Neil Quilliam
TT

Biden, Europe...Partners In Responsibilities and Burdens

Most European leaders will welcome with open arms the Biden Administration. After four years of intemperate foreign policy, which has only served to exacerbate tensions not only between the major powers, but also amongst middle powers in many regions of the world, expectations from the new administration are set high. Unsurprisingly, EU leaders expect a reset in transatlantic relations and to pick up from where former President Obama left off; after all, Biden was his vice president for eight years. This means the US fully re-engaging with NATO, encouraging closer integration amongst European states, re-joining the Paris Agreement and breathing life back into the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) amongst other things.

However, the world is a very different place to where it was in 2016; and, in fact, the march that Obama set in place towards Asia during his tenure is well underway, and, in many ways, we can expect Biden to continue down the same path that both Obama and Trump have walked. Given that, the new US administration, whilst likely ushering in a period of diplomatic engagement, prioritizing multilateralism, promoting better governance and accountability and working closely with allies, will also place a set of demands upon its partners to help address some of the most pressing issues of our time. In other words, the US is not going to simply engage and come to the rescue of its partners, but arrive expecting all partners to carry their own weight.

It is clear that US foreign policy – as part of a structural shift – is now geared towards meeting the challenge of the world’s other major power, China. However dressed up, China poses the greatest strategic threat and challenge to US global interests, and therefore it can be expected that whilst working with allies, its primary focus and energies will be spent checking Beijing’s financial, political and military power. It is against this backdrop that a Biden administration will want to work with partners in Europe, Asia and elsewhere.

Whilst its approach will differ significantly from the Trump administration leaving behind both transactional and unpredictable behaviors, the Biden administration will nevertheless seek to draw upon the full diplomatic, political and financial support of key partners to shore up its interests in different theaters, such as the Middle East and North Africa and the Caucuses, so that it can concentrate on great power competition in Asia.

Instead of the EU expecting the US to once again step up to its responsibilities as a global power, the converse will be true. DC may well be willing to deploy its full array of diplomatic tools, but it will now expect much more from the EU and its member states when it comes to securing their own backyards.

Trump’s chastisement of EU states for not carrying a greater burden of responsibility towards its wider neighborhoods whilst unwelcome largely fell on deaf ears. After all, his policies hardly aligned with the more strategic interests of Europe, especially when it came to Russia, Turkey and the Middle East. Biden, on the other hand, is likely to pursue policies intended to neuter Moscow’s influence in Ukraine, Belarus, Syria and Libya. In doing so, however, and with eyes on the strategic challenge posed by China the US will demand that European partners adopt a much more robust and muscular approach towards both Russia and Turkey. This means no more wavering on using policy instruments, such as sanctions, and projecting power alongside the US.

France has adopted a more forward leaning foreign policy and is willing to deploy diplomatic and military muscle, but without the support of Germany and the UK, it will be largely ineffective at best and counterproductive, at worst. Even though it is leaving the EU, the UK needs to remain part of the EU3 compact, both for the good of the US-EU relationship and also to retain its own diplomatic relevance.

As the Biden administration begins to grapple with the JCPOA, it is unlikely to deploy significant diplomatic capital beyond the immediate nuclear issue. Given that the EU faces a serious threat from the multiple conflicts in Middle East, it should play an instrumental role in not only encouraging the US to revive the JCPOA, but also leading an additional process to address regional issues, such as curtailing Iran’s influence in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

It is very well positioned to do so, especially as the EU3 states bring together a wealth of history, knowledge and experience in the region, as well as complementary relationships with key regional states. This way, the EU would demonstrate its commitment to work alongside the US on a major regional security initiative, in other words, burden-share, and at the same time, free up critical US diplomatic, political and financial capital required for its struggle for power with China. And by doing so, it will once again deepen institutional ties between the US and EU at a critical moment in world history and help ensure that the US remains engaged in Europe’s affairs, whilst it looks to the challenge coming from Asia.

Asharq Al-Awsat Exclusive