Syrian Fighter to Asharq Al-Awsat: Yes, I am a Mercenary and I Fought in Libya

Turkey-backed Syrian fighters gather on a road between the northern Syrian towns of Tal Abyad and Kobane. (AFP)
Turkey-backed Syrian fighters gather on a road between the northern Syrian towns of Tal Abyad and Kobane. (AFP)
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Syrian Fighter to Asharq Al-Awsat: Yes, I am a Mercenary and I Fought in Libya

Turkey-backed Syrian fighters gather on a road between the northern Syrian towns of Tal Abyad and Kobane. (AFP)
Turkey-backed Syrian fighters gather on a road between the northern Syrian towns of Tal Abyad and Kobane. (AFP)

“Yes, I am a mercenary in every meaning of the world. Whoever says otherwise is lying to himself.” This is how a prominent military official, who fought among the ranks of Syrian fighters in Libya, chose to describe himself.

A native of the Aleppo countryside in northwestern Syria, he identified himself as A.M. He recalled how he was just a regular vegetable vendor when the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011. When the unrest spread to his hometown in late 2012, he joined a military faction of the Free Syrian Army and fought against regime forces in several battles in Idlib and Aleppo cities and their countrysides.

When the fighting stopped, so did the fighters’ income. “A fighter earned only 100 Turkish liras. We lived in poverty and could barely afford food,” he said. A telephone call in February, however, would change his life. His close friend revealed to him that registration was open for fighting in Libya. A.M. promptly headed to Syria’s Afrin, had his personal details registered and was transferred within days, earning a salary of 2,000 dollars.

A.M., who is in his 40s, was among the first batch of Syrian fighters who were transported to Libya. They initially amounted to 150 and were overseen by the Turkish military. They were transferred by land from Afrin to Turkey’s Gaziantep and then by air to Istanbul airport where they boarded a Libyan Airlines plane and were flown to Misrata city, which is held by the Government of National Accord.

There, the Syrians were transferred to the frontlines, but kept separate from the pro-GNA forces. A.M. said that he fought for a month before being promoted. He was asked to recruit more Syrians. He returned to Syria about a month ago and began promoting fighting in Libya. Throughout his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, he kept on receiving messages via WhatsApp from Syrians wanting to fight.

“Every week, two flights, carrying 60 fighters each, travel to Libya,” he revealed, saying that most of the fighters have past battle experience. “The door for recruitment is open.”

A regular fighter earns a salary of 2,000 dollars, while the commander of a unit earns 4,000 dollars. Rising up the ranks, fighters can get paid as much as 30,000 dollars. The families of those killed in battle receive 60,000 dollars in compensation.

“These are unofficial numbers as there are no contracts to verify them,” said A.M. “The fighter has to assume responsibility for his decision and everyone knows that he is a mercenary and will be drafted to proxy wars.”

Some 100 Syrian mercenaries have been captured by the Libyan National Army, commanded by Khalifa Haftar, that is fighting the GNA. Some 300 Syrians have been killed in the conflict.

Asharq Al-Awsat contacted through WhatsApp the relatives of fighters who were killed in Libya. The majority hail from the provinces of Idlib and Homs and Ghouta near Damascus.

S.H. is a widow of mercenary who was killed in Libya some two weeks ago. All that remains of his memory is a family photo that she shot before he traveled. He left behind three children.

The widow, in her 30s, recalled how three months ago her husband, 37, telephoned her late at night to inform her that he was traveling to Libya to fight. He had picked up arms during the beginning of the Syrian conflict and remained a fighter until his death.

She struggled with her anger as she recalled the telephone call that informed her of his death: “I told him don’t go. We have children who deserve to live a dignified life. Leave this dirty war.”



Can Hezbollah Transition to a Fully Political Party?

Supporters of Lebanon's Hezbollah group block the streets with burning tires as they rally in cars and motorbikes to protest the government's endorsement of a plan to disarm it, in Beirut's southern suburbs early on August 8, 2025. (AFP)
Supporters of Lebanon's Hezbollah group block the streets with burning tires as they rally in cars and motorbikes to protest the government's endorsement of a plan to disarm it, in Beirut's southern suburbs early on August 8, 2025. (AFP)
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Can Hezbollah Transition to a Fully Political Party?

Supporters of Lebanon's Hezbollah group block the streets with burning tires as they rally in cars and motorbikes to protest the government's endorsement of a plan to disarm it, in Beirut's southern suburbs early on August 8, 2025. (AFP)
Supporters of Lebanon's Hezbollah group block the streets with burning tires as they rally in cars and motorbikes to protest the government's endorsement of a plan to disarm it, in Beirut's southern suburbs early on August 8, 2025. (AFP)

Mounting calls in Lebanon for Hezbollah to hand over its weapons and dissolve its armed wing have reignited debate over whether the party’s structure, principles and founding ideology could allow a smooth shift to purely political activity – or whether such a change would require a complete overhaul of the party and a new charter to match the country’s shifting landscape.

Founded in 1982, Hezbollah has gone through two major ideological milestones: its 1985 “open letter,” which served as its founding political and religious manifesto, and its 2009 “political document,” an updated vision shaped by regional and domestic changes.

In its early platform, Hezbollah openly called for an Islamic republic in Lebanon, rejected the sectarian political system, pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader, and endorsed armed resistance as the only path to confront Israel.

By 2009, the group acknowledged that Lebanon’s multi-sectarian fabric made an Islamic state impossible, advocating instead “consensual democracy” as a transitional step toward abolishing sectarianism, while reaffirming armed resistance in coordination with the army and the people.

Hezbollah entered parliamentary politics in 1992 after the civil war and joined the cabinet in 2005, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri.

Former MP Fares Souaid, head of the Lady of the Mountain Gathering, said Hezbollah “does politics in military fatigues,” making it hard to imagine a transformation from what he called “an Iranian military arm in Lebanon” into a regular political party.

“Hezbollah’s presence in parliament and cabinet was to monitor decisions that could hinder its military and security work, not to be fully involved in constitutional politics,” Souaid told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He added that many in the group’s Shiite base still view its arsenal as a guarantee, even though dissenting voices have emerged.

Jad al-Akhaoui, head of the Lebanese Democratic Coalition, said Hezbollah’s founding principles – rooted in religious ideology and armed struggle under Iran’s “Wilayat al-Faqih” (Guardianship of the Jurist) – are incompatible with the concept of a civilian political party in a democracy.

“If Hezbollah truly wants to become a political party, it must separate religion from the state, abandon its weapons and redefine itself as Lebanese first and foremost, not as a regional proxy,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Akhaoui argued that Hezbollah’s political participation has been a means to entrench its position within the state without integrating fully into it, using parliament and cabinet to shield its weapons.

“The party used politics to legitimize its arms, not to reconsider them,” he said, adding that frustration is growing within its Shiite constituency over the economic collapse, international isolation and involvement in wars unrelated to Lebanon.

Political analyst Kassem Kassir, however, said there is no inherent reason why Hezbollah could not become a purely political party.

“Armed resistance was due to Israeli occupation and external circumstances,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“If the occupation ends and the state can defend the people and rebuild, there is no problem with giving up the weapons.”

Kassir said Hezbollah’s political track record shows it can mobilize popular support and use politics to serve the community and defend the resistance.

“Today, the continued Israeli occupation and the state’s failure to protect its citizens are what keep the arms in place,” he said.