Gaddafi and the West… The Colonel’s Need for a Foe that Legitimizes His Presence

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from a book by Mojahed Bosify about the Libyan colonel and his thorny relations with the West

Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
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Gaddafi and the West… The Colonel’s Need for a Foe that Legitimizes His Presence

Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)
Gaddafi at his headquarters in Bab Al-Azizia, Tripoli, after the US raids in 1986. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat will begin, starting on Monday, releasing excerpts from a book by Libyan author Mojahed Bosify about Libya under the rule of late leader Colonel Moammar al-Gaddafi. Today’s excerpt tackles his thorny relations with the West and how he believed that its true “religion” was money, which is how he based his approach towards it. As the years went by, Gaddafi came to view the presence of the West as an “important enemy” that offered his rule longevity at the least cost.

“Dawlat al-Khayma” (The Tent State) is published by Beirut’s Difaf Publications and will be released at the Cairo Book Fair. Bosify wrote about how Gaddafi disliked the West, a position that did not change throughout his rule. The late leader recalled an encounter in the United Kingdom in 1966 when he was undergoing further military training. He recalled how he was seated next to a Briton on a train. When drinks were served, the man only paid for his order. Gaddafi objected to his behavior, which he perceived as lacking dignity. The event would shape Gaddafi’s view of the British, whom he believed do not host you or allow you to host them, which contradicts the Bedouin values on which he was raised.

After he came to power, he would recount to the BBC how his fellow Libyans were insulted by English officers during their training in the UK. “I am certain that they hated us,” he told his interviewer.

Gaddafi would never really understand the West – as friend or foe alike. He constantly viewed the West from his own Libyan lens, not from the perspective of its own history and values. Indeed, he would come to hate the West. He was keen on relaying this hatred to everyone, developing a state of enmity that in turn would bring him fame. With time, the mutual hostility between them would constantly provide the enemy with the excuse to revolt against Gaddafi, and provide him with the justifications to remain in power.

The colonel based part of his propaganda on religion and history. He believed that the hostility was part of the tenth Crusade that was targeting Libya and the entire Muslim east. He was eager to meet this hostility and at one point during a televised address challenged US President Jimmy Carter to an armed duel to resolve wars. At another instance, he alleged that westerners were part of Darwin’s missing link between man and monkey and even tasked researchers to back his claim.

Gaddafi’s failure to learn foreign languages and deep sense of pride prevented him from understanding complex political, social and industrial issues that are integral to life in the West. For nearly two decades, he kept visiting these lands, leaving behind fear wherever he went. He carried out or supported terrorist operations in most European cities, and then sent his squads of professional murderers to the United States, to assassinate opponents in the heart of the greatest enemy.

In April 1986, US President Ronald Reagan decided to set a new rule in dealing with him, so he sent a squadron of planes that bombed his private home and a few other targets. The US army missed at least two targets and caused a massacre of which the colonel cleverly benefited. But the message had arrived and served its purpose for several years. This time, the colonel understood that he had to stay calm.

After the Kuwait war, a simultaneous announcement by Britain and the United States formally accused the Libyan regime of blowing up an American civilian plane. Two Libyan men were wanted for trial. Libya, along with Iraq, was subject to a siege that lasted for seven years, before a Saudi-South African mediation succeeded in persuading Gaddafi to hand over the accused to a neutral court, before finally acknowledging responsibility of the attack.

The Lockerbie case cost Gaddafi great efforts and losses on all fronts. But he emerged from that turmoil with a new theory, which he expressed in few words: The West’s only religion is money.

The colonel started to award contracts to Western companies and his new approach did not disappoint him at all, but opened for him the paths he desired.

With his abundant money and traveling with his tent and camel, he visited most of the capitals of the West, with the exception of London, for which he maintained a lasting hatred.

During a visit to Paris, he sat on the chair of Louis XIV, after he was officially received by French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Elysée Palace. No one had imagined at that time that he had funded Sarkozy’s election campaign.

The real problems with the West had not yet begun. They will start with the emergence of Osama bin Laden, who will strike the heart of America without mercy, in a Hollywood-like scene, from which the White House itself barely escaped.

Less than two years later, Saddam Hussein will fall in another operation. Around that day, special security units came to the heart of Tripoli at night, removing the large posters of the leader hanging on the walls, fearing that they would be too provocative. A cautious fear overwhelmed the colonel. He expected at any time the appearance of US warplanes in Libyan skies.

A week after Saddam was captured, Gaddafi finally realized that the game was over. He announced that he would abandon any programs to produce “chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.”

America waved the stick whenever necessary. In March 2004, a delegation headed by Joseph Biden, then chief Democrat in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited the Jamahiriya. After his meeting with Gaddafi near Sirte, he delivered a speech the next day, in which he said that the Libyan people had capabilities and opportunities, but suffered from a big problem, which is a “misleading ideology”.

The live television broadcast was immediately cut off at this point, and dozens of diplomats and politicians sought to reduce the intensity of those words. Biden, however, remained adamant about his opinion of the colonel, whom he described after his return to Washington as “not having a single bone that believes in democracy.”

While many Western delegations looked for investment opportunities in Libya, others wanted different type of information.

Two years after Joseph Biden’s visit, a delegation from the National Institute for Democracy in Washington, which was at that time headed by Madeleine Albright, the former Secretary of State, visited the African country.

The delegation, which included four experts in the region and observers of the progress of change, spent nine days wandering around the country, and came out with a report describing bleak conditions 37 years after the leader came to power.

“It is very clear that the executive authority is in the hands of Colonel Gaddafi... who created a system that carries a decision-making mechanism that is extremely dark and unclear,” the experts said.

The report goes on to explain the rest of the reality in Libya, where legal penalties are imposed on freedom of expression and assembly, to such an extent that the movements and communications of the delegation itself “were under close supervision throughout the mission.”

Many delegations flocked to Libya, while the colonel tried to carefully chart the new approach, without a valid infrastructure and no qualified cadres, except in rare cases, for use in the outside world. Gaddafi remained in a frenzied quest for “international legitimacy”, with which he hoped to crown his life as a global example.

Two years after resolving the Lockerbie crisis, the colonel was able to come out with the signing of the Initial Declaration of the African Union, for which he chose a date chose as he liked: 09/09/1999.

The African leaders could barely keep him away from the presidency of that union for ten years, before he finally won it at the exact time he wanted. As soon as he assumed the post in 2010, he also took on the Arab chairmanship at the Sirte summit a few weeks later.

Between these two presidencies, he finally arrived in New York for the first and last time in his life. This performance culminated in a speech on the world’s podium. But his address was a poorly formulated monologue. The tragic moment, which lasted for more than two hours and was broadcast live around the globe, saw the Libyan leader violate all protocols and laws, mixing topics and presenting his worst performance ever throughout his long history.

The New York trip marked the end of his fame. When that Bedouin boy finally reached the world’s apple and financial hub, he spoiled the precious opportunity.

The Western world meanwhile remained idle, waiting for the opportunity. It first publicly denied any connection with the colonel, then lifted its cover to later intervene directly to uproot him.



ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.