Hood to Asharq Al-Awsat: Biden Administration Did Not Ignore the Arab Region

He emphasized that the Libyans decide whether to elect Haftar and Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi is still pursued by sanctions and warned against normalization with Assad.

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. (US State Department)
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. (US State Department)
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Hood to Asharq Al-Awsat: Biden Administration Did Not Ignore the Arab Region

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. (US State Department)
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood. (US State Department)

Many observers of the US foreign policies have always doubted the desire of the Biden administration to engage directly and effectively in the Middle East, or what is called in the US State Department as the "Near East," which extends from Afghanistan in the east to the Maghreb in the west.

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood denied it, saying their commitment was "longstanding and deep."

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Hood affirmed the US position on many issues in the region, which is based primarily on the interests of his country, and the support of partners and allies in promoting reforms, fighting corruption, and supporting human rights, which is the great framework of this administration in its dealings with countries in the region.

On the Syrian issue, Hood stressed the continuation of the Caesar Act and the deployment of US forces alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS, while warning countries against normalizing relations with the Assad regime. As for Lebanon, the US official called on the Lebanese politicians to set aside political differences and respond to the people’s needs. On Iraq, he stressed its important role in the region, supporting the integrity of the upcoming elections, and stopping arms in the hands of militias.

Finally, on Libya, he said that the choice of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar to be elected for the country’s president is up to the Libyans people to decide. He noted that Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi is being pursued by international sanctions and called on all foreign forces and mercenaries to leave the country.

Here is the text of the interview:

You have visited the Middle East region multiple times; tell us what is the Biden administration’s policy towards the region?
President Biden is reinvigorating American diplomacy by rebuilding alliances with our partners to advance US interests around the world.

It is in all our interest to advance policies that end conflict, fight corruption, promote human rights, and create jobs while preserving our climate for future generations. The United States is collaborating with our friends in the Middle East to address all of these challenges.

People say that Middle East is no longer important to the United States. Do you agree or not? Why?
The world over, we are committed to finding diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts, rebuilding alliances and relationships with our closest partners, prioritizing human rights and democratic values, and taking steps to address the challenge of climate change. All of these issues are foundational to our relationships in the Middle East and North Africa.

Our commitment to the region is longstanding and deep. Our security commitments are clear and powerful. We have free trade agreements with Morocco, Jordan, Israel, Bahrain, and Oman, making people in those countries and in the United States more prosperous. We have billions of dollars in trade and investment with other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. We see this strong relationship represented by more than 70,000 students from the region - and nearly 1.5 million total over the years - studying at American universities and institutions, training to be doctors, tech startup founders, and scientists who bring prosperity, innovation, and help to the lives of people in the region.

We also can’t forget the benefits unlocked by the normalization agreements between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, nor Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan before them. While these agreements do not mean the problems in the region are a thing of the past, they do open important avenues for cooperation. I want to underline that the United States continues to believe Israelis and Palestinians alike deserve equal measures of freedom, security, prosperity, and dignity.

Syria

Syria has been at war for 10 years, and no solution is going to happen soon. How did you see it on your recent trip? How many times have you visited Syria?
The Syrian people have experienced unimaginable suffering at the hands of the Bashar Assad regime. Because of his brutal rule and corruption, we have witnessed a humanitarian disaster.

We believe that stability in Syria can only be achieved through a political process that addresses the underlying factors that produced the conflict and crises we see today. If there is to be a sustainable end to the conflict in Syria, the Assad regime must change its behavior.

This process must represent the will of all Syrians. We are committed to working with allies, partners, and the UN to ensure that a durable political solution remains within reach.

This is one of the reasons Secretary of State Antony Blinken co-hosted the June 28 Syria Ministerial with Italian Foreign Minister De Maio on the margins of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition Ministerial, and why we continue to provide support for Syrians to effectively engage in the UN-facilitated political process and other diplomatic efforts in support of UNSCR 2254.

I visited northeast Syria in May to affirm these points and other elements of our Syria policy with the Defeat ISIS Coalition’s local partners. We remain committed to our presence in the northeast in the campaign to defeat ISIS, including via stabilization assistance for liberated areas.

Some people in Congress have expressed their opinions about Syria and asked the Biden administration to lift the Caesar sanctions against the Assad regime because of the great consequences on the economic situation. How does the State Department deal with this kind of thought in Congress?

The Administration believes the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, as well as other US sanctions authorities, are important tools to promote accountability for the Assad regime, including for its atrocities, some of which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. We will continue to exercise these tools.

These authorities have significant carve-outs for humanitarian aid. Our Syria-related sanctions do not target humanitarian-related trade, assistance, or activities. Sanctions seek to limit the ability of Assad and others in the Syrian government to profit from the conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, including by forcibly taking the property of Syrians. We will continue to use a variety of tools aimed at providing some measure of accountability for human rights abuses and violations against Syrians, and will coordinate with our allies to push for meaningful progress on our shared political objectives.

There are no plans to lift any current sanctions.

Some Arab countries announced their intention to normalize ties with the Assad regime again. Where does the US stand on that issue? Do you support it? Have you asked your allies not to do so?
The United States has no plans to upgrade our diplomatic relations with the Assad regime and would not consider doing so until we see a significant change of behavior and movement towards a political solution.

We have seen and taken note of these reports of normalization. We have urged and continue to stress to countries in the region to consider carefully the atrocities visited by the Assad regime on the Syrian people over the last decade, as well as the regime’s continuing efforts to deny much of the country access to humanitarian aid and security, when they consider normalizing. Are they doing it to benefit the Syrian people? Are they doing it to benefit their population? We don’t see either.

How many US troops are still in Syria? What is your plan for them?
While I would refer you to the Department of Defense on military operations questions, I would note that ISIS in Syria remains a serious threat. The group benefits from instability, demonstrates intent to cause attacks abroad, and continues to inspire terrorist attacks around the world.

The Biden Administration remains committed to working with our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces, to maintain pressure on ISIS remnants in Syria and ensure ISIS’ lasting defeat; this effort includes support for a continued US military presence and enabling stability across the northeast, including through assistance programs aimed at bolstering the resilience of local communities.

Lebanon

The Lebanese people have been suffering from corrupt politicians and facing a lack of security, a failed economy, and more disasters. What is the US policy towards Lebanon?
We call for Lebanon’s leaders to show sufficient flexibility to form a government that is willing and capable of true and fundamental reform so that the Lebanese people can realize their full potential.

They deserve a government that will urgently implement the necessary reforms to rescue the country’s deteriorating economy.

The economy is in crisis because of decades of corruption and mismanagement. Lebanon’s political leaders need to put aside their partisan brinkmanship, change course, and work for the common good and interests of their people.

We and the international community have been clear that concrete actions remain crucial to unlocking longer-term structural support to Lebanon.

We just had the first anniversary of the deadly blast that struck the Beirut port. We haven’t reached a conclusion yet, even though the FBI has supported the Lebanese in their investigation. Why?
I would refer you to the FBI for updates on their role in the investigation. I would stress that the United States stands with the Lebanese people as they recover and rebuild from compounding crises, including the economic crisis, COVID-19 pandemic, and the horrific explosion at the Port of Beirut.

On August 4, the President announced that the United States is providing nearly $100 million in additional humanitarian assistance for Lebanon. That is on top of almost $560 million in humanitarian aid over the last two years. The United States remains the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance in Lebanon and globally.

This humanitarian assistance will benefit vulnerable populations, including Syrian refugees, and the communities hosting them. It provides access to education and healthcare services, food assistance, support for protection services and rehabilitation of water and sanitation infrastructure, among other assistance.

International assistance should support the Lebanese people directly and be transparent so that everyone knows their assistance is reaching the most vulnerable.

How can the administration support the Lebanese to restore peace negotiations with Israel and discuss the border issues?
The maritime boundary is a decision for both Israel and Lebanon to make. The United States stands ready to facilitate negotiations on the maritime boundary between Lebanon and Israel on the previous basis upon which we initiated these discussions.

Iraq

Some Iraqi people believe that the Biden Administration didn’t get along with the Iraqi government nor has a clear agenda on deterring Iran’s malign activities. How do you respond to that?
The Biden Administration is a partner to the Iraqi government and we value our relationship. President Biden met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on July 26 to further strengthen our relationship. We held a session of the Strategic Dialogue just prior to the Prime Minister’s visit. Before that, we sent a high-level delegation to Iraq, which included US State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Dana Stroul, and myself.

It’s important to note that our relationship goes beyond just high-level visits and security cooperation. We partner with Iraq on the full range of bilateral issues as exemplified in the Strategic Framework Agreement, everything from encouraging US private sector investment to helping grow and expand the Iraqi economy to assisting in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and working together to find ways to help combat climate change and mitigate the negative effects of a warming planet.

As we have said many times, we see Iraq as a close partner with a strong role to play in the region, and we look forward to continuing to work towards our shared goal of an Iraq that is secure, stable, and prosperous.

What can the Administration do to reduce the tension in Iraq and support the democratic process in the coming election?
We support a stable, prosperous, democratic and unified Iraq, and our Strategic Framework Agreement remains the foundation for our bilateral relationship. We will continue to stand with those who seek a peaceful and prosperous future for Iraq. We support the right of the Iraqi people to express their opinions and protest peacefully without fear of violence or reprisal.

As for the elections, the United States does not support any individual candidate or party. We support the electoral process and hope to see free and fair elections in a secure environment so that the Iraqi people can express their will in a democratic system. As a committed partner, support for Iraqi elections is a top priority for us.

We were pleased that the UN Security Council unanimously approved the mandate renewal of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on May 27 and included provisions that responded to the Iraqi government’s request for election monitoring. The United States contributed $5.2 million fund UNAMI’s expanded election observation mandate, which has a total budget of $15.8 million.

We hope these measures, which include a robust and visible UN presence with broad geographic coverage, as well as coordinating support to third-party observers, will help to deter fraud, increase turnout, and rebuild Iraqi trust in their democracy.

When do you think US troops will leave Iraq?
The US troops currently in Iraq are part of the Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The role of those troops is limited to advising, assisting, and enabling the Iraqi Security Forces to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. I would urge your readers to question the motivations of any outlet that describes our presence otherwise.

The progress of our Iraqi partners in the growth of capabilities will allow for the full transition later this year of US and Coalition forces to a mission focused on training, enabling, and advisory tasks.

What concerns you the most in Iraq?
The single biggest obstacle to Iraq’s prosperity is the Iran-aligned armed groups and the people who undermine Iraqi institutions and the rule of law.

Libya

Gaddafi’s son has announced his desire to run in the coming election. What is the US position on that? Do you support that or not? How will you respond?
National elections on December 24 are critical to democratic progress and Libyan unity by allowing people throughout the country to have a voice in shaping Libya’s future. We believe the political process must be Libyan-owned, Libyan-led, and free from foreign interference or influence.

The United States does not have a position on prospective candidates. However, we would note that Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi is designated under UN and US sanctions, and remains subject to an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity for the commission of murder and persecution of civilians.

The US has always expressed its concerns about the Russian-affiliated forces in Libya but did not shed light on Turkish-affiliated forces. Is that something you discussed with Turkey and other NATO members? I remember that you have highlighted it in your recent teleconference.
We are in discussions with European and regional allies, the interim Libyan government, the UN, and others on how progress can be made towards a sequenced and balanced withdrawal of all foreign forces and fighters. Issues surrounding military de-escalation were highlighted at the Second Berlin Conference, and while still unresolved, useful bilateral discussions were held on how to begin to operationalize the departure of foreign fighters.

Russia’s destabilizing involvement in the Libyan conflict remains of particular concern for the United States.

The October 23, 2020 Libyan ceasefire agreement called for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries. This includes the Russian mercenary and MOD-affiliated forces, Turkish forces, and all foreign military forces, mercenaries, proxies, and foreign fighters including those from Syria, Chad, and Sudan, and the end of any foreign military intervention.

All actors involved in the conflict should respect the nationwide ceasefire agreement and immediately suspend all military operations, halt the transfer of foreign military equipment and fighters to Libya, begin removing their personnel, and allow local authorities to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.

What is the US vision to support Libyans to end the war and reunite Libya beyond the Berlin and Geneva outcomes?
The US goal is a sovereign, stable, unified, and secure Libya with no foreign interference, and a democratically elected government that supports human rights and development, and that is capable of combating terrorism within its borders.

We are increasing our diplomatic focus on supporting progress in Libya, including through the work of US Special Envoy Richard Norland.

As the Second Berlin Conference and July 15 ministerial-level UN Security Council meeting on Libya made clear, the international community expects national elections to take place on December 24, as agreed to in the roadmap adopted by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF).

Libya’s leaders must make key preparations to ensure successful nationwide elections in December, including determining a constitutional basis and the election law that will govern them. They must make the necessary compromises to meet the Libyan people’s expectation of free and fair elections, an essential step towards a stable, unified, and democratic Libya.

We will continue to promote international efforts to support these objectives and remain engaged with all stakeholders and the Government of National Unity as it prepares for the elections and works to implement the ceasefire agreement.

Will the Biden Administration support Gen. Haftar if he runs for the coming election? Or will you be open to dealing with him?
If Khalifa Haftar chooses to genuinely engage in the political process, Libyans themselves will determine whether there is a role for him to play in the country’s future.

The current Libya government is seeking to return some money that has been frozen in the US and the west since the revolution happened. Any thought on that matter?
The United States supports the UN Security Council’s intention to ensure that assets frozen under UN Security Council resolution 1970 (adopted in 2011) will be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people. On July 15, the Security Council reaffirmed its intention to ensure that such assets shall be made available “at a later stage” for the benefit of the Libyan people.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

“The army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian,” he says. “It wanted to restore control over security, nothing more.”

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. Security presentations would include Crown Prince Hassan, senior advisers, army commanders, the public security chief, the Royal Court chief, and the prime minister.

“Sometimes,” Obeidat says, “it was necessary to elaborate orally before the king on certain matters so they would not circulate more widely.”

Obeidat says the late King Hussein maintained a direct relationship with the General Intelligence Department, meeting regularly with senior officers and listening not only to intelligence briefings but also to their personal assessments.

When security briefings were presented before the king, Crown Prince Hassan would attend, along with royal advisers, senior army commanders, the public security chief, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister.

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. He met with the king regularly.

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.


Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
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Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)

Riyadh’s hosting of the Microsoft AI Tour this week delivered a headline with concrete weight: customers will be able to run cloud workloads from a local Azure data center region starting in the fourth quarter of 2026.

The announcement was more than a technical update. It marked a shift in posture. Saudi Arabia is no longer testing artificial intelligence at the margins. It is moving decisively into execution, where infrastructure, governance, skills development, and enterprise adoption align in a single direction.

For Turki Badhris, president of Microsoft Saudi Arabia, the timing reflects years of groundwork rather than a sudden push.

“Confirming that customers will be able to run cloud workloads from the Azure data center region in the fourth quarter of 2026 gives organizations clarity and confidence as they plan their digital and AI journeys,” Badhris told Asharq Al-Awsat on the sidelines of the event.

“Clarity and confidence” may sound procedural, but they are strategic variables. Government entities and large corporations do not scale AI based solely on pilot projects.

They move when they are assured that local infrastructure is available, regulatory requirements are aligned, and long-term operational continuity is secured. The announcement of the new Azure region signals that the infrastructure layer is no longer a plan, but a scheduled commitment nearing implementation.

From pilots to production

Saudi Arabia’s AI story has unfolded in phases. The first focused on expanding digital infrastructure, developing regulatory frameworks, and strengthening cloud readiness. That phase built capacity. The current phase centers on activation and use.

Badhris said the conversation has already shifted. “We are working closely across the Kingdom with government entities, enterprises, and partners to support readiness, from data modernization and governance to skills development so that customers can move from experimentation to production with confidence.”

The distinction is fundamental. Pilots test potential. Production environments reshape workflows.

Companies such as Qiddiya Investment Company and ACWA Power illustrate that transition. Rather than treating AI as isolated pilot initiatives, these organizations are embedding it into daily operations.

ACWA Power is using Azure AI services and the Intelligent Data Platform to optimize energy and water operations globally, with a strong focus on sustainability and resource efficiency through predictive maintenance and AI-driven optimization.

Qiddiya has expanded its use of Microsoft 365 Copilot to enable employees to summarize communications, analyze data, and interact with dashboards across hundreds of assets and contractors.

AI is no longer operating at the margins of the enterprise. It is becoming part of the operating core, a sign of institutional maturity. The technology is shifting from showcase tool to productivity engine.

Infrastructure as strategic signal

The Azure data center region in eastern Saudi Arabia offers advantages that go beyond lower latency. It strengthens data residency, supports compliance requirements, and reinforces digital sovereignty frameworks.

In highly regulated sectors such as finance, health care, energy, and government services, alignment with regulatory requirements is not optional; it is essential.

Badhris described the milestone as part of a long-term commitment. “This achievement represents an important milestone in our long-term commitment to enable real and scalable impact for the public and private sectors in the Kingdom,” he said.

The emphasis on scalable impact reflects a more profound understanding: infrastructure does not create value on its own, but enables the conditions for value creation. Saudi Arabia is treating AI as core economic infrastructure, comparable to energy or transport networks, and is using it to form the foundation for productivity gains.

Governance as accelerator

Globally, AI regulation is often seen as a constraint. In the Saudi case, governance appears embedded in the acceleration strategy. Adoption in sensitive sectors requires clear trust frameworks. Compliance cannot be an afterthought; it must be built into design.

Aligning cloud services with national digital sovereignty requirements reduces friction at scale. When organizations trust that compliance is integrated into the platform itself, expansion decisions move faster. In that sense, governance becomes an enabler.

The invisible constraint

While generative AI dominates headlines, the larger institutional challenge often lies in data architecture. Fragmented systems, organizational silos, and the absence of unified governance can hinder scaling.

Saudi Arabia's strategy focuses on data modernization as a foundation. A structured and integrated data environment is a prerequisite for effective AI use. Without it, AI remains superficial.

Another global challenge is the skills gap. Saudi Arabia has committed to training three million people by 2030. The focus extends beyond awareness to practical application. Transformation cannot succeed without human capital capable of integrating AI into workflows.

Badhris underscored that skills development is part of a broader readiness ecosystem. Competitiveness in the AI era, he said, is measured not only by model capability but by the workforce’s ability to deploy it.

Sector transformation as economic strategy

The Riyadh AI Tour highlighted sector use cases in energy, giga projects, and government services. These are not peripheral applications but pillars of Vision 2030. AI’s role in optimizing energy management supports sustainability. In major projects, it enhances execution efficiency. In government services, it improves the citizen experience.

AI here is not a standalone industry but a horizontal productivity driver.

Positioning in the global landscape

Global AI leadership is typically measured across four pillars: compute capacity, governance, ecosystem integration, and skills readiness. Saudi Arabia is moving to align these elements simultaneously.

The new Azure region provides computing. Regulatory frameworks strengthen trust. Partnerships support ecosystem integration. Training programs raise skills readiness.

Saudi Arabia is entering a decisive stage in its AI trajectory. Infrastructure is confirmed. Enterprise use cases are expanding. Governance is embedded. Skills are advancing.

Badhris said the announcement gives institutions “clarity and confidence” to plan their journey. That clarity may mark the difference between ambition and execution. In that sense, the Microsoft tour in Riyadh signaled that infrastructure is no longer the objective, but the platform on which transformation is built.