Hood to Asharq Al-Awsat: Biden Administration Did Not Ignore the Arab Region

He emphasized that the Libyans decide whether to elect Haftar and Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi is still pursued by sanctions and warned against normalization with Assad.

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. (US State Department)
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. (US State Department)
TT

Hood to Asharq Al-Awsat: Biden Administration Did Not Ignore the Arab Region

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. (US State Department)
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. (US State Department)

Many observers of the US foreign policies have always doubted the desire of the Biden administration to engage directly and effectively in the Middle East, or what is called in the US State Department as the "Near East," which extends from Afghanistan in the east to the Maghreb in the west.

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood denied it, saying their commitment was "longstanding and deep."

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Hood affirmed the US position on many issues in the region, which is based primarily on the interests of his country, and the support of partners and allies in promoting reforms, fighting corruption, and supporting human rights, which is the great framework of this administration in its dealings with countries in the region.

On the Syrian issue, Hood stressed the continuation of the Caesar Act and the deployment of US forces alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS, while warning countries against normalizing relations with the Assad regime. As for Lebanon, the US official called on the Lebanese politicians to set aside political differences and respond to the people’s needs. On Iraq, he stressed its important role in the region, supporting the integrity of the upcoming elections, and stopping arms in the hands of militias.

Finally, on Libya, he said that the choice of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar to be elected for the country’s president is up to the Libyans people to decide. He noted that Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi is being pursued by international sanctions and called on all foreign forces and mercenaries to leave the country.

Here is the text of the interview:

You have visited the Middle East region multiple times; tell us what is the Biden administration’s policy towards the region?
President Biden is reinvigorating American diplomacy by rebuilding alliances with our partners to advance US interests around the world.

It is in all our interest to advance policies that end conflict, fight corruption, promote human rights, and create jobs while preserving our climate for future generations. The United States is collaborating with our friends in the Middle East to address all of these challenges.

People say that Middle East is no longer important to the United States. Do you agree or not? Why?
The world over, we are committed to finding diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts, rebuilding alliances and relationships with our closest partners, prioritizing human rights and democratic values, and taking steps to address the challenge of climate change. All of these issues are foundational to our relationships in the Middle East and North Africa.

Our commitment to the region is longstanding and deep. Our security commitments are clear and powerful. We have free trade agreements with Morocco, Jordan, Israel, Bahrain, and Oman, making people in those countries and in the United States more prosperous. We have billions of dollars in trade and investment with other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. We see this strong relationship represented by more than 70,000 students from the region - and nearly 1.5 million total over the years - studying at American universities and institutions, training to be doctors, tech startup founders, and scientists who bring prosperity, innovation, and help to the lives of people in the region.

We also can’t forget the benefits unlocked by the normalization agreements between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, nor Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan before them. While these agreements do not mean the problems in the region are a thing of the past, they do open important avenues for cooperation. I want to underline that the United States continues to believe Israelis and Palestinians alike deserve equal measures of freedom, security, prosperity, and dignity.

Syria

Syria has been at war for 10 years, and no solution is going to happen soon. How did you see it on your recent trip? How many times have you visited Syria?
The Syrian people have experienced unimaginable suffering at the hands of the Bashar Assad regime. Because of his brutal rule and corruption, we have witnessed a humanitarian disaster.

We believe that stability in Syria can only be achieved through a political process that addresses the underlying factors that produced the conflict and crises we see today. If there is to be a sustainable end to the conflict in Syria, the Assad regime must change its behavior.

This process must represent the will of all Syrians. We are committed to working with allies, partners, and the UN to ensure that a durable political solution remains within reach.

This is one of the reasons Secretary of State Antony Blinken co-hosted the June 28 Syria Ministerial with Italian Foreign Minister De Maio on the margins of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition Ministerial, and why we continue to provide support for Syrians to effectively engage in the UN-facilitated political process and other diplomatic efforts in support of UNSCR 2254.

I visited northeast Syria in May to affirm these points and other elements of our Syria policy with the Defeat ISIS Coalition’s local partners. We remain committed to our presence in the northeast in the campaign to defeat ISIS, including via stabilization assistance for liberated areas.

Some people in Congress have expressed their opinions about Syria and asked the Biden administration to lift the Caesar sanctions against the Assad regime because of the great consequences on the economic situation. How does the State Department deal with this kind of thought in Congress?

The Administration believes the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, as well as other US sanctions authorities, are important tools to promote accountability for the Assad regime, including for its atrocities, some of which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. We will continue to exercise these tools.

These authorities have significant carve-outs for humanitarian aid. Our Syria-related sanctions do not target humanitarian-related trade, assistance, or activities. Sanctions seek to limit the ability of Assad and others in the Syrian government to profit from the conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, including by forcibly taking the property of Syrians. We will continue to use a variety of tools aimed at providing some measure of accountability for human rights abuses and violations against Syrians, and will coordinate with our allies to push for meaningful progress on our shared political objectives.

There are no plans to lift any current sanctions.

Some Arab countries announced their intention to normalize ties with the Assad regime again. Where does the US stand on that issue? Do you support it? Have you asked your allies not to do so?
The United States has no plans to upgrade our diplomatic relations with the Assad regime and would not consider doing so until we see a significant change of behavior and movement towards a political solution.

We have seen and taken note of these reports of normalization. We have urged and continue to stress to countries in the region to consider carefully the atrocities visited by the Assad regime on the Syrian people over the last decade, as well as the regime’s continuing efforts to deny much of the country access to humanitarian aid and security, when they consider normalizing. Are they doing it to benefit the Syrian people? Are they doing it to benefit their population? We don’t see either.

How many US troops are still in Syria? What is your plan for them?
While I would refer you to the Department of Defense on military operations questions, I would note that ISIS in Syria remains a serious threat. The group benefits from instability, demonstrates intent to cause attacks abroad, and continues to inspire terrorist attacks around the world.

The Biden Administration remains committed to working with our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces, to maintain pressure on ISIS remnants in Syria and ensure ISIS’ lasting defeat; this effort includes support for a continued US military presence and enabling stability across the northeast, including through assistance programs aimed at bolstering the resilience of local communities.

Lebanon

The Lebanese people have been suffering from corrupt politicians and facing a lack of security, a failed economy, and more disasters. What is the US policy towards Lebanon?
We call for Lebanon’s leaders to show sufficient flexibility to form a government that is willing and capable of true and fundamental reform so that the Lebanese people can realize their full potential.

They deserve a government that will urgently implement the necessary reforms to rescue the country’s deteriorating economy.

The economy is in crisis because of decades of corruption and mismanagement. Lebanon’s political leaders need to put aside their partisan brinkmanship, change course, and work for the common good and interests of their people.

We and the international community have been clear that concrete actions remain crucial to unlocking longer-term structural support to Lebanon.

We just had the first anniversary of the deadly blast that struck the Beirut port. We haven’t reached a conclusion yet, even though the FBI has supported the Lebanese in their investigation. Why?
I would refer you to the FBI for updates on their role in the investigation. I would stress that the United States stands with the Lebanese people as they recover and rebuild from compounding crises, including the economic crisis, COVID-19 pandemic, and the horrific explosion at the Port of Beirut.

On August 4, the President announced that the United States is providing nearly $100 million in additional humanitarian assistance for Lebanon. That is on top of almost $560 million in humanitarian aid over the last two years. The United States remains the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance in Lebanon and globally.

This humanitarian assistance will benefit vulnerable populations, including Syrian refugees, and the communities hosting them. It provides access to education and healthcare services, food assistance, support for protection services and rehabilitation of water and sanitation infrastructure, among other assistance.

International assistance should support the Lebanese people directly and be transparent so that everyone knows their assistance is reaching the most vulnerable.

How can the administration support the Lebanese to restore peace negotiations with Israel and discuss the border issues?
The maritime boundary is a decision for both Israel and Lebanon to make. The United States stands ready to facilitate negotiations on the maritime boundary between Lebanon and Israel on the previous basis upon which we initiated these discussions.

Iraq

Some Iraqi people believe that the Biden Administration didn’t get along with the Iraqi government nor has a clear agenda on deterring Iran’s malign activities. How do you respond to that?
The Biden Administration is a partner to the Iraqi government and we value our relationship. President Biden met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on July 26 to further strengthen our relationship. We held a session of the Strategic Dialogue just prior to the Prime Minister’s visit. Before that, we sent a high-level delegation to Iraq, which included US State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Dana Stroul, and myself.

It’s important to note that our relationship goes beyond just high-level visits and security cooperation. We partner with Iraq on the full range of bilateral issues as exemplified in the Strategic Framework Agreement, everything from encouraging US private sector investment to helping grow and expand the Iraqi economy to assisting in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and working together to find ways to help combat climate change and mitigate the negative effects of a warming planet.

As we have said many times, we see Iraq as a close partner with a strong role to play in the region, and we look forward to continuing to work towards our shared goal of an Iraq that is secure, stable, and prosperous.

What can the Administration do to reduce the tension in Iraq and support the democratic process in the coming election?
We support a stable, prosperous, democratic and unified Iraq, and our Strategic Framework Agreement remains the foundation for our bilateral relationship. We will continue to stand with those who seek a peaceful and prosperous future for Iraq. We support the right of the Iraqi people to express their opinions and protest peacefully without fear of violence or reprisal.

As for the elections, the United States does not support any individual candidate or party. We support the electoral process and hope to see free and fair elections in a secure environment so that the Iraqi people can express their will in a democratic system. As a committed partner, support for Iraqi elections is a top priority for us.

We were pleased that the UN Security Council unanimously approved the mandate renewal of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on May 27 and included provisions that responded to the Iraqi government’s request for election monitoring. The United States contributed $5.2 million fund UNAMI’s expanded election observation mandate, which has a total budget of $15.8 million.

We hope these measures, which include a robust and visible UN presence with broad geographic coverage, as well as coordinating support to third-party observers, will help to deter fraud, increase turnout, and rebuild Iraqi trust in their democracy.

When do you think US troops will leave Iraq?
The US troops currently in Iraq are part of the Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The role of those troops is limited to advising, assisting, and enabling the Iraqi Security Forces to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. I would urge your readers to question the motivations of any outlet that describes our presence otherwise.

The progress of our Iraqi partners in the growth of capabilities will allow for the full transition later this year of US and Coalition forces to a mission focused on training, enabling, and advisory tasks.

What concerns you the most in Iraq?
The single biggest obstacle to Iraq’s prosperity is the Iran-aligned armed groups and the people who undermine Iraqi institutions and the rule of law.

Libya

Gaddafi’s son has announced his desire to run in the coming election. What is the US position on that? Do you support that or not? How will you respond?
National elections on December 24 are critical to democratic progress and Libyan unity by allowing people throughout the country to have a voice in shaping Libya’s future. We believe the political process must be Libyan-owned, Libyan-led, and free from foreign interference or influence.

The United States does not have a position on prospective candidates. However, we would note that Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi is designated under UN and US sanctions, and remains subject to an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity for the commission of murder and persecution of civilians.

The US has always expressed its concerns about the Russian-affiliated forces in Libya but did not shed light on Turkish-affiliated forces. Is that something you discussed with Turkey and other NATO members? I remember that you have highlighted it in your recent teleconference.
We are in discussions with European and regional allies, the interim Libyan government, the UN, and others on how progress can be made towards a sequenced and balanced withdrawal of all foreign forces and fighters. Issues surrounding military de-escalation were highlighted at the Second Berlin Conference, and while still unresolved, useful bilateral discussions were held on how to begin to operationalize the departure of foreign fighters.

Russia’s destabilizing involvement in the Libyan conflict remains of particular concern for the United States.

The October 23, 2020 Libyan ceasefire agreement called for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries. This includes the Russian mercenary and MOD-affiliated forces, Turkish forces, and all foreign military forces, mercenaries, proxies, and foreign fighters including those from Syria, Chad, and Sudan, and the end of any foreign military intervention.

All actors involved in the conflict should respect the nationwide ceasefire agreement and immediately suspend all military operations, halt the transfer of foreign military equipment and fighters to Libya, begin removing their personnel, and allow local authorities to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.

What is the US vision to support Libyans to end the war and reunite Libya beyond the Berlin and Geneva outcomes?
The US goal is a sovereign, stable, unified, and secure Libya with no foreign interference, and a democratically elected government that supports human rights and development, and that is capable of combating terrorism within its borders.

We are increasing our diplomatic focus on supporting progress in Libya, including through the work of US Special Envoy Richard Norland.

As the Second Berlin Conference and July 15 ministerial-level UN Security Council meeting on Libya made clear, the international community expects national elections to take place on December 24, as agreed to in the roadmap adopted by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF).

Libya’s leaders must make key preparations to ensure successful nationwide elections in December, including determining a constitutional basis and the election law that will govern them. They must make the necessary compromises to meet the Libyan people’s expectation of free and fair elections, an essential step towards a stable, unified, and democratic Libya.

We will continue to promote international efforts to support these objectives and remain engaged with all stakeholders and the Government of National Unity as it prepares for the elections and works to implement the ceasefire agreement.

Will the Biden Administration support Gen. Haftar if he runs for the coming election? Or will you be open to dealing with him?
If Khalifa Haftar chooses to genuinely engage in the political process, Libyans themselves will determine whether there is a role for him to play in the country’s future.

The current Libya government is seeking to return some money that has been frozen in the US and the west since the revolution happened. Any thought on that matter?
The United States supports the UN Security Council’s intention to ensure that assets frozen under UN Security Council resolution 1970 (adopted in 2011) will be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people. On July 15, the Security Council reaffirmed its intention to ensure that such assets shall be made available “at a later stage” for the benefit of the Libyan people.



El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Was Shocked by Deputy’s Role in Mubarak Assassination Plot

Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Was Shocked by Deputy’s Role in Mubarak Assassination Plot

Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

This happens only in thrillers. A religious leader summons an obscure army officer and meets him for the first time two days before a planned coup. He appoints him president with an unprecedented line, “You will go to the palace as president, and I will go to prison as a detainee.”

That is what happened on June 30, 1989. The officer, Omar al-Bashir, went to the presidential palace while security forces took Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi to the notorious Kober Prison along with other political leaders.

Al-Turabi’s “ruse” aimed to conceal the Islamic nature of the coup so that near and distant governments would not rush to isolate it. Intelligence agencies in neighboring states, including Egypt, fell for the deception and assumed that Bashir had seized power at the head of a group of nationalist officers. Cairo recognized the new regime and encouraged others to follow.

This happens only in stories. A young man landed at Khartoum airport carrying a passport that said his name was Abdullah Barakat. He arrived from Amman. One day he would knock on Al-Turabi’s office door, though Al-Turabi refused to see him.

Soon after, Sudanese security discovered that the visitor was a “poisoned gift,” in Al-Turabi’s words. He was the Venezuelan militant known as Carlos the Jackal, a “revolutionary” to some and a “notorious terrorist” to others.

He led the 1975 kidnapping of OPEC ministers in Vienna under instructions from Palestinian militant Dr. Wadie Haddad, an architect of aircraft hijackings. One night, and with the approval of Al-Turabi and Bashir, French intelligence agents arrived in Khartoum. Carlos awoke from sedatives aboard the plane taking him to France, where he remains imprisoned for life.

Bashir’s government was playing with explosives. In the early 1990s, it also hosted a prickly young man named Osama bin Laden, who after Afghanistan was seeking a base for training and preparation. He arrived under the banner of investment and relief work. Mounting pressure left bin Laden with no option but to leave.

This happens only in thrillers. The leadership of the National Islamic Front gathered with its top figures, Bashir, and security chiefs. The occasion was the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

Ali Osman Taha, Al-Turabi’s deputy, stunned attendees by admitting that Sudanese security services were linked to the attempt. Those present understood that he had been one of its sponsors. Neither the sheikh nor the president had prior knowledge.

After the attempt, some proposed killing the operatives who had returned from the Ethiopian capital to eliminate any trail that could incriminate the Sudanese regime. Al-Turabi opposed the assassinations. The impression spread that Bashir supported the killings and signs of a rift between him and Al-Turabi began to appear.

The split later became formal in what came to be known as the “separation” among Islamists. Power is a feast that cannot accommodate two guests. Bashir did not hesitate to send to prison the man who had placed him in the palace. Al-Turabi did not hesitate to back Bashir’s handover to the International Criminal Court. Al-Turabi tasted the betrayal of his own disciples. Disciples, after all, are known to betray.

This happens only in thrillers. Through Al-Turabi’s mediation, Osama bin Laden agreed to meet an intelligence officer from Saddam Hussein’s regime named Farouk Hijazi. The meeting produced no cooperation, but it became one of the early arguments George W. Bush used in 2003 to justify the invasion of Iraq.

Hijazi also met senior Sudanese security officials who later visited Baghdad and were warmly received, and it became clear that Ali Osman Taha was among Saddam’s most enthusiastic admirers.

Sudanese blood now flows like the waters of the Nile. Bodies scattered on the streets of el-Fasher are almost making the world forget the bodies buried under the rubble of Gaza. Hard men are pouring fire onto the oil of ethnic and regional hatreds. Making corpses is far easier than making a settlement, a state, or institutions.

Since independence, Sudan has been a sprawling tragedy. Because the present is the child of the recent past, searching for a witness who knows the game and the players, and journalism leads to meeting and interviewing the experienced politician and researcher Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam.

For a decade he served as Al-Turabi’s office director. For another decade, he wrote some of Bashir’s speeches.

In recent years, his bold conclusions stood out, including that Sudan’s Islamic movement has exhausted its purposes, that it shares responsibility with other elites for the country’s condition, and that it erred in dealing with others just as it erred when it chose the path of coups, violence, ghost houses, and contributed to pushing the South outside Sudan’s map.

Abdul Salam does not hesitate to scrutinize Al-Turabi’s own mistakes and his passion for wielding power. I sat down for an interview with him, and this is the first installment.

Abdul Salam was a first-year university student when Al-Turabi’s ideas caught his attention. Al-Turabi then appeared different, moving outside Sudan’s traditional social divides. He also knew the West, having studied in Paris and London. In 1990, Abdul Salam became Al-Turabi’s office director until the end of that decade.

Abdul Salam recalled: “I am often asked this question, are you a disciple of Al-Turabi? I have told them more than once, yes, I am a disciple of Al-Turabi, a devoted one. But I graduated from this school and became an independent person with my own ideas and experiences, perhaps broader than those of the Islamic movement’s earlier leaders.”

Asked about when he discovered Al-Turabi’s mistakes and developed a critical sense toward his experience Abdul Salam said that it was “perhaps in 2011, with the ‘Arab Spring’, and the Egyptian revolution in particular and the change that took place in Egypt.”

A tense beginning

Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi’s relationship with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak began on polite terms when they met in 1986 during an Al-Azhar conference on the Prophet’s biography. At the time, he recalled, Cairo was hostile or deeply wary of the Sudanese government under Sadiq al-Mahdi. The meeting, in his words, “was more courtesy than substance.”

According to Abdul Salam, relations later deteriorated sharply because of the deception surrounding the 1989 coup, then worsened further after the 1995 assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

The Addis Ababa shock

Abdul Salam recounted that a major political meeting was convened after the failed attempt, held at the home of Ali Osman Mohammed Taha and attended by Al-Turabi, Bashir and all senior leaders. He said that during this gathering, both Bashir and Al-Turabi learned “for the first time” that Sudanese security services and Al-Turabi’s own deputy had been involved in the operation without informing them, describing the moment as a “huge shock” to the leadership.

He said Taha admitted at the meeting that the security services were involved and that it later became clear he himself was implicated. When a proposal emerged to kill the operatives returning from Ethiopia to erase evidence, Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi “rose in fierce opposition,” calling the idea outside both politics and Sharia. He cited Dr. Ali al-Haj as saying this moment “marked the beginning of the split.”

Egyptian intelligence reassesses Sudan

Abdul Salam describes how the Sudanese and Egyptian intelligence services eventually moved toward reconciliation. He said Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s intelligence chief, sent a message through French intelligence stating that the attack had been carried out by Egyptian Islamist groups.

According to Abdul Salam, Suleiman maintained that Sudan had only provided what he described as logistical support including money, shelter and weapons, rather than planning or executing the attack. This understanding, he says, prevented Egypt from responding harshly.

The communication opened a door for “major repair” of relations, Abdul Salam added, as Sudan began presenting itself as a pragmatic government after distancing itself from Al-Turabi.

After 1999: Rapprochement with Cairo

The reconciliation with Egypt and the region, Abdul Salam noted, took shape after 1999. He recalled that Taha’s visit to Cairo came after that date, followed by a visit from intelligence chief Salah Gosh. Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman regularly traveled to Egypt and maintained a friendship with his Egyptian counterpart, further improving ties.

The memorandum that shifted power

Abdul Salam described the turning point in relations between Bashir and Al-Turabi as the “Memorandum of Ten” in October 1998. During a major Shura gathering attended by hundreds of party, state and tribal leaders, ten members presented a document calling for the removal of Al-Turabi and the installation of Bashir as both head of state and leader of the movement.

He said the memorandum included reform language, but its essence was ending dual leadership. Bashir, according to Abdul Salam, “conspired with the ten” and accepted the proposal, calling the conspiracy “clear and very public.”

Abdul Salam recounted that Bashir wanted to confine Al-Turabi to a symbolic role and that some officers close to Bashir even asked Al-Turabi to remain as a spiritual figure who would bless decisions made elsewhere. “Al-Turabi would not accept this,” he stressed.

Al-Turabi’s influence and gradual reemergence

Reflecting on the early years of the Salvation regime, Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi authored all strategic decisions while the government handled daily business independently. He avoided public appearances during the first five years, he recalls.

Abdul Salam added that Al-Turabi gradually reemerged and became speaker of the National Assembly in 1996. He said Al-Turabi’s influence “never truly faded” because of his charisma, knowledge and strong presence, and diminished only when he was imprisoned after the split.

The 2001 Memorandum and South Sudan

Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi was arrested after the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in February 2001. He confirmed he personally signed the document.

Asked whether he felt responsible for South Sudan’s independence, Abdul Salam rejected the suggestion. He said his position was clear and aligned with Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, who argued that unity required suspending the hudud laws introduced under President Jaafar Nimeiri. Abdul Salam told southern leaders that unity should take precedence over maintaining those laws, adding that Islamic legislation, like all legal systems, is shaped by its psychological and historical context.

Complicated relationship

Abdul Salam described the relationship between Al-Turabi and his deputy Ali Osman Taha as complex and shaped by long-standing philosophical differences. He recalled a sharp split within the Islamist movement in 1968 when Taha aligned with figures who believed Al-Turabi had grown too dominant.

He cited Taha’s personal doctrine as follows: if an individual disagrees with the organization he sides with the organization, if the organization disagrees with the state he sides with the state, and if the state disagrees with Islam he sides with Islam. Al-Turabi, Abdul Salam said, did not operate that way and pursued his own ideas regardless of circumstance.

Abdul Salam recalled that during the Salvation regime, Ahmed Osman Maki had originally been prepared to succeed Al-Turabi but later moved to the United States. He stated that Maki’s strong charisma may have made him unsuitable as number two, while Taha excelled at concealing his emotions and functioning as deputy. He said the two leaders worked in outward harmony during the early years of the regime before deep differences surfaced later.

Abdul Salam added that Taha admired Saddam Hussein’s model of governance and believed Sudanese society was not ready for liberalism or pluralism.

The Arab Spring and the Islamic movement’s decline

According to Abdul Salam, the Arab Spring was “harsh on the Islamic movement.” Although the regional wave ended around 2012, Sudan’s version of it erupted in 2019. He said the uprising struck Islamists hard and reflected the real sentiment of the Sudanese street.

He argued that during its years in power, the Islamic movement held a barely concealed hostility toward civil society, youth, women and the arts. Sudanese intellectual and cultural life, he said, naturally opposed the regime’s long authoritarian rule. The revolution’s slogans of peace, freedom and justice were not part of the movement’s vocabulary, and over time the movement evolved into a posture “contrary to Sudanese society.”

The Communist Party’s influence

Abdul Salam said the Sudanese Communist Party helped shape opposition to the Salvation regime. After the execution of its leaders in 1971, the party underwent major transformation, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union it fully embraced liberalism. He remarked that many young Sudanese seeking freedom, justice and an expanded role for women found the Communist Party closer to their aspirations than the conservative Islamist movement.

Responsibility for Sudan’s political impasse

Abdul Salam rejected the narrative that Sudan’s decades of military rule make the military solely responsible for the country’s crises. He stressed that responsibility also lies with the civilian elite. Officers were part of this elite, and civilians who supported them in government shared responsibility. Sudan’s civilian parties, he argued, lacked clear programs to address longstanding distortions inherited from the colonial era.

One of Abdul Salam’s most sensitive moments with Al-Turabi occurred on the eve of the Islamist split. He said he personally succeeded in arranging a meeting between Al-Turabi and Bashir after months of estrangement, trying to avoid complete rupture. Bashir proposed turning the party conference into a political showcase while setting aside differences. Al-Turabi agreed, but according to Abdul Salam, disagreements reappeared by the end of the day.

Writing Bashir's speeches and choosing a side

Abdul Salam described his relationship with Bashir as very good and said he wrote the president’s speeches from early 1990 until the late 1990s. The speeches reflected the movement’s overall positions.

When the split occurred, Abdul Salam aligned with Al-Turabi not on personal grounds, but because he shared his positions on democracy, public freedoms, federal governance and adherence to agreements with the South.

Abdul Salam said the relationship between Al-Turabi and Bashir resembles other regional cases involving a sheikh and a president only to a limited extent. Bashir was originally a member of the Islamist movement led by Al-Turabi and obeyed him even after becoming president.

The split emerged naturally once the visible authority of the presidency clashed with the hidden authority of the movement, “which was the one truly governing,” he said.


UK Chancellor to Asharq Al-Awsat: Strengthening Partnership with Saudi Arabia a Top Priority

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

UK Chancellor to Asharq Al-Awsat: Strengthening Partnership with Saudi Arabia a Top Priority

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)

UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves affirmed that strengthening relations and economic partnership with Saudi Arabia represents a top priority for her government, noting that under the ambitious Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia finds in the United Kingdom an ideal partner thanks to Britain’s stability, regulatory flexibility, and global expertise.

She revealed her government’s plan to support major projects that unleash growth, starting with the expansion of Heathrow Airport and extending to infrastructure spending exceeding £725 billion ($958.7 billion) over the next decade.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat from Riyadh, Reeves said her participation in the Future Investment Initiative (FII) Conference stems from a key goal: deepening mutual investment and trade. She confirmed that this visit, the first by a UK Chancellor to the Gulf in six years, reflects London’s seriousness in strengthening regional relations.

“This visit marks the first time a UK Chancellor has travelled to the Gulf in six years, which reflects just how seriously this government takes our relationship with Saudi Arabia and the wider region,” Reeves said.

“I’m here with one of the largest UK business delegations to the Gulf in recent years, and our participation is driven by our number one priority: growth.”

“At a time of global uncertainty, the UK offers stability, regulatory agility and world-class expertise – qualities that make us an ideal partner for Saudi Arabia's ambitious Vision 2030 transformation,” she added.

Reeves emphasized the economic complementarity between the two nations, noting that her delegation includes UK business leaders in key sectors such as financial services, life sciences, AI, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing.

She pointed out that Britain’s expertise in these fields uniquely positions London to support Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification, while Gulf investment helps drive growth and create jobs across the UK. According to her, joint trade and investment deals exceeded £10 billion over the past 18 months alone, creating more than 4,100 jobs in the United Kingdom.

Reeves and her accompanying delegation meet with Saudi Minister of Commerce Majid Al-Qasabi at the National Competitiveness Center in Riyadh (Ministry)

Deepening Mutual Investment and Trade

The Chancellor said: “My discussions are focused on deepening the two-way investment and trade that benefits families and businesses in both our countries. The £6.4 billion ($8.4 billion) package we've announced this week demonstrates the tangible results of this approach.”

According to Reeves, the package includes £5 billion in Saudi-backed exports supporting British manufacturing, alongside major investments by Barclays, HSBC and others, strengthening their presence in Saudi Arabia.

Key Priorities

Reeves said that one of her top priorities is accelerating progress on a UK–GCC Free Trade Agreement, noting that such a deal could boost bilateral trade by 16 percent and represents the kind of forward-looking partnership that creates prosperity for both sides.

“My vision is straightforward: I want Britain and Saudi Arabia to be partners of choice for each other. We regulate for growth, not just risk. We're backing key infrastructure projects like Heathrow expansion – where the Saudi Public Investment Fund holds a 15 percent stake,” she said.

She added: “We’re creating opportunities for co-investment, particularly through our National Wealth Fund and pension reforms that will unlock tens of billions for infrastructure and innovation.”

“My message at the FII this week was clear – I'm championing the UK as a stable investment destination,” she stressed, referring to Britain’s “ironclad commitment to fiscal rules and our modern Industrial Strategy focused on the sectors of the future.”

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saudi–British Cooperation

On the most prominent areas and nature of cooperation between Riyadh and London, Reeves said: “Our partnership – built on mutual respect and shared ambition – spans multiple high-value sectors and continues to deepen.”

“Over the past 18 months alone, we've secured over £10 billion in two-way trade and investment, creating more than 4,100 UK jobs and many others in Saudi Arabia. Over 1,600 UK companies also now have a presence in the Kingdom – this is a partnership that works to the benefit of families and businesses on both sides,” she added.

“In financial services, London remains a world-leading international financial centre. We’ve launched a new concierge service – the Office for Investment: Financial Services – to help international firms establish and expand in the UK, while banking giants like Barclays and HSBC are expanding their operations in Riyadh,” Reeves explained.

She highlighted that Riyadh Air’s first-ever flight landed in London this past weekend, powered by UK-manufactured wings and Rolls-Royce engines – showing how British engineering is integral to Gulf aviation ambitions.

According to Reeves, UK firms like Quantexa are launching new AI services in the region, while Saudi cybersecurity firm Cipher is investing $50 million to open its European headquarters in London, demonstrating a partnership at the forefront of technology and innovation.

She added: “We are also collaborating closely in areas like sustainable infrastructure, clean energy, education and the life sciences. But I feel we can and must go further – a UK–GCC Free Trade Agreement would unlock huge mutual benefits, including boosting bilateral trade by 16 percent.”

Reeves and the UK business delegation at the British Residence in Riyadh (Ministry)

A British Plan to Contain Financial Challenges

On her government’s plan to address the financial challenges facing the United Kingdom, Reeves said: “After years of decline – from austerity to Brexit to the mini-budget – we inherited significant challenges. But we've moved decisively to address them whilst investing in our future.”

“We have an ironclad commitment to robust fiscal rules. This provides the stability and certainty that investors need. The IMF now projects that, after the US, the UK will be the fastest-growing G7 economy. This didn't happen by accident – it's the result of tough choices and disciplined economic management,” she added.

Reeves emphasized that “growth is our number one priority, because it's how we overcome challenges and put more money in working people's pockets. Our modern Industrial Strategy focuses on key sectors of the future – AI, life sciences, financial services, clean energy – where Britain has genuine competitive advantages, many of which are shared by our partners in the Gulf.”

She continued: “We're catalysing private investment through our National Wealth Fund, which is driving over £70 billion in investment, and pension reforms unlocking up to £50 billion for infrastructure and innovation. This creates opportunities for co-investment with partners like Gulf sovereign wealth funds.”

Reeves confirmed that the United Kingdom offers strength in uncertain times by combining stability with ambition. She referred to her government’s plan to support major projects that unleash growth, from Heathrow Airport expansion to infrastructure spending exceeding £725 billion over the next decade.

“We're open for business, but we're being strategic about building partnerships that create good jobs, boost business and bring investment into communities across the UK – from the North East to the Oxford–Cambridge corridor. That's how we build an economy that works for, and rewards, working people in Britain,” she said.

The minister concluded by stressing that “turning inwards is the wrong response to global challenges.” She affirmed that Britain remains open for business and is taking a strategic approach to building partnerships that create jobs and benefit working people across the United Kingdom.

“After landmark deals with the US, EU and India, we're accelerating progress with the GCC,” she said.


Yemen’s Interior Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah Members Arrested in Aden

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
TT

Yemen’s Interior Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah Members Arrested in Aden

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan said that security forces have arrested members of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as well as Syrians and Iranians involved in drug trafficking and supporting the Houthi militias.

The detainees are connected to drug smuggling networks that moved to Yemen after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, he told Asharq Al-Awsat in an interview.

The minister stated that security forces arrested two individuals at Aden International Airport. One is affiliated with Hezbollah and the other is a Syrian national.

The arrests took place after the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport was bombed by Israel, disrupting flights and prompting the two to try to enter through Aden Airport as tourists. He added that “the suspects remain in custody in Aden.”

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, the minister also said that a Yemeni court has recently sentenced six Iranians to death for smuggling tons of narcotics, after convicting them of taking part in large-scale smuggling operations linked to regional networks that fund the Houthis.

Haydan accused Iran of sending military experts and transferring drug factories and drone production facilities to Yemen after the collapse of some of its traditional proxies in the region.

The minister believes that the Houthi group has reached its “weakest point,” saying that the latest Israeli strikes that targeted militia leaders have created divisions within the movement’s ranks.

Haydan hailed the security partnership between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, saying it has made great achievements in arresting terrorists and criminals.

He described the partnership as a “great example of productive security cooperation.”

The minister said the security cooperation between the two sides has “yielded significant successes on the ground,” most notably the joint security operation in Al-Mahra Governorate, which “resulted in the arrest of a cell affiliated with ISIS and several of its most dangerous members, thanks to direct coordination with Saudi security agencies through special units.”

The minister said that “the exchange of intelligence information between the Yemeni Interior Ministry and the relevant security authorities in the Kingdom has also been a decisive factor in the recent successes in combating drug smuggling.”

“Security forces have managed to thwart several operations and seize large quantities of illegal substances,” he told his interviewer.

He also stressed that Saudi support is not limited to field operations, but also includes training and capacity building of security personnel.

One of the most prominent forms of this support, he said, was the training programs implemented last year to qualify personnel working at land, air, and sea border crossings.

Haydan also described security ties between Yemen and the US as “excellent,” saying it is witnessing a “gradual progress toward restoring the level of partnership that existed before the Houthi coup in 2014.”

He noted that cooperation between the two sides “is gradually returning to its normal course after years of interruption.”

“We have already begun receiving training opportunities for counterterrorism personnel in a number of friendly countries under US sponsorship,” he said, pointing out that his country is “working to develop this cooperation to include equipping the Interior Ministry with advanced specialized devices for counterterrorism efforts.”