Secret Jordanian Document Proposes ‘Change in Behavior’ of Syrian Regime

The Syrian town of Douma on the outskirts of Damascus as seen on April 17, 2018. (AFP)
The Syrian town of Douma on the outskirts of Damascus as seen on April 17, 2018. (AFP)
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Secret Jordanian Document Proposes ‘Change in Behavior’ of Syrian Regime

The Syrian town of Douma on the outskirts of Damascus as seen on April 17, 2018. (AFP)
The Syrian town of Douma on the outskirts of Damascus as seen on April 17, 2018. (AFP)

A “secret” Jordanian document has proposed a new approach to dealing with the Syrian regime. The document puts in place steps that aim to achieve gradual change in behavior by the regime, leading up to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the war-torn country and recognizing the “legitimate interests” of Russia there.

A senior western official, who read the document, confirmed that it was discussed between Arab leaders, including Jordan’s King Abdullah II, who tackled it with US President Joe Biden in Washington in July and Russian President Vladimir Putin in August.

The official told Asharq Al-Awsat that Jordan was encouraged to pursue its efforts in Syria after it received support from Washington over the extension of gas pipelines through Syria, Egypt and its own territories to Lebanon. It also received pledges that it will not come under sanctions in line with Caesar Act for working with Damascus.

Russia, meanwhile, exerted efforts to reach the recent settlement in the southern Syrian province of Daraa. The deal made sure that civilians would not seek asylum in Jordan and that Iran would not expand its influence in Daraa. In return, Jordan would reopen the border with Syria and officials would exchange visits to hold military, security and economic talks.

Last week, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mikdad held talks with his Egyptian, Jordanian and Tunisian counterparts. In contrast, the Syrian opposition practically held no meetings in New York.

On the Arab scene, consensus remains elusive over Damascus’ return to the Arab League. Its membership was suspended in 2012 in wake of the uprising and the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful protesters. Arab countries are hinging Syria’s return on Damascus taking tangible steps in implementing the political solution in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254 and ensuring the withdrawal of foreign militias from its territories.

Multiple failures
The western official said the secret document stemmed from an assessment that the approach towards ending the Syrian conflict that was adopted in the past ten years has been a failure on all levels. As it stands, some 6.7 Syrians have fled their homes, 6.6 million are displaced and 13 million are in need of humanitarian aid and 80 percent of the population lives in poverty.

As for ISIS, it may have been defeated in March 2019, but the terrorist group may still regroup in various Syrian regions, including the desert (Badia) and southeastern region that borders Jordan.

The official revealed that the secret document also addresses Iran’s presence in Syria. It concluded that Tehran “enjoys growing military and economic influence over the regime and different regions in the country, especially the southwest”, where drugs smuggling – a main source of income for its militias – is rampant, posing a threat to the region and beyond.

New approach
Based on the above, the document proposes a new approach that could refocus attention on the political solution in Syria based on resolution 2254 and addressing the humanitarian crisis and its security impact on the country and the region. The approach would adopt a series of accumulative steps that would focus on “combating terrorism and containing Iran’s growing influence” with the ultimate goal being changing the behavior of the regime. In return, Damascus would be offered incentives that would reflect positively on the Syrian people and allow the return of refugees and the displaced, revealed the official.

These ideas align with those proposed by UN envoy Geir Pedersen, who had suggested a “step-for-step” approach towards Syria that would start with an American-Russian understanding that would identify these steps. These steps would then be backed by the region, Arab world and Europe before a mechanism is put in place for the regime to be implemented.

The western official said garnering Russia’s support for the new approach was fundamental, as was recognizing Moscow’s legitimate interests. There are hopes that cooperation could take place with Russia to determine the common points of interest so that efforts can move ahead towards the political solution and implementing resolution 2254.

Roadmap
Among the obstacles hindering the new approach is the division over how the regime would be involved. Another obstacle is the lack of Arab consensus over Syria’s return to the Arab League and lack of progress in the political solution based on resolution 2254. Another hurdle is the US and Europe’s commitment to pressure tools against Damascus: sanctions, isolation and funding the reconstruction. The Caesar Act is yet another obstacle.

To address some of these hurdles, it was suggested that Jordan test the waters with Damascus before expanding contacts with the regime. Experts have therefore, sought to draft an “executive roadmap” over how to achieve the “step-for-step” approach that would cover the abovementioned files and the necessary stance from Damascus over “changing the behavior of the regime”, the peace process, resolution 2254, the Constitutional Committee, Iran’s role and return of refugees.

A top priority at the moment appears the demand for “all non-Syrian forces to withdraw from the contact lines” and then the eventual pullout from the country of all foreign forces that deployed there after 2011. In return, American forces would withdraw from Syria and dismantle the al-Tanf base on the Syrian-Jordanian-Iraqi border, and channels of coordination would be opened between the Syrian army and security forces with their counterparts from neighboring countries to control border security.

The document did not include a timetable for its execution. It also did not include a stance on the Russian military presence in Syria even though it did recognize Moscow’s interests. It also did not address Damascus’ stance that the deployment of Iranian militias was based on its request, noted the western official.



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.