Norland Says Withdrawal of Syrians from Western Libya Linked to Wagner’s Presence in East

US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. Asharq Al-Awsat
US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. Asharq Al-Awsat
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Norland Says Withdrawal of Syrians from Western Libya Linked to Wagner’s Presence in East

US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. Asharq Al-Awsat
US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland. Asharq Al-Awsat

US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland defended his country’s policies toward the Libyan conflict, denying that the United States favors one faction over another, and refuting the allegations that Washington was ignoring Turkey’s military intervention in Libya as a way to counter the increased Russian involvement in the country.

In a wide-ranging interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Norland said Libyans have made progress toward a political settlement, adding that they “are tired of war.”

He commended the head of the Government of National Accord, Fayez al-Sarraj, for announcing his intent to step down, but said he would like to see him staying in his post for a little bit more time.

The diplomat spoke of his recent visits to Egypt and Turkey where he met with top officials, saying he would “encourage” Cairo and Ankara “to consult directly with each other as a way to avoid miscalculations” on Libya.

Explaining what is meant by his country’s proposal to “demilitarize” the Libyan cities of Sirte and al-Jufra, he said that “joint police or civilian security personnel” would remain in those areas. Any remaining armed groups, including Kremlin-linked mercenaries known as the Wagner Group, would only “undermine” confidence building measures between the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army.

“There’s unfortunately little doubt that Wagner is acting on behalf of the Russian government, and that their activities help to drive instability in Libya,” he said. “Those who call for the withdrawal of Syrian and other fighters from western Libya, for example, cannot possibly hope to see this happen as long as Wagner continues to build up its presence in the east.”

The Ambassador did not want to take a position on the agreement signed between the GNA and Turkey last year, and said bilateral maritime disputes involving competing claims over territorial waters in the Mediterranean “is a matter for international law and negotiations between the parties themselves.”

“My understanding is that the GNA did what it had to do to survive the LNA offensive,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Below is the full text of the exclusive interview with Norland:

1- Libya seems to be making some kind of progress towards a political settlement now, after the failure of the National Army’s push towards Tripoli, earlier this year. The warring parties are engaged in dialogue in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Switzerland and may be other places too. How optimistic are you now of reaching a breakthrough? What would you say to the Libyans who are engaged in these talks/negotiations? And are you playing any role in helping the Libyans reach a settlement?

Camille, thank you for the question, and thank you for the opportunity to talk about Libya with your readers. I agree with your view. Libyans have made progress toward a political settlement. Several sets of talks in Geneva, Montreux, as well as helpful confidence-building discussions in Egypt and Morocco, have helped set the stage for the upcoming Libyan Political Dialogue Forum or LPDF guided by the UN and now is the time to focus on this process. I know that many Libyans see this as just another conference where politicians talk, and maybe they believe it will fail like previous talks did. Yet there are many things that are different this time around. First of all, people are tired of war: In my many consultations with Libyan leaders, I see that there is a growing consensus on the importance of political dialogue - not military force for resolving the conflict. Similarly, Libyans increasingly want to re-assert Libyan sovereignty and remove armed foreign forces from the country. In addition, the LPDF will be the first edition of talks where participants must declare themselves ineligible for political positions in the new institutions to be created. It’s also worth noting that in the same context, Prime Minister Sarraj has signaled his intention to eventually step down and turn power over to the new executive authority that would be established under the LPDF. That is a courageous and unprecedented step that also sets this moment apart from previous attempts to find a political settlement.

2- You have lately been involved in meetings on Libya with both the Egyptians and Turks. Are you encouraged by what you have been told by these opposing sides, each of which is backing a different party in Libya? Can we assume that you have brokered a ‘Libyan truce’ between the Turks and the Egyptians? What do you expect Cairo and Ankara to do next to push the Libyans towards a deal?

I was encouraged by my consultations with senior officials in Cairo and Ankara earlier this month and in August, in line with Secretary Pompeo’s desire to use American diplomatic tools to help create the conditions that lead to a successful political process for Libya. My consultations suggested the United States, Egypt, Turkey, and other international partners are looking for pragmatic ways to support the LPDF. Such consultations help us understand common interests in finding a peaceful, negotiated settlement to the conflict rather than escalating and further destabilizing Libya and the region. Having said that, I certainly would encourage Egypt and Turkey to consult directly with each other as a way to avoid miscalculations and build cooperation on their common interest in a stable and peaceful Libya.

3- Can you explain to the readers what is meant by your proposal to “demilitarize” the Libyan cities of Sirte and al-Jufra? Who will be in charge of these two cities? Does this mean, in addition to the withdrawal of the National Army units, the Russian mercenaries will also have to leave their alleged bases in the Ghardabiya Airbase and al-Jufra airbase? Is this what you are seeking?

As a matter of policy, the United States has consistently called for the departure of all foreign forces including mercenaries and contractor forces from Libya. These armed foreign groups have only further destabilized Libya and escalated the conflict. Wagner, the Kremlin-linked contract company is among those actors. In the near term, what we recommended is a concrete confidence-building measure by demilitarizing Sirte and al-Jufra, likely with joint police or civilian security personnel to remain in those areas. The exact details to operationalize this idea should be negotiated by the Libyans themselves. This could be a concrete first step that facilitates additional steps towards de-escalation. Any remaining armed groups, including Wagner, would only undermine such confidence building measures.

4- Can you expand on the role Russia plays in Libya? The Wagner Group is alleged to have deployed not only mercenary fighters, but also aircrafts and anti-aircraft battery missiles in Libya, an allegation Moscow denies. Is it your understanding that these Russian mercenaries could not have been deployed without an agreement from the highest authorities in Moscow, namely the Kremlin? As a follow up, can you confirm that these mercenaries are still deployed in Libya, including in the oil fields?

As I said earlier, the United States opposes all foreign military involvement in Libya including that of the Wagner Group. As I think you’ve seen, our military, namely AFRICOM has publicly identified Russian military activities and instances when Russia has brought in sophisticated weapons in violation of the arms embargo. There’s unfortunately little doubt that Wagner is acting on behalf of the Russian government, and that their activities help to drive instability in Libya. Those who call for the withdrawal of Syrian and other fighters from western Libya, for example, cannot possibly hope to see this happen as long as Wagner continues to build up its presence in the east.

5- Do you believe that Russia is seeking to establish a base in Libya, and what would that mean, if true?

I don’t claim to know Russian intentions, that is a question for Moscow. What I do know is that Libyans are looking for less rather than more foreign military presence in their country. We share that interest and see the LPDF as the best tool to help Libyans achieve this.

6- Russia has lately complained that it has offered to sit down and talk with you on Libya but you are refusing to do so. Why, if true?

I never refused discussions with Russia. The United States has regular contact with Russia, including on Libya. The Russian government is well informed of our position on the role of Wagner in Libya, and our support for the LPDF. I think there is a current within Russia that is actually supportive of a Libyan political solution and recognizes that Russia can achieve its legitimate interests in Libya, such as promoting Russian businesses and counterterrorism, through political dialogue. The Russian military investment in Libya, however, undermines this position.

7- You have been a subject of constant criticism by your opponents in Libya, who allege that you are leaning towards, or even backing, the Muslim Brotherhood in Western Libya. Those who hold such a view accuse you of ignoring Turkey’s military involvement in Libya, may be as a tool in countering Russia’s involvement. Turkey, according to its opponents, publicly backs the Muslim Brotherhood and hosts Libyan Islamists, some of which your own government used to consider as terrorist. Your critics would also accuse you of allowing the Turks to establish bases in Libya, from which they can threaten Egypt (by the Islamists) and even European states (by an influx of migrants). Can you set the record straight and refute these allegations?

We don’t support any one side in the Libyan conflict. As a pragmatic matter, the Turkish military intervention would likely never have happened had the LNA not engaged Wagner mercenaries in its offensive on Tripoli. Now the challenge is to help all Libyans -- east, west and south -- create the conditions for reclaiming their sovereignty and setting the stage for the departure of all foreign combat forces. The United States is engaged in active diplomacy with all sides, something the White House called 360 diplomatic engagement, in order to support the LPDF. The ongoing escalatory military dynamic is fraught with the risk of miscalculation and new levels of violence. It should be clear to all that renewed hostilities in Libya will not produce a victor, it will only bring more carnage, more criminal activity, more illegal migration and more problems for the average Libyan -- be it a reduction of income, a degradation of medical care, or less electricity. As I said, we oppose all foreign military intervention in Libya and we have zero tolerance for terrorists. A political settlement under the LPDF will open the way to the departure of all foreign forces and can facilitate solving problems that thrive within the instability of the Libyan conflict.

Similarly, militias will need to be disarmed, demobilized or where possible, integrated into the regular military or security services under civilian control. Exactly how that happens is a question for Libyans to decide. That decision process would be most effective under new political institutions in a sovereign Libya following a political settlement under the LPDF.

8- As a follow up to the above, what is your position on the legality of the Turkish treaty with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli regarding oil explorations in the Mediterranean, as well as the security deal too? That deal, as you well know, has been rejected by Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, who claim it encroaches on their waters?

The US does not take a position on bilateral maritime disputes involving competing claims over territorial waters – this is a matter for international law and negotiations between the parties themselves. My understanding is that the GNA did what it had to do to survive the LNA offensive.

9- Has Sarraj explained to you why he has offered to resign by the end of this month? Do you still expect him to do so soon?

Thanks for this question. I just want to commend Prime Minister Sarraj for announcing his intent to step down. His historic decision to step down voluntarily shows that he is willing to put the interests of the Libyan people above his own personal interest, and deserves respect. Regarding the exact timing, I have to acknowledge that at the time of his announcement we expected that he would be able to turn power over to a new executive authority at the end of October. However, due to COVID and other complications in organizing the dialogue, UNSMIL has indicated that the current timing of LPDF meetings will push this into November. So I would hope and expect that he stays on as Prime Minister a little longer, at least until this transfer of power is possible. Having said that it’s clear to me that he has every intention of stepping down.

10- In a briefing you gave a few months ago, you hinted that some in Egypt may have backed the wrong side in Libya, alluding to Haftar. Are the Egyptians still clinging to him, or are they backing different groups now, mainly tribes from eastern Libya? Do the Americans have any contact with Haftar and his National Army now?

The Cairo Declaration, which broadened the political face of the east, and Egypt’s support of the LPDF with important steps such as hosting the Hurghada Security talks are evidence that the Egyptians are invested in the political solution to the Libya conflict rather than a military one. I don’t want to speak for the Egyptians, but in my consultations with senior officials they’ve signaled a pragmatic approach which recognizes that military escalation only destabilizes Libya and potentially threatens the wider region. As a neighbor, this is the exact opposite of what they want to see. So I’ll repeat here my genuine appreciation for Egypt’s concrete steps in support of the LPDF.

On the second part of your question, we do have contact with General Haftar and the LNA, and recognize that they can be part of the solution if they are willing to follow the exclusively political path. It was a good signal from the LNA that oil production was able to resume for the benefit of Libyans. We understand their representatives are taking a constructive approach in the 5+5 talks this week in Geneva. Our outreach to the LNA is part of our wide ranging diplomatic engagement with all sides, and should not be confused with taking sides.

11- Have you witnessed an increase in ISIS or Al-Qaeda’s activities in Libya lately, taking advantage of the fighting between the warring parties of eastern and western Libya?

We know that the conflict has given terrorist groups the space and the opportunity to try to regroup in Libya. Thus far our counter-terrorism efforts have constrained ISIS and Al-Qaeda efforts to reestablish a significant presence. But the threat is still there, and the best way to address this is to ensure that the State of Libya is a fully sovereign and capable partner in the fight against terrorism. Success in the LPDF offers the best guarantee that this will happen.

12- I have to ask you this question: having served in Kabul before, which, in your opinion, is more difficult to resolve the Afghan or the Libyan crisis.

Both conflicts have proven resistant to efforts at peaceful resolution, though the Afghan conflict has now lasted much longer than the Libyan one. Both conflicts have opened up space for extremists and terrorist groups. Both conflicts involve efforts to establish democratic governments in places that have not known this before. Both conflicts feature corruption and entrenched interests opposed to a peaceful resolution. Both conflicts have led to enormous hardships for average citizens. Both conflicts have featured toxic foreign intervention, and in both cases the United States has sought to play a helpful role in support of democracy and human rights, though not without some mistakes along the way. Both Afghanistan and Libya represent potentially lucrative commercial gateways to remote markets. While both Libya and Afghanistan have significant untapped natural resources, Libya has had the advantage of being able to access its natural wealth and put it on the world market before Afghanistan could. This gives Libyans an advantage which we hope will be seized upon through the LPDF. If Libya is able to emerge as a stable and unified country through political dialogue it could be incredibly prosperous.

13 - Is Libya better or worse without Gaddafi? An assessment from a non-Libyan is much appreciated.

Certainly if you read books like Hisham Matar’s “In the Country of Men” you realize the Gaddafi era featured brutality and torture, and the downing of Pan Am 103 was his regime’s work as well. But questions about a country’s leadership should really be answered by the citizens of that country. That is exactly why we are so focused on supporting sovereign Libyan efforts to achieve a lasting end to the conflict and national elections as quickly as possible, through which Libyans can exercise the voice that the Qaddafi dictatorship sought to silence through violence and oppression. In the coming days, Libyans from across the political spectrum, including the so-called “Greens,” will come together peacefully through the LPDF to debate the most critical issues facing the country and forge government institutions that are accountable to the Libyan people. This dialogue stands in powerful contrast with the former regime, where Libyans had no say in how leaders were chosen, no freedom to criticize leaders, and no power to demand accountability. No one can deny that the years since the revolution have been tumultuous, but I believe there is a real opportunity for Libyans to start building a brighter future.



Amr Moussa: I Lost Faith in Nasser on June 5, 1967

Amr Moussa speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Amr Moussa speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Amr Moussa: I Lost Faith in Nasser on June 5, 1967

Amr Moussa speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Amr Moussa speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Some politicians fade into isolation after losing the blessing of powerbrokers and surrendering their office keys. A rare few retain their presence and shine, even without official seals. Amr Moussa is among the latter.

Now in his late 80s, Moussa remains an active observer of events and transformations. For more than half a century, he was a key player or close witness to milestones that reshaped the Arab world.

He served as Egypt’s ambassador to the United Nations before becoming foreign minister, and later took on the arduous role of Secretary-General of the Arab League.

The position placed him at the heart of regional diplomacy, navigating divergent leaders and unpredictable politics — from Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad to Muammar Gaddafi and Yasser Arafat.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Moussa opened up his rich memory vault, reflecting candidly on pivotal events and prominent figures. His remarks were marked by unease about Egypt’s future.

“Mistakes have been piling up. Egypt is paying the price for 70 years of poor governance,” he said.

He recalled the morning of June 5, 1967 — the start of the Six-Day War — as the moment he stopped believing in President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “At 9 am, I realized the official statements were lies. Egypt was in danger.”

Moussa praised former President Anwar Sadat for what he called a “very sound” decision to regain all Egyptian land lost in the war, noting that the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, remain under Israeli occupation.

He was not asked about the ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, a topic on which he has been outspoken. His condemnation of Israeli actions has been clear in his public statements and regular contributions to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Good Governance

Asked whether he was worried about Egypt’s future, Moussa did not hesitate.

“Of course I’m worried—and worry is a good thing,” he said. “Not being worried means you’re living in a fantasy. With all these crises we’re facing—global, regional, and local—how could anyone not be concerned? I am among those who are.”

Moussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister and Arab League chief, said Egypt’s most pressing challenge is its rapidly growing population. He voiced support for the slogan of the “New Republic” often seen on state television, saying the country urgently needs a fresh start—but one rooted in genuine reform.

“We need a new republic, and that can only be built through full implementation of good governance,” he said.

Explaining what that means, Moussa invoked the principle of communicating vessels: “The education sector, healthcare, defense, foreign policy, food supply, even sports and civil administration—they must all be treated with equal importance, and developed in parallel.”

Moussa noted that Egypt’s path to revival lies in managing its wealth—not in claiming poverty.

“We need to focus on people, on buildings, and on agriculture,” Moussa said. “And by buildings, I don’t just mean roads. I mean roads, hotels, architecture, and beautiful cities. Urban elegance matters.”

He pointed to Cairo’s historical neighborhoods as examples of past glory.

“When you walk through Old Cairo, Fustat, or the city of Al-Muizz, you see a grandeur from another time,” he said. “And when you look at Khedival Cairo, you see the elegance of the late 19th century that lasted through the 1950s. But today, there is no real interest in cities—or villages.”

Moussa rejected the notion that Egypt is poor.

“Egypt is not a poor country. It’s a mismanaged one,” he said. “What we need is better wealth management, better resource extraction, and stronger trade. These ideas are on the table now. There’s a new government in place, and we hope it brings new policies that reflect today’s realities. This is possible.”

The Day Faith in Nasser Died

Moussa’s reflections on governance brought him back to a deeply personal turning point—June 5, 1967, the day Israel launched a devastating surprise attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

“It was a painful day in Egypt’s history, in Arab history, and for Nasser’s leadership,” he said.

At the time, Moussa was a young diplomat and a passionate supporter of Nasser.

“I was part of the Vanguard Organization, following Egypt’s political path closely—non-alignment, rejection of foreign alliances, Arab unity. All of it embodied in what Nasser stood for,” he recalled.

Though raised in a liberal Wafd Party family in rural Egypt, Moussa said his early political consciousness was shaped by the Palestinian cause.

“We’d talk about Palestine in the village. It was the first political issue I ever heard of,” he said. “I remember hearing Abdel Wahab’s song: ‘My brother, the oppressors have gone too far’—I’ll never forget it.”

That sense of solidarity, combined with Egypt’s political narrative and artistic expression, drew Moussa toward Nasserism. But it all came crashing down on that June morning in 1967.

“I was on my way to work, hearing reports on the radio of Israeli planes being downed, bold statements from Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi about nearing Tel Aviv—massive declarations,” he said.

When he arrived at the Foreign Ministry, the picture changed dramatically.

“There was a flood of real information—and it was completely different. We were being lied to,” Moussa said. “It was a mutual delusion: I lie to you, and you lie to me. But this wasn’t a game. The country was in danger.”

Moments later, he heard a BBC report claiming Israeli forces had reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.

“I was stunned,” he said. “A young man, just beginning to understand the world, already inside the diplomatic corps—and suddenly, everything I believed in collapsed.”

“That was it,” he added. “At 9 a.m. on June 5, 1967, I stopped believing in Nasser.”

Despite his political break with the late Egyptian president, Moussa admits he still finds himself captivated by Nasser’s voice.

“I still follow what’s published about Nasser on social media and listen to his speeches,” Moussa said.

“Whenever one comes on, I stop everything to hear it—even though I know how the story ends. We’re in the 21st century, and I know the outcome. But I still feel a kind of sympathy, as if hoping that what he promised would come true. I know it didn’t. But his charisma still holds me.”

The former diplomat said Nasser’s appeal remains stronger for him than even Egypt’s greatest musical icons.

“If there’s a beautiful song by Umm Kulthum or Abdel Wahab playing at the same time as a Nasser speech, I turn off the music and listen to Nasser,” he said. “That’s the first part.”

A Costly Gamble

But Moussa draws a sharp line between personal admiration and political accountability.

“My belief—or lack of belief—in Nasser comes down to responsibility,” he said. “When a national disaster like that happens, the responsibility lies with the head of state. No question.”

He sharply criticized Egypt’s military posture in the lead-up to the 1967 war with Israel, when much of the army was tied down in Yemen.

“You’re playing a dangerous game on both the regional and international level with Israel, while a large part of your army is deployed in Yemen—and your forces aren’t ready?” he asked. “At the very least, you should have considered the possibility of being attacked. Who’s going to defend the country?”

Moussa added: “This was a massive miscalculation. No one should gamble with their country’s fate. War and peace decisions cannot rest in the hands of one man. Many of us hold Nasser responsible and are deeply saddened by what happened. In contrast, what Sadat did afterward was, in my view, absolutely the right thing.”

The Swiss Food Controversy

Moussa also addressed past controversy over his remark that Nasser had special food sent from Switzerland while Egyptians were enduring hardship.

“To be clear, if you go back to the original wording, I never said it like that,” he said. “I was speaking more broadly about how people—especially the poor—can be taken in by a leader with great charisma.”

He explained that, during his diplomatic posting in Switzerland, certain items were brought for Nasser, who was diabetic.

“There were specific food products meant for people with diabetes. This wasn’t about indulgence,” Moussa said. “Perhaps there were other luxurious items added, but the original purpose was medical, not pleasure.”

Moussa has stood by his controversial comments about Nasser receiving diabetic-friendly food from Switzerland, insisting the issue was misunderstood and politically weaponized.

“This happened in the 1960s, and at the time, Cairo didn’t have access to such medical food,” Moussa said. “As president, of course, he had the right to obtain special dietary items due to his diabetes. But my point was about the perception of leadership—how ordinary people can view their leader as the greatest in the world.”

Moussa recalled an Egyptian envoy who collected the food supplies and spoke of Nasser with unwavering reverence. “He would say things like, ‘Mr. Amr, we have the greatest president in the world.’ It was a reflection of the aura Nasser had,” he added.

He said his remarks were intended to highlight how a leader’s image can become idealized, especially among the public. But they sparked backlash from Nasser loyalists.

“Some of them twisted it, asking: ‘Could Nasser, the champion of the poor, really be importing food from Switzerland?’ No, he wasn’t ordering gourmet meals,” Moussa said. “This was food for a diabetic patient—unavailable in Cairo at the time.”

He insisted he never changed his account of what happened. “Recently, Ambassador Mounir Zahran confirmed the same details in an interview with Al Arabiya,” Moussa said. “We have no reason to fabricate anything.”

Crossing the Bar Lev Line: A Nation's Pride Restored

Reflecting on Egypt’s 1973 war against Israel, Moussa described the crossing of the heavily fortified Bar Lev Line as a moment of national catharsis.

“It was overwhelming happiness—not personal joy, but national pride,” he said. “The Egyptian army, our soldiers and officers, performed brilliantly. It was the first time Israel’s army, long touted as invincible, was defeated in battle. That crossing, that breach of the Bar Lev Line—it was monumental.”

Moussa said the 1973 war helped Egypt begin to recover from the humiliation of its 1967 defeat.

“We had to respond to the insult, and that was the first step,” he said. “The Egyptian people would never have accepted continued occupation.”

He praised President Sadat for charting a strategic path that combined military precision with diplomatic foresight.

“Sadat made the right call,” Moussa said. “He ensured the army was properly trained, understood the limitations, and complemented the battlefield effort with political and diplomatic moves. This comprehensive approach led to Israel’s full withdrawal from Sinai. As an Egyptian, I could never accept that a small country like Israel should occupy such a large part of our land. I never accepted that defeat.”

Nasser vs. Sadat: A Clash of Leadership Styles

Asked about the enduring rivalry between supporters of Nasser and Sadat, Moussa acknowledged a clear divide.

“Of course, there’s competition between their followers—both in style and substance,” he said. “Nasser’s model was centered on the individual leader. Sadat, too, had a strong personal streak. He even described himself as the ‘last of the pharaohs.’”

Moussa’s reflections reveal a deep reverence for the history he witnessed—along with a willingness to reassess Egypt’s leadership legacy with a critical eye.

Sadat was deeply motivated by a sense of responsibility to reclaim Egyptian territory and restore the dignity of the military after the 1967 defeat by Israel, said Moussa.

“Sadat felt it was his duty to recover the land and to avenge the humiliation of the Egyptian army. That emotional drive was a powerful psychological force,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Quoting his longtime friend and former diplomat Mostafa El-Feki, Moussa drew a sharp distinction between Egypt’s two most iconic post-revolution presidents: “Nasser was a great leader, but Sadat was a true statesman. He thought in terms of the state and how to govern it.”

“Sadat’s top priority,” Moussa added, “was responding to what happened on June 5, 1967—and he was absolutely right.”

While Sadat approached leadership from the perspective of governance and national interest, Moussa said Nasser’s identity was inseparable from his charismatic style of leadership. “For Nasser, leadership wasn’t just a role—it was a core part of who he was.”

Sadat’s Visit to Knesset ‘Felt Like a Moon Landing’

Moussa recalled the moment Sadat addressed the Israeli Knesset in 1977—an unprecedented move that stunned the Arab world and paved the way for the Camp David Accords.

“It was a very complex moment emotionally,” he said. “I was working at the Foreign Ministry in Cairo at the time. Some parts of Sadat’s speech were actually drafted there. But the initiative itself—it felt like the moon landing.”

He remembered being in Alexandria when the visit took place, coinciding with an upcoming holiday.

“The streets were empty. Just like the day humans first set foot on the moon,” he said. “It was bold. No words were needed to describe the courage behind it.”

Moussa described the speech as carefully worded, balanced, and free of unnecessary concessions.

“There was strength in that address,” he said. “It was not about surrender—it was about taking control of our destiny.”

Sadat’s historic 1977 address to the Israeli Knesset was penned by two of Egypt’s most prominent political minds at the time—journalist Moussa Sabri and senior diplomat Osama El-Baz—according to former foreign minister Amr Moussa, who worked closely with El-Baz.

“The main contributors to the speech were Moussa Sabri, then editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar, and Osama El-Baz, who headed the Foreign Minister’s office. I was working with El-Baz at the time,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The message in the speech was clear: Egypt was ready for peace—but not at any cost. Peace had to be based on principles, definitions, and conditions,” he said. “That’s the approach we adopted—negotiating along two tracks: one focused on Egypt and its occupied territories, the other on Palestine.”

Ceausescu’s Quiet Influence

Moussa dismissed the idea that Sadat’s decision to visit Israel was suggested by the United States. “The idea came from Sadat himself,” he said. “He developed it on his own. He wanted to take a bold step that would shake the world and push Israel toward a peaceful resolution—primarily to secure its withdrawal from Egyptian territory.”

However, Moussa did not rule out the influence of some Eastern European leaders close to Israel at the time—particularly Romanian Communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu.

“It’s possible Ceausescu encouraged Sadat or was consulted. We read that Sadat specifically asked about (Israeli Prime Minister) Menachem Begin—who he was, and whether it would be worthwhile to meet him,” Moussa said.

“Ceausescu apparently told Sadat: ‘If you get a deal with a right-wing leader like Begin, it will hold. But if it’s someone from the left, the right will turn against him.’ That was part of the reasoning—but again, it was not an American idea.”

Moussa added: “If something else happened behind the scenes that neither I nor Osama El-Baz knew about, I highly doubt it.”

Would He Have Gone to Jerusalem?

When asked if he would have joined Sadat on the trip to Jerusalem had he been foreign minister at the time, Moussa paused.

“I don’t know,” he said. “I was working with Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, who refused to go. Others, like Boutros Ghali and Mostafa Khalil, did go—Khalil later became both foreign minister and prime minister.”

“Opinion in Egypt was split. Sadat wasn’t going to Israel for tourism or normalization just to please others—he went because Egyptian land was still under occupation,” Moussa said. “It came after the October War and the diplomatic complications that followed. I can’t say yes or no with certainty.”

Arafat, Assad and the Camp David Opportunity

Moussa believes Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat missed a historic opportunity by not joining Sadat in the peace process that culminated in the Camp David Accords.

“I think Arafat was afraid,” Moussa said in a wide-ranging interview. “Had he aligned with Sadat, Egypt would have supported him, and he might have gained something significant.”

Moussa argued that the Palestinian section of the Camp David framework—offering full autonomy as a prelude to negotiations on a Palestinian state—could have laid the groundwork for a very different future.

“Imagine if that had been implemented back then,” he said. “Of course, you could argue—and I still tell myself—that Israel’s strategy to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state has been in place since the partition plan was first issued.”

On Assad and the Missed Golan Opportunity

Asked whether Syrian President Hafez al-Assad made a mistake by not joining Sadat’s peace initiative, Moussa said Sadat never actually asked Assad to participate—only to wait and see what might come of it.

“Sadat told him: ‘If I succeed, everyone will benefit. If I fail, I’ll bear the responsibility,’” Moussa recalled.

He also addressed long-standing rumors that Assad contemplated detaining Sadat during a visit to Damascus. “No, that was never going to happen—although, according to reports we’ve read, some hotheads may have entertained the idea. But that’s not based on confirmed information.”

Turning to the strategic importance of the Golan Heights, Moussa stressed that Israel’s continued occupation remains a major obstacle to regional peace.

“You cannot build a new regional order with Israel expanding into the Golan or controlling most of it,” he said. “This is not feasible—it will continue to be a source of anxiety, tension, and regional instability.”

Moussa dismissed nationalist slogans, saying his stance stemmed from a desire for peace and regional cooperation.

“There should be no occupation in Syria, Palestine, or Lebanon,” he said. “Let’s be honest: which of us would willingly gift land to Israel, for no reason and with no justification?”

The Day Sadat Was Assassinated

Reflecting on the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, Moussa recalled the shock and sorrow he felt.

“I was then deputy head of Egypt’s delegation to the United Nations,” he said. “Ambassador Esmat Abdel Meguid, who led the delegation, had gone on pilgrimage, so I was acting head when the assassination happened.”

Worried about how the UN would respond, Moussa immediately called Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

“I told him there had been a major attack on Sadat—I couldn’t confirm his death yet—but we should prepare a memorial session for later that day. If we wait until tomorrow, political interference might get in the way.”

As news of Sadat’s death emerged from the White House, Moussa called Cairo again. “I said: the Americans are announcing that the president is dead. Either confirm this or tell me to remain silent—but I can’t ignore an official statement from the US.”

Minutes later, Cairo confirmed the news.

Diplomatic Tensions and a Handshake Dodged

As the UN prepared for the memorial, Moussa received another challenge: Israel wanted to speak during the tribute.

“I couldn’t stop them,” he said. “The president [of the General Assembly] would give them the floor.”

Moussa anticipated that the head of the Israeli delegation would try to shake his hand.

“I asked one of our delegates to stand a few meters away. If the Israeli ambassador approaches, greet him and accept the condolences,” he said. “And that’s exactly what happened—the ambassador hugged him and got it out of his system.”

When the Israeli envoy reached Moussa, he offered a handshake. “I shook his hand dryly to avoid an embrace. The cameras were rolling. He gave his condolences and left.”