Why Has Moscow Now Chosen to Reveal Assad’s Plea to ‘Save’ him in 2013?

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, reacts with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad during their meeting in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia, Thursday, May 17, 2018. (AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, reacts with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad during their meeting in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia, Thursday, May 17, 2018. (AP)
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Why Has Moscow Now Chosen to Reveal Assad’s Plea to ‘Save’ him in 2013?

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, reacts with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad during their meeting in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia, Thursday, May 17, 2018. (AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, reacts with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad during their meeting in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia, Thursday, May 17, 2018. (AP)

A recent article published by a Russian publication revealed for the first time that the Syrian leadership had pleaded with Moscow back in 2013 to save it from imminent collapse.

The revelation was made by Rami al-Shaer in an article published by Russia’s Zavtra newspaper.

The development raises questions as to why Russia chose this moment to reveal the plea. More importantly, it raises questions over why Moscow took two years to respond to it. Russia intervened militarily in the conflict in 2015, turning the tide in the regime’s favor.

The letter, dated November 24, 2013, read: “We have turned over the chemical weapons to the international community, trusting that Russia will provide the necessary alternatives to the terrorist aggression against our nation.”

“The situation, however, points to potential sudden collapse in just a few days after we lost yesterday five towns in al-Ghouta and gunmen are now just 3 kilometers away from Damascus International Airport,” it added, acknowledging that the regime had run out of man and fire power.

“Direct military intervention from Russia is therefore very urgent, otherwise Syria and the civilized world will fall in the hands of terrorist Islamists,” it stressed.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Shaer confirmed the authenticity of the letter, saying many others were sent through various channels that were set up by the regime.

But why was the letter revealed now? Notably, Zavtra chose “Will Damascus Seek to Normalize Relations with Israel?” as a headline for its revealing article.

The choice of title reveals Moscow’s growing frustration with Syrian president Bashar Assad’s behavior. The frustration, said the article, is no longer limited to the regime’s attempts to obstruct Russia’s efforts to push forward the work of the Constitutional Committee in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2254.

The frustration has gone beyond this point. The regime is banking on the international community’s lack of alternatives to the committee, is still pursuing a military solution to resolve the conflict, and most importantly, is considering “other roles or deals, such as leaning toward normalizing relations with Israel.”

Trusted Russian sources said that “manipulating the normalization file behind Russia’s back is very dangerous because it represents a readiness to abandon everything, including the firm stances that Moscow has defended.”

This issue is one of the reasons why the regime’s plea was revealed at this time. Moscow is deliberately reminding the regime of the situation it was in before its intervened to save it.

Moreover, the upcoming elections in Syria are another point of contention. Russia wants the polls to go ahead to avoid any possible constitutional vacuum that would have harmful consequences. It does not want its position to be interpreted as approval of what the regime’s propaganda machine is portraying as the inevitability of the “victorious” Assad remaining power.

Another question remains: Why did Moscow wait two years before intervening in Syria? How did it deal with the plea when it was first made?

Zavtra said: “Many are wondering about the role Russia is playing during such critical times for the Syrian people.”

Shaer said that Moscow’s wait does not mean that it did not rush to provide valuable logistic and military support to the regime, such as opening weapons ad supply routes, sending military experts and providing intelligence information.

Another cause for pause for Russia was the military presence of Iran, Turkey and the United States at the time the regime made its plea. “Russia could not have embarked on an adventure without weighing the consequences. The situation demanded vast coordination with the forces on the ground, meaning opening up channels of communication with Turkey and Iran and coordination with the Americans to avoid any possible clash on the ground. Furthermore, Moscow had to resort to international laws in order to obtain Damascus’ approval for direct military intervention,” explained Shaer.

Moscow waited when the situation in Syria reached a critical phase, whereby “Damascus was truly threatened and surrounded. Signs at the time showed that the battles were on the verge of reaching the capital, meaning the eruption of a bloody confrontation between the Fourth Armored Division, which would have led to catastrophic civilian casualties,” he continued. “That is when Moscow chose to intervene militarily to save Damascus and other Syrian cities.”

Separately, Russian media aired a report about Russia’s field trials of its Orion drone in Syria. The aircraft were also used to attack positions of armed groups.

The report said that 17 positions, whose locations were not disclosed, were targeted. It also did not reveal when the operations were carried out.

This is the first time that Moscow reveals that it had carried out trials of modern aircraft in Syria. The Orion was manufactured at the Sukhoi factories and officially entered service in September 2019.

One official confirmed the trial, saying the aircraft showed high precision in striking targets.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.