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Conflict Rages over ‘Weapons and Heart’ of Tribes in Northeastern Syria

SDF commander Abdi Mazloum, wearing a traditional Arab dress, meets tribal leaders in Syria.
SDF commander Abdi Mazloum, wearing a traditional Arab dress, meets tribal leaders in Syria.
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Conflict Rages over ‘Weapons and Heart’ of Tribes in Northeastern Syria

SDF commander Abdi Mazloum, wearing a traditional Arab dress, meets tribal leaders in Syria.
SDF commander Abdi Mazloum, wearing a traditional Arab dress, meets tribal leaders in Syria.

The conflict that kicked off in mid-2019 between international and regional powers to win over the tribes of northeastern Syria intensified in recent days after the assassination of a senior figure in the Al-Uqaydat tribe, one of the largest in the Deir Ezzour province.

A look at the past
Backed by the US-led international coalition, the Kurdish-Arab Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) liberated the town of Baghouz, in Deir Ezzour, from ISIS in March 2019. Weeks later, protests erupted in the region east of the Euphrates, demanding an improvement in services and a halt to the “export” of oil to regions held by the Damascus regime. The SDF controls about 185 square kilometers, or nearly a third of Syria, 90 percent of the country’s oilfields, half of its gas fields, its three largest dams and most agricultural territories.

The majority of influential players in Syria have tried to win these tribes over to their side. These efforts have led to the tribes striking alliances with various forces: One alliance was struck with the SDF, another with Ankara and the third with Damascus. Tehran, meanwhile, attempted to offer “attractive packages” to Syrian youths to recruit them to its militias.

The Arab Council in Al Jazeera and Al Furat, which was formed in 2017, supported the Deir Ezzour protests that erupted against SDF. Ankara, meanwhile, supported the establishment of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans in December 2018. These clans and tribes voiced their support for the Turkish operations against the SDF.

On the other end, figures close to Damascus, including Hussam Qaterji, sponsored a conference for the Deir Ezzour tribes. The event was held in the Aleppo countryside and vowed to provide 5,000 fighters at a time when Iran was present militarily in Deir Ezzour. The al-Baqir brigade announced the formation of “resistance tribal units” aimed at expelling foreign forces from Syria.

New factors
A number of major and minor developments had taken place in recent months, which shifted attention to northeastern Syria. The first was US President Donald Trump’s announcement that he will keep a number of American forces in the region east of the Euphrates River after he had initially announced that he was pulling out the troops from the country. The second was the continuation of Israeli raids against “Iranian positions” in the Deir Ezzour and Albukamal regions. The third was Russia testing just how committed Washington was to maintaining its forces by its repeated attempts to reach the Iraqi border.

On the internal scene, and after months of secret American and French-sponsored negotiations, the two most prominent Kurdish parties in northeastern Syria succeeded in reaching preliminary agreements that guarantee the commitment to the Hewler (Erbil) pact. Deep differences between the Kurdish National Council and Democratic Union alliance had thwarted the implementation of the pact.

Another development was the declaration by Syria's Tomorrow Movement, headed by Ahmed al-Jarba, of the formation of the new Peace and Freedom Front. The front includes the Arab Council in Al Jazeera and Al Furat, Assyrian Democratic Organization and Kurdish National Council. Leaders of the front said it includes Kurdish, Arab and Assyrian forces on the ground in order to underscore the ties and cooperation between them. They acknowledged the role of the SDF, but said that it alone cannot rule the region.

A delegation from the Peace and Freedom Front recently met with American officials in the region east of the Euphrates. One of its leaders told Asharq Al-Awsat that the delegation received positive responses from the US, which was keen on establishing a partnership that the Syrian people deserve.

Commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, had on his end held a number of meetings with tribal leaders from Deir Ezzour to listen to their demands.

Another significant development was US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Senator Lindsey Graham’s announcement of a partnership deal between the US Delta Crescent Energy company and SDF to invest in oil in the region east of the Euphrates with the possibility of exporting it. Observers interpreted the move as American recognition of the Kurdish autonomous administration, significantly since the agreement, which deals with national Syrian resources, does not involve Damascus.

Amid all of these developments, Sheikh Muttshar al-Hifl, a senior Al-Uqaydat tribe member, was assassinated in Deir Ezzour in early August.

Raging conflict
The autonomous administration and SDF did not comment on the oil deal, but Ankara, Damascus, Tehran and Moscow were quick to denounce it as a “violation of Syria’s sovereignty” and “theft” of its resources. The deal and Hifl’s assassination have added fuel to the raging conflict between local, regional and international forces over the Deir Ezzour tribes.

The SDF denied its involvement in the murder and instead implied that the regime was involved. It has arrested a number of suspects and investigations are ongoing with them, said a Kurdish official. “The tribes are politically disorganized and the region was liberated from ISIS only a year ago,” he added. “We are tasked with providing security to hold elections and help the tribes organize themselves.”

Meanwhile, the “Al-Uqaydat Zubaid” tribe announced on Monday the formation of a military council aimed at “liberating the region.” It hailed the “heroics of the Syrian Arab Army” and saluted “the friends of Syria and their support of the war against terrorism led by president Bashar Assad.” Another group, called the “Al-Uqaydat tribe” issued a statement “thanking the Turkish command, government and army for what it has offered to the Syrian people.” It thanked them for meeting a series of demands, including having the US cease its support to the SDF, handing over the region to its people and rejecting demographic change.

The Arab Council in Al Jazeera and Al Furat was quick to condemn Hifl’s assassination. But the most significant reaction to the murder came from Ibrahim al-Hifl, Sheikh of the Al-Uqaydat Zubaid tribe, who was wounded in the attack. In a statement on Tuesday, he held the international coalition “fully” responsible for the developments in the region, demanding that it turn it over to the people and that the Arabs play their role “in full” in the area. He gave the coalition a month to meet the demands and hand over the perpetrators.

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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.