Why Did Russia Set up a New ‘Tripartite Process’ in Syria?

Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attend a meeting in Doha, Qatar March 11, 2021. (Handout via Reuters)
Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attend a meeting in Doha, Qatar March 11, 2021. (Handout via Reuters)
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Why Did Russia Set up a New ‘Tripartite Process’ in Syria?

Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attend a meeting in Doha, Qatar March 11, 2021. (Handout via Reuters)
Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attend a meeting in Doha, Qatar March 11, 2021. (Handout via Reuters)

The first test facing the newly launched “tripartite consultations process” on Syria will be the successful convening of the sixth round of the Constitutional Committee talks before the advent of the holy fasting month of Ramadan in mid-April. The new process was kicked off by Russia with Turkey and Qatar, and without Iran, on Thursday.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had vowed at the conclusion of Thursday’s talks in Doha that the committee would meet next month.

US stance
The new process was launched amid Russian diplomatic criticism while the United States was transitioning from the Donald Trump to the Joe Biden administration. Clearly, Syria is a not a priority for Biden. His administration is currently reviewing American policy in the war-torn country and Brett McGurk has been appointed White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa. All signs point to Washington’s insistence on keeping forces in northeastern Syria. The deployment will not be victim to sudden tweets by Biden, which had been the case with his predecessor.

The US will continue to express the same “moral” position on the Syrian crisis, but it will not find itself forced to take any tangible steps on the ground because it does not want to act as the world’s policeman. Washington will instead return to seeking its direct interest that lies in fighting ISIS and making do with providing political support for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2254, offering humanitarian aid and issuing statements that urge accountability for crimes.

Signs of the US stepping back were evident when Secretary of State Antony Blinken cancelled a televised address before the Brussels donor conference, set for March 30. He will not attend the event. The US will be represented by the American ambassador. Blinken will instead be present at a conference for the international coalition fighting ISIS, set for the same day as the Brussels event.

Clear priorities
Moreover, American institutions are reviewing the impact the Caesar Act is having on the fight against the coronavirus pandemic and on the humanitarian situation. This does not mean that the sanctions will be revoked as some US Congress members continue to press punitive measures on the regime.

The US has agreed to issuing a statement with Britain, Germany and France on Sunday that outlines the political stance on the situation in Syria on the tenth anniversary of the eruption of the crisis. The European Union will issue a similar statement. Among the main points is the demand for the upcoming presidential elections to be based on resolution 2254. Failure to do so will not help in restoring relations with Damascus. It also notes that the causes that sparked the crisis in 2011 remain unaddressed.

Russian attack
Amid this picture and growing tension between Washington and Moscow, Russia decided to appeal to main Arab countries in a new attempt to persuade them to normalize relations with Damascus and restore its membership in the Arab League. It is also seeking their contribution in Syria’s reconstruction and in humanitarian aid.

Some of these countries believe that the causes that led to Syria’s suspension still remain and are demanding a political solution that pleases all Syrian parties. They also believe that sectarian militias are hampering the solution and that they must pull out from the country. Other countries believe that the Caesar Act impedes the chances of normalizing ties.

Speaking alongside his Qatari counterpart Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Lavrov said he welcomes the development of a collective Arab stance over the need to return Syria to the Arab League.

“I believe that such a unified decision would play a major role in stability in this entire large region,” he added.

Evidently, this unified position has not been developed yet.

It is tempting to compare the new consultations process between Russia, Turkey and Qatar to the Astana process that was launched between Russia, Turkey and Iran in May 2017. The latter, however, was initially focused on the military aspect of the conflict before shifting to holding a national dialogue conference in Sochi in early 2018. It then turned its attention to the constitutional path in early 2021.

Lavrov said the three countries were not seeking to replace the Astana process.

The tripartite process launched on Thursday directly focuses on the humanitarian and constitutional aspects of the crisis and indirectly address political and military issues, such as the confrontation with the Kurds, Washington’s allies.

Written agreement
The statement from Thursday’s meeting is greatly similar to statements made by the Astana group, especially in regards to the constitutional process.

Russia, Turkey and Qatar stressed “the need to combat terrorism in all of its forms and to confront all separatist agendas.” These agendas refer to the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Such a statement is significant given that the US deployment in Kurdish-held regions east of the Euphrates River will continue during the Biden administration. The appointment of McGurk, who is viewed as a Kurdish sympathizer by Turkey, only cements this position and puts Washington further at odds with Moscow, Ankara and Damascus.

The gatherers on Thursday also underscored the need to increase humanitarian aid to everyone in Syria and throughout its territories. Ankara interprets such as a statement as a precursor to Russia’s extension of the resolution that allows cross-border aid deliveries. The resolution expires in mid-July. For Moscow, this statement could pave the way for the beginning of Qatari and Turkish contributions to Syria’s reconstruction, despite opposition from Europe and the US.

The consultations process also expressed its support for the constitutional path. It underlined the significant role played by the Constitutional Committee, which Moscow, Ankara and Doha hope will meet before Ramadan. On Wednesday, head of the government-backed delegation at the committee, Ahmed al-Kuzbari, submitted a proposal to head of the opposition delegation, Hadi al-Bahra, on the mechanism for the drafting of the constitution. On Thursday, Bahra submitted a “counter-proposal” to UN envoy Geir Pedersen, who will in turn send it to Kuzbari.

The test lies in whether a written agreement, desired by Pedersen, can be reached over the mechanism and whether a new round of committee talks can be held within weeks. Moscow is hoping for this, but the coming days will reveal Iran’s position after it was not invited to the Doha meeting. Damascus has also yet to declare its stance.

Representatives of the new process are set to hold their next meeting in Turkey and later in Russia.



Sweida’s Druze, Bedouin Tribes Locked in Historic Grievances

Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
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Sweida’s Druze, Bedouin Tribes Locked in Historic Grievances

Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)

Sweida, a province in southern Syria, is teetering on the brink after days of deadly violence and clashes between local communities and government security forces, an unrest that signals deeper turmoil across the war-battered country.

The latest flare-up has laid bare tensions that go beyond the provincial borders, raising concerns about the future of coexistence and civil peace in a region long known for its rich tapestry of religious, social, and cultural diversity.

While the Syrian government in Damascus seeks to reassert control over all of its territory, local groups are renewing calls for greater recognition of their rights and “distinct identity.” The result is a fragile and combustible equation in a strategically vital region.

Sweida has long been a flashpoint, shaped by decades of uneasy relations between Druze communities and neighboring Bedouin tribes. That legacy of mistrust now intersects with a crumbling economy, a lack of essential services, the rise of armed factions, and a newly entrenched central authority in Damascus, factors that together threaten to turn the province into a flashpoint for wider instability.

Competing narratives have further muddied the waters, with each side offering starkly different versions of recent events, accounts that are often shaped not just by what happened in the past few days, but by long-standing grievances and buried animosities. The deepening rift and absence of trust among local communities highlight just how far Syria remains from reconciliation.

As pressure builds, observers warn that without a sustainable political solution that acknowledges local demands while maintaining national cohesion, Sweida may be a harbinger of further unrest in Syria’s uncertain future.

Power Struggles and Fractured Alliances

In Syria’s Sweida, power is fragmented among a complex web of religious authorities, influential families, and rival armed factions, a fractured landscape that reflects the broader divisions tearing at the country.

Local leadership is split between traditional Druze clerical authorities and prominent families, each with their own loyalties and varying degrees of influence on the ground. Political rivalries run deep, and military factions are equally divided, some aligning with the government in Damascus, while others openly challenge it.

Among the most prominent pro-government groups is the “Madafat al-Karama” faction led by Laith al-Balous, son of the late Druze leader Sheikh Wahid al-Balous. He is seen as a key ally of Damascus, alongside Suleiman Abdel-Baqi, commander of the “Ahrar Jabal al-Arab” group.

On the opposing side are factions such as the “Military Council in Sweida” and “Liwa al-Jabal” (Mountain Brigade), which collectively field around 3,000 fighters. These groups are seen as aligned with the views of influential Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has been increasingly critical of the central government.

A newer alliance has also emerged under the banner of “Counter-Terrorism Forces” or the “Syrian Brigade Party,” bringing together factions such as “Dir’ al-Tawhid,” “Forces of Al-Ulya,” “Sheikh al-Karama,” “Saraya al-Jabal,” and “Jaysh al-Muwahideen.” This coalition formally severed ties with Damascus following Sheikh Hijri’s speech on July 15, in which he rejected the government’s announcement of a ceasefire agreement with local notables.

Also active in the province is the “Men of Dignity Movement,” a relatively large faction led by Abu Hassan Yehya al-Hajjar. Though not officially aligned with the new coalition, the group is also staunchly opposed to the Syrian government.

The growing number of factions and rival power centers has deepened instability in Sweida.

Bedouin Tribes in Sweida Say They Are Marginalized, Blamed and Forgotten

Even after government forces withdrew and a fragile ceasefire took hold in Sweida, clashes reignited, this time between Druze residents and Bedouin tribes, underscoring the deep and historical grievances simmering beneath the surface of the country’s sectarian fault lines.

The Bedouin, who see themselves as long-marginalized stakeholders in the region, say they have been caught in the crossfire - blamed for violence they did not initiate and excluded from political life and public services.

“We are the perpetual scapegoats,” said Mohammad Abu Thulaith, a lawyer and member of the Sweida Tribal Council. A descendant of one of the Bedouin tribes long at odds with the Druze population, he told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Bedouins are the weakest link in the local power struggle.”

The sense of injustice voiced by Abu Thulaith runs deep and is rooted in historical narratives. According to his account, the Druze - who migrated to the Jabal al-Arab area around two centuries ago - gradually expanded their influence, curbing the pastoral livelihoods of the Bedouin, particularly livestock herding. This, he said, led to the forced migration of nearly half of the Bedouin tribes from the mountain region toward Jordan, rural Damascus, and Daraa.

He cited the example of Saad Hayel al-Surour, a former speaker of the Jordanian parliament, who remains a Syrian citizen to this day. His father, Hayel al-Surour, once headed the Syrian parliament before the 1958 union between Syria and Egypt.

Many in the Bedouin community consider themselves the original inhabitants of the land, victims of what they describe as “a prolonged injustice” that denied them citizenship rights, political representation, and even basic services.

Abu Thulaith argues that the source of current tensions must be addressed at its roots. “We are blamed because the other side does not dare confront the real actors behind the violence,” he said, referring to armed groups operating in the area.

He called on the Druze tribal leadership - often referred to as “the people of the mountain” - to assume responsibility for protecting the Bedouin community and ending decades of exclusion. “We’ve suffered from a double injustice,” he said. “One at the hands of the Assad regime and Baathist rule, and the other from our neighbors. We have no access to employment, no political representation, and we’re deprived of the most basic public services.”

Despite the mounting frustration, Abu Thulaith insists that the Bedouin do not seek confrontation. “We don’t have the means to fight,” he said. “All we want is to live in peace with our neighbors. No one can erase the other. Since the fall of the former regime, tribal communities have hoped the state would step in to offer protection and ensure the most basic rights.”

As tensions in Sweida continue to spiral, voices like Abu Thulaith’s are demanding a deeper national conversation about identity, land, and the future of Jabal al-Arab - one that addresses long-neglected wounds before they erupt into further conflict.

Druze Grapple with a Perpetual Identity Crisis

For Syria’s Druze minority, identity is not just a question of culture or belief, it is a matter of survival. That fear of erasure has long shaped their political instincts, social structures, and geographic presence in the country.

“The Druze, like many minorities, live with a constant sense of threat,” said Khaldoun Al-Nabbouani, a professor of political philosophy at the University of Paris and a native of Sweida. “This persistent anxiety drives them to close ranks around their identity in a collective effort of self-preservation.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Nabbouani explained that the community’s inward turn is not only symbolic or cultural - it also manifests demographically. “Just as the Alawites are concentrated in the coastal mountains, the Druze have built their stronghold in Jabal al-Arab. It reflects a broader pattern among minorities to cluster in specific regions where they can reinforce their social cohesion and safeguard a perpetually anxious identity.”

That reflex dates back centuries. The very formation of the Druze sect, he said, was a political and cultural rebellion against traditional Islam. “Since its inception, the community has developed a deep need for internal solidarity and social insulation,” he said. “Even today, that’s visible in things like marriage practices - interfaith unions remain extremely rare.”

This insularity, he noted, extends to the political realm. The community has historically resisted the appointment of governors or officials from outside the Druze fold, a trend dating back to the 1930s and continuing into recent decades. One of the more controversial examples was the appointment of a non-Druze governor under the government of Ahmad Al-Sharaa, which sparked uproar, resignation, and a political standoff before the governor ultimately returned.

Tensions between the Druze and the central government are nothing new. Under President Adib Shishakli in the early 1950s, relations with Damascus deteriorated sharply. Shishakli accused the Druze of plotting against the state and in 1954 ordered artillery strikes on Jabal al-Arab, an assault that killed civilians, displaced families, and left deep scars that still echo in local memory.

When the Baath Party seized power in 1963, Damascus shifted tactics, pursuing what Al-Nabbouani described as a policy of “soft containment.” Symbolic appointments of Druze figures to government positions were coupled with tight security oversight in Sweida, a strategy aimed at managing rather than integrating the province.

As new waves of unrest ripple through southern Syria, the Druze community once again finds itself wrestling with existential questions caught between historical trauma, present instability, and an uncertain future.