4 Pieces of Advice from Russia to its ‘Difficult Ally’ Syria

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
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4 Pieces of Advice from Russia to its ‘Difficult Ally’ Syria

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)

Weeks ago, an American official remarked that Russian President Vladimir Putin needed to ask himself, that five years since his direct military intervention in Syria, does he want the Syria of 2025 to be the same as Syria of 2020?

There is no doubt that the Russian delegation’s visit to Syria has this question in mind. The delegation carried with it economic promises and diplomatic advice to its “difficult ally” with the hopes of receiving different answers than what some Syrian officials desire.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and intelligence officials’ visit to Syria in early 2012 kicked off the phase of protecting the “allies” in Damascus through diplomatic and economic means. The intervention in late September 2015 paved the way for military intervention to “save the regime” and Damascus. So, yesterday’s “significant visit” is the beginning of the shift from military action towards politics, economy and diplomacy in the heart of Damascus, ultimately paving the way for different solutions in Syria.

Before departing Syria, the Russian delegation leaves behind four pieces of advice to its “difficult ally”:

‘American sword’
The United States has now entered a complicated electoral phase ahead of November’s presidential elections. At the moment, there are no serious indications that American forces will withdraw from northeastern Syria, even if Joe Biden were to win the polls.

From Moscow’s perspective, the upcoming weeks will witness the announcement of new American sanctions as part of the Caesar Act. The last batch had targeted president Bashar Assad, his wife and their son. It also targeted his senior aides and businessmen. The new sanctions will include more businessmen, lawmakers and military officials. The Caesar Act enjoys bipartisan support in the US, meaning they are here to stay for the foreseeable future. Confronting them, therefore, demands coordination between Moscow and Damascus. To that end, it appears that the Russian delegation brought with it attractive financial and economic promises to Damascus in the shape of loans or grants worth billions of dollars that will give the regime some sanctions and economic relief in the near future.

Iranian ‘crescent’
In return for these pledges, Moscow “advised” Damascus of the need to “help us so we can help you” in breaking its diplomatic-political isolation and kicking off the reconstruction process. How? By taking some tangible steps in reorganizing its internal affairs, implementing constitutional reform according to United Nations Security Council resolution 2254 and reassessing its ties with Iran. Damascus is demanded to “decrease its role in the ‘Iranian crescent’” that stretches from Tehran, passing through Baghdad and Damascus, and ending in Beirut. The “crescent” is coming under frequent Israeli strikes with American blessing and Russian silence, reflecting the implementation of the Russian-American agreement that calls for keeping Iran away from southern Syria.

All of this will pave the way for Arab and European countries to “normalize” relations with Syria and help in its reconstruction. In return, Damascus must accept the understandings reached between Moscow and Washington over the regions east of the Euphrates River. It must also accept the understandings reached between Moscow and Ankara over northwestern Syria. In other words, Syria must yield to the strategic understandings reached between Russia and Turkey that go beyond the frontlines in northwestern Syria. Moscow had, after all, received days ahead of Lavrov’s Damascus trip a Turkish delegation to discuss the latest developments in the deal struck with Russia in March.

Decentralization
Moscow recently hosted the signing of an agreement between head of the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Elham Ahmed, and head of the Russia-backed People's Will Party, Qadri Jamil. Lavrov met with Ahmed and Qadri after the agreement was signed.

The deal stipulated that the “new Syria will enjoy a democratic constitution that achieves a modern relationship between decentralization and centralization in main (foreign, defense and economic) affairs.” It also underscored a “fair democratic solution to the Kurdish issue”. Moreover, it stressed that the “Syrian army is the sole national institution with the right to carry arms and that it is barred from meddling in politics.” The SDF must be incorporated in the army, it added.

Lavrov informed Ahmed and Jamil of his complete support of the agreement, saying he will relay its details to officials in Damascus.

New Syria
The “new Syria” addressed in the agreement is one that Russia is keen to achieve through resolution 2254 and the Constitutional Committee. It is clear, however, that Damascus is not on board to seriously join this venture. During its latest meeting two weeks ago, the government delegation at the committee may have changed its approach, but its goals remain the same. The delegation refused to be referred to as the “government delegation” or “government-backed delegation” Rather, it reneged on a previous agreement, reached with the opposition representatives at the committee, on “procedural regulations”, saying it is an “independent entity”.

Such behavior is only aimed at buying time until after the presidential elections set for mid-2021, because Damascus wants the polls to be held according to the current constitution. It is, therefore, hoping for talks on the constitution to be postponed until after the elections. It is also insisting on holding a referendum on the results of the Constitutional Committee meetings.

UN envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen traveled to Moscow to brief Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on the third round of committee talks, which were attended by a Russian representative, who saw for himself the government delegation’s behavior. Lavrov pledged to address the issue with the “difficult ally”. It is believed that his “advice” would be for Damascus to alter its behavior at the Constitutional Committee meetings and speed up its efforts to reach a breakthrough ahead of the presidential elections.

The coming days and weeks will, therefore, act as a test to see just how much Damascus heeded this “advice” and whether it will prove wrong remarks by a former Russian diplomat, who noted: “Damascus takes everything from us, but advice.”



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.