Syria: No Change in Zones of Influence in the Past 6 Months

US, Russian and Syrian forces in the East Euphrates region. AP file photo
US, Russian and Syrian forces in the East Euphrates region. AP file photo
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Syria: No Change in Zones of Influence in the Past 6 Months

US, Russian and Syrian forces in the East Euphrates region. AP file photo
US, Russian and Syrian forces in the East Euphrates region. AP file photo

Five years after the Russian military intervention in the war in Syria, which has an area of 185,000 square kilometers, the country remains divided into three zones of influence, with demarcation lines remaining relatively unchanged in the past six months.

The first zone - around two thirds of territories in the country - falls under the control of government forces backed by Iran and Russia. In the second, a quarter of the territories in northeastern Syria are controlled by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces that are supported by the US-led coalition.

The third zone of control that lies in northern and northwestern Syria is run by factions backed by the Turkish military.

“Jusoor for Studies” said that Russian officials have repeatedly announced that prior to Moscow’s intervention in Syria’s war in September 2015, regime forces were in control of only 10 percent of the country’s territories. With Russia’s help, the government is now in control of around two-thirds of the country.

According to a study carried out by the institution, the spheres of influence of the different powers have remained relatively stable since February. Opposition factions kept their control on 10.98 percent of territories, the regime on 63.38 percent while the remaining 25.64 percent stayed under the control of the SDF.

“ISIS has no military control of Syrian territories since February 2019,” it said. But the militant group has kept cells east of the Euphrates and the Syrian desert, known as the Badia.

The study said that demarcation lines have remained relatively unchanged due to agreements struck by the countries of influence, the coronavirus pandemic, and Syria’s economic crisis including the repercussions of Washington’s sanctions on it.

Among such deals is the understanding reached between the US and Russian militaries in mid-2017 on de-confliction by exchanging information on the flights of their fighter jets and considering the Euphrates a line separating the Americans and their allies from Russia and the factions it supports.

The deal included some exceptions, such as the US keeping the outpost of Tanf, near the border with Iraq and Jordan, south of the Euphrates, and in Manbij west of it.

The Syrian government also kept its presence in areas in Qamishli and Hassakeh east of the Euphrates.

The situation remained relatively stable until October 2019 when US President Donald Trump withdrew his forces from areas near the Turkish border, which encouraged his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to make a military incursion along with its Syrian allies between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain.

The SDF also signed an agreement with Damascus for cooperation with the Syrian and Russian armies to deploy around 10,000 troops in areas where US troops had withdrawn from.

The deal included carrying out Russian-Turkish patrols on the main roads between Aleppo and Qamishli.

In reversal, Trump agreed to leave about 500 US troops east of the Euphrates and around 100 in al-Tanf, which turned northeastern Syria into a complicated battleground with different forces operating there.

This led to Russian-US negotiations to confirm that the de-confliction agreement was still in force.

But the Russian military has upped its presence and tried more than once to obstruct US patrols.

In June, US Marine General Kenneth McKenzie, the head of US Central Command, said international coalition forces have discovered an increase in Russian military equipment in the region, which complicates the US role in the area.

By the end of June, Russian forces began entering areas where coalition troops have a presence as part of a plan to “expel” them from the region.

National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien said on Friday that the US has conveyed its concerns to Russia over an incident in Syria in which several US troops were injured when a Russian military vehicle collided with theirs.

“It’s been communicated to them (Russia) very clearly,” O’Brien told a White House news conference. “It’s been communicated at the appropriate level.”

Another agreement on Syria is that of Turkey and Russia in the country’s Idlib region.

Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Damascus in March to confirm commitment to the agreement with Turkey on Idlib and to avoid battles amid the coronavirus pandemic.

Along with the spread of the disease, Syria’s economic crisis has deepened and the currency has depreciated as the US hit Syria with its toughest sanctions yet under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act to choke off revenue for the regime in a bid to force it back to United Nations-led negotiations and broker an end to the country’s war.

Ways to deal with the sanctions, the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2254 and the fate of the demarcation lines in northwestern and northeastern Syria will be likely discussed during the visit of a Russian military, political and economic delegation to Damascus on Sunday.



Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)

In the third installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa discusses various experiences with Arab leaders, emphasizing the nuances of diplomacy in a turbulent region.

Moussa recalled that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak “was neither bloodthirsty nor a pharaoh, nor did he try to be one.” He points to a famous remark by President Anwar Sadat, who once said: “Gamal (Abdel Nasser) and I are the last of the pharaohs.”

The Gaddafi encounter

Reflecting on his complex interactions with Libyan leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, Moussa admitted that the beginning was anything but smooth. “When I first met Gaddafi, he treated me as if I were an American spy. He wouldn’t look at me directly, only speaking while facing another direction. It was very theatrical,” Moussa said. He recalled this behavior with a certain amusement, treating it almost like a game: “I would wager with myself before our meetings—will he speak to me directly this time, or not?”

Initially, rumors had reached Gaddafi that Moussa had been sent with a US agenda, though he had actually been Egypt’s ambassador to the UN in New York, not Washington. “But once he observed how I performed in my role, he began to change his mind. Eventually, he would ask President Mubarak if I could join their private discussions.”

Moussa recalled a specific instance in Tobruk, where he was invited by Gaddafi to sit at a table with him and Mubarak to discuss a matter of importance. He knew this would stir unease among others present, but the conversation went ahead regardless. This type of scene, he noted, happened several times.

Hosni Mubarak, Moammar al-Gaddafi and Amr Moussa at the Arab summit in Sirte in 2010. (AFP)

Diplomatic drama in a tent

When Gaddafi visited Cairo during Moussa’s tenure as foreign minister, the Libyan leader insisted on setting up his trademark tent in the gardens of the Qubba Palace. Though the palace was fully equipped, Gaddafi would receive guests only in the tent. “At that time, he still saw me as a US spy,” Moussa said, “so he avoided looking at me during our meeting. He inspected every corner of the tent—except the one where I was sitting.”

Despite Gaddafi’s sometimes abrasive behavior, Moussa conceded that the Libyan leader was intelligent and unique. “He was eccentric, yes, but he had a cleverness about him. His actions often carried a deeper rationale, even if misguided.”

Gaddafi’s erratic rule extended to his own ministers. Moussa noted how even highly regarded officials like Abdul Rahman Shalgham and Ali Treki were subject to his whims. “If Gaddafi was displeased with something, he might simply tell you to stay home—and that could mean house arrest for years. Yet, your salary would still arrive at your door.”

A moment of humor

One incident stood out. Libya was scheduled to host the Arab summit and had failed to pay its dues to the Arab League, and as Secretary-General, Moussa received an envoy from Gaddafi carrying a list of demands. Moussa didn’t even read the letter; he simply locked it in a drawer. “When the envoy asked what to report back, I told him exactly that,” Moussa laughed.

Soon after, Gaddafi summoned him to Sirte. As Moussa waited in the tent, Gaddafi’s secretary, Bashir Saleh, walked by singing an old Arabic poem: “You seem tearless, and patience is your nature.” Moussa quipped: “Tell the leader he’s not tearless—he’s payment-less!” Saleh shared the joke with Gaddafi, who burst into laughter and finally paid Libya’s dues.

Later, during an Arab summit in Libya, Gaddafi displayed a surprising sense of responsibility. Moussa recalled a heated moment when Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh demanded immediate action on forming a pan-Arab army. Gaddafi gently interrupted: “Take it easy, Ali.” That phrase—“Take it easy, Ali”—spoke volumes, according to Moussa. “It revealed Gaddafi’s desire to manage tension even among volatile leaders.”

On Hosni Mubarak and the ‘pharaoh’ myth

Asked if Mubarak ever resembled the authoritarian archetype of a “pharaoh” as Russians view their “czars,” Moussa was firm: “No, not Mubarak. Maybe Sadat had some traits—he liked symbolism. But Mubarak? He wasn’t violent, nor bloodthirsty. Yes, he could be firm, but he didn’t revel in bloodshed.”

Moussa clarified that while Mubarak might have approved harsh punishments as president, it never escalated to a murderous level. “Perhaps there were isolated incidents, especially within the prison system, but it wasn’t part of Mubarak’s character to govern through violence. He wasn’t built that way.”

Saddam Hussein meets with Amr Moussa in Iraq in January 2002. (AFP)

The song that stirred controversy

When the Egyptian folk singer Shaaban Abdel Rahim sang “I hate Israel, and I love Amr Moussa,” it caused a stir. Moussa downplayed the drama. “I don’t think Mubarak himself was offended. He was the president; no foreign minister would rival him in popularity. But some people in the surrounding circles—not necessarily his inner circle—were irked.”

Eventually, another version of the song emerged, replacing Moussa’s name with Mubarak’s. “But it was the original that made waves. Even a diplomat from Latin America once told me, ‘We’re dancing to this song here!’”

A difficult meeting with Saddam Hussein

One of the most tense encounters Moussa ever had was with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After being elected Secretary-General of the Arab League in 2001, Moussa set out to visit all Arab leaders. He deliberately left Saddam until the end, knowing the sensitivities involved.

In January 2002, Moussa visited Saddam at a small palace. He carried a message from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding weapons inspections. “I told Saddam that Annan was open to negotiations, and that continued confrontation with the US would lead nowhere. At some point, no one would stand by him.”

Moussa asked Saddam directly: “Do you possess nuclear weapons?” Saddam answered, “No.” Moussa pressed him again: “Are you absolutely sure?” Saddam repeated, “No.” This made Moussa’s deputy, Ahmed Ben Helli, visibly nervous. “He probably thought we weren’t going to walk out of there.”

Moussa then asked why Iraq objected to the UN inspectors. Saddam responded: “These people don’t just inspect nuclear sites. They ask civilians about food supplies, their opinions on the government. What business is that of theirs?”

Moussa promised to report this to Annan, which he did. Negotiations resumed between Iraq and the UN, but history took its course and the US-led invasion followed.

Asked if he felt fortunate never to have served directly under a figure like Gaddafi, Moussa answered without hesitation: “Absolutely. I saw how respected men like Shalgham and Treki were sidelined. You could be a top official one day and under house arrest the next.”