stand up to the regime.

- Are you working with Canadians and Ukrainians and other countries to ensure there is a fair investigation into the Ukrainian plane incident?

Iranians did admit that they shot down the plane. It defies explanation why the regime would not shut down its commercial airport, at a time when it is launching missiles into another country. And the regime has been killing a lot of innocent Iranians, whether it's protesters in November, or innocent lives on the Ukrainian jet, innocent Iranians. We would like to see the supreme leader start making better decisions for the Iranian people.

The Treasury Department has granted exemptions to our sanctions on Iran for anybody to help with the investigation of the jet crash. We have many times offered the hand of assistance to the Iranian people in times of crisis. We'll see if the regime accepts it.

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Interviews

Lebanon PM to Asharq Al-Awsat: No Lebanese Wants Return to Civil War

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam arrives to attend a cabinet meeting to discuss efforts to bring all weapons in the country under the control of the state, at the Presidential Palace in Baabda, Lebanon August 5, 2025. REUTERS/Emilie Madi
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam arrives to attend a cabinet meeting to discuss efforts to bring all weapons in the country under the control of the state, at the Presidential Palace in Baabda, Lebanon August 5, 2025. REUTERS/Emilie Madi
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Lebanon PM to Asharq Al-Awsat: No Lebanese Wants Return to Civil War

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam arrives to attend a cabinet meeting to discuss efforts to bring all weapons in the country under the control of the state, at the Presidential Palace in Baabda, Lebanon August 5, 2025. REUTERS/Emilie Madi
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam arrives to attend a cabinet meeting to discuss efforts to bring all weapons in the country under the control of the state, at the Presidential Palace in Baabda, Lebanon August 5, 2025. REUTERS/Emilie Madi

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on Friday rejected warnings from Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem that disarming the group could plunge the country back into civil war, insisting that no Lebanese wanted to relive that conflict.

Salam’s response came after Hezbollah escalated its rhetoric against the government’s decision to enforce “the exclusivity of arms” under state authority.

Qassem, in his first major confrontation with authorities since becoming the group’s secretary-general, accused the government of bearing responsibility for any “sedition” that might follow.

“This is propaganda directed at Hezbollah’s supporters. Unfortunately, it is misleading,” Salam said in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat’s editor-in-chief Ghassan Charbel, due to be published in full on Sunday.

“This government is a national Lebanese government. It makes its decisions through the cabinet and is not subject to external dictates but to the demands of the Lebanese people. I believe the overwhelming majority of Lebanese support the government’s decision to implement a plan to restrict weapons to the state. I have no doubt about that.”

He added: “It is a shame to claim this government is acting under dictates. I do not want to enter into disputes, but I know who is truly subject to dictates, who listens to them, and who has considered himself an extension of external powers. No one in this government considers themselves an extension of any foreign side.”

Salam stressed that monopolizing arms was the duty of the state.

“There is no state without exclusive control of weapons. There cannot be two, three, four or five decision-making centers,” he said.

“Decisions of the state are taken in cabinet, not elsewhere. The national army is Lebanon’s army, not the army of other groups under any pretext. Does our army need strengthening? Of course. And this is what we are seeking. We want a stronger army.”

He rejected Hezbollah’s claim that surrendering its weapons would mean handing them to Israel.

“No one is asking Sheikh Naim to hand over his weapons to Israel. On the contrary, we refuse for anyone to hand their weapons to Israel,” Salam said.

“We want to protect the resistance’s weapons from Israeli strikes. What we ask is that weapons be under the state’s exclusive control, meaning they should be delivered to the Lebanese state and its national army. If anyone doubts the army’s patriotism, let him say so openly.”

Turning to Qassem’s warning of civil war, Salam said: “No Lebanese today – not just the wise among them, but all Lebanese, young and old, men and women, in the south or the north – wants to return to civil war. This direct or indirect threat of civil war is shameful. No Lebanese wants to go back to that.”

Salam noted that the principle of arms under state control was not new.

“Sheikh Naim speaks as though the government is introducing something unprecedented. The issue of exclusive weapons under state authority has been raised since the Taif Accord, which he himself recalled. At Taif, we all agreed to extend the state’s authority over all Lebanese territory.”

“We have delayed for years and years. Today, after the latest war and after the arrangements for the cessation of hostilities last November - which once again stressed that weapons should be restricted to the state and specified who may legally bear arms in Lebanon: the Lebanese army, the Internal Security Forces, General Security, State Security, the municipal police, and no one else - the matter is clearer than ever.”

He underlined that no political party had the right to hold arms.

“No party or political faction has the mandate to carry weapons in Lebanon,” he said.

“This was affirmed under the previous government of Najib Mikati, in which Hezbollah and Amal were directly represented. They agreed to that deal – to the November arrangements ending hostilities. Our government adopted the agreement and reaffirmed the Taif Accord, because it is the basic reference point. Even before UN resolutions 1701 and 1559, there was the Taif Accord, the mother of agreements, which ended the civil war that no one wishes to see return.”

The prime minister added: “That accord stipulates extending state authority over all Lebanese territory by its own forces. The principle of exclusive arms was reaffirmed in the president’s oath of office. We also underlined that the state alone has the authority to decide on war and peace. That was the basis on which we gained parliament’s confidence. This is a national pact, not open to alternative interpretations.”

Salam said the government had drawn up an executive plan to implement the monopoly of arms and dismissed claims it was acting under foreign pressure.

“No one should say this is what US envoy Tom Barrack or French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian want, or that it is the result of foreign dictates. This has always been a Lebanese demand, delayed for 10, 20, 30 years. The time has come,” he said.

“Lebanese today have the right to stability, to security and to safety. Without security, the country cannot stand on its feet. We will not attract investment or funds for reconstruction. We have committed to reconstruction, and I want to be able to gather the resources for it and for new investment. But this will not happen unless people feel safe. That requires exclusive control of weapons by the state.”

Interviews

Abubakr Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Ali Abdullah Saleh Anticipated His Fate at the Hands of the Houthis

Saleh with Hosni Mubarak in 2003 (AFP) 
Saleh with Hosni Mubarak in 2003 (AFP) 
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Abubakr Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Ali Abdullah Saleh Anticipated His Fate at the Hands of the Houthis

Saleh with Hosni Mubarak in 2003 (AFP) 
Saleh with Hosni Mubarak in 2003 (AFP) 

Former Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. Abubakr Al-Qirbi reflected on the unraveling of Yemen’s political landscape following 2004, the year that marked the beginning of a complex and eventually fatal relationship between the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthi movement.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat in the second and final part of an in-depth conversation, Al-Qirbi shares personal insights on the war, Iran’s influence, the Arab Spring, and how Yemen’s long-time ruler foresaw his tragic end.

According to Al-Qirbi, Saleh first began to see the Houthis as a threat around the year 2000, when they started building external alliances, including with Iran and Libya, and shifting from religious activism to overt political mobilization. This culminated in the first armed conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis in 2004.

Al-Qirbi believes the Houthis’ turn toward Iran was a direct consequence of the wars waged against them in Yemen. “They sought a protector, and they found one in Iran,” he said, noting that Tehran’s support came not only from the government but also from religious institutions.

He recounted that he personally visited Iran twice to address Yemen’s concerns, meeting both President Mohammad Khatami and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “We stressed three things: Yemenis—Sunnis and Zaydis—had coexisted peacefully for centuries; regional peace depended on non-interference; and Iran needed to stop supporting the Houthis, even indirectly.” Tehran, for its part, assured him of its commitment to Yemen’s stability but, Al-Qirbi implied, offered little practical restraint.

Talk of Succession

Reflecting on the 2006 elections, Al-Qirbi described them as a turning point: “It was the first time Saleh truly earned his win, receiving 60 percent of the vote in a competitive race.” He insisted the process was largely free and fair, with credible international observers in attendance.

These elections, however, intensified internal political strife. There was growing suspicion that Saleh was preparing his son for succession, a rumor that dogged his later years and stirred discontent among Yemenis and international stakeholders alike.

The Arab Spring: Shock and Opportunity

Yemen, like much of the Arab world, was caught off-guard by the speed and ferocity of the Arab Spring. Al-Qirbi acknowledges that while the regime anticipated regional change - particularly after 9/11 and increased US civil society activity - the spark from Tunisia was unexpected.

“Saleh wasn’t surprised by the demands for reform,” Al-Qirbi noted, “but he questioned the method. His position was that change should come through democratic institutions, not by toppling governments.”

During the mass youth sit-ins and growing opposition movements, Al-Qirbi believes Saleh recognized the West’s shifting stance. “He realized that the US and others were now saying plainly: Saleh must go.” Despite this, the president insisted any transition should occur constitutionally, not through force.

One of the most poignant moments in the interview comes when Al-Qirbi addresses Saleh’s reaction to the downfall of fellow Arab leaders like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. “It deeply affected him,” Al-Qirbi said. “These were men he knew personally. Watching them fall, especially so brutally, had a profound impact.”

Saleh, according to Al-Qirbi, was aware of the cost of clinging to power.

“He could have crushed the protests with force. He had the means, but he chose not to, fearing the chaos it might unleash.” Ultimately, Saleh agreed to a Gulf-brokered deal to step down in 2011, ushering in Vice President Abed Rabbuh Mansour Hadi as his successor.

From Vice President to Rival: The Hadi Transition

Al-Qirbi was a strong supporter of Hadi’s elevation to the presidency, arguing that his long service as vice president and his lack of overt political ambition made him a natural and unifying choice. But the relationship between the two men quickly deteriorated.

“Saleh began to feel that Hadi was sidelining him from the General People’s Congress (GPC),” Al-Qirbi said. “He felt betrayed, especially when Hadi began appointing his own loyalists to represent the party in the National Dialogue Conference.”

This rift widened dramatically as Houthi forces advanced through northern Yemen. While some accused Saleh of allying with the Houthis to settle scores with political rivals, Al-Qirbi disputes this characterization. “He never truly allied with them. At best, there was a tactical understanding, and even that crumbled once they reached Amran.”

Al-Qirbi confirms that Saleh had urged Hadi to stop the Houthi advance before they reached Sana’a, a warning that went unheeded. “Saleh expected the government to act, but it didn’t. That was a pivotal moment.”

The Fall of Sana’a and Saleh’s Final Days

When the Houthis seized Sana’a in 2014, Al-Qirbi was in the city. He recalls the shock that swept through the capital as government forces surrendered without resistance. “Nobody expected it to happen so easily,” he said.

Despite forming a brief partnership with the Houthis, Saleh grew increasingly uneasy. Al-Qirbi recounts how Houthi supervisors effectively controlled ministries, sidelining GPC ministers and eroding Saleh’s influence.

By 2017, tensions reached a breaking point. As Saleh prepared to commemorate the anniversary of the GPC’s founding, Houthi forces viewed the event as a political threat. That same year, they killed him.

“Saleh anticipated it,” Al-Qirbi admits. “He understood the risks of engaging with the Houthis and sensed early on that they were not true partners.”

Al-Qirbi speaks of Saleh with a mix of admiration and reflection. “He was a flexible leader, willing to engage with enemies, and he preferred dialogue over violence. Had he been a man of force, he could have crushed the protests. But he chose restraint.”

Asked whether Saleh’s long rule prevented the building of a true Yemeni state, Al-Qirbi acknowledges both internal constraints and missed opportunities. “There were moments - after reunification, after the 1994 war, and especially after 2006 - where a stronger state could have been built. But like many revolutionary leaders, Saleh became too focused on power and too cautious to make drastic reforms.”

On Yemen’s famously complex tribal and political fabric, Al-Qirbi supports Saleh’s infamous quote likening governance in Yemen to “dancing on the heads of snakes.” He agrees, “It’s an accurate description. Balancing tribal, regional, political, and external interests is an impossible act.”

Hope for Unity?

Despite everything, Al-Qirbi remains cautiously optimistic about Yemen’s future. “Yemen must return to unity. Without it, there can be no long-term stability,” he insists. But he warns that foreign interference remains a significant obstacle. “The day Yemenis are left to negotiate among themselves is the day peace becomes possible.”

Asked whether the Houthis could be brought under the authority of a national government, he offers a realist’s view: “There are now three centers of power: Sana’a, Aden, and the internationally recognized government. None are truly sovereign in their decisions. But if dialogue is given a real chance - without outside manipulation - Yemenis will find a solution.”

 

 

 

Interviews

Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saddam Told Me Iraq Fight Was for Arab Dignity

Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
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Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saddam Told Me Iraq Fight Was for Arab Dignity

Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)

When al-Qaeda’s planes tore through New York’s skyline on September 11, 2001, Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi cut short a visit to Berlin and rushed back to Sana’a, confronting a moment that would reshape global politics and Yemen’s foreign policy for years to come.

The attacks – among their many repercussions – pushed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to fully align with the United States in its war on terror. One of Saleh’s first moves was to seek an urgent meeting with President George W. Bush, hoping to convince the White House that Yemen was not a breeding ground for al-Qaeda.

In the first part of an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, al-Qirbi, who served as Yemen’s top diplomat from April 2001 until 2014, recounts his experience navigating regional upheaval, from the USS Cole bombing off Aden in October 2000 to the US-led invasion of Iraq.

He also reflects on Saleh’s last-ditch attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the United Nations – a message the Iraqi leader rejected, declaring instead: “This is a battle for the dignity of the nation, and we will pay the price.”

Below are excerpts from the interview:

Q: Your first major test as foreign minister was the September 11 attacks. Where were you when they happened, and how did you react?

A: I was on an official visit to Berlin, having lunch with the German foreign minister at the time. We were preparing for a river cruise and a reception with German officials and Arab diplomats when we were stunned by the news. We gathered around the television and immediately cancelled the event.

Q: How did President Saleh respond to the 9/11 attacks?

A: I wasn’t in Yemen at the time, so I can’t speak to his immediate reaction. But it was deeply concerning for all of us, especially coming so soon after the USS Cole bombing. That incident had already cast Yemen as a hub for al-Qaeda and terrorism. We knew the attacks in New York would only intensify that perception.

Q: When you returned from Berlin and met President Saleh, was the potential fallout from 9/11 your main concern?

A: Absolutely. We were not only concerned about Yemen but also the wider region. Our priority was to shield Yemen from the consequences. That’s why our first step was to arrange a swift visit for President Saleh to Washington. He was among the first Arab leaders to arrive there after the attacks, meeting President Bush in November of that year.

Saleh’s Confrontation with Bush at the White House

Q: How would you describe the meeting between President Saleh and President Bush?

A: It was, in many ways, a confrontation – but a diplomatic one. Saleh aimed to convince Bush that Yemen was not a terrorist haven and should not be punished for the 9/11 attacks.

Q: Did Bush accuse Saleh directly?

A: No, he didn’t. But he did emphasize the importance of fighting terrorism and acknowledged the presence of extremists in Yemen. In the end, President Saleh defused the situation by pledging Yemen’s cooperation with the international community in combating terrorism. That marked the beginning of a new chapter in Yemen-US relations.

Q: Did the US make specific demands during President Saleh’s visit to Washington in late 2001?

A: Not at that time. But eventually, the main concern became how to cooperate in combating al-Qaeda operatives within Yemen.

Q: Did Yemen take serious action on that front?

A: Absolutely. We launched operations to pursue the group responsible for the USS Cole bombing, and our security services arrested some of them. Investigations began shortly thereafter. The US requested direct participation in those interrogations, but Yemen declined, insisting that the investigations were the government’s responsibility. However, we allowed US observers to attend the sessions and submit questions through Yemeni investigators.

Q: Did the investigations uncover anything significant about 9/11?

A: I can’t recall specific details from the security files, but there was definitely intelligence exchanged between the two countries’ agencies.

From Security Cooperation to Military Invasions

Q: Intelligence cooperation between Yemen and the US became more structured. As foreign minister, did you anticipate that the US would launch military campaigns in Afghanistan and then Iraq?

A: We knew the US was deeply wounded by 9/11, but I didn’t expect it to act so hastily. In my view, the rush into war dragged the US into complications later on.

Q: Did President Saleh view the US as both a powerful partner and a potentially dangerous one?

A: Definitely. During his visit to the US, Saleh recognized how volatile the American position was for Yemen and the wider region. That was reflected in his positions on many Arab issues—whether the Palestinian cause or later the Iraq war. We were constantly trying to avoid provoking the US Our main concern was to spare Yemen from becoming a target.

Saleh’s Final Message to Saddam Hussein

Q: After the US invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban, did you grow concerned as Washington turned its focus to Iraq?

A: The Iraq campaign came later, around 2003, and stemmed from different motives. It wasn’t directly linked to Afghanistan. The US seemed determined to expand its influence in the region—politically, strategically, and economically. After 2001, there was a clear shift toward targeting Arab regimes, including through initiatives like the “Greater Middle East Project” and what former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called “creative chaos.” That deeply unsettled many Arab governments.

In the Arab League, we foreign ministers discussed how to send clear messages to Washington—that Arab states were not sponsors of terrorism and that we supported political and economic reform.

Q: As the US prepared to invade Iraq, how did President Saleh and the Yemeni government respond?

A: Our role was first through the Arab League. We wanted a unified Arab position to confront the looming US aggression, but unfortunately, the region was divided.

The second step was to try to convince Saddam Hussein to avoid war. I was the last Arab official to visit Iraq carrying a personal message from President Saleh to Saddam—this was about six to eight weeks before the invasion.

Q: Was that message directly from President Saleh?

A: Yes, it was.

Q: And you personally handed it to Saddam Hussein?

A: Yes, I delivered it to him in person. The message urged Saddam to preserve Iraq and its achievements and avoid dragging the country into a destructive war.

Saddam, however, refused. He thanked President Saleh for his concern and support. But he said: ‘This is a battle for the dignity of the Arab nation. We must pay the price to defend it.’ Saddam’s only request was that Saleh protect Yemen’s national unity.

Saleh’s Plea Rejected

Q: What exactly did Saleh’s message to Saddam Hussein contain?

A: It urged him to comply with United Nations demands—demands largely driven by the United States at that point.

Q: Did Saddam show any willingness to compromise?

A: No. He saw meeting American demands as a humiliation to the Arab nation.

Q: As a foreign minister hearing that this was about Arab dignity, did you feel Iraq was in danger?

A: Absolutely. After I delivered the message in an official capacity, I asked to speak to him as an Arab citizen speaking to an Arab leader. I told him: yes, this may be a battle for dignity, but it also requires wisdom. Iraq had built institutions, achieved development, and possessed military capabilities—those gains could be lost. I warned that the war wouldn’t end with an invasion and that all Arabs might pay the price. Saddam replied: “We in Iraq will bear that responsibility.”

Q: Did you meet with any Iraqi officials on that trip?

A: No, only President Saddam Hussein.

Q: When you relayed his response to President Saleh, how did he react?

A: He was pained by it. He sensed Iraq was heading toward war and feared the consequences.

Q: What is it like for an Arab foreign minister to sit face-to-face with Saddam Hussein?

A: You’re sitting with a leader who achieved much for his country. But in the Arab world, decisions of war and peace are often made by one man. That’s a core problem in our region—decisions are taken unilaterally, without consultation with military, security, or political institutions.

Q: Did you have the same feeling about Saddam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait?

A: Certainly. Much of what we suffer from today stems from that same tragedy: the concentration of power.

Q: Do Arab leaders feel they are entrusted with historic missions? Was Saleh also a unilateral decision-maker?

A: Sometimes, yes. But Saleh evolved. After years of war and political conflict, he initiated a national dialogue to bring political forces together. Still, some decisions remained personal.

Q: Did Saleh ever describe Saddam as stubborn or autocratic?

A: He didn’t say that explicitly, but I believe he thought Saddam had made a grave mistake.

Preparing for the Inevitable

Q: As the invasion of Iraq loomed, how did Saleh respond?

A: For months, the Arab League debated ways to avert war. Some states tried to contain the conflict, while others, I wouldn’t say encouraged it, but refrained from opposing the US. Yemen believed war was inevitable. We viewed it as a disaster and sent several envoys to Iraq before I went personally.

Q: After Saddam’s regime collapsed, did Saleh fear for his own future?

A: No.

Q: Yet when Saddam was executed, Saleh was visibly affected. What do you recall of that?

A: I remember it well—I was in Amman at the time. His execution on Eid had a strong emotional impact on Saleh. He felt it was vengeful and driven by deep hatred. We had hoped for a fair trial and a more humane process.

Q: In an Arab summit, Saleh made a comment: “Before they shave your head, shave it yourself.” Was that a reference to Saddam’s fate?

A: Yes, that was his phrasing. He meant: before others impose their will on you, take the initiative and fix things yourself.

A Bond Forged in Shared Causes

Q: What was behind the strong personal bond between Saleh and Saddam? Was it Yemen’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War?

A: That support stemmed from an already close relationship between the two leaders. They shared a pan-Arab stance, a firm position on Israel, and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Their chemistry was real—and they were very close.

Saddam’s Support for Yemen? “I Don’t Know”

Asked whether Saddam Hussein ever provided concrete support to Yemen, al-Qirbi said he was not aware of such assistance. Yemen, however, joined Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq in the so-called “Arab Cooperation Council,” a bloc seen by some as an effort to reshape regional balances.

“Unfortunately, the Arab world was facing one crisis after another,” he said. “Some leaders formed new councils either to escape collective Arab action or to strengthen it. In reality, these councils achieved little on the ground.”

A Trusted Ally: Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah

Among Arab leaders, Saleh’s closest relationship in the 2000s was with Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince and later King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. Their bond deepened after Yemen signed a border agreement with the Kingdom.

“That trust translated into tangible support,” al-Qirbi said. “With Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, we worked to strengthen Yemen’s position, alongside Qatari FM Hamad bin Jassim and UAE’s Abdullah bin Zayed.”

But the relationship began to sour around 2008 during the war with the Houthis. Miscommunication, al-Qirbi suggested, led Saudi Arabia to question Saleh’s stance on ending the conflict.

Outside the Gulf, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was another key ally. Both he and Saleh viewed Eritrea’s actions—particularly its threats to Yemeni islands and its war with Ethiopia—as destabilizing to the region.

Post-Eritrea Tensions, Quiet Mediation

Saleh also had cordial ties with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki until territorial disputes soured the relationship. Yemen later attempted to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with al-Qirbi visiting both countries several times in an effort to mend relations.

Syria, Iraq, and the Perils of Foreign Intervention

During his tenure, al-Qirbi said Yemen maintained only limited ties with Hafez al-Assad. But when Syria plunged into conflict years later, Saleh opposed any external military intervention.

“Saleh believed—whether in Iraq or Syria—that foreign intervention ultimately destroys the country,” he said.

Saleh and Gaddafi: A Strained Arab Brotherhood

The relationship between Saleh and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was marked by what al-Qirbi called “political sparring.”

“Gaddafi saw himself as the heir to Nasser’s Arab nationalist mantle,” he said. “Saleh thought he exaggerated his role as a pan-Arab leader.”

Q: Did Saleh mock Gaddafi privately?

A: No. He didn’t mock him but did criticize his frequent calls for Arab unity, especially after so many failed attempts.

Q: Why did Gaddafi support the Houthis?

A: I don’t know his motives. Perhaps to pressure Saleh—or to put pressure on Saudi Arabia.

Q: Did Gaddafi send weapons or money to the Houthis?

A: I have no information, but he did have contact with them.

Putin, China, and Yemen’s Future

In 2008, al-Qirbi accompanied Saleh on a visit to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin amid growing unrest in Yemen.

“The atmosphere was very warm. Putin understood Yemen’s political situation,” he said. “Yemen relied heavily on Russian military equipment, and the two leaders discussed ways to strengthen that cooperation.”

Putin invited Saleh to a military parade showcasing advanced weaponry. “It was clear that Putin saw Saleh as one of the Arab leaders closest to Moscow,” al-Qirbi said, adding that Saleh greatly admired the Russian president. “He said Putin would restore Russia’s global role.”

While Saleh held some admiration for Western leaders like France’s Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and US President George W. Bush—whom he met multiple times—his primary focus remained the Arab world.

China was another rising partner. In one of Saleh’s final visits to Beijing, he sought to open Yemen to Chinese investment. The Chinese agreed to lend Yemen $1 billion for development projects as part of their Belt and Road Initiative, but Yemen’s parliament ultimately stalled the agreement over repayment terms.

Arab Diplomacy Through Al-Qirbi’s Eyes

Reflecting on fellow Arab diplomats, al-Qirbi spoke warmly of Saudi Arabia’s late foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal.

“He was known for his wisdom and patience, even when hearing views he didn’t like,” al-Qirbi said. “He always sought consensus.”

Other standout figures included Oman’s Yousef bin Alawi, Sudan’s Mustafa Osman Ismail—“a leading figure during the Iraq crisis”—and Libya’s Ali Treki, a staunch Arab nationalist often at odds with Gaddafi’s more erratic stances.

Q: Did you know Libya’s former foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham?

A: Yes. A cultured man. I remember once in Cairo, during a dinner gathering, he played the oud and sang for us.

Q: What about Amr Moussa?

A: I admired him when he was Egypt’s foreign minister—especially his firm stance on the Palestinian cause. That admiration only grew when I worked with him at the Arab League. I consider him among the League’s best secretary-generals during my time—not just as foreign minister but as an observer of the League’s work. He always held firm to Arab principles.

Unfortunately, decisions at the Arab League are shaped by powerful member states and their foreign ministers—not the secretary-general.

From Medicine to Diplomacy... and Arabic Poetry

A physician by training, al-Qirbi’s love for classical Arabic poetry has endured.

Q: Who is your favorite poet?

A: Al-Mutanabbi.

Q: Why him?

A: His verses are full of timeless wisdom and values. To me, they are like proverbs for life.