No Strategic Change as Iran Begins 'Tactical' Withdrawal of its Militias in Syriahttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2279746/no-strategic-change-iran-begins-tactical-withdrawal-its-militias-syria
No Strategic Change as Iran Begins 'Tactical' Withdrawal of its Militias in Syria
A Russian soldier on his armoured vehicle watches Syrian opposition factions during evacuation from Daraa city, on July 15, 2018. (AFP)
Iran has intensified in recent days the redeployment of its militias in various regions in Syria, including Damascus and Deir Ezzour, and even moving west towards Iraq.
Officials dismissed these moves as nothing more than "tactical", saying that they don't signify any strategic change for Iran in Syria.
A western official told Asharq Al-Awsat that the tactical withdrawal could have been prompted by several factors, such as the Iranian economic crisis and the new coronavirus pandemic. He said the tensions with the United States playing out in Iraq are another factor. He also noted the reemergence of ISIS in the west, Israel's intensification of its strikes on Syria and the easing of the fighting in some Syrian regions, as well as Russian pressure.
At the same time, some foreign Iranian militias were handing over their positions to Syrian militias that are loyal to Tehran. He compared the situation to what happened in southern Syria after the American-Russian deal that called for the withdrawal of non-Syrian forces to 80 kilometers from the Jordan border and disengagement line in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
Redeployment
The Deir Ezzour 24 network reported on Monday that members of the Fatemiyoun and 313 organizations had moved from Deir Ezzour and al-Mayadeen on Saturday. The former returned to their headquarters in Palmyra, while the other group returned the Sayeda Zainab area south of Damascus.
The network said they were transported in civilian buses without their weapons. The majority of the members were Afghans and they were replaced by local forces.
Sayeda Zainab had recently witnessed tensions between Syrian forces and Iranian factions over the regime's decision to lock down the area over the coronavirus outbreak.
Iranian and Iraqi forces loyal to Damascus are deployed widely in the Deir Ezzour countryside, especially in the Alboukamal and al-Mayadeen areas. They also control the Alboukamal border crossing with Iraq.
Syria's Jisr network reported of a handover operation at Iranian checkpoints and positions in Deir Ezzour under the supervision of Russian military police. The positions were handed over to the Qaterji militias that are affiliated with the Syrian Qaterji group. They are led by Fawwaz al-Bashir, a tribal leader, and affiliates of the Quds brigade that is run by the Russian Wagner group.
The withdrawal began from Deir Ezzour and the forces headed east towards the Iraqi border. The new forces now hold 70 kilometers of territory in Deir Ezzour leading east, while the Iranian militias control 70 kms in other areas, significantly in Alboukamal.
Slain Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani had overseen the reopening of the crossing, which gives Tehran a land route from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean. Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike near Baghdad in January.
Israeli position
On May 5, Israeli officials declared that Iran had started to pull out its forces from Syria after succumbing to frequent Israeli strikes.
Defense Minister Naftali Bennett said last week: "Iran has nothing to do in Syria... (and) we won't stop before they leave Syria." He said Iran was "trying to establish itself on the border with Israel to threaten Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa".
"They have enough problems at home with the coronavirus (and) the collapsing economy," he said about Iran.
Bennett said Iran "used to be an asset for the Syrians... but now it's a burden".
He made his remarks after 14 Iranian and Iraqi fighters were killed in suspected Israeli strikes on Deir Ezzour and on military caches in Aleppo.
In April, three civilians were killed in Israeli strikes near Damascus and a week earlier, nine pro-regime forces were killed in strikes on Palmyra.
Israel had in recent years drawn "red lines" in Syria, including: barring the transfer of rockets to Hezbollah in Lebanon, preventing Iran from setting up permanent military bases and factories for the manufacture of long-range rockets, and standing against the formation of cells in the Golan. It has launched hundreds of raids, none of which were intercepted by Russian air defenses deployed in Syria.
American position
US State Department’s special representative for the Syrian war and the fight against ISIS, James Jeffrey, told Asharq Al-Awsat earlier this month that his country supports "in every possible way", diplomatically and logistically, Israeli raids on Iranian sites in Syria.
He said all foreign forces, including Iranian ones, must withdraw from Syria. Russia was the exception because it has been there before 2011 when the conflict began.
Western officials confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Iran was redeploying its forces in Syria.
Jeffrey said that the Iranians were indeed tactically pulling out from Syria partially because they do not need so many ground forces there. He also cited concern over the economic toll amid the US sanctions against Tehran and the massive financial burden caused the coronavirus outbreak in Iran.
He also added that the moves could just be tactical with no far-reaching significance.
American and regional officials in countries neighboring Syria have speculated that internal and external pressure may have prompted the Iranian moves, but they downplayed their significance, saying they do not amount to strategic change.
A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
People in Iraq often wonder dejectedly: What if Saddam Hussein were alive and ruling the country today? Many will reply with fantastical answers, but Saddam’s era would have responded: Iraq is isolated, either by siege or by a war that he launched or was being waged against him.
Many people cast doubt on whether actual change has been achieved in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. The invasion ousted the Baath version of Iraq and Saddam was executed in December 2006, leaving questions to pile up over the years with no one having any answers.
After a quarter century, Iraq is accumulating questions. It casts them aside and forges ahead without addressing them. At best, it reviews itself and returns to that moment in April 2003 when the US launched its invasion. Or it asks new questions about the 2005 civil war, the armed alternatives that emerged in 2007, how ISIS swept through the country in 2014, or the wave of protests that erupted in 2019. It also asks new questions about Iran’s influence in the country that has persisted for decades.
The questions are many and none of the Iraqis have answered them.
A US marine wraps the American flag around the head of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad. (Reuters file)
Saddam and the alternative
The September 11, 2001, attacks shook the United States and the entire world. They struck fear in Baghdad. Saddam had that year claimed that he had written a book, “The Fortified Castle”, about an Iraqi soldier who is captured by Iran. He manages to escape and return to Iraq to “fortify the castle”.
The terrifying Saddam and the terrified Iraqis have long spun tales about escaping to and from Iraq. It is a journey between the question and the non-answers. That year, when Baghdad was accused of being complicit in the 9/11 attacks, Saddam’s son Uday was “elected” member of the Baath party’s leadership council. The move sparked debate about possible change in Iraq. Bashar al-Assad had a year earlier inherited the presidency of Syria and its Baath party from his father Hafez.
The US invaded Iraq two years later and a new Iraq was born. Twenty-five years later, the country is still not fully grown up. Twenty-one years ago, on April 9, 2003, a US marine wrapped the head of a Saddam statue in Baghdad with an American flag. The Iraqis asked: why didn’t you leave us this iconic image, but instead of an American flag, used an Iraqi one?
Baghdad’s question and Washington’s answer
As the Iraqis observe the developments unfold in Syris with the ouster of Bashar from power, they can’t help but ask how this rapid “change” could have been possible without US tanks and weapons. Why are the Syrians insisting on celebrating “freedom” every day? They are also astonished at the Syrians who scramble to greet Abu Mohammed al-Golani, who has not yet managed to put this image behind him and fully assume his original identity of Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Iraqis wonder how the Syrians are managing this transition so far without a bloodbath.
They ask these questions because the Iraqis view and judge the world based on their own memories. They keep asking questions and await answers from others instead of themselves.
The Iraqis recall how in August 2003, after four months of US occupation, that the Jordanian embassy and United Nations offices were attacked, leaving several staff dead, including head of the UN mission Sergio de Mello. The Americans arrested Ali Hassan al-Majid, or “chemical Ali”, Saddam’s cousin, and 125 people were killed in a bombing in al-Najaf, including Shiite cleric Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim.
During that bloody month, the Iraqis asked questions about security, forgetting about Saddam’s alternative, democracy and the promised western model. Later, the facts would answer that the question of security was a means to escape questions about transitional justice.
Sergio de Mello (r) and Paul Bremmer (second right) attend the inaugural meeting of the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad on July 13, 2003. (Getty Images)
The question of civil war
Paul Bremer, the American ruler of Iraq, once escorted four opposition figures to Saddam’s prison cell. They flooded him with questions. Adnan al-Pachachi, a veteran diplomat, asked: “Why did you invade Kuwait?” Adel Abdul Mahdi, a former prime minister, asked: “Why did you kill the Kurds in the Anfal massacre?” Mowaffak al-Rubaie, a former national security adviser, asked: “Why did you kill your Baath comrades?” Ahmed al-Halabi simply insulted the former president. Saddam recoiled and then just smiled.
Saddam’s opponents left the prison cell with answers that should have helped them in running the transitional justice administration, but they failed.
The following year, Washington appointed Ayad Allawi to head the interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) that had limited jurisdiction so that it could be free to wage two fierce battles: one in Najaf against the “Mahdi Army”, headed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and the other against armed groups comprised of “resistance fighters” and “extremists” in Fallujah.
The opposition in the IGC got to work that was already prepared by the Americans. They outlined the distribution of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in the country, with historic questions about the majority and minority, and the “oppressed” now assuming rule after the ouster of the “oppressors”.
On the ground, the Ghazaliya neighborhood in western Baghdad with its Shiite and Sunni residents was in store for a bloodbath. On a winter night in 2005, an entire family was massacred and an enfant strangled to death. Soon after, lines drawing the Shiite and Sunni sections of the neighborhood emerged. The popular market became the tense border between the two halves. Two new rival “enemies” traded attacks, claiming several lives.
In Baghdad’s Green Zone, the IGC drew up a draft of the transitional rule. In January 2005, 8 million Iraqis voted for the establishment of a National Assembly.
Meanwhile, different “armies” kept on emerging in Baghdad. The media was filled with the death tolls of bloody relentless sectarian attacks. Checkpoints manned by masked gunmen popped up across the capital.
Those days seemed to answer the question of “who was the alternative to Saddam.” No one needed a concrete answer because the developments spoke for themselves.
Nouri al-Maliki came to power as prime minister in 2006. He famously declared: “I am the state of law” - in both the figurative and literal sense. Iraqis believed he had answers about the “state” and “law”, dismissing the very pointed “I” in his “manifesto”.
Nouri al-Maliki. (Getty Images)
The Maliki question
The American admired Maliki. Then Vice President Dick Cheney had repeatedly declared that he was committed to the establishment of a stable Iraq. Before that however, he had dispatched James Steele - who was once complicit in running dirty wars in El Salvador in the mid-1980s - to Baghdad to confront the “Sunni rebellion”. Steele set up the Shiite “death squads”. Steele was the man in the shadows behind Ahmed Kazim, then interior minister undersecretary, and behind him stood the new warlords.
In 2006, the political process was shaken by the bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra. Questions were asked about the “need” to draw up new maps. Shiite high authority Ali al-Sistani said in February 2007 that the Sunnis were not involved in the attack. In July 2013, Maliki denied an American accusation that Tehran was behind it.
In those days, Maliki’s ego was growing ever bigger, and Steele’s death squads were rapidly growing greater in numbers.
The Iran and ISIS questions
Maliki tried to save himself as one city after another fell into the hands of ISIS. On June 9, 2014, as ISIS was waging battles in Mosul, Maliki met with senior Sunni tribal elders based on advice he had not heeded earlier and which could have averted the current disaster.
It was said that he made reluctant pledges to them and a third of Iraq later fell in ISIS’ hands. Sistani later issued a fatwa for “jihad” against the group, which later turned out not be aimed at saving the premier.
Maliki left the scene and Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force, took over. Successive prime ministers would know from then on what it is like to be shackled by Tehran’s pressure as IRGC officials made regular visits to their offices.
Soleimani reaped what Steele sowed. By 2017, armed factions were the dominant force in Iraq. Running in their orbit were other factions that took turns in “rebelling” against the government or agreeing with its choices.
Today, and after 14 years, Iran has consolidated what can be described as the “resistance playground” in Iraq that is teeming with armed factions and massive budgets.
Protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square in October 2019. (AFP)
The October question
The Iraqis were unable to answer the ISIS question and the armed factions claimed “victory” against the group. Many ignored Sistani’s “answer” about whether the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) was there to protect Iraq or just its Shiites.
Exhausted Iraqis asked: “What next?”
Next came Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government in October 2018. It was weighed down by unanswered questions and a year later, thousands of youths took to the streets to protest the state of affairs in Iraq, specifically the dominance of armed groups.
They were met with live bullets. Many were abducted and others were silenced. Abdul Mehdi acquitted the killers, saying instead that a “fifth column” had carried out the bloody crackdown on protesters.
After he left office, some Iraqi politicians were brave enough to tell the truth, dismissing former PM’s acquittal and pinning blame on the factions.
Sistani called for PMF members to quit their partisan affiliations. His demand was left unheeded. Mustafa al-Qadhimi became prime minister in May 2020. He left office months later, also failing in resolving the issue of the PMF and armed factions.
By 2022, everyone had left the scene, but Iran remained, claiming the Iraqi crown for itself, controlling everything from its finances to its weapons.
Question about post-Assad Syria
On December 8, Syria’s Bashar fled the country. Everyone in Iraq is asking what happens next. The whole system in Iraq is at a loss: Do we wait for how Tehran will deal with Ahmed al-Sharaa, or do we ask Abu Mohammed al-Golani about his memories in Iraq?
The Iraqi people’s memories are what’s ruling the country, more so than the constitution, political parties and civil society because they are burdened with questions they don’t want to answer.
And yet they ask: What if we weren’t part of the “Axis of Resistance”? Iraq’s history would reply that it has long been part of axes, or either awaiting a war or taking part in them.
