Fontenrose to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Expect More Iranian Attacks, We Will Retaliate with Force

Four Iran Guards vessels are seen next to the guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Hamilton in the Gulf, April 15, 2020. (Reuters)
Four Iran Guards vessels are seen next to the guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Hamilton in the Gulf, April 15, 2020. (Reuters)
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Fontenrose to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Expect More Iranian Attacks, We Will Retaliate with Force

Four Iran Guards vessels are seen next to the guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Hamilton in the Gulf, April 15, 2020. (Reuters)
Four Iran Guards vessels are seen next to the guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Hamilton in the Gulf, April 15, 2020. (Reuters)

Kirsten Fontenrose is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. A graduate of the Harvard Business School, in 2018 she served as senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council, leading the development of US policy toward the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan. Prior to that, she served for years at the Defense Department, with her work always focusing on the Middle East. She is well-known to decision-makers in the Arab Gulf and closely watches Iran’s actions, whether inside Iran or beyond its borders.

In an interview to Asharq Al-Awsat, Fontenrose stressed the United States’ commitment to its Gulf partners and addressed Iran’s threats to the region and Washington’s policy in countering them. She warned that if Iran attempted to attack American forces in Iraq “one more time”, then it will be met with a “very strong” retaliation, meaning the Iraqi Hezbollah will be “wiped off the map” and Iranian Revolutionary Guards naval bases will be targeted. Below is the interview:

Does the United States, specifically President Donald Trump’s administration, still consider the Arab Gulf countries partners and allies?

Of course, we have seen how the US withdrew from long conflicts, such as the one in northeastern Syria. The forces were pulled out because they were needed elsewhere and because we are living during a time of major rivalries. For years, we used to perceive terrorism as the real danger, but not anymore. The US therefore, needed to reposition itself. In fact, what we would like to know is whether some Gulf countries were still committed with us or not, because all of our pullouts were linked to Gulf security. We have seen how some Gulf countries are seeking to purchase the S-400 missile system from Russia and are establishing relations with China and assessing ties with Huawei.

Bahrain, for example, listened to our advice in early 2018 when we told them that 5G and Huawei were Chinese means for gathering intelligence, under commercial guises. Bahrain realized that. China, however, is threatening American security, so what side of the equation is more committed to the relationship? Everyone claimed that the US pulled out of northeastern Syria because President Trump will not allow rockets to rain down on our army in Iraq, but the truth is, we believe that Gulf states must be more committed with us.

But the Gulf is important for American national security…

We can discuss this. Gulf countries are our partners and we trust them. We want the partnership to continue. At one point, these countries were the only ones providing oil in the world. They were then necessary for American national security. I am not saying they are not important now, but the relationship leans less towards economy and more towards partnership. We want these countries to be our partners in fighting terrorism and extremism and in stabilizing the economic markets. There are many things we want them to be partners with us in. We share with them their vision of the global system. It doesn’t matter that they have a different system of rule or religions, but we are looking at where the world is headed. We need them as partners, and they need us. We have drawn in Europe and Japan into this circle, and sometimes India. It is a partnership over common interests, more so than the fact that the Gulf is important geo-strategically for US national security.

Khamenei ordered the rehabilitation of houses on islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates and occupied by Iran. The Revolutionary Guards even spoke of building residential compounds and two airports. How do you interpret this? Should the Gulf countries prepare for more hostile acts?

Yes, I believe so. They should definitely be prepared because Iran has no intention of backing down since it has declared goals, which is forcing the US out of the region. This means pressuring Gulf countries to sever relations with Washington, meaning Iran wants to have its presence felt anywhere it can.

In Iraq, it pledged to allow the formation of an Iraqi government because it wants international attention away from it and its hands are a bit tied after the attack on American forces in Iraq. It is therefore looking beyond Iraq, for example, the Arabian Sea. Let’s go to the Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb and Abu Moussa islands. It is trying to do a lot. It wants to demonstrate that with Khamenei in quarantine – because several officials have contracted the coronavirus – that it is not weak or that nothing can distract it from its expansionist goals.

Some Iranian officials are trying to rally the people, claiming that dangers are constantly lurking around them. They take advantage of that to threaten America and Sunni regimes. This is why the Iranian regime tries to keep these threats alive. If the situation calms down, then it will be difficult to rally the people around it. They keep on making threats to enemies to provoke reactions to later claim: “See, they are threatening us. They want to topple us and so, we must remain united.”

This is how they function and we should expect more. We have also been very clear recently and Iran knows full well what America is thinking about now: If Iran attempts to attack American presence in Iraq one more time, the response will be very strong. It will not just target logistic positions as it did in the past, because that has proven ineffective in deterring Iran. If they try to mobilize their groups or strike American forces in Iraq, then America’s response will be much harsher. It could mean wiping the Iraqi Hezbollah off the map or attacking Revolutionary Guards naval bases. Escalation will definitely happen. I believe that Iran knows that America is considering these options and it does not want to risk it. That is why it is looking beyond Iraq and see where else it can pursue its provocations, while still avoiding escalation.

It wants to remain on the edge…

Exactly. Iranian officials believe that the whole world is preoccupied with the virus and will not notice its activities, even though they know that the international community is watching Iraq. They are therefore, moving outside of Iraq by targeting small areas beyond the border. They are waiting for a reaction. They think that if the world is watching and turned a blind eye, then it can go ahead with another operation. However, they recently realized that Washington will not allow that. The Iranians are standing in the way of our relations with Iraq and they want to drag it into a war for them. We will never allow that from now on. A strong strike is in store and the Iranians must realize that. It appears that they are.

How can the Gulf countries prepare for that?

There are two ways to get ready: First, they must make sure that the international community is watching, because Iran will not act if it knew it will be condemned internationally. One of the reasons why it has continued its attacks was because Europe did not take a strong stance against it. Gulf countries must make sure that Europe is closely watching developments, the US as well. Gulf countries must realize that the US will be by their side. Unfortunately, some Gulf countries have opened secret channels with Tehran in pursuit of their own interests. I do not like what is happening, because from an American perspective it seems that they want America to remain in the region to protect them as they receive attacks from Iran. Also, some Gulf countries have struck bilateral agreements with Iran to protect their interests, but it is essential that they reach non-aggression pacts with Iran.

Do you think Iran would respect a non-aggression pact?

Maybe they will. Last fall, Iran proposed a comprehensive agreement as the UN General Assembly drew near. The deal, however, was like Jared Kushner’s peace plan, no one wanted to read it.

It did have some good ideas. I read Iran’s plan as someone who adopts a hardline approach against it. I saw some positive things in it, but also saw Iran’s desire for America to leave the region so that it would emerge as the main player. The parts on non-aggression pacts are good ideas, but they were not groundbreaking. A non-aggression agreement had been struck in the past between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

This was during the rule of Hashemi Rafsanjani?

Yes, this can be achieved as nothing is impossible. But we know that Iran has many goals in the Gulf. If it starts with a non-aggression agreement, then it would have achieved its goals. If it wants America out of the region, then it should start with deals with the Gulf, meaning America would no longer be needed in the region for protection.

But how can the Gulf trust Iran when it wants to impose its hegemony?

That’s true. There is no need for an alliance if the threat still stands. Moreover, how can it accept an alliance while the international community is watching and while American troops are there and the Fifth Fleet is deployed in Bahrain?

President Trump has ordered the US Navy to retaliate to any harassment by Revolutionary Guards boats.

All he did was voice out loud orders that the naval command implicitly knows. They always have the right to defend themselves in the Gulf. The president said nothing new. Defense Secretary Mark Esper recently signed a plan that says if Iran provoked us, we will respond immediately. This means that naval commanders do not need to turn to Washington for approval. The president’s statement was aimed at Iran.

Will naval commanders respond?

Yes, but the commanders are experienced and they will not be perturbed. If Iran continued in carrying out the same operations it is used to, to assert its presence, the commanders will not respond. Such operations are only significant to Iran.

Like the story of the elephant and the ant…

Exactly. We have seen in the past how the Revolutionary Guards planted mines around an oil tanker in the Gulf. If the commanders notice an Iranian vessel loaded with explosives, then they will definitely blow it up. If they see a speedboat racing towards a ship, they will definitely strike. But they will not respond to acts committed by an “ant”.

We noticed that Iran launched its first ever military satellite shortly after Trump made his threats. Does this mean that all American pressure has so far failed, meaning before the new policy you just mentioned?

No, I don’t believe the launch was a response to the president’s threats. A satellite cannot be launched within a week.

But it could have delayed a launch…

Yes, or Iran could have launched it without fanfare. I think it launched it so that we would know and for the world to know. It was a show of force…. They are definitely trying to build their capabilities to reach farther grounds, not America, of course. It was a warning that it harbors enmity towards our partners and allies.

What of the mullah regime in Iran that backs proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen? We have recently seen Germany blacklist Hezbollah.

The designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist group is a result of Germany’s observation of the suffering of Lebanon and the Lebanese expatriates in Germany. US Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell was on the verge of being appointed national security advisor after John Bolton’s resignation. He is a hawk and was insisting on a German stance. The Germans realized that he is an influential figure and not just a diplomatic envoy.

I also know that the Lebanese diaspora in the US is very influential. They are all highly educated, politically active and respected. This is why Washington is keen on Lebanon, even if it is a small country. True, there is Hezbollah and General Michel Aoun is president, but Lebanon is not in a good place and is close to becoming a failed state. The people are suffering and the Europeans, the Germans, specifically, have stated to sense that they cannot abandon the Lebanese people. I am very proud with the German position.

How can Lebanon be saved from Hezbollah?

Good question. I believe Lebanon needs an international work group. There is an elite, but no prominent actors. No one knows how to run a country. All of those who protested wanted change, but no one knows how to implement it. And Hezbollah is taking advantage of this. The international community must therefore, focus on helping Lebanon combat Hezbollah’s actions and back the role of civil political parties and hold elections. The Lebanese army must be trained to be capable of defending itself. The police must also be trained. Everyone wants to support Lebanon. People are now interested in Lebanon, but the White House is not looking at Lebanon. American officials are wrong when they say that “as long as Hezbollah is in control, then we will not talk to the Lebanese.”

Will the US allow the International Monetary Fund to offer loans to Lebanon?

Pressure will be exerted on Washington to save Lebanon and it will allow the loans. It will not allow the IMF to offer Iran any loan. In 2018, the White House was interested in Lebanon, but then the elections happened and Hezbollah emerged victorious, and so it turned its back on the country.

Back to the future of the mullah regime…

I am worried. We used to believe that the elderly mullahs will go in peace and a new era in Iran will emerge. I don’t think that will happen. The generation that will succeed Khamenei will be just like him or even more extreme. There is Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba. He is a hardliner and a close friend of the head of Iranian intelligence, Ali Shamkhani. They are the ones running everything.

Since Qassem Soleimani’s killing, Khamenei’s group has been confined in quarantine, but he is still in control. There is Mojtaba and Soleimani’s successor, Esmail Ghaani, he is not as charismatic, but he is a logistic planner. There is also Zeinab, Soleimani’s daughter, who is used to attract people and appeal to the proxies and hardliners.

A struggle for power will ensue when Khamenei is gone. Some figures who are older and calmer than this circle have been marginalized. They believe that one of them should succeed Khamenei, but then there is his ambitious son, who will say that he holds the money and he was his father’s right-hand man. He will also say that the intelligence agency backs him. We will see a struggle for power, but they will keep it under wraps. I don’t think any of the older figures wants Mojtaba to come to power. I also don’t think that Mojtaba will allow others to marginalize him.

When Khamenei dies, they will keep everything secret until the struggle is sorted out. They will then announce his death and we wouldn’t have even known that he died.

Similar to what happened with Mullah Omar, the leader of Taliban, whose death was revealed two years after his passing…

Yes. We should applaud the Taliban for their feat, but I don’t think the Iranians will keep Khamenei’s death secret for two years.

After the satellite launch, General Amir Ali Haji Zada declared that Iran was now a major power…

Iran is no more a major power than North Korea. Being a rogue state does not make you a major power. Being under the watchful eye of the international group due to the problems you make does not make you a world power. Furthermore, if it were a world power, then its withdrawal from the global markets should have sparked a crisis. With all of the sanctions against Iran and its exclusion from all markets, no such crisis has taken place.

True, it does have a large army, but it is outdated. All revenues have gone to the Guards. All the military vehicles are old and broken. Moreover, they lack creativity. All they have exported is the revolution.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.


Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
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Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)

Riyadh’s hosting of the Microsoft AI Tour this week delivered a headline with concrete weight: customers will be able to run cloud workloads from a local Azure data center region starting in the fourth quarter of 2026.

The announcement was more than a technical update. It marked a shift in posture. Saudi Arabia is no longer testing artificial intelligence at the margins. It is moving decisively into execution, where infrastructure, governance, skills development, and enterprise adoption align in a single direction.

For Turki Badhris, president of Microsoft Saudi Arabia, the timing reflects years of groundwork rather than a sudden push.

“Confirming that customers will be able to run cloud workloads from the Azure data center region in the fourth quarter of 2026 gives organizations clarity and confidence as they plan their digital and AI journeys,” Badhris told Asharq Al-Awsat on the sidelines of the event.

“Clarity and confidence” may sound procedural, but they are strategic variables. Government entities and large corporations do not scale AI based solely on pilot projects.

They move when they are assured that local infrastructure is available, regulatory requirements are aligned, and long-term operational continuity is secured. The announcement of the new Azure region signals that the infrastructure layer is no longer a plan, but a scheduled commitment nearing implementation.

From pilots to production

Saudi Arabia’s AI story has unfolded in phases. The first focused on expanding digital infrastructure, developing regulatory frameworks, and strengthening cloud readiness. That phase built capacity. The current phase centers on activation and use.

Badhris said the conversation has already shifted. “We are working closely across the Kingdom with government entities, enterprises, and partners to support readiness, from data modernization and governance to skills development so that customers can move from experimentation to production with confidence.”

The distinction is fundamental. Pilots test potential. Production environments reshape workflows.

Companies such as Qiddiya Investment Company and ACWA Power illustrate that transition. Rather than treating AI as isolated pilot initiatives, these organizations are embedding it into daily operations.

ACWA Power is using Azure AI services and the Intelligent Data Platform to optimize energy and water operations globally, with a strong focus on sustainability and resource efficiency through predictive maintenance and AI-driven optimization.

Qiddiya has expanded its use of Microsoft 365 Copilot to enable employees to summarize communications, analyze data, and interact with dashboards across hundreds of assets and contractors.

AI is no longer operating at the margins of the enterprise. It is becoming part of the operating core, a sign of institutional maturity. The technology is shifting from showcase tool to productivity engine.

Infrastructure as strategic signal

The Azure data center region in eastern Saudi Arabia offers advantages that go beyond lower latency. It strengthens data residency, supports compliance requirements, and reinforces digital sovereignty frameworks.

In highly regulated sectors such as finance, health care, energy, and government services, alignment with regulatory requirements is not optional; it is essential.

Badhris described the milestone as part of a long-term commitment. “This achievement represents an important milestone in our long-term commitment to enable real and scalable impact for the public and private sectors in the Kingdom,” he said.

The emphasis on scalable impact reflects a more profound understanding: infrastructure does not create value on its own, but enables the conditions for value creation. Saudi Arabia is treating AI as core economic infrastructure, comparable to energy or transport networks, and is using it to form the foundation for productivity gains.

Governance as accelerator

Globally, AI regulation is often seen as a constraint. In the Saudi case, governance appears embedded in the acceleration strategy. Adoption in sensitive sectors requires clear trust frameworks. Compliance cannot be an afterthought; it must be built into design.

Aligning cloud services with national digital sovereignty requirements reduces friction at scale. When organizations trust that compliance is integrated into the platform itself, expansion decisions move faster. In that sense, governance becomes an enabler.

The invisible constraint

While generative AI dominates headlines, the larger institutional challenge often lies in data architecture. Fragmented systems, organizational silos, and the absence of unified governance can hinder scaling.

Saudi Arabia's strategy focuses on data modernization as a foundation. A structured and integrated data environment is a prerequisite for effective AI use. Without it, AI remains superficial.

Another global challenge is the skills gap. Saudi Arabia has committed to training three million people by 2030. The focus extends beyond awareness to practical application. Transformation cannot succeed without human capital capable of integrating AI into workflows.

Badhris underscored that skills development is part of a broader readiness ecosystem. Competitiveness in the AI era, he said, is measured not only by model capability but by the workforce’s ability to deploy it.

Sector transformation as economic strategy

The Riyadh AI Tour highlighted sector use cases in energy, giga projects, and government services. These are not peripheral applications but pillars of Vision 2030. AI’s role in optimizing energy management supports sustainability. In major projects, it enhances execution efficiency. In government services, it improves the citizen experience.

AI here is not a standalone industry but a horizontal productivity driver.

Positioning in the global landscape

Global AI leadership is typically measured across four pillars: compute capacity, governance, ecosystem integration, and skills readiness. Saudi Arabia is moving to align these elements simultaneously.

The new Azure region provides computing. Regulatory frameworks strengthen trust. Partnerships support ecosystem integration. Training programs raise skills readiness.

Saudi Arabia is entering a decisive stage in its AI trajectory. Infrastructure is confirmed. Enterprise use cases are expanding. Governance is embedded. Skills are advancing.

Badhris said the announcement gives institutions “clarity and confidence” to plan their journey. That clarity may mark the difference between ambition and execution. In that sense, the Microsoft tour in Riyadh signaled that infrastructure is no longer the objective, but the platform on which transformation is built.