Hussam Itani
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Partition and Federalism: Self-Deceptive Assurance

The August 4 explosion shattered the already fragile links that had tied the Lebanese together. The fact that the loss of life and destruction were concentrated in Beirut’s Christian neighborhoods reinforced residents’ sentiments of having fallen victim to a scheme contrived by some among their own to impose Muslim domination, whether it be Sunnis or Shiites, over what remains of Lebanon’s Christians.

The illusion that some Christians convinced themselves in - since the agreement signed by then Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah- has shattered. It had been widely believed that the accord guaranteed Christians’ retrieval of their power after the Syrian forces withdrew and the March 14 factions failed to absorb the Aounist wave. Instead, the March 14 factions manifested a desire to contain and eliminate this wave through what had been known as the “quadripartite alliance” between the Future Movement, Progressive Socialist Party, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. The Christians saw this as an alliance among Muslim parties aiming to perpetuate the marginalization of Christians that had begun with Michel Aoun being forced out of Baabda in 1990.

The Aounists proposed a counter-alliance with Hezbollah, the strongest of their four opponents. The Aounists would provide Hezbollah with the “national” cover that ends its sectarian isolation in exchange for Hezbollah’s pledge to support all their aspirations, first to lead the Christians, then to ascend to presidency of the republic and control the Christian’s share of political and administrative posts. This is what happened, until the Christian public began to realize how little it had to gain from Michel Aoun assuming the presidency, with only a narrow circle of partisans and beneficiaries reaping massive gains, material and immaterial, from Aoun’s presence in the presidential palace.

Unprecedentedly aggressive spoil-sharing characterized the first three years of Michel Aoun’s reign, as the parties to the “presidential settlement” took corruption, embezzlement, clientelism and plunder to new extremes. Christians who did not meet the criterion of blind loyalty to the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement and Michel Aoun’s son-in-law were thrown out of the Eden of the state, while their Shiite ally’s influence on state institutions and Lebanon’s foreign policy has grown to the extent that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps leadership considers Lebanon to be among the Arab countries under their control, amid an unprecedented deterioration of Lebanon’s relations with the Arab world and international community, which had been providing significant amounts of capital that cannot be underestimated given the country’s political-economic model since its independence. Criticism of this model and explanations of its shortcomings are beside the point.

The October 17 uprising’s failure, the explosion at the Port of Beirut and the toppling of the French initiative are three developments that Hezbollah played a pivotal role in, preventing the emergence of a rescue plan that could extricate Lebanon from the disaster brought about by a corrupt and murderous political class, not to mention the general sense that there is no hope for reform or even to patch up the collapse...All of this justified Christians and non-Christians’ claims that perpetuating the governance framework has become impossible, as it has prevented the erection of a state of law and citizenship and imposed the authority of an armed group with a foreign agenda. Physical annihilation now lurks behind the door after Christian society and culture were dealt knockout blows.

In their minds, the solution is to establish a federal system in which federations have wide-ranging authority, thereby assuring minorities that they can determine their fate, enjoy their freedoms, and preserve culture. In the event of this proposal’s failure, Lebanon should be divided into independent sovereign entities. Each of the entities then chooses the path that its dominant group sees fit.

There are two problems with this vision. In addition to the fact that federalism does not solve foreign policy, defense and financial policy issues, it also mandates that these are the federal state’s prerogatives, and those who present these proposals for partition and federalism disregard explaining how these sovereign or united entities would manage political life internally, make their plans for the future and elect their leaders. What is important, for those who hold the aforementioned vision, is that these entities would free themselves of the burden of the other; the "Muslim"- Sunni or Shiite. Perhaps its distinct cultural heritage (another illusion in today’s world) will facilitate a return to past economic prosperity.

Unfortunately, Lebanese groups’ history could accurately be described as a series of intra-sectarian rather than inter-sectarian wars. From the battle of Ain Dara between the Qaysis and the Yemenis, both under Druze leadership, in 1711, to the Shiite-Shiite war between 1988 and 1990, the intra-Christian war between the Lebanese Forces and Michel Aoun’s army, the wars fought among brothers were fiercer and more destructive than the wars against traditionally hostile sects.

There is no use in distorting this history, nor in conjuring up exceptions and reasons that downplay the events of these intra-sectarian wars because the reasons that create conflict between sects are exactly the same as those that lead to strife between members of the same sect: The absence of a framework for generating leadership, rotating power within the community concerned and distributing wealth. In other words, the total absence of all requisites for the Lebanese society or sectarian groups need to become a modern entity amid the dominance of every form of oriental or medieval tyranny.

Regardless of whether or not the Lebanese become convinced of federalism or division, reality will impose the same simple political truths. Who rules, how and why? The sources of conflict will be recreated at the level of each sect and clan, similarly to the events unfolding at the moment between two tribes in the Bekaa who do not differ in their views, lineage, sect or love for resistance.