Warning Message from US to Region: Do Not Weaken Our Ability to Pressure Damascus

US forces patrol oil fields in Syria, Oct. 28, 2019. (AP)
US forces patrol oil fields in Syria, Oct. 28, 2019. (AP)
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Warning Message from US to Region: Do Not Weaken Our Ability to Pressure Damascus

US forces patrol oil fields in Syria, Oct. 28, 2019. (AP)
US forces patrol oil fields in Syria, Oct. 28, 2019. (AP)

The latest American sanctions against Damascus and the Middle East tour carried out by Joel Rayburn, US Special Envoy for Syria in the US State Department, delivered a strong message that a change in administration in Washington does not mean a change in policy or an end to the regime’s isolation.

Even if tactical changes were to be introduced, strategic changes on Syria will not happen, he said.

The sanctions came with an added “warning” against taking steps that could weaken Washington’s ability to continue its pressure campaign on Damascus.

The recent sanctions “shut the door for the possibility of holding negotiations between the US and Syria” and obstruct the possibility of opening “channels of dialogue.” Rather, they only increase the economic pressure on Damascus with the central bank being among the latest targets. The impact was immediate, with foreign banks declaring that they were halting operations in Damascus.

Coordination with London
Washington blacklisted Asma al-Assad, president Bashar’s wife, her father and two brothers, as well as businesses they own. In addition, it targeted security, economic and executive Syrian officials, including Lina Mohammed Nazir al-Kinayeh, whom the Treasury identified as an official in Assad’s presidential office, her husband, MP Mohammed Hammam Masouti, and their businesses, and others.

The latest sanctions take to 114 the number of individuals and entities that have been targeted since the Caesar Act came into effect in mid-June. Reports have said new sanctions will be announced before US President Donald Trump leaves the White House on January 20.

Rayburn said the latest sanctions were announced a year after Trump signed the Caesar Act.

“The United States remains committed to carrying out a sustained campaign of economic and political pressure to prevent the Assad regime and its staunchest supporters from amassing resources to fuel their war against the Syrian people,” he stressed on Tuesday.

“To that end, the United States is imposing sanctions on 18 more individuals and entities, including the Central Bank of Syria. These individuals and corrupt businesses are impeding efforts to reach a political and peaceful resolution to the Syrian conflict, as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 2254,” he added.

“Among those individuals sanctioned today are Asma al-Assad and some of her immediate relatives, all of whom are based in the United Kingdom. Asma al-Assad has spearheaded efforts on behalf of the regime to consolidate economic and political power, including by using her so-called charities and civil society organizations. Her and her family’s corruption is one of the many reasons that this conflict lingers on,” he remarked.

Rayburn said it was “significant” that Asma and her immediate relatives – her father, Fawaz Akhras; Asma al-Assad’s mother, Sahar Otri Akhras; Asma al-Assad’s brothers, Firas Akhras and Eyad Akhras – were being targeted.

He noted that all of these figures are dual Syrian and UK citizens and are all based in the UK.

“We coordinated this action with our UK counterparts,” he revealed. “Our UK counterparts are very, very close partners of ours on the Syria file. And so we did everything in conjunction with them. We would never surprise them on this because we’re in a very close strategic partnership with the UK on Syria.”

It remains to be seen whether the British government or European Union will also sanction the same individuals.

Tuesday’s sanctions reveal that Washington will continue to exert pressure on the Akhras family, Asma and her entourage. They also send a strong message that Syrians and non-Syrians who cooperate with the regime may be sanctioned. The third message is that anyone anywhere cooperating with the regime may be targeted.

Closing the door
Politically, some of the latest blacklisted figures used to play a role in the “second path” or “second door” of negotiations with American parties. They had held secret meetings in London to tackle western sanctions on Damascus, among other issues.

Their designation makes such talks “legally impossible” in the future. The message of the “Syrian file team” in Washington is that “you cannot be a mediator in London or any other European capital and also a partner to Damascus.”

The Caesar Act bars any dealings with the regime.

Significantly, some of the American officials who were part of this negotiations path will possibly play a role in managing the Syrian file in Joe Biden’s administration. The sanctions, effectively, put an end to this option.

Rayburn had recently concluded a tour of the region that included Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, northeastern Syria and other countries.

The tour served as a “reminder” and a “warning” to concerned countries of the American goals in Syria: ensuring the defeat of ISIS, pressuring Iran to pull out from the country and pressuring the regime to implement resolution 2254.

These are not the goals of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo or Raybun, but of America. The change in officials, will not change the goals. A change in administration, does not mean a change in policy.

“I think that those goals already have a consensus behind them in Washington, and I really don’t think you’re going to see a significant change away from those goals. You can – there are different people who will come into different positions; they can have good ideas about how to implement those goals better. But I don’t think you’re going to see a discarding of those goals,” stressed Rayburn.

“I think you can count on the United States as well as the other like-minded countries to continue seeking those goals regardless of who is in the White House,” he added.



Iran Faces Power Struggle Over Nuclear Talks Management

Photo posted on Larijani’s Telegram account last May
Photo posted on Larijani’s Telegram account last May
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Iran Faces Power Struggle Over Nuclear Talks Management

Photo posted on Larijani’s Telegram account last May
Photo posted on Larijani’s Telegram account last May

A renewed debate is simmering in Tehran over whether Iran’s nuclear file should remain under the Foreign Ministry or be returned to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), after Ali Larijani’s reinstatement as the council’s secretary sparked speculation of a shift in control.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi dismissed the rumors, telling the Khabar Online news site, which is close to Larijani and had floated the possibility, that “there is currently no such plan on the agenda, and I do not think it will happen.”

His comments appeared aimed at cooling media chatter over a redistribution of authority, fueled by Larijani’s comeback and the council’s historic dominance in shaping nuclear strategy.

The remarks come a month after parliament passed a law suspending cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog and requiring SNSC approval for future inspections of atomic sites. While not a breakthrough, the law was seen as a tactical move to pressure Western powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

A joint subcommittee of the SNSC and Defense Ministry – with operational protection handled by a special Revolutionary Guards unit – currently coordinates inspector access with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

Analysts say the legislation reflects a broader push to boost the security council’s influence over the nuclear file, tightening its grip on future talks.

Shifting Authority, Same Ultimate Arbiter

The tug-of-war over who runs the negotiations is not new. While tactics have shifted with changes in government, ultimate authority has always rested with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The most notable shift came in 2013 under former president Hassan Rouhani, when responsibility for negotiations was handed to the Foreign Ministry. The SNSC, however, remained the main decision-making “kitchen,” with all major policy choices vetted by Khamenei.

The move gave the ministry a higher profile internationally but did not strip the council of its veto power.

Larijani’s return has revived speculation about a reversal.

Between 2004 and 2006, he served as SNSC secretary and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator before resigning in a dispute with then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose hardline stance triggered UN Security Council sanctions later frozen under the 2015 nuclear deal.

Power struggles over the file go back further, including attempts in the Rafsanjani era to transfer oversight to the Expediency Council, the Supreme Leader’s top advisory body now chaired by Larijani’s brother, Sadeq.

Those efforts were part of a bid to continue the negotiation track started in 2003 under reformist president Mohammad Khatami, when Rouhani held the SNSC post.

Khamenei’s Signals

In March 2024, reports suggested Khamenei wanted the nuclear file moved back under bodies directly answerable to him, after appointing political adviser Ali Shamkhani to run parallel talks alongside the late president Ebrahim Raisi’s government.

Shamkhani oversaw negotiations for a decade as SNSC secretary, a period when the file was formally under the Foreign Ministry but still shaped by the council.

Critics of the current structure say the ministry’s limited powers make indirect talks with Washington harder. Rouhani himself complained about this during the final months of his presidency, when near-final Vienna talks with the Biden administration collapsed in March 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Parallel Channels

Larijani’s return may reassure pro-diplomacy factions, given his role in shepherding the 2015 deal as parliament speaker. His exclusion from the 2021 and 2024 presidential races was partly due to conservative backlash over his support for the accord.

But others fear he may revert to closer alignment with hardliners, given his mandate to execute Khamenei’s policies. In June, Larijani posted a video on X threatening IAEA chief Rafael Grossi during the 12-day war with Israel.

Khamenei underscored his oversight on July 16, in only his second public appearance since the conflict began, urging diplomats to act with “precision” and follow “guidance” – remarks widely read as direct orders reflecting the sensitivity of the moment.

Adding to the intrigue, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi revealed this month the existence of an influential, unnamed parallel committee directing negotiations outside the SNSC framework. He gave no details on its members but called it “effective and active.”

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said the ministry works within a clear hierarchy and communicates its views to relevant decision-makers. While an imminent transfer of the file appears unlikely, current signs point to Larijani having a greater hand in shaping Iran’s strategy, given his experience and direct access to Khamenei.

The tussle over control of the nuclear file, analysts say, reflects Iran’s internal balance of power more than any technical procedural dispute.

The Foreign Ministry brings diplomatic tools and international reach, but the SNSC – and its shadow committees – retain final authority under the Supreme Leader. Larijani’s return could centralize decision-making and unify messaging, but at the cost of limiting the diplomats’ room for maneuver.

Success in any future talks, they say, will depend on how well Tehran balances internal discipline with external pressure.