Amin Gemayel: I Overcame My Reservations against Aoun and Appointed him Head of Military Govt.

Asharq Al-Awsat releases excerpts from the former Lebanese president’s memoirs

Amin Gemayel (R) seen at the Baabda presidential palace after Michel Aoun was named head of a military government. (Getty Images)
Amin Gemayel (R) seen at the Baabda presidential palace after Michel Aoun was named head of a military government. (Getty Images)
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Amin Gemayel: I Overcame My Reservations against Aoun and Appointed him Head of Military Govt.

Amin Gemayel (R) seen at the Baabda presidential palace after Michel Aoun was named head of a military government. (Getty Images)
Amin Gemayel (R) seen at the Baabda presidential palace after Michel Aoun was named head of a military government. (Getty Images)

In the second part of his memoirs, excerpts of which are exclusively being published by Asharq Al-Awsat, former Lebanese President Amin Gemayel recalls the final day of his term in office on September 22, 1988. With Lebanon in the throes of its 1975-90 civil war, he spoke of the difficulties he encountered in forming a transitional government that would be tasked with preparing for the election of a new president after parliament had failed to do so.

Gemayel recounted how he saw in the military council, headed by then-army commander Michel Aoun, as the best choice in leading the country. He even received the approval of all six of its members for the task before later receiving a shock from Syrian media that reported the resignation of its three Muslim officers. He was not even informed of their decision beforehand. Below is part two of three of Gemayel’s memoirs:

After a tumultuous night, dawn finally broke on September 22, 1988, my final day in office in what has been a difficult term. I had breakfast alone in my office as I wrestled with my concerns and bitterness. I was left to tackle my final constitutional duty: the formation of a transitional government. Hussein al-Husseini was strongly pressing for parliament to elect Mikhael al-Daher. It seemed unlikely that he would garner the necessary quorum. At noon, the issue resolved itself: only ten MPs showed up at Nijmeh Square and the session was adjourned to 10:30 am the next day.

Salim al-Hoss had informed me that he was going back from his resignation from a government he was not even heading. He was serving as acting prime minister after the assassination of outgoing Premier Rashid Karami. He had assumed an official role in violation of the constitution. I could not accept this, which therefore demanded that I form a new government in line with the constitution and Lebanese traditions.

I thought of naming president Charles Helou as prime minister of a draft government lineup I had prepared in case such a day would come when we would be confronted with potential vacuum. I contacted him and explained my reasoning for naming him. I told him he alone could run the transitional period until my successor could be elected. He agreed.

He was a wise and moderate man, who knew to the core the sensitivity of the national equation. He had experienced its importance firsthand during two very critical times in our nation’s history. He was above conflicts and could hold dialogue with all sides. He was widely respected and can bring together all Lebanese. I could find no one else with these qualities.

I did not want to reach such a crossroads of issuing a decree for the formation of a transitional government that would replace the president. I had followed the example of President Bechara al-Khoury, who on September 18, 1952 had resigned from his position and tasked a Maronite to head a transitional government to succeed a president whose term had ended without the election of a successor. During such cases of vacuum, the jurisdiction of the president is transferred, according to the constitution, to an interim government. Since the vacant position is that of a Maronite official, I had to keep such jurisdiction in the hands of that sect and appoint a Maronite head of government, which would play the role of president. The cabinet would then act as a guarantor of our national norms. That is why I first thought of Charles Helou for the task.

At 9 am on September 22, I summoned him to the Baabda palace for consultations. He apologized, saying he could not accept the task, citing his and his wife’s poor health. Taking care of her at all times would prevent him from taking on the “massive responsibility,” he told me. I believed that he knew that he would have been forced to strike agreements that would have been uneasy for him. He suggested to me an alternative, who enjoys the suitable qualities: a Maronite, open-minded and enjoys good relations with all Muslim and Christian parties.

“He is also a Helou,” he added.

He named Pierre Helou.

I thought about it and did not make up my mind. Pierre Helou had been an MP from Aley since 1972. He was a former minister and a patriot to the core. He was also an old friend of both Kamal Jumblatt and Imam Moussa al-Sadr. A moderate, he would not have provoked any of the parties.

I summoned him to the presidential palace at 11:30 am, just after meeting with the army commander. He agreed without hesitation to form a government, expressing his understandable fears over the extreme difficulty of the task.

He kicked off his consultations to form a new government from the Baabda presidential palace. He wanted it to include main effective parties - Muslim and Christian alike - and therefore summoned them to discuss their participation.

He was met with one veto after another. Some Sunni figures, including some of the most moderate, refused to take part in a transitional government that includes Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea. For one reason or another, they held them responsible for the assassination of Sunni PM Rashid Karami.

Parties on the other end believed that forming a cabinet without Aoun and Geagea would render it unbalanced. Such a government would seem biased and representative of some parties without others. It would not be able to rule or last long.

I had received from Aoun and Geagea their serious insistence on being part of the transitional government, rejecting any solution that would keep them out. They warned that not being part of cabinet would force them to take firm stances. Even the grand mufti, who has rarely ever been accused of taking a hardline, had informed Pierre Helou that none of the Sunnis would take part in a “flawed government that includes those two men.”

By the afternoon, Pierre Helou had failed in forming a government team that would support his new task. He finally chose to apologize from accepting his naming as premier, taking in the advice of his friends, Michel Edde and Khalil Abou Hamad.

With Pierre Helou hitting a dead end, as I challenged fate by going against traditions, I tasked Dany Chamoun with inquiring with Salim al-Hoss, his friend since their college days at the American University of Beirut, about forming a transitional government that would include all political powers, including the Lebanese Forces. He insisted instead that the current outgoing cabinet lineup be preserved. He relented to some amendments: appointing Dany Chamoun as minister to succeed his father Camille, Omar Karami to succeed his brother Rashid, and expanding it to include four more ministers. He proposed George Saadeh and Joseph Skaff as potential candidates. He accepted the appointment of two deputy prime ministers: Abdullah al-Rassi, an Orthodox Christian, and Dany Chamoun, a Maronite. Hoss adamantly rejected however, Aoun and Geagea’s inclusion in cabinet even though it did include other political leaders and militia chiefs, most notably Damascus allies Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri. He also insisted that the government keep holding its meetings at its West Beirut headquarters in Sanayeh.

Hoss’ proposal would have been in line with that of [Syrian Vice President] Abdul Halim Khaddam to [US Assistant Secretary of State] Richard Murphy on September 3, 1988. This meant Hoss would retain his government team and would keep cabinet meetings being held in strict Syrian areas of influence.

If I had accepted Hoss’ proposal to Chamoun, I would have handed Lebanon to Syria on a silver platter. I refused. There was no way I would sign a decree that I viewed as unbalanced. There was no way I would accept the formation of a government of Damascus allies, who, for whatever reason, have no room to maneuver except under Syria’s influence. In Christian majority East Beirut, political and military forces would not have recognized the authority of an unbalanced government that would have been formed under direct Syrian influence. This would have inevitably led to the country’s division.

Since September 21 after my return from Damascus to Bkirki and then to the Baabda presidential palace, I held a series of consultations with my aides and MPs. The meetings stretched long passed midnight. We received an unencouraging cable from Archbishop of New York John O'Connor, addressed to Lebanon’s Christians, urging them to “save the republic”. Our options were narrowing and we had to make difficult choices: we could either hold elections, but without any serious signs that a president would be elected, or contend with chaos, which Murphy had warned us of.

Rene Mouawad told me: “If elections are not held, then we will be held responsible by the United States, Vatican and Europe. Instead of helping us, the Americans have reiterated the Syrian demand.”

Last choice

Pierre Helou and Salim al-Hoss were now out of the picture. I had no choice but to reveal my last card. I had failed in my attempt to form an expanded and balanced political government that includes all effective players. I had to resort to another option: forming a non-political government that would at the same time represent Lebanon’s national fabric and assume its responsibilities.

The only options were handing power to a state institution: either the higher judicial council or the military council. The judicial council was headed by Maronite Sheikh Amin Nassar, an open-minded and dutiful official who had contacts with all sides. The military council was headed by another Maronite, army commander Michel Aoun. Both officials were dedicated to the unity the country, but I ultimately leaned more towards the military council. It alone could protect itself and institutions. It could protect the country’s security and confront any unrest and defuse tensions. A government of judges would not have withstood such challenges.

I relied in my reasoning on Bechara al-Khoury, who prior to the end of his term in 1952 had asked army commander Fuad Chehab, a Maronite, to head a transitional government. I therefore, turned to the army and military council, which was formed according to the balance of power that emerged in 1984. It reflected the diversity of Lebanon’s various sects whereby six of its members represented the six main sects. They were named by the government and were not opponents of Syria or any other side.

In order to avoid any criticism and doubts, I kept the council as it was with no amendments. I also overcame all of my reservations against its chief, Michel Aoun, because the country’s interest demanded it. Some of my aides suggested that I include civilian ministers to the council, such as a foreign minister who would be affiliated to me and maintain international contacts, but I refused to create any hole in the new government. The cabinet would be bound with one duty stipulated by the constitution and that is to elect a new president, nothing more. It had no other responsibilities because it was an interim transitional government chosen to carry out an urgent task that is not preceded by any other. Article 62 of the constitution stipulates that the jurisdiction of the president would be transferred to the transitional council and that its members would all rule collectively. This way I would have appointed a military council government, not a Michel Aoun government.

That day, parliament was supposed to convene at the Nejmeh Square to elect a president at the invitation of Hussein al-Husseini and under mounting Syrian pressure. Only 13 lawmakers showed up. He issued another invitation for September 23, a day after my term ends.

Transforming the military council into a government was the least damaging solution. I was left with the task of personally contacting all six of its members to ensure that they would not step down soon after their appointment. Before issuing my final presidential decree, I contacted them all and none of them refused the mission. They thanked me for entrusting them with the duty. However, we were all surprised when just after midnight on September 22 with the announcement that the three Muslim officers had resigned. Syria was the first to make the announcement through its radio, while none of the officers – Mahmoud Tay Abou Dargham, Nabil Qoreitem and Lotfi Jaber – had submitted their written resignation, which ultimately never came.

I had sought to consult spiritual and political leaders ahead of making my announcement. Just before midnight on September 22, I contacted [Maronite] Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. He was asleep and I asked that he be awakened so that I could inform him of my final choice.

“We have held today a long marathon meeting with all brothers, lawmakers, Lebanese Forces and the army. We proposed all possible solutions to avoid constitutional vacuum. We had three choices: A government headed by Hoss with a majority that is allied to him, but ultimately in an unbalanced cabinet that cannot rule. The second was an expanded government that would include all parties, but in the end would be left with its Christian members because its Muslims, even the moderates, would walk away from it.”

Sfeir said: “I heard the news. It appears that the mufti and Shamseddine had warned against it.”

“The third choice is the military council, headed by General Aoun, that boasts all sects and parties,” I added. “We have opted for the third solution. General Aoun is next to me and we are discussing the issue. The problem is very dangerous. At least we wouldn’t be handing over affairs without knowing where the situation is headed? … I was forced to take this decision.”

“It may be the best. God willing. It’s imperative that the situation does not deteriorate,” he said.

“At any rate, we must remain vigilant. We are headed towards unpredictable political developments,” I remarked.

“It seems that the Americans have not changed their position,” he said.

“Yes,” I replied.

“Unfortunately,” he added.

I should inform Geagea of the new decision. He arrived at the presidential palace and showed great disappointment when he found out that he was not part of the new proposal. He requested some time to think it over. He held talks alone with General Aoun, who was at the palace. He then came back to inform me of his approval before quickly leaving my office. He informed the media that he supports the new cabinet and its head, describing it as an “independence” government.

I later learned that during their brief talks at the palace, Aoun had asked for Geagea’s conditional support in return for allowing the Lebanese Forces free reign in Christian areas where Syrian troops were not deployed. He also received a pledge that the army would not intervene in disputes within the LF.

Minutes before midnight on September 22, 1988, the moment my term end, I signed – with great bitterness and yet an easy conscience – my last presidential decree (number 5,387), which calls for the formation of a transitional government headed by General Aoun. The majority of Arab and foreign governments immediately announced their support. [French President] Francois Mitterrand telephoned George Bush, who was recently elected US president. Bush declared his support for the Lebanese government and said he would ask the Russians to do the same.

My desk seemed empty that night. It used to be loaded with files. I felt burdened by exhaustion and tribulations, but proud that I had completed my duties to the end.

Part three continues on Sunday.



US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
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US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)

The fifth round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations ended in Washington on Friday with the signing of a framework agreement that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said could help lay the foundation for “lasting peace and security” between the two countries.

At a ceremony where the flags of the United States, Lebanon and Israel stood side by side, Rubio announced a framework agreement between the sovereign government of Lebanon and the government of Israel, mediated and supported by Washington.

The US-sponsored talks shifted the discussion from a ceasefire to a field-based model under which Israel would gradually withdraw from areas it occupies in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army would then take control of those areas and prevent the return of Hezbollah’s military presence.

Behind closed doors, and despite talk from Tehran and its allies about “victories” and “resistance,” leaks from negotiating rooms in Washington and Switzerland point to a different picture: firm US pressure, Israeli efforts to secure substantial security gains, and Iranian concessions that could reshape Tehran’s regional influence from Beirut to Baghdad.

Before the agreement was announced, Rubio said Israel and Lebanon had made progress and were close to a “declaration of intentions.” Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the talks focused on security measures needed to restore stability and extend state authority to Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders. Israeli and Lebanese officials, however, denied US claims that Israel had withdrawn from part of the “buffer zone” as a goodwill gesture.

What emerged on Friday was an initial understanding on direction, not an agreement on implementation. The talks therefore appear to mark the start of a new political and security track rather than the end of the current military phase.

The Lebanese track has also become connected, though not fully merged, with US negotiations with Iran. Washington insists Lebanon’s future is being discussed with its government, while also holding Tehran responsible for restraining Hezbollah and ending its funding and armament. The round has thus become part of a broader test of a regional order that did not exist before the war.

Israeli military APCs parked in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon, Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

Army deployment

The main outcome was preliminary acceptance of “pilot zones.” The plan calls for selecting a defined area from which Israeli forces would withdraw after Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is removed. Lebanese Army units would then deploy and secure the area before the model is repeated elsewhere.

The formula combines Lebanon’s demand for withdrawal and restored sovereignty with Israel’s demand that evacuated territory not become a platform for Hezbollah to rebuild its capabilities.

But Rubio’s phrase “commitment of intentions” also reveals the limits of the achievement. It signals agreement on the broad goal, not on maps, timetables or monitoring rules.

Disagreement also remains over the location of the first zone: whether it begins north of the Litani River, as Lebanese information suggests, or inside the buffer zone established by Israel.

Another unresolved question is whether withdrawal would be part of a comprehensive roadmap or decided case by case according to Israeli security assessments.

The confusion over withdrawal underscored that these questions remain unsettled.

A US official said Israel had pulled forces from part of the area without specifying where. An Israeli security official noted that the army had not withdrawn, while a senior Lebanese official stressed that Beirut knew nothing about such a step.

This may mean Washington announced Israeli political approval before implementation, or that a limited redeployment took place that Israel does not consider a withdrawal and that Lebanon has no information about.

Either way, Washington appears to be trying to prevent the talks from collapsing under the pressure of skirmishes and strikes.

Southern Lebanon remains, in practice, a war zone for tens of thousands of displaced residents unable to return because of Israeli forces or widespread destruction. The success of the agreement will be measured by whether it produces the first clear, documented handover of land to the Lebanese army.

A security wall in northern Israel on the border with Lebanon , Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

‘Pilot zones’

The plan means different things to each side. For Lebanon, a pilot zone should be the first step toward full Israeli withdrawal, an end to strikes and assassinations, the return of residents, and the deployment of the state up to the international border.

For Israel, it is a test of the Lebanese army’s ability to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure, control supply routes and prevent the group’s fighters from returning under civilian cover.

Israel is therefore insisting on a “zone-by-zone” approach. It does not want to commit in advance to a comprehensive withdrawal before seeing the results of the first phase.

It is also linking any pullback to Hezbollah’s disarmament, or at least to clearing the relevant area of military infrastructure and weapons capable of threatening northern Israeli communities.

Beirut fears the plan could yield another form of the occupation: withdrawal from secondary positions while Israel keeps a narrower security strip.

This leaves a central question unanswered: what does Hezbollah’s disarmament actually mean? Does the first phase only require removing weapons and fighters from areas where the state deploys, or does it include Hezbollah’s arsenal across Lebanon? Which weapons come first: precision and long-range missiles, drones, air defenses, anti-tank missiles, tunnels or command centers?

Nothing announced so far proves there is a final agreement on the type of weapons to be collected or the timetable.

Washington appears to be trying to break the problem into stages: first establishing areas free of military presence, then moving to heavy and strategic weapons, while leaving small arms and organizational structures to a longer Lebanese process.

Israel fears this approach will give Hezbollah time to regroup. Lebanon fears a domestic confrontation the army cannot contain.

The US guarantee

This is where the US guarantee becomes essential. The model requires a verification mechanism that determines who decides an area is weapons-free, how violations are monitored, what happens if Hezbollah tries to return, and what limits are placed on Israel’s right to act.

Without agreement on these rules, every violation could become a pretext for renewed Israeli strikes, and every strike could trigger a return to fighting.

Separating Lebanon from Iran’s influence

At first glance, US policy toward Lebanon appears dual-track. Rubio says Lebanon-Israel negotiations are separate from talks with Iran because Lebanon is a sovereign state with a government Washington deals with directly.

In parallel, Vice President JD Vance is leading talks with Tehran that include ending the fighting in Lebanon, while President Donald Trump has threatened to strike Iran again if it fails to stop Hezbollah from “causing trouble.”

Rubio’s track identifies the legitimate decision-maker: the Lebanese government, not Iran or Hezbollah. Vance’s track deals with the actor capable of obstructing the US efforts.

In that sense, Washington is negotiating Lebanon’s future with Beirut, while negotiating with Tehran over support for the force that could derail any arrangement. It is using Iran’s need to stabilize the ceasefire and ease sanctions to pressure it on Hezbollah without granting it guardianship over Lebanon.

Trump’s warnings are therefore more than just threats. They shift responsibility for Hezbollah’s actions to its sponsor, Iran, suggesting that continued violence in Lebanon could carry a direct cost for Tehran.

The strategy is risky. Including Lebanon in a US-Iran understanding could allow Tehran to claim that any Israeli withdrawal resulted from its pressure, not from the Lebanese track.

It also raises fears in Beirut and Tel Aviv that Lebanese security details could become bargaining chips in talks over the nuclear file, sanctions and the Strait of Hormuz.

That is why Rubio insists publicly on separation, even as he acknowledges that Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah cannot be ignored.

Washington may be unable to separate the two tracks completely, but it is trying to prevent their political merger.

Its success depends on using Iranian influence to restrain Hezbollah without turning Iran into a partner in shaping the Lebanese state or its arrangements with Israel.

Israeli tank maneuvers as United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy drive between destroyed houses in the south Lebanon village of Mais al-Jabal, as seen from the Israeli side of the border in the upper Galilee, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Israeli concerns

Israel’s concern is that a US-Iran understanding could save Hezbollah from the consequences of the war. Israeli officials fear Washington’s priority may shift from dismantling the group and reducing Iranian influence to simply preserving a ceasefire and preventing conflict, while pressuring Israel to withdraw before durable security guarantees are in place.

Israel therefore is insisting on freedom to act against what it sees as rearmament or imminent threats and has not offered an unconditional commitment to return to the border. The buffer zone has become both a negotiating card and a security guarantee. Giving it up without disarmament would expose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to domestic criticism.

The Lebanese army, meanwhile, faces a test that goes beyond entering territory vacated by Israel. It must prove it can remain there, control it, prevent Hezbollah’s return, deal with weapons depots and tunnels, and avoid being dragged into civil strife.

It also needs manpower, equipment, funding and political cover, all of which remain uncertain, especially amid widespread destruction and the need to protect returning residents and secure the border.

The United States is studying training for Lebanese units and ways to verify their readiness and reliability. Reports have suggested a possible role for US Central Command, or CENTCOM, in supervision or monitoring, but no final announcement has clarified whether CENTCOM would directly vet personnel or limit itself to support and coordination.

Analysts say the deeper problem is that army deployment is not the same as disarmament.

The army may be able to control a specific area after an Israeli withdrawal if it receives enough support. But dismantling Hezbollah’s network across Lebanon requires a national political decision, a gradual mechanism, guarantees for the Shiite community and steps to prevent Iran from rebuilding funding and weapons channels.

If Washington burdens the army with more than it can carry, the model may turn from a test of state sovereignty into a test that exposes the limits of the state.


Through Lebanon… Is a New Regional Order Taking Shape?

Esmail Qaani 
Esmail Qaani 
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Through Lebanon… Is a New Regional Order Taking Shape?

Esmail Qaani 
Esmail Qaani 

Iran is portraying the outcome of the current war as a “victory” that forced Israel to consider withdrawal. That narrative was reinforced by a warning from Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, who said Israel would either withdraw voluntarily or “flee in defeat”, a clear attempt to present the negotiating process as the result of the resilience of Tehran’s regional axis.

While Qaani’s remarks are unmistakably mobilizing rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences and Iran’s regional allies, one fact cannot be overlooked: Tehran succeeded in making a ceasefire in Lebanon part of its understandings with Washington. Despite the military blows it has sustained, Iran has preserved both its political system and a key regional bargaining chip.

Measured against the concessions, Tehran has been forced to accept, however, the picture looks different. Lebanon is engaged in direct negotiations with Israel over the deployment of the Lebanese Army and the disarmament of Hezbollah, Iran’s most prominent regional ally. Washington has also publicly held Iran responsible for Hezbollah’s actions, while Iran-aligned factions in Iraq are facing pressure to integrate into state institutions or reduce their independent armed presence. At the same time, negotiations over sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program have become linked, to some extent, to Tehran’s ability to rein in its regional network.

Writing in Foreign Affairs, former US ambassador James Jeffrey argues that failing to achieve maximum objectives does not amount to an Iranian victory. In his view, the conflicts since 2023 have weakened Iran’s capabilities, eroded its network of proxies, and strengthened Washington’s position. That assessment remains open to debate, however, given that Hezbollah has not disappeared, Iraqi armed factions have not been disarmed, and Iran has demonstrated an ability to use the Strait of Hormuz and other regional flashpoints to compel direct negotiations.

It may therefore be more accurate to say the region is entering a transitional phase rather than witnessing the definitive end of Iran’s regional axis. Tehran appears to be shifting from reliance on large, openly organized groups with extensive arsenals to smaller, more clandestine networks, or accepting the formal integration of some factions into state institutions while preserving its influence within them.

The success of the Lebanese model will therefore carry significance far beyond Lebanon itself. If Israel withdraws, the Lebanese Army deploys, and Hezbollah is prevented from re-establishing its presence, it would set a precedent for placing arms exclusively in the hands of the state. Only then could it be said that the fifth round of negotiations marked the beginning of a new phase for Lebanon and the wider region. If, however, withdrawal remains stalled or Hezbollah returns to evacuated areas, the fifth round will amount to little more than another negotiated truce.


Older Buildings and Substandard Construction Left Venezuela Vulnerable to Earthquakes

People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
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Older Buildings and Substandard Construction Left Venezuela Vulnerable to Earthquakes

People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Older buildings, substandard construction and geography left many neighborhoods in Venezuela vulnerable to strong earthquakes like the ones that struck the country this week.

Engineers and other experts said the back-to-back earthquakes on Wednesday were among the most intense to hit the country in more than a century, leveling buildings and leaving more than 900 dead with the number expected to rise. Videos and satellite imagery from the disaster zone reviewed by The Associated Press reveal scores of multistory buildings had collapsed.

Microsoft’s AI for Good Lab analyzed satellite imagery of Catia La Mar in La Guaira state, one of the hardest hit cities along the Caribbean coast. Using AI-based damage assessment models, Microsoft determined that about a third of the city's nearly 30,000 structures were damaged.

Among the factors that left so many structures at risk: Some housing complexes in northern Venezuela were constructed quickly during recent oil booms, and builders may not have adhered to best practices that mitigate the risks of serious seismic activity, according to experts.

Engineers said that older housing erected in the 1950s and 1960s — before modern earthquake standards were adopted — may not have been retrofitted to survive such violent shaking. And many buildings were constructed on geography and soft soils that compound the danger of the earthquakes, the experts said.

Tall buildings and older concrete contributed to damage David Cocke, a structural engineer in California and former president of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, said that a combination of soft soils, tall towers and older concrete structures contributed to the widespread damage, particularly when buildings pancaked, or collapsed floor-by-floor.

“They just don’t have the more modern reinforcing steel connections that we put in those kinds of buildings today,” said Cocke.

Since the 1970s, engineers have known that concrete buildings are particularly susceptible to earthquakes and seek to reinforce new construction with steel. While many rich nations have forced property owners to retrofit or tear down dangerous buildings, many poorer or middle income countries have lagged in enforcing upgrades as they battled more immediate woes.

“Some of the more advanced countries like Japan and New Zealand and the US have made those changes, but some of the other countries have not,” Cocke said. “It’s a very typical kind of construction all over the world.”

‘Soft stories’ and soft soil played a role

Other experts noted that a number of buildings that collapsed also had non-structural walls comprised of heavy bricks, or they had “soft stories" in which their ground floors consisted of garages or similar open spaces. Such construction increases the risk of pancaking, they said.

“Soft stories are a huge problem everywhere in the world,” said Eduardo Miranda, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University. “And in Venezuela, they are particularly prevalent, and if you combine softer soils with a soft story, buildings can collapse.”

Marcos Ferreira, a geophysicist and researcher at the Geological Survey of Brazil, said the destruction in Venezuela was compounded by the back-to-back quakes, known as a doublet. A similar incident took place in Türkiye and Syria in 2023, killing almost 60,000 people.

“It is as if I am screaming and then someone starts screaming, too," Ferreira said. “That amplifies the vibration and adds to the potential hazard.”

Newer buildings also collapsed

Venezuelan government officials took steps following a deadly 1967 quake to update building codes. But it is unclear how many buildings were retrofitted to comply with those rules.

In late 1999, former President Hugo Chávez’s first year in office, floods and landslides destroyed housing, including in coastal northern Venezuela. The government went on a building spree to replace the demolished structures and to house so many displaced people, said Juan Carlos Vielma, a Venezuelan civil engineer who is head of academic affairs of the civil engineering school at Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, Chile.

Some of the newer buildings appear to also have collapsed.

“Something that leaves me perplexed is the fact that, among the collapsed buildings, more than one was recently designed and built in accordance with current standards,” Vielma said. “We need to embark on a process not only of reconstruction, but also of reviewing the applicable standards, since something might have gone wrong within our engineering processes, too.”