Amin Gemayel: I Overcame My Reservations against Aoun and Appointed him Head of Military Govt.

Asharq Al-Awsat releases excerpts from the former Lebanese president’s memoirs

Amin Gemayel (R) seen at the Baabda presidential palace after Michel Aoun was named head of a military government. (Getty Images)
Amin Gemayel (R) seen at the Baabda presidential palace after Michel Aoun was named head of a military government. (Getty Images)
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Amin Gemayel: I Overcame My Reservations against Aoun and Appointed him Head of Military Govt.

Amin Gemayel (R) seen at the Baabda presidential palace after Michel Aoun was named head of a military government. (Getty Images)
Amin Gemayel (R) seen at the Baabda presidential palace after Michel Aoun was named head of a military government. (Getty Images)

In the second part of his memoirs, excerpts of which are exclusively being published by Asharq Al-Awsat, former Lebanese President Amin Gemayel recalls the final day of his term in office on September 22, 1988. With Lebanon in the throes of its 1975-90 civil war, he spoke of the difficulties he encountered in forming a transitional government that would be tasked with preparing for the election of a new president after parliament had failed to do so.

Gemayel recounted how he saw in the military council, headed by then-army commander Michel Aoun, as the best choice in leading the country. He even received the approval of all six of its members for the task before later receiving a shock from Syrian media that reported the resignation of its three Muslim officers. He was not even informed of their decision beforehand. Below is part two of three of Gemayel’s memoirs:

After a tumultuous night, dawn finally broke on September 22, 1988, my final day in office in what has been a difficult term. I had breakfast alone in my office as I wrestled with my concerns and bitterness. I was left to tackle my final constitutional duty: the formation of a transitional government. Hussein al-Husseini was strongly pressing for parliament to elect Mikhael al-Daher. It seemed unlikely that he would garner the necessary quorum. At noon, the issue resolved itself: only ten MPs showed up at Nijmeh Square and the session was adjourned to 10:30 am the next day.

Salim al-Hoss had informed me that he was going back from his resignation from a government he was not even heading. He was serving as acting prime minister after the assassination of outgoing Premier Rashid Karami. He had assumed an official role in violation of the constitution. I could not accept this, which therefore demanded that I form a new government in line with the constitution and Lebanese traditions.

I thought of naming president Charles Helou as prime minister of a draft government lineup I had prepared in case such a day would come when we would be confronted with potential vacuum. I contacted him and explained my reasoning for naming him. I told him he alone could run the transitional period until my successor could be elected. He agreed.

He was a wise and moderate man, who knew to the core the sensitivity of the national equation. He had experienced its importance firsthand during two very critical times in our nation’s history. He was above conflicts and could hold dialogue with all sides. He was widely respected and can bring together all Lebanese. I could find no one else with these qualities.

I did not want to reach such a crossroads of issuing a decree for the formation of a transitional government that would replace the president. I had followed the example of President Bechara al-Khoury, who on September 18, 1952 had resigned from his position and tasked a Maronite to head a transitional government to succeed a president whose term had ended without the election of a successor. During such cases of vacuum, the jurisdiction of the president is transferred, according to the constitution, to an interim government. Since the vacant position is that of a Maronite official, I had to keep such jurisdiction in the hands of that sect and appoint a Maronite head of government, which would play the role of president. The cabinet would then act as a guarantor of our national norms. That is why I first thought of Charles Helou for the task.

At 9 am on September 22, I summoned him to the Baabda palace for consultations. He apologized, saying he could not accept the task, citing his and his wife’s poor health. Taking care of her at all times would prevent him from taking on the “massive responsibility,” he told me. I believed that he knew that he would have been forced to strike agreements that would have been uneasy for him. He suggested to me an alternative, who enjoys the suitable qualities: a Maronite, open-minded and enjoys good relations with all Muslim and Christian parties.

“He is also a Helou,” he added.

He named Pierre Helou.

I thought about it and did not make up my mind. Pierre Helou had been an MP from Aley since 1972. He was a former minister and a patriot to the core. He was also an old friend of both Kamal Jumblatt and Imam Moussa al-Sadr. A moderate, he would not have provoked any of the parties.

I summoned him to the presidential palace at 11:30 am, just after meeting with the army commander. He agreed without hesitation to form a government, expressing his understandable fears over the extreme difficulty of the task.

He kicked off his consultations to form a new government from the Baabda presidential palace. He wanted it to include main effective parties - Muslim and Christian alike - and therefore summoned them to discuss their participation.

He was met with one veto after another. Some Sunni figures, including some of the most moderate, refused to take part in a transitional government that includes Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea. For one reason or another, they held them responsible for the assassination of Sunni PM Rashid Karami.

Parties on the other end believed that forming a cabinet without Aoun and Geagea would render it unbalanced. Such a government would seem biased and representative of some parties without others. It would not be able to rule or last long.

I had received from Aoun and Geagea their serious insistence on being part of the transitional government, rejecting any solution that would keep them out. They warned that not being part of cabinet would force them to take firm stances. Even the grand mufti, who has rarely ever been accused of taking a hardline, had informed Pierre Helou that none of the Sunnis would take part in a “flawed government that includes those two men.”

By the afternoon, Pierre Helou had failed in forming a government team that would support his new task. He finally chose to apologize from accepting his naming as premier, taking in the advice of his friends, Michel Edde and Khalil Abou Hamad.

With Pierre Helou hitting a dead end, as I challenged fate by going against traditions, I tasked Dany Chamoun with inquiring with Salim al-Hoss, his friend since their college days at the American University of Beirut, about forming a transitional government that would include all political powers, including the Lebanese Forces. He insisted instead that the current outgoing cabinet lineup be preserved. He relented to some amendments: appointing Dany Chamoun as minister to succeed his father Camille, Omar Karami to succeed his brother Rashid, and expanding it to include four more ministers. He proposed George Saadeh and Joseph Skaff as potential candidates. He accepted the appointment of two deputy prime ministers: Abdullah al-Rassi, an Orthodox Christian, and Dany Chamoun, a Maronite. Hoss adamantly rejected however, Aoun and Geagea’s inclusion in cabinet even though it did include other political leaders and militia chiefs, most notably Damascus allies Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri. He also insisted that the government keep holding its meetings at its West Beirut headquarters in Sanayeh.

Hoss’ proposal would have been in line with that of [Syrian Vice President] Abdul Halim Khaddam to [US Assistant Secretary of State] Richard Murphy on September 3, 1988. This meant Hoss would retain his government team and would keep cabinet meetings being held in strict Syrian areas of influence.

If I had accepted Hoss’ proposal to Chamoun, I would have handed Lebanon to Syria on a silver platter. I refused. There was no way I would sign a decree that I viewed as unbalanced. There was no way I would accept the formation of a government of Damascus allies, who, for whatever reason, have no room to maneuver except under Syria’s influence. In Christian majority East Beirut, political and military forces would not have recognized the authority of an unbalanced government that would have been formed under direct Syrian influence. This would have inevitably led to the country’s division.

Since September 21 after my return from Damascus to Bkirki and then to the Baabda presidential palace, I held a series of consultations with my aides and MPs. The meetings stretched long passed midnight. We received an unencouraging cable from Archbishop of New York John O'Connor, addressed to Lebanon’s Christians, urging them to “save the republic”. Our options were narrowing and we had to make difficult choices: we could either hold elections, but without any serious signs that a president would be elected, or contend with chaos, which Murphy had warned us of.

Rene Mouawad told me: “If elections are not held, then we will be held responsible by the United States, Vatican and Europe. Instead of helping us, the Americans have reiterated the Syrian demand.”

Last choice

Pierre Helou and Salim al-Hoss were now out of the picture. I had no choice but to reveal my last card. I had failed in my attempt to form an expanded and balanced political government that includes all effective players. I had to resort to another option: forming a non-political government that would at the same time represent Lebanon’s national fabric and assume its responsibilities.

The only options were handing power to a state institution: either the higher judicial council or the military council. The judicial council was headed by Maronite Sheikh Amin Nassar, an open-minded and dutiful official who had contacts with all sides. The military council was headed by another Maronite, army commander Michel Aoun. Both officials were dedicated to the unity the country, but I ultimately leaned more towards the military council. It alone could protect itself and institutions. It could protect the country’s security and confront any unrest and defuse tensions. A government of judges would not have withstood such challenges.

I relied in my reasoning on Bechara al-Khoury, who prior to the end of his term in 1952 had asked army commander Fuad Chehab, a Maronite, to head a transitional government. I therefore, turned to the army and military council, which was formed according to the balance of power that emerged in 1984. It reflected the diversity of Lebanon’s various sects whereby six of its members represented the six main sects. They were named by the government and were not opponents of Syria or any other side.

In order to avoid any criticism and doubts, I kept the council as it was with no amendments. I also overcame all of my reservations against its chief, Michel Aoun, because the country’s interest demanded it. Some of my aides suggested that I include civilian ministers to the council, such as a foreign minister who would be affiliated to me and maintain international contacts, but I refused to create any hole in the new government. The cabinet would be bound with one duty stipulated by the constitution and that is to elect a new president, nothing more. It had no other responsibilities because it was an interim transitional government chosen to carry out an urgent task that is not preceded by any other. Article 62 of the constitution stipulates that the jurisdiction of the president would be transferred to the transitional council and that its members would all rule collectively. This way I would have appointed a military council government, not a Michel Aoun government.

That day, parliament was supposed to convene at the Nejmeh Square to elect a president at the invitation of Hussein al-Husseini and under mounting Syrian pressure. Only 13 lawmakers showed up. He issued another invitation for September 23, a day after my term ends.

Transforming the military council into a government was the least damaging solution. I was left with the task of personally contacting all six of its members to ensure that they would not step down soon after their appointment. Before issuing my final presidential decree, I contacted them all and none of them refused the mission. They thanked me for entrusting them with the duty. However, we were all surprised when just after midnight on September 22 with the announcement that the three Muslim officers had resigned. Syria was the first to make the announcement through its radio, while none of the officers – Mahmoud Tay Abou Dargham, Nabil Qoreitem and Lotfi Jaber – had submitted their written resignation, which ultimately never came.

I had sought to consult spiritual and political leaders ahead of making my announcement. Just before midnight on September 22, I contacted [Maronite] Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. He was asleep and I asked that he be awakened so that I could inform him of my final choice.

“We have held today a long marathon meeting with all brothers, lawmakers, Lebanese Forces and the army. We proposed all possible solutions to avoid constitutional vacuum. We had three choices: A government headed by Hoss with a majority that is allied to him, but ultimately in an unbalanced cabinet that cannot rule. The second was an expanded government that would include all parties, but in the end would be left with its Christian members because its Muslims, even the moderates, would walk away from it.”

Sfeir said: “I heard the news. It appears that the mufti and Shamseddine had warned against it.”

“The third choice is the military council, headed by General Aoun, that boasts all sects and parties,” I added. “We have opted for the third solution. General Aoun is next to me and we are discussing the issue. The problem is very dangerous. At least we wouldn’t be handing over affairs without knowing where the situation is headed? … I was forced to take this decision.”

“It may be the best. God willing. It’s imperative that the situation does not deteriorate,” he said.

“At any rate, we must remain vigilant. We are headed towards unpredictable political developments,” I remarked.

“It seems that the Americans have not changed their position,” he said.

“Yes,” I replied.

“Unfortunately,” he added.

I should inform Geagea of the new decision. He arrived at the presidential palace and showed great disappointment when he found out that he was not part of the new proposal. He requested some time to think it over. He held talks alone with General Aoun, who was at the palace. He then came back to inform me of his approval before quickly leaving my office. He informed the media that he supports the new cabinet and its head, describing it as an “independence” government.

I later learned that during their brief talks at the palace, Aoun had asked for Geagea’s conditional support in return for allowing the Lebanese Forces free reign in Christian areas where Syrian troops were not deployed. He also received a pledge that the army would not intervene in disputes within the LF.

Minutes before midnight on September 22, 1988, the moment my term end, I signed – with great bitterness and yet an easy conscience – my last presidential decree (number 5,387), which calls for the formation of a transitional government headed by General Aoun. The majority of Arab and foreign governments immediately announced their support. [French President] Francois Mitterrand telephoned George Bush, who was recently elected US president. Bush declared his support for the Lebanese government and said he would ask the Russians to do the same.

My desk seemed empty that night. It used to be loaded with files. I felt burdened by exhaustion and tribulations, but proud that I had completed my duties to the end.

Part three continues on Sunday.



Why Iran’s Oil Industry Is Increasingly Threatened by US Blockade

People walk in a local market in Tehran, Iran, April 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
People walk in a local market in Tehran, Iran, April 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
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Why Iran’s Oil Industry Is Increasingly Threatened by US Blockade

People walk in a local market in Tehran, Iran, April 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
People walk in a local market in Tehran, Iran, April 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters

Even as Iran squeezes world energy supplies with its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, its own oil industry is increasingly being threatened by an American blockade.

With no way to export the oil it is pumping out and diminishing room to store it at home, Iran may be forced to dramatically reduce or cease production from some of its wells, perhaps beginning in as little as two weeks, experts say.

The situation likely isn’t as dire as US President Donald Trump recently described, colorfully suggesting pipelines could start exploding within days. But once shut down, production from the aging wells may not be restarted so easily, if at all, undermining Iran’s future oil output. Iran appears to have begun dialing back production already, analysts say, to avert outright shutdowns.

The pressure is building as the US Treasury Department ratchets up sanctions on Iranian oil shipments already at sea. The US military has seized at least two tankers off Asia believed to be carrying Iranian oil.

With its oil trade constrained, Iran is seeing less hard currency flow back into an economy mauled by weeks of war, months of unrest and decades of international sanctions. But with fewer tankers shipping Iranian oil, the effects of the Strait of Hormuz shutdown are only being magnified, leading to shortages of jet fuel and rising gasoline prices around the world.

Iran's leaders “are really resisting” shutting down oil wells because of how painful that would be long-term, said Miad Maleki, a former sanctions expert at the US Treasury who is now a senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“They’ve been under sanctions, they’ve been isolated for 47 years now. Those oil wells are not maintained well. Their machinery is not maintained well," Maleki said. Once shut off, he added, the wells won't easily “snap back after a few months.”

The squeeze on Iran intensifies

Iran had been pumping over 3 million barrels of crude oil a day before the war, with a little more than half going toward its domestic market. But since the American blockade began on April 13, ships have been filled with oil and unable to get out.

“It looks like there’s been a significant slowdown in production,” said Antoine Halff, the co-founder and chief analyst at Kayrros, an environmental intelligence company that tracks emissions and energy supply chains. He pointed to signs that storage is not filling as fast as usual at Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export terminal in the Gulf.

Iran is likely storing some of its oil in tankers positioned around Kharg Island, Halff noted.

Kpler, a firm monitoring commodities markets, said it believes Iran has enough capacity left to store about two weeks worth of oil production, even after reducing output.

“While the immediate revenue impact is limited, operational constraints are now forcing production cuts and setting up a delayed but significant financial squeeze,” wrote Homayoun Falakshahi, an analyst at Kpler.

Wood Mackenzie, another oil analysis firm, estimates Iran will run out of storage capacity in about three weeks.

“If the blockade persists, cuts become inevitable,” wrote Alexandre Araman of Wood Mackenzie. Shutdowns of more than a month “risk long-term damage” to Iran’s oil reservoirs, he wrote, adding that recovering older fields “remains uncertain.”

Iran’s oil industry long a shaky lifeline

From the moment it first struck oil in 1908, Iran’s oil industry has been entangled in the region’s politics. A move to nationalize Iran’s oil fields and wrest control from the British sparked the CIA-backed 1953 coup that cemented Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule.

That also lit a long fuse to Iran’s 1979 revolution that toppled the shah. During the revolution, oil workers went on strike and brought production down from 6 million barrels a day to around 1.5 million.

Iran’s oil industry never recovered and faced decades of international sanctions, during which its infrastructure aged and faltered.

In his first term, Trump exerted a “maximum pressure” campaign, hiking sanctions to severely cut Iran’s oil exports. Forced to store oil in tankers at sea, the Iranian government lost tens of billions of dollars in revenues. Still, the pressure failed to push Tehran into reaching a nuclear deal with the US.

Now Iran faces a combination of hiked sanctions and the blockade. Trump on Tuesday claimed that Iran was “in a ‘State of Collapse.’”

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent piled on, writing on X, “Iran’s creaking oil industry is starting to shut in production thanks to the US BLOCKADE. Pumping will soon collapse. GASOLINE SHORTAGES IN IRAN NEXT!”

There have been no immediate signs of any gasoline shortages in Iran. However, Iran does seem to be acknowledging some of the pain indirectly.

A segment on state TV, which is run by hard-liners, included journalists discussing the possibility of an oil storage crisis. One noted that if empty tankers get blocked from returning to Iran, “we won’t be able to export.” Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad on Monday praised oil terminal staff for their “continuous perseverance."

Maleki, the analyst from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said that if the blockade continues and production slows further or halts, oil workers could potentially lose their jobs — which could cause new unrest.

“In 1979 when the oil industry was disrupted, in the 1980s war with Iraq ... you can go and look at to see how effective they were in really pressuring the regime,” he said. “It’s really going to affect some of the most strategic provinces in Iran and the most strategic industry.”


Houthi Summer Centers: A 'Mandatory' School Passage to the Front Lines

“School trip” for children at a Houthi-run summer camp in Amran (Asharq Al-Awsat)
“School trip” for children at a Houthi-run summer camp in Amran (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Houthi Summer Centers: A 'Mandatory' School Passage to the Front Lines

“School trip” for children at a Houthi-run summer camp in Amran (Asharq Al-Awsat)
“School trip” for children at a Houthi-run summer camp in Amran (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In a corner of the courtyard of a public school in Sanaa, a woman dressed in black stands, once used to seeing her son in the morning assembly line. Today, she returns to the same place not as a mother, but as a cleaner trying to keep what remains of her life intact. She wipes the ground in heavy silence, as if whispering to the courtyard gravel: I had a son here. He left a child and came back a corpse.

She sees her son’s face in the student lines, hearing chants and slogans that were once unfamiliar. Quietly, she realizes many of them may follow the same path, but she says nothing. Two years ago, Umm Amer lost her only son. He was 17. He was returned to her a lifeless body, his image raised atop a coffin. They told her: “Ululate, he has attained martyrdom.”

She recalls how he began to change gradually after joining that summer camp. He became quieter, sometimes sharper, shouting and repeating phrases she had never known, about “jihad” and “victory,” as if they were his only path. She did not understand what was happening, but she saw in his eyes a look that was carrying him away from her.

Today, she does nothing but wipe her tears in secret and continue cleaning, in a job she obtained as the “mother of a martyr,” to support her three daughters after losing the family’s provider.

From Summer Activity to Mobilization Apparatus

The Houthi summer centers did not emerge with the group’s takeover of Sanaa in 2014. They are an extension of a historical trajectory tied to the group’s origins. Their beginnings date back to the early 1990s, specifically 1991, when activities were organized under what was known as the “Believing Youth” in Saada. These included youth programs and seasonal courses aimed at transmitting ideological messaging through study circles and summer camps, serving as early tools to build a social and organizational base by combining education with ideological formation.

With the outbreak of the Saada wars in 2004, these activities underwent a qualitative shift. They were no longer limited to religious or educational aspects but became tools of mobilization and recruitment, benefiting from public sympathy during the conflict and expanding their reach among youth.

By 2008, the group began spreading these activities beyond Saada using nontraditional means, including distributing digital materials on SD cards and USB drives. These contained Houthi doctrinal lectures and lessons tied to the summer centers, as well as what is known as the “Malazim” - Houthi doctrinal lectures delivered by the group’s founder, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, transcribed into booklets.

A supervisor in Sanaa said he received such memory devices in 2008, distributed among selected students. Upon reviewing their contents, he found recordings and Houthi doctrinal lectures by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, noting that these materials marked a turning point in his adoption of the group’s ideas and support for it.

He attended closed gatherings to listen to these Houthi doctrinal lectures in private meeting spaces with individuals close to the group in Sanaa and nearby areas such as Bani Hushaysh, Khawlan, and Sanhan.

Following the developments of 2011, particularly the February protests and sit-ins and the broader moment of political opening, these activities expanded to a number of provinces. More organized centers and courses appeared outside the group’s main stronghold, with clearer administrative oversight under the appealing slogan “regime change.” They moved beyond narrow circles to fill libraries and kiosks with the Malazim, establishing stalls in multiple locations to distribute booklets, posters, and slogans free of charge, and installing loudspeakers to continuously broadcast chants.

The most significant transformation came after the takeover of Sanaa in 2014, when summer centers shifted from limited activities into a wide-ranging program formally administered through state institutions, within an organizational structure that includes central, technical, and supervisory committees, with the involvement of multiple ministries.

A security source said the group had, in earlier stages, relied on what it called “cultural courses” and religious seminaries to attract youth, gain their sympathy, and integrate them into its project before the current model of summer centers emerged. The source added that these centers “are no longer limited, but have become an institutional program managed within an integrated organizational structure,” noting that they are used as a tool to influence youth orientations, ultimately pushing some toward the front lines.

Students in a classroom perform a military salute and chant the Houthi slogan (al-sarkha) (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Types of Summer Camps

According to available information, the group divides these centers or camps into three types: closed, model, and open. Closed camps function as ideological military courses. They are held in military barracks and focus primarily on preparing participants to become fighters within the group. They are trained both militarily and ideologically for this purpose and are considered reserve forces. Once enrolled, their phones are confiscated, contact with their families is cut off, and they are transported at night between training camps that change periodically.

All participants are high school students who have completed weapons dismantling training in schools. Their trainers nominate them for military courses as a reward for excellence and distinction, in addition to some members of school scout groups whose activities have been shifted from scouting to military.

In these camps, participants are trained to use light and medium weapons, RPGs, mortars, grenades, and camouflage and concealment techniques.

Model camps, typically for those over the age of 10, are considered “specialized camps.” Top-performing students in various school activities are recruited to them. These are closed camps where students remain throughout the week, but they are allowed to communicate with their families and their phones are not confiscated. They may return home weekly or every two weeks.

These camps are usually held in provincial capitals, where students receive intensive ideological lectures from senior group leaders, watch films on “jihad,” and study the biographies of the group’s leaders, Hezbollah, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. They also receive limited training in dismantling and using certain types of weapons.

Open camps are for children aged 5 to 10. They begin in the morning and end at noon, appearing to the public as Quran memorization centers and summer activities. As a result, the group spreads them across schools and mosques to make them widely accessible. However, children in these camps are taught the “pledge of allegiance,” to chant the Houthi slogan (al-sarkha), and to obey the group’s leader.

Girls are not excluded. There are dedicated centers for females, managed by the General Women’s Cultural Authority, which designs and implements programs, recruits students through field networks, supervises female staff, and prepares unified guidance materials.

These centers are presented as educational and recreational spaces, but they also include intensive religious programs, mobilization-oriented lectures, and group activities that reinforce discipline and belonging.

Embedding a “Conspiracy Theory” Narrative

In its messaging, the group promotes the idea that the summer centers are a fortress against “conspiracies” targeting religion and the nation. They are presented as a means of instilling what it calls “Quranic culture” in younger generations and building a generation armed with knowledge and awareness.

The group also emphasizes that the “battle with the enemy” is not limited to the military dimension but extends to “targeting awareness.” These centers are framed as a safeguard against what is described as “soft war” and “cultural invasion,” and as part of a long intellectual struggle aimed at preparing a generation capable of confrontation.

Alongside this messaging, educational sources indicate that organizers rely on a set of material and moral incentives, such as providing meals, basic supplies, organizing trips, and offering activities, to attract as many students as possible each year.

According to one of the Malazim, a Houthi doctrinal lecture by founder Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi titled “Lessons in Knowing God,” delivered at the Believing Youth forum in Saada, the overarching objective is to “develop students’ knowledge of God and entrench doctrine within their souls and consciences, in a way that propels them toward fighting and confronting enemies.”

Lessons Outside the Official Curriculum

In this year’s season, which began on March 28, the group distributed its own curricula for the summer centers, printed in high quality with a distinct visual identity. This reflects the scale of resources allocated to these programs compared to formal education, which continues to suffer from declining support and capacity.

Students are often forced to purchase their official textbooks from the black market, while teachers struggle to obtain their salaries. Each year, as preparations for the summer centers begin, the group’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, delivers an annual speech calling for enrollment, a call that has itself evolved significantly over time.

These materials carry no reference to the Republic of Yemen or the Ministry of Education. Instead, they are issued under the title “The Quranic March – General Administration of Summer Courses.”

This extends to the naming of the centers, which are not attributed to the schools hosting them but are instead given symbolic names such as “Al-Hadi,” “Al-Hussein,” “Fatima,” “Martyr Taha al-Madani,” and “Martyr Saleh al-Sammad.”

Morning assembly for children in uniform at Houthi summer camps (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Administrative Structure with a Ministerial Character

The administrative structure of the summer courses and activities in areas under Houthi control reflects a multi-level system, led by the Ministries of Education and Youth and Sports, alongside the General Mobilization Authority, which plays a central role in mobilization and guidance, and the Ministry of Endowments, responsible for religious content.

At the executive and technical levels, local authorities in Houthi-controlled provinces oversee field implementation and coordinate activities within districts and centers through education offices and supervisory committees. Daily activities are managed, staff are assigned, and program implementation is monitored, reflecting a system that extends from central leadership down to neighborhoods.

Other ministries participate as technical partners in sectoral programs: the Ministry of Interior runs “Aware Youth... Safe Society,” Agriculture oversees the “Green Army,” Health manages “Health Ambassadors,” the communications sector supervises “Awareness in the Age of Communications,” and Technical Education and Vocational Training oversees “My Profession is My Future.”

The Ministry of Information plays an ongoing supporting role through annual coordination ahead of the launch of the courses, setting the framework for media coverage, including promotion and field reporting, as part of a plan to strengthen the centers’ presence in society.

These centers are managed by the “Supreme Committee for Summer Courses and Activities,” chaired by the prime minister in the Houthi administration, with membership including the ministers of education and youth and sports, a representative of the Endowments Authority, and representatives from the group’s mobilization and cultural apparatus.

Subcommittees are headed by provincial governors, with mobilization officials as deputies, and include directors of education, youth and sports, and endowments offices.

A Turning Point in 2026

While expansion of the summer centers had occurred gradually in previous years, 2026 marks a decisive turning point. Summer schooling is no longer optional; the group has moved to a new phase in which attendance is effectively compulsory. According to testimonies from students, parents, and teachers, a network of direct and indirect pressures is being applied, at times reaching the level of threats, placing families before a stark equation: comply or risk their children’s future.

Although this shift has not been officially announced, it has become a daily reality. Multiple sources confirm that, with preparations for this year’s summer centers underway, the group has escalated practices linking school procedures to participation in these programs.

For example, student results and admission for the next academic year are tied to participation, alongside pressure on school administrations to push students into the camps under threat of penalties. If a student wants their academic record to remain free of marks that could affect their future, including university admission, they must register in these centers.

In some schools, the release of results or acceptance into the following year is tied to a certificate of attendance from the summer center. Messages circulated on communication groups include implicit warnings that absence may negatively affect academic progression.

One message sent by a school administrator to mothers in a WhatsApp group contains a veiled threat that any student who does not attend the summer centers will be denied enrollment next year: “Dear mothers, please be informed that registration will not be accepted without a certificate from the summer center. We ask that students who have not yet registered do so and join the center to benefit.”

In another group, a teacher urged students: “Come early tomorrow, those registered and those not yet registered should register. The administration will not accept them at the start of the school year without the summer center certificate.”

A message attributed to a school principal in northern Ibb indicated that attendance at the summer centers is a condition for receiving exam results, while failing students are enticed with additional marks if they join the courses.

Extracurricular activities titled “My Profession is My Future” at a Houthi-run summer camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Declining Participation and Criminalization

According to sources, these measures were introduced out of concern that the summer centers might face declining turnout, as families are increasingly aware of their outcomes. Teacher A. Abdul Karim, who works in these centers, said that despite the group’s efforts to mobilize as many students as possible, participation has recently declined.

He noted that turnout has become very weak, and that recruiting students now requires significant time, sustained persuasion, and financial incentives.

The Yemeni Teachers’ Syndicate warned of the dangers posed by these centers, stating they have become organized tools for sectarian ideological mobilization and the recruitment of children and youth, as part of a systematic targeting of national identity and the education system in Yemen.

In a statement dated Sunday, April 12, 2026, the syndicate said the group has expanded these centers since taking control of Sanaa to attract the largest number of students, using them to instill doctrinal ideas based on concepts of lineage-based selection that conflict with national and religious values and serve a political project threatening Yemen’s security and stability.

Neglected Schools, Flourishing Centers

In its messaging, the group describes the summer centers as an “educational support channel” to compensate for gaps caused by war. However, according to many teachers, this is nothing more than a worse excuse than the offense itself. Schools themselves could serve that role if there were genuine intent to reform education.

Teachers argue that the group’s insistence on these centers reveals that the goal is not education, but the production of a generation prepared for early recruitment and ideological mobilization. They pose a central question: if the group holds full control over formal education and has successfully inserted its ideology into school curricula, why deliberately neglect schools, leaving them in a state of near collapse, without teachers, salaries, or basic educational resources?

This contradiction between stagnating schools during the academic year and their sudden revival in summer raises serious questions.

While significant attention, funding, and effort are directed toward summer centers that quickly turn into active and crowded spaces, formal education remains in a state of severe stagnation and resource deprivation, with thousands of schools lacking even the most basic requirements for learning.


Meroe Pyramids Resist Destruction, Guard Sudan’s Heritage

Archaeologist Mohamed Mubarak walks past pyramids standing in the Meroe desert, at one of the archaeological sites of the so-called Island of Meroe on the eastern shore of the Nile River, about 220 km north of Khartoum, on April 22, 2026. (Photo by KHALED DESOUKI / AFP)
Archaeologist Mohamed Mubarak walks past pyramids standing in the Meroe desert, at one of the archaeological sites of the so-called Island of Meroe on the eastern shore of the Nile River, about 220 km north of Khartoum, on April 22, 2026. (Photo by KHALED DESOUKI / AFP)
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Meroe Pyramids Resist Destruction, Guard Sudan’s Heritage

Archaeologist Mohamed Mubarak walks past pyramids standing in the Meroe desert, at one of the archaeological sites of the so-called Island of Meroe on the eastern shore of the Nile River, about 220 km north of Khartoum, on April 22, 2026. (Photo by KHALED DESOUKI / AFP)
Archaeologist Mohamed Mubarak walks past pyramids standing in the Meroe desert, at one of the archaeological sites of the so-called Island of Meroe on the eastern shore of the Nile River, about 220 km north of Khartoum, on April 22, 2026. (Photo by KHALED DESOUKI / AFP)

Mostafa Ahmed Mostafa is the heir to a long line of groundskeepers who have guarded Sudan's ancient pyramids of Meroe. Now, three years into the war between the army and paramilitary forces, he stands near-solitary sentinel over his heritage.

"These pyramids are ours, it's our history, it's who we are," the 65-year-old said, flanked by the dark sandstone structures of the Bajrawiya necropolis, which is part of the Island of Meroe, a UNESCO World Heritage site.

Clad all in white, Mostafa cut a striking figure crossing the 2,400-year-old burial site, which holds 140 pyramids built during the Kingdom of Kush's Meroitic period.

None are intact. Some were decapitated, others reduced to rubble, first in the 1800s by dynamite at the hands of treasure-hunting Europeans, and then by two centuries of sand and rain.

A three-hour drive from the capital Khartoum, it was once Sudan's most visited heritage site. Now three years into the war between Sudan's army and the Rapid Support Forces, only a lone camel's grunt cuts through the silence.

Archaeologist and site director Mahmoud Soliman gave AFP journalists a tour, explaining the Kush kingdom's matrilineal succession, trade routes and relationship with neighboring Egypt.

"It's maybe the fourth time I've shown people around since the war broke out," the scientist said.

Together, he, Mostafa and young archaeologist Mohamed Mubarak man the site, cobbling together resources to keep the erosive rain and sands at bay.

Apart from a short-lived influx of visitors early in the war -- mostly displaced people desperate for something to do -- the site has stood largely abandoned.

It is worlds away from its pre-war days, when there were "regular weekend visits from Khartoum, busloads of 200 people per day", Soliman remembered fondly.

Sudan's heritage sites had experienced a resurgence, he explained, after the uprising of 2018-2019, when young Sudanese protested against Omar al-Bashir.

One chant went: "My grandfather Taharqa, my grandmother Kandaka" -- the former a Kush Pharaoh, the latter the name for ancient queens, and also used to honor the women icons of the revolution.

"Young people were taking more of an interest, they were organizing trips to tourist sites and getting to know their own country," Soliman said.

Sudanese site director Mahmoud Soliman gestures inside a tomb beneath a pyramid at one of the archaeological sites of the so-called Island of Meroe, on the eastern shore of the Nile River, about 220 km north of Khartoum, on April 22, 2026. (Photo by KHALED DESOUKI / AFP)

Residents of the nearby Tarabil village -- named after the local word for "pyramids" -- sold souvenirs and rented camels and "were entirely dependent on the site".

On a breezy day in April, Khaled Abdelrazek, 45, rushed to the site as soon as he heard there were visitors. He squatted at the entrance, showed AFP journalists handmade miniature sandstone pyramids and reminisced about when there were "dozens of us selling".

In the months before the war, there were visits from documentary crews, a music festival and "big ideas for right after Eid al-Fitr", said Soliman -- all destroyed when the war broke out in the last days of Ramadan.

"I used to feel like I was teaching people about their culture," said Mubarak, who has worked at the site since 2018.

"Now, everyone's top priority is of course food and water and shelter. But this is also important. We need to protect this for future generations, we can't let it be destroyed or wither away."

Near the site's entrance, the proud pyramids, each fronted by a small mortuary temple, are framed by rolling black sandstone hills.

The vista is breathtaking, but Soliman said his eyes see only danger: Is that crack in that pyramid new? Has that sand mound moved? Does the pipe scaffolding at that burial chamber entrance need to be redone before the rainy season?

"I think if the pyramids had been left in their original state we wouldn't have all these problems," Mubarak said.

The structures are smaller and steeper than their Egyptian neighbors, built to "withstand the sands and sweep away the rainwater, but every fracture creates issues".

Local site guard Mostafa Ahmed speaks in front of pyramids standing in the Meroe desert, at one of the archaeological sites of the so-called Island of Meroe on the eastern shore of the Nile River, about 220 km north of Khartoum, on April 22, 2026. (Photo by KHALED DESOUKI / AFP)

The largest pyramid of the lot -- of Queen Amanishakheto, who reigned around the 1st century AD -- suffered more than just fractures and is now effectively a sandbox, fine sand swirling where her tomb once stood.

In 1834, Italian adventurer Giuseppe Ferlini, who destroyed dozens of pyramids, levelled Amanishakheto's and carted her jewelry off to Europe. It is now exhibited in the Egyptian museums in Berlin and Munich.

The outside of her temple wall still stands, where a larger-than-life carving of the queen shows her standing proud, holding a spear in one hand and smiting enemy captives.

Soliman showed AFP journalists more reliefs: the lion deity Apademak and motifs shared with Egypt, including the gods Amun and Anubis, lotus flowers and hieroglyphics.

He yearns for the day tourists and archeologists will return.

"This is just a distant dream, but I'd really like us to one day be able to do proper restoration on these pyramids," he said, as if he were not really allowing himself to hope.

"This place has so much potential."