Will ‘Syrian Understandings’ Stop the American-Russian Collapse?

US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive to meet at the Villa la Grange on Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. (AP)
US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive to meet at the Villa la Grange on Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. (AP)
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Will ‘Syrian Understandings’ Stop the American-Russian Collapse?

US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive to meet at the Villa la Grange on Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. (AP)
US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive to meet at the Villa la Grange on Wednesday in Geneva, Switzerland. (AP)

Ever since Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria in late 2015, every summit between President Vladimir Putin and his American counterpart former President Donald Trump was an opportunity to reach understandings that would bring Washington closer to Moscow’s stance on the crisis.

Now, Syria, in wake of Wednesday’s summit between Putin and US President Joe Biden, has become a “buffer zone” to halt the major collapse between Washington and Moscow. The leaders discussed cooperation in limited files – small or strategic – playing out in Syria.

Trump, who “trusted” Putin, agreed during an unannounced meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Hamburg in 2017, to a ceasefire in southern Syria. He also proposed ending the secret program that was run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the participation of Arab and western countries, to support the Free Syrian Army through Jordan to the south. The program helped the FSA combat the Syrian government.

This was a “gift” offered by Trump to Putin before their meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vietnam in 2017.

The two leaders did not hold a direct announced meeting, rather they sufficed with issuing a statement in which they expressed their “rejection of a military solution in Syria.” They also agreed to keep open channels of military communication between Russia and the US with the aim of averting dangerous accidents between forces fighting ISIS.

Previously, the American and Russian armies had agreed to a deconfliction arrangement in Syria. They also designated a separating line, which is the Euphrates River, whereby US-backed forces would be deployed east of the river and Moscow-backed forces would be deployed to its west.

In July 2018, Putin and Trump met in Helsinki. Among several points, they announced their commitment to “guaranteeing Israel’s security”. Then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been pushing the two leaders to take efforts to “keep Iran out of southern Syria.”

In August 2018, it was announced that an international-regional deal on southern Syria was reached. Russia's special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev said that Hezbollah fighters and Shiite militias backed by Iran had pulled out of the area. The Iranians, who work as military “advisors” to the government forces, were not included in the deal.

Wednesday’s Putin-Biden summit differs from previous meetings between the Russian and American leaders. The goal behind the cooperation in Syria has changed. It is no longer about building trust or offering American “gifts” to Russia. But Syria is now being used as an arena to stop the collapse in American-Russian relations, which are at their lowest point since the Cold War. Ties have deteriorated because of sanctions, cyberattacks, diplomatic tensions, meddling in interna affairs and differences over North Korea, Ukraine and others.

It is widely believed that despite the “red lines” that Putin and Biden sought to draw over contentious issues, they sought cooperation over others, such as the Iran nuclear file, Syria and the fight against terrorism.

On Syria, the Biden administration is prioritizing the continued defeat of ISIS, halting the regime’s chemical weapons program, ensuring Damascus’ commitment to the 2013 Russian-American agreement and delivering cross-border humanitarian aid to Syrians.

Ahead of Wednesday’s summit, the Americans and Russians on the highest levels sought to exchange various political and field messages in all files. This included Russia’s strikes on Idlib that targeted leading members of the terrorist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group and the Americans’ push to increase the number of border crossings to deliver aid.

It all likelihood, the Geneva summit will give the green light for keeping open the channel of dialogue between Russia and the US in Vienna. Washington was awaiting a call from Moscow, while Moscow was waiting for Washington to take the initiative. The Geneva summit probably put a stop to this endless loop and will pave the way for the two sides to renew cooperation in several files:

1 – They will maintain military arrangements east of the Euphrates to prevent any collision. Moscow would also encourage Damascus and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to hold dialogue over operational and perhaps even political arrangements.

2 – Damascus would be pressured to respond to inquiries by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in return for restoring the government’s privileges at the group. The government was recently included in the World Health Organization’s executive board in the Eastern Mediterranean region and a Syrian special representative was appointed to the Special Committee on Decolonization.

3 – The ground would be paved for extending the international resolution on cross border aid that expires next month. The Biden administration is seeking the opening of three crossings, while Russia’s agreement to extend the opening of the current crossing – Bab al-Hawa – would be interpreted as a sign that it agrees to the continued cooperation.

Arab and regional countries will draw their own conclusions over the Putin-Biden summit and what it entails for Syria.

The implications of the summit on Syria will be revealed during the briefing by UN special envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen to the organization in New York on June 25. They will also be revealed when US Secretary of State Antony Blinken chairs the meeting of the small group of foreign ministers ahead of the meeting of members of the international coalition to defeat ISIS on June 28. The implications of the summit will be tangibly felt on July 11 when the Security Council votes on the cross-border aid resolution.

Some observers believe that these specific Syrian signals could expand to include other issues, such as Iran’s military presence in the war-torn country, especially if Washington and Tehran agree to return to the nuclear deal. This issue would in turn be tied to Damascus normalizing relations with Arab countries and its return to the Arab League. In return, it would receive help in its reconstruction.



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.