Syrian Refugees Face Ramadan Penury amid Lebanon's Economic Ruin

Hussein al-Khaled and his family eat their Iftar meal during Ramadan inside a tent at an informal tented settlement in Bar Elias, in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon April 22, 2021. (Reuters)
Hussein al-Khaled and his family eat their Iftar meal during Ramadan inside a tent at an informal tented settlement in Bar Elias, in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon April 22, 2021. (Reuters)
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Syrian Refugees Face Ramadan Penury amid Lebanon's Economic Ruin

Hussein al-Khaled and his family eat their Iftar meal during Ramadan inside a tent at an informal tented settlement in Bar Elias, in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon April 22, 2021. (Reuters)
Hussein al-Khaled and his family eat their Iftar meal during Ramadan inside a tent at an informal tented settlement in Bar Elias, in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon April 22, 2021. (Reuters)

Hussein al-Khaled and his family have lived in a makeshift hut in Lebanon for a decade since fleeing the war in neighboring Syria, but this year COVID and economic collapse are making it even harder to spend Ramadan away from home.

Khaled, his wife and their 11 children share a two-room hut made of wood and tarpaulin in an informal refugee camp in a field in the Bekaa Valley town of Bar Elias, and are now reliant on aid donations because there is no work to be found.

"Our spirits are down this year. Ramadan is here and we don't know what to do for the kids," said Khaled, 50, who has not had a job for the past six months.

His wife, who goes by Um Ahmad which means mother of Ahmad, said the family could no longer afford enough oil to fry potatoes for dinner when they break their daily Ramadan fast at sundown.

Gone are the days of Ramadan feasts and new clothes for the children, when the family lived comfortably at home in Aleppo and Khaled had regular work in construction, laying tiles. The war destroyed their house and put an end to that life.

"I never would have expected this. My children's future is gone," he said. "They ask me about many things. 'Baba why don't you get me this?' How can I buy things for them?"

The family are among up to 1.5 million Syrian refugees who have poured into Lebanon since 2011 and are estimated to make up almost a quarter of the country's population. Most have languished in severe poverty in tented settlements.

Many refugees like Khaled used to be able to work to eke out a living, but daily wages have been slashed as the COVID-19 pandemic has forced Lebanon into repeated lockdowns.

Compounding the problem, Lebanon's unprecedented financial meltdown, which has pushed most Lebanese into poverty since 2019, has sent the price of staple foods soaring.

"Everything is 10 times more expensive - rice, bread, a can of Pepsi," said Khaled. "Things are very tough, on us and on the people of this country."

Still, in spite of all the hardship, Khaled says the family remains wary of returning to Syria for now because of security fears. Um Ahmad says it is painful to think of life at home before the war.

"Today, we've been displaced for 10 years," she said. "From living in our home to sitting in a tent, it's the difference between the sky and the earth."



Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
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Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)

The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, marked by periods of resolution and banning of activities, is not disconnected from the long history of the group’s journey in the kingdom, dating back to the mid-1940s when it was first established.

However, this journey—characterized by varying relations with successive governments—began with collaboration and ended in conflict. How did this unfold?

Leaders of Jordan’s Islamic movement, encompassing both the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, consistently supported Jordan’s stability during the last decades of the 20th century.

This support, however, shifted into decades of confrontation with the authorities after the divisions within the movement emerged.

A key moment in the movement's history came when Jordanian authorities accused the group of plotting to “stir chaos” and possessing “explosive materials,” marking a significant turning point for the Islamic movement in the kingdom.

This came especially after recordings revealed the arrested individuals’ ties to the unlicensed Brotherhood group in Jordan.

Founded in 1946, the Brotherhood initially operated as a charitable society, providing aid through fundraising efforts. It attracted young people who were influenced by its leaders’ calls for public activism.

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an alliance with the government. Its leaders gradually moved into senior official positions, using their power to expand their grassroots support and promote their message within Jordanian society, which historically had a strong conservative religious base.

During this time, the Brotherhood’s influence on school students was significant. It encouraged protests and sit-ins against political forces opposed to them, particularly the Communist and Ba’ath parties before the latter's split. Clashes occurred between these groups in downtown Amman and in key cities across the kingdom.

In the 1970s, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the government evolved into one of partnership and alliance, particularly under the leadership of former Prime Minister Wasfi Tal. This period saw prominent Islamic leader Ishaq Farhan appointed as Minister of Education and later as Minister of Awqaf, overseeing important reforms in educational curricula.

Farhan’s task of reforming the education system included incorporating the Brotherhood’s religious teachings into school textbooks, reflecting the growing influence of the group in shaping Jordanian public life.

Meanwhile, members of the Brotherhood, funded by the government, pursued advanced studies in the United States, returning to hold key positions in the Ministry of Education, with Abdullatif Arabiyat, a senior member, serving as the ministry’s deputy for almost a decade.

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Brotherhood sought to capitalize on regional developments, aiming to increase its political influence. Its leadership, particularly in key urban centers such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, began to broaden its outreach.

The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf became critical battlegrounds for the Brotherhood, enabling it to infiltrate mosques through imams and transform them into organizational hubs.

This religious outreach laid the groundwork for political mobilization, with gatherings and lessons organized after evening prayers, further solidifying the Brotherhood’s presence in the public sphere.

The political journey of the Brotherhood in Jordan took a dramatic turn in 1989, when the country lifted martial law and resumed parliamentary life after decades of authoritarian rule.

The Brotherhood seized the opportunity, winning a powerful bloc in the 11th Parliament and securing popular support, positioning itself as a key political player.

That era also marked the Brotherhood’s first foray into governance, backing Prime Minister Mudar Badran’s cabinet as part of a national effort to support Iraq against a US-led coalition. It was a rare alignment with the state, underscored by the election of Arabiyat as parliamentary speaker for three consecutive terms — a move widely seen as part of a government-Brotherhood alliance.

In 1992, the group formalized its political arm with the creation of the Islamic Action Front, cementing the link between its religious mission and political ambitions. But the distinction between party and group remained blurred, with critics arguing that the party remained under Brotherhood control.

That same year, tensions flared when the Brotherhood opposed Jordan’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, prompting a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Taher Masri. Although Masri resigned voluntarily, the incident marked the start of growing rifts between the Brotherhood and the state.

The following parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened internal fractures, both within the movement and between the Brotherhood and its political allies. The rift widened further in 1994, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote on the treaty, signaling a decisive shift from cooperation to confrontation.

In the aftermath of the peace treaty, the Brotherhood distanced itself from official alliances and became a staunch opponent of normalization with Israel. The group boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that triggered an exodus of leaders who opposed the boycott. Some dissidents went on to form the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, led by Abdel Rahim Akkour.

Distrust between the Brotherhood and the government deepened under the shadow of King Hussein’s illness and the succession of King Abdullah II. The movement remained politically dormant until 2003, when the Islamic Action Front re-entered parliament following a two-year suspension of legislative life during the Second Intifada. The party secured 16 seats in the 14th Parliament.

However, the rocky relationship persisted. In 2007, the Brotherhood and its party participated in elections again after negotiations with then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. But allegations of large-scale vote rigging saw the Islamic Action Front secure only six seats — a result it denounced as a betrayal of the agreement with the government.

The controversial election result sparked a leadership crisis within the Brotherhood. The group’s hardline faction, known as the Hawks, overpowered the traditional moderates (the Doves) in internal polls, leading to a purge of long-standing leaders.

Accusations emerged that the group had been hijacked by Hamas sympathizers, reshaping the Brotherhood’s identity and guiding principles.

In the years that followed, former leaders split from the movement, accusing its new leadership of dragging the Brotherhood and its political arm into a confrontational path aligned with regional Islamist movements.

From mainstream political player to marginalized actor, the Brotherhood’s trajectory in Jordan mirrors a broader regional trend — one where Islamist movements rise through democratic openings but often clash with the state over ideology, foreign policy, and the limits of political power.