Episode 5: Clinton Tried to Dissociate Assad from Iraq Bombing by Resuming Negotiations with Israel

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Secret Letters between the Syrian, Iraqi Presidents in the mid-1990s

US President Bill Clinton and his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad, in Damascus in October 1994 (Getty Images)
US President Bill Clinton and his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad, in Damascus in October 1994 (Getty Images)
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Episode 5: Clinton Tried to Dissociate Assad from Iraq Bombing by Resuming Negotiations with Israel

US President Bill Clinton and his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad, in Damascus in October 1994 (Getty Images)
US President Bill Clinton and his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad, in Damascus in October 1994 (Getty Images)

In the second half of 1998, Syria was reassured by its “tutelage” over Lebanon on its western front and was testing secret channels with the new decision-maker on its southern borders, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

However, the country was encircled by the Iraqi flames in the east and by a storm of Turkish threats and military build-up on its northern borders, aimed at pressuring President Hafez al-Assad to expel the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Abdullah Ocalan.

As tension rose in Iraq at the beginning of 1998, Assad dispatched his deputy, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa to Cairo, to convey a message to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

According to the minutes of the meeting, obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat from Khaddam’s personal papers, Assad and Mubarak were convinced that Saddam “was not removing the pretexts” to prevent military escalation. The two leaders agreed to send a joint message and to tell Saddam Hussein frankly, that the strike would target him in particular, as a regime change was required and would not happen but through an attack.

By the end of that year, the American threat was approaching Iraqi soil. Upon examining the documents and messages between Saddam, Assad and other leaders, it was evident that the Iraq issue was linked to other files - other gains pertaining to Syria.

In fact, in July 1996, French President Jacques Chirac tried to lure Assad to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon in exchange for working with Netanyahu for “Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan and the guarantee of Syria’s continued military presence in Lebanon.”

Almost two years later, US President Bill Clinton clearly declared Assad’s “neutrality” regarding a strike on Iraq by working to resume peace negotiations with Netanyahu “from where they left off” during the era of his predecessor Shimon Peres in 1996, when the Syrian President received an Israeli commitment to a complete withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 line.

On February 21, 1998, Clinton wrote to Assad: “If Saddam compels us to take military action, it will be important for Syria to remain committed to Iraq’s full compliance with UN resolutions… I am fully aware of our previous efforts (in the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations) and I am not ready to go back to ground zero. However, based on my conversations with the Prime Minister of Israel (Benjamin Netanyahu), I believe that it is still possible, even at this time, to achieve a peace agreement. Flexibility will be required on both sides.”

Assad responded on March 13, 1998, saying: “You have noticed the extent of anxiety and tension that prevailed in public opinion, especially in the Arab and Islamic worlds, due to the possibility of military action against Iraq that would increase the suffering.”

He added: “But resuming negotiations without continuing to build on what has been achieved will not only be a waste of five difficult years of US, Syrian and Israeli efforts, but will also lead to derailing the negotiations.”

The Iraqi problem was one of the most dangerous crises that the region witnessed after the Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. American pressure was mounting with regards to the weapons of mass destruction. The only way to inspect them was the creation of the Monitoring and Inspection Committee by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In light of the tense situation, Assad made a phone call with Mubarak, during which they agreed that Khaddam and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa visit Cairo to assess the situation and draw the appropriate position that would ward off harm from Iraq.

On February 17, 1998, Khaddam and Al-Sharaa met in Cairo with Kamal Al-Ganzouri, Prime Minister of Egypt, Amr Moussa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Osama Al-Baz, Advisor to the President for Political Affairs, before meeting Mubarak.

According to the minutes of the meeting, Mubarak asked the Syrian delegation how they would evaluate the situation, their opinion about the correctness of the Americans’ intention to strike Iraq and the Israeli role in the crisis.

Khaddam replied: “Of course, Israel has a role. Mr. President, in view of what is happening, is this fierce campaign and this large crowd aimed for searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? […] Or there is something else being plotted for us, as Arabs, and for the region? Insisting on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction is just an argument, nothing more, nothing less. Moreover, Saddam says there is nothing there, that the weapons have been destroyed. He says that the eight presidential palaces have nothing and that they are open to the inspection body of the US and the United Nations. However, the Americans, the British and others who joined them still say that it is necessary to implement international legitimacy and UN resolutions and allow the international and US inspectors to search for weapons of mass destruction, biological or chemical weapons, etc., and come up with opinions and theories about them and their whereabouts.”

Khaddam asked: “Is this campaign and this mobilization that is taking place in full swing, for the sake of the weapons, or there is another goal – a goal that has been plotted long time ago and is being implemented now - while we, Arabs are facing what is happening while awaiting their will?”

Mubarak commented by saying that it was necessary to confront what was happening.

Khaddam replied: “Yes, and there is a conviction among the Arab citizens and in the Arab street that what is happening is planned by the Americans and the Israelis, on the one hand to provide support for Israel, and on the other hand for hegemony and control of this region, in implementation of the same Israeli project throughout history […]”

The Syrian vice-president went on to say: “I hope that we will work together to confront the situation and study the possible solutions, of course with Amr Moussa and Farouk al-Sharaa, so that we can see the picture clearly in all its dimensions. The first thing we should do is to work together to spare Iraq such a devastating military strike, and also to send a delegation to Iraq and make the necessary contacts, for the sake of the Iraqi people […]. Here I am carrying a message from President Hafez al-Assad on this subject.”

Mubarak replied: “Certainly, the implementation of Security Council and United Nations resolutions with regard to inspection and destruction of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons must be adhered to, and then the inspection mission should be carried out… to avoid a military strike.”

Khaddam, for his part, said: “Yes. I am one hundred percent sure that no Iraqi envoy would dare to convey such words to Saddam personally.”

Mubarak replied: “This is exactly what is happening, and it happened during his invasion of Kuwait. We advised him, but he refused to listen, and the result is what you see today.”

Khaddam told the Egyptian president that Saddam Hussein must be explicitly told that the strike “will come and target you in particular, as a regime change will not happen without an attack.” Mubarak agreed.

Days after the Cairo trip, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, arrived in Baghdad and held talks with the Iraqi leadership that led to the signing of an agreement, in which Saddam accepted the terms of the Security Council for supervision and inspection.

Khaddam recounted: “The storm receded, but for how long? Have American goals changed, or will their methods change?”

The Syrian vice-president said that during the crisis between Iraq and the United States, the US administration made several contacts with Damascus with the aim of “dissociating the Syrian position and reminding us of the 1990 alliance during the occupation of Kuwait.”

Saddam agreed to the demands of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. However, after accusing Baghdad of not cooperating with UN inspectors and observers, Clinton took a decision to bomb Iraq on December 15, 1998, focusing on Baghdad and strategic sites in Iraq, with the participation of Britain. On December 19, President Clinton ordered a halt to the bombing.

Khaddam said that these operations had a deep resonance in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and loud demonstrations took place. In Damascus, Syrians demonstrated and attacked the US embassy and the residences of the US and British ambassadors.



US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
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US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)

Syrians have lived under the shadow of US sanctions for 46 years, spanning generations who know no other reality. These sanctions have become woven into every aspect of daily life, from banking and international aviation to construction and food supplies. Their burden has fallen hardest on ordinary people, rather than on the symbols of the ousted Assad regime.

While lifting sanctions now would undoubtedly unlock planning and reconstruction efforts, political and security concerns persist, and Syria’s dilapidated infrastructure may impede private-sector investment.

Most importantly, we must ask whether US President Donald Trump’s move to begin lifting sanctions was as improvised as his 2018 announcement to withdraw militarily from Syria, or whether it marks a pivotal shift in US foreign policy toward Syria.

On May 13, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions on Syria. This triggered a period of confusion and internal reviews before his administration outlined an initial mechanism that balanced implementing his announcement with addressing his advisors’ worries over unfettered engagement with the new Syrian leadership.

Before assessing this current phase of easing sanctions, we need a historical overview of them, their context, underlying rationale, implementation methods, and what their potential impact might be for Syria and its people. Sanctions on Syria can be divided into three eras: under Hafez al-Assad, under his son Bashar, and now under interim President Ahmed al‑Sharaa.

Shift toward Iran (1979–2000)

US sanctions on Syria began in 1979, following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and the rise of Iran’s revolution. With the end of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Damascus, Hafez al-Assad viewed Iran’s emerging regime as a counterweight to Iraq and Israel.

Washington designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979 due to its role in Lebanon and its support for fighters opposed to Israel. Consequently, the US imposed restrictions on foreign aid, defense exports, and the transfer of dual‑use goods. In November 1986, President Ronald Reagan barred Syrian planes from landing in the US.

The Iraq War (2001–2010)

Sanctions entered a new phase as US policy shifted after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, coinciding with Bashar al‑Assad’s arrival to power in July 2000. In his 2002 State of the Union, President George W. Bush labeled Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and North Korea the “Axis of Evil”, prompting Iran to form a “Resistance Axis” that included Syria and Hezbollah.

With these strains came stricter measures: the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Act of 2003, enforced by OFAC at the US Treasury in 2004 under Executive Order 13338, targeted Syria’s role in Lebanon and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its opposition to the US-led occupation of Iraq.

On May 7, 2025, the Trump administration signed a notice extending the national emergency concerning Syria until May 7, 2026, encompassing executive orders from 2003 to 2012.

The Syrian uprising and Caesar Act

Following Syria’s uprising in March 2011, the US imposed a wave of sanctions targeting violence and human rights abuses. President Barack Obama’s April 29, 2011 executive order froze Assad regime assets, followed by an August 2011 ban on oil, asset freezes, and broad trade prohibitions, excluding food and medicine.

However, the defining moment came with the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019, signed by Trump in December 2019 and implemented in June 2020. Targeting infrastructure, military maintenance, energy, and those funding the Assad regime, it also banned foreign investment in Syria’s reconstruction. This legislation aimed to check both Russian and Iranian influence and serve as leverage for negotiations with Moscow, permitting temporary waivers if productive talks occurred.

Though enacted long after the internal conflict began, the Act functioned less as a response to internal dynamics and more as an economic restraint on reconstruction efforts.

Al‑Sharaa after Assad

By late 2024, with Bashar al-Assad’s regime fallen and Trump back in power, Syria had not been a US priority, with internal debate over how to engage the new al‑Sharaa administration. That shifted after Trump spoke with Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 16, signaling alignment with Turkish‑Saudi policy against the hardline Israeli stance.

In Saudi Arabia, Trump began rolling back sanctions on Syria, but the fate of the Caesar Act remains uncertain, currently suspended in 180‑day increments, extendable. Although it was briefly lifted for humanitarian relief during the Feb 2023 Türkiye-Syria earthquakes and in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), its full repeal remains on hold.

Mechanisms and challenges

Trump’s administration has implemented three key executive measures: Treasury’s “GL‑25” on May 23, enabling sweeping economic coverage; a 180‑day suspension of Caesar sanctions; and a specific waiver for the Commercial Bank of Syria via the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, allowing re‑establishment of correspondent banking relationships.

GL‑25 has no set expiry and can be revoked anytime, while Caesar waivers renew every six months. An earlier GL‑24 waiver, issued in January, allowed limited official and energy sector transactions and personal transfers, but US banks have remained cautious.

The permit covers four sectors: finance, oil‑gas, maritime shipping, and aviation. US persons remain barred from transactions that may benefit Russia, Iran, or North Korea, meaning rigorous due diligence is necessary. The original executive orders remain in force, although press reports suggest possible cancellations.

Procedurally, Syria remains on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, as removal would require Congress to be notified by the US State Department. The Department of Commerce and State’s defense trade regulators have yet to remove export controls, which means that Syria still falls under International Traffic in Arms Regulations, necessitating export licenses for most goods, excluding basic food and medicine.

Furthermore, Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham is still designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Even after al‑Sharaa met Trump, the Treasury’s waiver excludes HTS leader Abu Mohammed al‑Golani, al-Sharaa's former nom de guerre, who remains sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1267, supported by a likely Russian veto of any attempt to remove HTS from global blacklists. Arms embargoes and surveillance‑tech restrictions will also persist.

The Caesar Act itself was renewed by Congress in January 2025 for five years, lasting until January 2030 unless overturned legislatively and its suspension may be extended in November 2025. But these continue as temporary waivers, not full repeals.

US politics and Congressional dynamics

Legislative repeal would require Act passage in Congress. Ironically, Trump’s allies in this are Democrats, as many Republicans, especially senators, remain wary.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jim Risch remarked that Trump lifted sanctions a bit more than what was expected, but cautioned that the sanctions could come back. US energy firms, together with Syrian‑American groups, have lobbied Trump to ease sanctions, while pro‑Israel lobby AIPAC insists any relief must hinge on demonstrable positive behavior from the new Syrian government.

Impact on economy and society

In 2018, the UN estimated at least $250 billion would be required to rebuild Syria fully, far beyond what domestic resources can furnish.

Serious barriers remain: destroyed roads, hospitals, and power networks hinder basic services. Reviving industry needs massive investment; millions displaced internally or abroad need rehousing; food, fuel, medical gear, and decent jobs are in short supply.

Even a partial lifting marks a seismic shift: essential imports like food, medicine, and technology could flow more freely; reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and roads becomes feasible; frozen international assets might be unfrozen, inviting foreign companies back to construction, energy, and trade.

The most immediate relief will come from reconnecting Syrian banks to global payment systems, especially SWIFT, dismantling the economic collapse born of widespread distrust. Yet Syria remains on the FATF grey list, deterring banks and obstructing liquidity, so regulatory frameworks must be built.

Future prospects

Ambitious domestic and regional projects have surfaced under al‑Sharaa, with some contracts bypassing competitive bids. The UAE has been granted an $800 million concession at the Port of Tartus, via a Dubai Ports World MoU, to develop multi-purpose terminals, industrial zones, dry ports, and logistics hubs.

Meanwhile, a 30‑year deal with French CMA CGM was signed to develop Latakia Port. China’s VDL company secured rights to 300,000 m² in the Adra Free Zone outside Damascus for 20 years to build industrial and commercial facilities with tax breaks, labor flexibility, and repatriable profits.

A Qatari-US-Turkish energy consortium plans a $7 billion, 5,000 MW power project.

All are seen as steps to lure foreign capital and reshape Syria’s foreign policy by leveraging international corporate interests.

Uncertain transition

The sanctions regime hinges on three pillars: Syria’s State Sponsor designation (since 1979), the Syria Accountability Act (2003), and the Caesar Act (2019). Only the first may soon shift, pending a State Department and Congressional review; the others remain entrenched.

While Syria will not likely see a flood of US investment tomorrow, the first visible presence would probably involve Turkish and Gulf investors, as the US must first verify the stability and reliability of the new Syrian leadership before enabling wider investors to return.

Damascus does not fully control its territory or armed factions, and fresh sanctions may target entities linked to coastal violence in recent months.

Thus, Caesar’s intent has transitioned from coercing the Assad regime to ensuring al‑Sharaa’s good behavior. But its six‑month renewals offer limited investor certainty, making regional neighbors the marginal beneficiaries.

Al‑Sharaa’s teams may aim to woo Trump with bold reconstruction plans akin to a Marshall Plan. But Trump isn’t easily swayed. He has yet to appoint an ambassador to Damascus; instead, US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack was named envoy to Syria, indicating Syria remains an extension of Turkish policy.

Trump is unpredictable and could reverse course swiftly, but current signs still point to provisional waivers rather than a full repeal of sanctions.