According to a recent poll by the government-affiliated Russian Public Opinion Research Center, one in two Russians fears a prospect of nuclear war to one degree or another. Anxiety associated with the possibility of a local conflict with Ukraine or the West in Syria escalating into World War III is a permanent feature of Russian society. Therefore, any tension near Russia's vast borders is central to the federal and regional media.
The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is a special topic, not just because for Russia at the turn of the 1990s, this region became the first element in a long chain of armed conflicts on the territory of the disintegrating Soviet Union, but also because several thousand Russian peacekeepers are serving there. Moreover, journalists with Armenian roots are closely integrated into the Russian media space, and their opinions have an impact on the public discourse.
Starting with a scandal with the supply of Iranian goods to Stepanakert, the conflict between Tehran and Baku reached new levels. Tehran deployed troops near the Azerbaijan border while the deputy head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Ali Fadavi directly criticized Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Fadavi compared the reaction of the Azerbaijani leadership to the Iranian military exercises with the behavior of a child. However, this crisis appears to have been relegated to the periphery of media, even though it was hotly debated in the Armenian parliament.
The Khyber Conquerors exercise entailed unprecedented maneuvers of large forces of the IRGC ground forces and army troops that were deployed together to the border only at the height of the Karabakh war in 2020. Yet the details of the exercises have been sparsely covered in the Russian and even in the Armenian press. The exceptions are the channels Telegram, messenger, and tabloids that spread fake news about shootings between the military of Iran and Azerbaijan and the impending war, in which Moscow could be dragged.
From a military point of view, Tehran’s actions appear competent. The status quo in the region has been altered, so the country is obliged to prepare for a conflict that may have only a fractional probability of ever occurring (and practically no chances of occurring in the near-term). The Iranians are transferring military equipment to the Azerbaijani border in such a way that it is impossible to understand whether this is happening within the framework of the exercises, the scale of which was not announced, or it is something more. The Iranians did not disclose the timing and specific objectives of the exercises. This technique allows you to hide the time required to mobilize and concentrate a sufficient number of forces and means for a particular military operation. In 2020, many military specialists in Russia and Armenia were misled by Azerbaijan, since Baku first managed to covertly mobilize and deploy troops, and then by a reconnaissance-in-force to divert attention from the main direction of the attack.
Politically, Iran probably deliberately leaves room for interpretations of its actions. Moreover, the situation in Karabakh is sensitive for Iran due to the ethnic factor. On the one hand, millions of Azerbaijanis live in the northwestern provinces and are very receptive to the position of the leadership in Baku. On the other, there are more than 100,000 Armenians in Iran who sympathize with Armenia and have opportunities for lobbying their position.
Iran is thus outraged by the fact that Azerbaijanis have begun to take duties for the transit of Iranian trucks to Armenia via the Goris-Kapan section of the road. Iranian cargos are inspected under the suspicious that drugs are being imported into Nagorno-Karabakh. The Iranians are also extremely dissatisfied with the increased military cooperation between Ankara and Baku, which Islamabad has joined, and the traditional Azerbaijani-Israeli military-technical cooperation.
In August, a trade mission of Azerbaijan with diplomatic status and an official representation for the development of tourism were opened in Israel, which was officially called a historic milestone in relations between the two countries. In fact, this was only the first step towards liquidating the asymmetry in Israeli-Azerbaijani relations, since Baku did not open a diplomatic mission in Israel, although the Israelis did so back in 1994. Tehran looks at those events with a wary eye. The UAE is normalizing its relations with Israel, and Iran may believe that it could be threatened by the military presence of Israel in Azerbaijan and the Emirates, although in reality the possibility of this is extremely low.
Consequently, the exercises near the Azerbaijan border have so far been Tehran's only reaction to the policy of its northern neighbor. But the status quo after conflagration in Karabakh is unstable. In fact, the South Caucasus region, once a rather isolated geopolitical area, has now become more connected to the MENA. Middle Eastern actors are increasingly influencing what is happening in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Therefore, it will be difficult for Moscow to maintain its role as a moderator in the conflict zone.
The protectorate of Russia over the remaining territories of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is limited by the five-year mandate of the Russian peacekeepers. Moscow does not expect an easy extension of this mission, as Baku and Ankara will insist on the full return of the region under the control of Azerbaijan, which considers the region its economic zone. The incomplete control of Baku in these territories creates the illusion of the possibility of independence among the Armenians of Karabakh, which is periodically expressed in their skirmishes with the Azerbaijani military. Armenia and Russia are bound by allied obligations within the framework of the CSTO, and the Russian peacekeepers are logistically tied to the base in Armenia. Therefore, Moscow looks rather inertly at the disarmament of such Armenian detachments.
In general, therefore, Azerbaijan and Iran have extensive channels for resolving conflicts and are able to reduce the degree of contradictions within the framework of negotiation groups and high-level meetings. However, the current balance of power could push Iran to more actively support the Armenians, which could significantly complicate the task of achieving clear and sustainable post-war status quo in the region.
