Lebanon is shifting its approach to Hezbollah after decades of political and institutional coexistence with the group's influence and weapons, as military and regional upheaval brings the question of exclusive state authority back to the fore.
From the 1989 Taif Agreement to recent government decisions, the shift marks a move away from political compromises toward tighter oversight, greater accountability and attempts to restore the authority of state institutions.
What has changed?
Hezbollah's alleged influence once reached deep into sensitive areas of the Lebanese state, from cargo shipments and customs inspections to the judiciary and security agencies.
Beirut airport was a major flashpoint. In May 2008, a government decision to dismiss its security chief, coupled with a move against Hezbollah's telecommunications network, triggered armed clashes that exposed the limits of the government's ability to enforce its decisions.
At Beirut port and land border crossings, repeated allegations pointed to shipments moving through channels exempt from routine inspections. Former officials described containers marked in red as belonging to the "resistance" and therefore off-limits to customs inspectors.
The judiciary faced similar pressure. In 2021, alleged threats by Hezbollah liaison official Wafiq Safa against judicial investigator Tarek Bitar renewed concerns over interference in judicial investigations.
The picture is different today.
Authorities say they have tightened inspections at the airport, port and border crossings and pursued weapons and explosives cases, including the 2026 Dahr al-Baidar case and the Bsharri cell.
A more assertive presidency and government decisions to place weapons under exclusive state control have accompanied the measures.
The change is also evident in official rhetoric. Where the debate once focused on special cargo routes and exemptions, officials now increasingly demand inspections, accountability and equal enforcement of the law.
Along the Syrian border, the change in power in Damascus has disrupted communication and supply routes Hezbollah once relied on.
But tighter controls do not mean Hezbollah's former influence has disappeared or that the state has regained full authority. The real test remains whether Lebanon can enforce its rules equally and consistently.
From Taif to the erosion of political coexistence
Former lawmaker Fares Souaid traces the roots of the arrangement to the 1989 Taif Agreement, which called for the Lebanese state to extend its sovereignty through its own forces and for militias to disband.
Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon and the influence of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who was entrusted with implementing the agreement with US approval, effectively "upgraded Hezbollah from a militia to a resistance movement," Souaid said.
Other militias surrendered their weapons. Hezbollah kept its arsenal.
"Coexistence began under Syrian influence and continued under Iranian influence," he said.
After Israel withdrew from most of southern Lebanon in 2000, Souaid recalled Walid Jumblatt's choice between "Hanoi or Hong Kong" as a defining question about Lebanon's future.
The Syrian army's withdrawal in 2005 did not end foreign influence, he argued. Hezbollah stepped into the vacuum with Iranian backing, benefiting from Tehran's expanding regional reach after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.
Souaid links that period to the death of Yasser Arafat, the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the execution of Saddam Hussein, as well as Iran's influence across Syria, Iraq and Lebanon through Hezbollah and its alliance with the political movement represented by former Lebanese President Michel Aoun.
The balance began to shift with the confrontations that erupted in October 2023, followed by the 2024 pager explosions and the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, and then the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government, Souaid said.
Together, those developments weakened the regional alliance that had sustained Hezbollah's position and protected the previous political arrangement.
Souaid sees Arab support for Joseph Aoun's election as president and Nawaf Salam's appointment as prime minister in 2025 as carrying a clear message: aid would depend on the Lebanese state restoring its sovereignty.
The change, he says, goes beyond the country's political leadership. State institutions are increasingly willing to exercise their powers over the judiciary, security agencies and public facilities.
Arab and international demands for Lebanese sovereignty have also grown more explicit, replacing earlier compromises that repeatedly deferred confrontation over Hezbollah's weapons, he said.
Souaid points to cabinet decisions on Aug. 5 and 7, 2025, aimed at establishing exclusive state control over weapons, and a March 2, 2026, decision banning Hezbollah's military and security activities and requiring it to surrender its arsenal.
He also cites a shift in presidential rhetoric, with the Lebanese president now naming Hezbollah directly.
In the judiciary, Souaid praises "the courage of Judge Claude Ghanem at the Military Court." Recalling the 2008 killing of pilot Samer Hanna, he alleges that Hezbollah handed over a person who was not the perpetrator.
Souaid also acknowledges improved controls at the airport, port and borders, despite sporadic security incidents.
"Contrary to the prevailing public mood, we must be patient with the army," he said.
He argues that restoring state authority requires "Shiite political and social support" for the constitution and the Taif Agreement, rather than "putting an entire sect, its mothers and fathers, on trial for the conduct of one party."
Disarming Hezbollah, he insists, is "a purely Lebanese national demand rooted in the country's political covenant," not a matter tied to the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, Israeli elections or the calculations of Trump and China.
It is a demand Lebanon failed to fulfill in both 1989 and 2005, he said.
Souaid advocates a sustained campaign fought through "smart judicial, political, security, military and media" efforts.
"This is a necessary and unavoidable battle, but it cannot be won by a knockout. It must be won on points."
A stronger state, but authority remains incomplete
Former lawmaker Wehbe Katisha says Hezbollah's influence was once rooted in its political strength inside state institutions.
"In the past, the state was on Hezbollah's side. Most ministers and lawmakers supported it. Hezbollah was therefore not weak within state institutions. It had a political majority that provided influence and protection," he said.
"That reality has changed. Most ministers and lawmakers are now against Hezbollah, shifting the balance of power within the state," he added, describing his assessment of the political landscape.
Katisha says the confrontations destroyed much of Hezbollah's military and political leadership and devastated large parts of southern Lebanon.
He estimates the group's losses at "around 10,000 dead and 30,000 wounded."
Funding and logistical support routes have also narrowed, he says, pointing to the closure of the Syrian supply route and Iran's declining strength.
"Together, these factors have weakened Hezbollah inside Lebanon, while the state has grown stronger at its expense," he said.
The judiciary offers another measure of that shift, Katisha argues.
"Lebanese people used to watch Wafiq Safa threatening a public prosecutor," he said, recalling what he describes as earlier pressure on judicial officials.
He cites the Lebanese Forces party's demand to refer the Dahr al-Baidar explosives case to the Judicial Council after Judge Claude Ghanem brought charges against 13 people in October 2026.
"In the past, who would have dared to discuss such cases and demand their referral to the Judicial Council?" he asked.
Katisha says Hezbollah's former sources of influence at the airport, port, judiciary, land border crossings and public administration have weakened as military and political conditions have shifted.
Security and judicial cases are now handled differently, he argues.
"Hezbollah had what amounted to a military fast-track lane at the airport and port, and officials running those facilities were largely under its sway," he said.
Katisha recalled testimony given by a customs director-general while he was serving in parliament.
"The customs director-general told us plainly that there were containers no one was allowed to approach or inspect because they belonged to the resistance. Other containers were subject to inspection," he said.
"Containers marked in red were classified as belonging to the resistance and therefore could not be inspected."
According to the account Katisha cites, those containers were linked to weapons, ammunition, money and goods.
"That situation no longer exists today as it once did," he said.
Katisha points to Hezbollah's diminished influence across government departments, land border crossings and the judiciary. But he cautions that the state cannot fully reclaim its authority through political declarations alone.
Those declarations must be translated into action.