Why Did the G7 Refuse to Criticize 'Normalization' With Damascus?

Attendees take part in G7 foreign ministers meeting in London, Britain May 5, 2021. Ben Stansall/Pool via REUTERS
Attendees take part in G7 foreign ministers meeting in London, Britain May 5, 2021. Ben Stansall/Pool via REUTERS
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Why Did the G7 Refuse to Criticize 'Normalization' With Damascus?

Attendees take part in G7 foreign ministers meeting in London, Britain May 5, 2021. Ben Stansall/Pool via REUTERS
Attendees take part in G7 foreign ministers meeting in London, Britain May 5, 2021. Ben Stansall/Pool via REUTERS

Discussions that took place between the foreign ministers of the Group of Seven in London over the past two days revealed some change in the position of the United States and its allies regarding the Syrian file. While the group has maintained the same policy, efforts to implement it have declined and are no longer an urgent priority for the administration of US President Joe Biden.

Some parties suggested adding a phrase to the final statement of the London meeting, including an indication that the time was not appropriate for “any form of normalization” with Damascus. The assistants of some of the ministers drafting the proposal relied on two previous statements issued on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Syrian protests: the first by the foreign ministers of the US, Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, and the second by Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The two statements noted that the proposed Syrian presidential elections this year would be neither free nor fair, and should not lead to any measure of international normalization with the Syrian regime.

However, the G7 final statement issued following the first direct meeting between the leaders in two years reiterated previous points announced in UN Security Council Resolution 2254, namely the chemical file and humanitarian aid, in addition to a brief reference to the Syrian presidential elections scheduled for May 26.

The statement read: “In line with UNSCR 2254 and 1325, we urge all parties, especially the regime, to engage meaningfully with the inclusive UN-facilitated political process to resolve the conflict, notably the Constitutional Committee, to include the release of detainees and the meaningful participation of women. This includes a nationwide ceasefire and a safe and neutral environment to allow for the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of refugees. It should pave the way for free and fair elections under UN supervision, ensuring the participation of all Syrians including members of the diaspora.”

Without any reference to the normalization, the statement added: “Only when a credible political process is firmly underway would we consider assisting with the reconstruction of Syria.”

On the other hand, the focus of the G7 was placed on the humanitarian and chemical files, as the ministers condemned “the Assad regime and its backers’ ongoing atrocities against the Syrian people and attempts to disrupt regular and sustained humanitarian access into and within Syria.”

“We call for the full, unhindered humanitarian access into Syria that is vital for alleviating the impact of the crisis. We strongly support the re-authorization of cross-border humanitarian assistance later this year so that those in need can get the assistance they require,” the statement underlined.

The G7 also urged the regime in Syria to adhere to its obligations under UNSCR 2118. It strongly welcomed the decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Conference of the States Parties to suspend Syria’s rights and privileges under the Chemical Weapons Convention, until it completes the steps set out in the OPCW Executive Council Decision of 9 July 2020 and refrains from further use of chemical weapons.

“We are firmly committed to accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons and violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable, and pledge support for the work of appropriate international criminal justice and investigative mechanisms and transitional justice mechanisms,” the statement concluded.

The G7 position on Syria converges with priorities set by the new US administration. Since Biden came to power, his team has requested a review of the Syria policy, which is expected to be completed this month.

It is noteworthy that officials working on the Syrian file in Washington avoid participating in public meetings, in an indication to a break with the previous approach adopted by former US President Donald Trump, which was based on “maximum pressure” on Damascus and "strategic patience", through the use of tools such as sanctions.

The new US priorities in the Syrian file include three axes:

First, the humanitarian dimension, by focusing on the renewal of the Security Council’s decision to provide “cross-border” humanitarian aid on July 10.

Second, the chemical file, by exerting great pressure on Damascus and Moscow to abide by the Russian-US agreement signed between Sergei Lavrov and John Kerry at the end of 2013.

Third, the fight against ISIS, by making sure that reducing the US presence in Iraq and the region will not affect the strategy of preventing the re-emergence of the organization.

In these three axes fall the US focus, based on which Washington’s allies in Europe and Arab capitals are acting, until a major development in the US-Russian understanding takes place to revive the “step-by-step” approach, which is currently difficult to achieve amid mounting tension between Washington and Moscow on the one hand, and the Europeans and the Russians on the other.



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.