Egypt, US Agree on Importance of Political Solutions for Regional Criseshttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3247326/egypt-us-agree-importance-political-solutions-regional-crises
Egypt, US Agree on Importance of Political Solutions for Regional Crises
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi meeting the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Robert Menendez (Egyptian Presidency)
Egypt, US Agree on Importance of Political Solutions for Regional Crises
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi meeting the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Robert Menendez (Egyptian Presidency)
Egypt and the US agreed on the need to strengthen efforts toward reaching political solutions to regional crises to ensure the territorial integrity of states and the resources of their peoples.
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi met on Thursday with the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Robert Menendez, in the presence of Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Director of the General Intelligence Service Abbas Kamel, and US Ambassador to Cairo Jonathan Cohen.
Egyptian presidential spokesman Bassam Radi said that Menendez expressed his profound appreciation for Egypt's role, under Sisi’s leadership, in combating terrorism and extremist ideology, and efforts to achieve comprehensive and sustainable development for its citizens.
Sisi underscored the "robust and longstanding strategic relations between Egypt and the US," reiterating Cairo's commitment to further advancing bilateral relations in light of the regional developments and challenges, primarily the growing threat of terrorism.
Menendez stressed that the US also accords great importance to its relations with Egypt, valuing the "outstanding level of their cooperation."
He noted that Egypt is a cornerstone for security and stability in the Middle East and the Arab world and a vital partner in the region.
He also reiterated the US administration's appreciation for Egyptian efforts to restore calm in the Gaza Strip.
The President affirmed "Egypt's position in support of the various efforts exerted to revitalize the peace process and resume negotiations."
Sisi stressed Egypt's firm position in this regard, namely to reach a "just and comprehensive solution that guarantees the rights of the Palestinian people and the establishment of an independent state, under international references, opening up prospects for peaceful coexistence among all peoples of the region."
Earlier, Sisi received a phone call from British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
The presidential spokesman stated that they discussed the ongoing preparations for the COP 26 UN Climate Change Conference, which will take place in Glasgow, UK.
Both leaders stressed the need to strengthen coordination to ensure that this session would bring about positive results to promote the international community's efforts amid the current global climate crisis.
They also touched on the most prominent forms of bilateral relations and ways to develop them in defense, security, and combating terrorism, including means to revive tourism from Britain to Egypt.
They discussed regional developments, especially the situation in Libya, and agreed to support holding the elections there as scheduled by the end of this year.
They also stressed that it is crucial that all foreign forces and mercenaries leave Libya.
Are Defections Eroding Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces From Within?https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5309318-are-defections-eroding-sudan%E2%80%99s-rapid-support-forces-within
Are Defections Eroding Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces From Within?
Rapid Support Forces fighters (File photo - AP)
A force of dozens of fighters led by General Musa Khamsin has defected from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and joined the army, the latest in a series of defections in recent months involving field commanders, fighters, and political officials from the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis).
The defections are raising questions over what is happening inside the RSF: whether they mark the start of deeper military and political erosion, or remain limited losses that its leadership can contain and replace.
Khamsin said that after reaching army-held territory, his group had come from North Darfur and that Major General al-Nour Ahmed al-Qubba, one of the most prominent RSF defectors, had helped them reach Khartoum.
He also cited disappointment with the Tasis project, saying they had initially believed it would establish a new state but later reached a different conclusion.
Welcoming Khamsin and his fighters, al-Qubba said he expected more commanders and forces to defect. He urged RSF fighters in Darfur and Kordofan to join the army.
Army moves to absorb defectors
The latest defection comes as the army takes further steps to integrate former RSF members.
On Wednesday, it said it had completed the first phase of procedures to regularize the status of those who had joined its ranks. The process included taking an oath and completing security and administrative arrangements ahead of their deployment to army formations and units.
The army did not disclose how many people were involved.
Major General al-Walid Abdel Qader Ajabna, director of the army’s Administration Branch, welcomed the new arrivals and praised what he called their decision to “side with the state” and leave the RSF.
One of the most significant defections came in October 2024, when Abu Aqla Keikel, commander of the Sudan Shield forces and a senior RSF commander responsible for Gezira state in central Sudan, left the RSF and joined the army.
The trend gathered momentum this year.
In April, Major General al-Nour al-Qubba, one of the RSF’s most prominent commanders in Darfur, defected and joined the army. He later said he had been the “third man” in the RSF by military rank and had left with three groups, along with their vehicles and equipment.
More defections follow
Further defections followed.
In May, field commander Ali Rizqallah, known as al-Safna, announced his departure from the RSF after fighting on several fronts. Smaller defections were also reported in Kordofan.
The trend spread to Blue Nile state in southern Sudan, where Dhaifallah Adam, deputy commander of the Fourth Combat Group, defected in June.
He said his decision was driven by what he described as “racism and the absence of a cause or purpose for the war.”
The defections have also reached the RSF’s political circle.
Faris al-Nour, a former adviser to the RSF commander and a member of the Tasis alliance’s Presidential Council, resigned from the council and from his post as governor of Khartoum.
He was followed this month by Hamed Mohammed Khalifa, a Presidential Council member whom the alliance had appointed governor of the Kordofan region.
The resignations add a political dimension to the military defections, as Tasis seeks to present itself as the political framework for the RSF-led project and its allies.
Questions over loyalty
Journalist and political analyst Osman Mirghani said the developments represented a “major shift” that had moved beyond the military sphere into politics.
He said the defections reflected the “collapse of the political project” and declining belief among some RSF members that there was a genuine political cause worth fighting for.
Mirghani said the way the government and army received defectors, particularly al-Qubba, had encouraged others to follow, after seeing that the army was prepared to accept and absorb them.
At the same time, comments by Major General Ahmed Qajja, a senior RSF commander, have raised concerns within the group about the loyalty of some political and military figures.
Qajja recently said there was what he called a “fifth column” inside both the RSF and Tasis.
He said his forces had information raising suspicions about around 50% of political advisers, without providing evidence.
He also said he had information about politicians planning to defect and that a file containing their names was being prepared for submission directly to the RSF leadership. He added that there were similar concerns among military personnel.
Qajja called for tighter controls on the movements of senior leaders, saying: “No senior political figure should move without the commander-in-chief’s permission.”
He denied the existence of any agreement with the army and described joining it as “a betrayal of the cause.”
RSF still able to fight
Despite signs of internal strain, the RSF has not yet lost its ability to operate militarily.
It remains capable of mobilizing fighters, moving forces and launching attacks on several fronts, as seen recently in North Kordofan and Blue Nile, despite conflicting accounts from the two sides over the outcome of those battles.
That continuing capacity makes it difficult to treat the defections alone as evidence of an imminent military collapse.
As long as the RSF can recruit, move units and sustain operations across distant fronts, the impact of the defections remains uncertain.
Retired army Lieutenant Colonel al-Tayeb al-Malkabi cautioned against viewing them as proof that the RSF’s collapse was inevitable.
He described the defections as “an indicator that needs to be monitored.”
Their impact, he said, depended on the importance of the commander who defects, the size of the force leaving with him and the RSF’s ability to replace its losses.
Still, al-Malkabi said the defections were “not a good sign” for the RSF because of their potential effect on cohesion and troop movements, as well as their psychological and political impact.
What does the army gain?
The defections also raise questions about the army’s motives for absorbing former RSF members.
Is it mainly seeking to turn the defections into a political gain and weaken its rival from within, or is integrating them also a way to make up for any shortage in its own fighting forces?
With defections spreading from the battlefield into politics, public concern inside the RSF over the loyalty of some advisers and military personnel, and the army moving to absorb those leaving its rival, the picture remains mixed.
Pressure on RSF cohesion is growing, but the group has so far retained its ability to mobilize, fight and open new fronts.
The key test will be whether the RSF can replace those who leave and preserve cohesion in its command and control.
That will determine whether the current defections remain manageable losses or mark the start of a broader process of internal erosion.
Israel Moves to Gradually Seize Ali al-Taher After Hezbollah Rejects Evacuationhttps://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5309311-israel-moves-gradually-seize-ali-al-taher-after-hezbollah-rejects-evacuation
Israel Moves to Gradually Seize Ali al-Taher After Hezbollah Rejects Evacuation
A Lebanese army checkpoint at the entrance to the town of Zawtar al-Gharbiya, one of the first model areas in southern Lebanon (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Israel is seeking to gradually seize the strategic Ali al-Taher Heights east of Nabatieh in southern Lebanon, while piling diplomatic pressure on the Lebanese state and Hezbollah, which categorically rejects any discussion of evacuating the site, according to sources familiar with the group’s position.
The standoff raises the risk that Israel could turn to a “third option”: resuming fighting in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s refusal to discuss evacuating Ali al-Taher rests on one point: the site lies “north of the Litani River,” sources familiar with the group’s position told Asharq Al-Awsat.
The group “insists on implementing the Nov. 27, 2024 agreement, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which provides for an end to the aggression, an Israeli withdrawal and exclusive state control over weapons south of the Litani,” the sources said.
Hezbollah’s reading of the resolution and the agreement, they added, is that “exclusive control over weapons applies only south of the Litani, while the resistance’s weapons north of the river are a Lebanese matter governed by the national security strategy.”
Freedom of movement
Hezbollah says the “Islamabad agreement” was what brought about the de-escalation and ended the war in Lebanon.
At the same time, Tel Aviv entered direct negotiations with Lebanon in Washington, seeking to move away from the US-Iranian negotiating track and separate the two files.
Sources familiar with Hezbollah’s position say that reality “gave Israel freedom of movement and freedom to carry out attacks,” leaving unoccupied areas near the yellow line virtually deserted, including Ali al-Taher.
Even so, they said, “the arrangement failed to satisfy part of the Israeli public that supports the war and did not restore confidence among residents of northern Israel.”
That, the sources said, led Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to inflate the political and security significance of Ali al-Taher, turning it into a symbol so that any seizure of the hill could be presented as a major achievement.
Yet “the presumed facility on the hill is smaller than other facilities Hezbollah handed over to the Lebanese army south of the Litani,” they said.
US proposal to evacuate the site
Israel has been seeking for about 10 weeks to take control of the strategic high ground, with war kept as the last option.
A source said Washington is calling for the Lebanese army to take over the site, after which Israel would verify the handover.
Hezbollah received the proposal but views it as “a maneuver,” the source said, because all sides already know the group will reject it.
The group also sees the request as an attempt by the Lebanese authorities to show Washington that “Lebanon did what was required of it, but Hezbollah refused.”
The source said the proposal offers “no guarantees” that the site would not ultimately be handed to Israel if the Lebanese army were told to withdraw, or if it pulled back under Israeli fire.
Hezbollah also sees the proposal as an attempt to draw it into arrangements outside the agreement it says it continues to uphold: the November 2024 cessation-of-hostilities deal.
The source said the United States had informed Lebanon that it would allow Israel to take control of the high ground without triggering an escalation.
Military option
With Hezbollah rejecting any proposal to evacuate the site, Israel is left with the military option.
That could begin with “gradual encroachment,” Lebanese sources familiar with Israeli movements around the heights said.
The strategy involves “making the area unlivable, cutting off supplies and preventing fighters from being rotated in and out,” they said, weakening the position until it falls and allowing Israel to enter after only a limited battle.
Israel has been pursuing that approach for about 10 weeks, according to the sources.
They said failure of the strategy before Israel’s elections “could lead to an open battle similar to what prevailed before the ceasefire agreement took effect on June 14.”
Hezbollah is betting on Iranian intervention if Israel broadens the fighting and breaks with the rules of engagement in place since the ceasefire.
That calculation rests on Tehran’s stated position that it would not allow any new territory in southern Lebanon to be carved off by force.
Hezbollah also points to remarks by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, made hours after an Israeli strike targeted Hezbollah commanders deep in southern Lebanon last Saturday.
Ghalibaf said he was in contact with Hezbollah fighters on the front and checked on them daily to assess conditions and readiness for any new support operation.
Risk of renewed war
Such developments carry the risk of renewed fighting between Israel and Iran and a fresh deterioration in regional security.
But the prospect of war resuming in Lebanon “remains on the table,” the source said.
“Ali al-Taher Heights is a flashpoint that could reignite the war,” the source added.
“Israel is seeking a security achievement before the elections. Hezbollah, for its part, will not retreat from its firm position that exclusive state control over weapons applies south of the Litani, not north of it.”
The source also rejected reports of proposals under which Hezbollah would evacuate its Ali al-Taher facility in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied city of Bint Jbeil or the town of Khiam.
Both lie inside the “yellow line” created by Israel, extending about 10 km (6 miles) into Lebanese territory in what it calls a “security zone.”
Hezbollah says no such proposals exist and describes the reports as “baseless.”
It views them as “part of a disinformation effort” aimed at blaming Hezbollah for any failure by Israel to withdraw if fighting resumes.
The group also accuses the Lebanese state of “deceiving itself,” arguing that Israel “does not accept discussion of a new area, and every time it is given something, it demands more without offering any concession in return.”
Sources: Ghalibaf’s Baghdad Visit Fell Short of All Objectiveshttps://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5309299-sources-ghalibaf%E2%80%99s-baghdad-visit-fell-short-all-objectives
Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf at the entrance to parliament (parliament website)
Sources: Ghalibaf’s Baghdad Visit Fell Short of All Objectives
Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf at the entrance to parliament (parliament website)
Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on Thursday backed Iraq’s push to bring weapons under state control amid a Sept. 30 deadline.
Ghalibaf also reaffirmed Tehran’s commitment to security agreements between the two countries.
He arrived in Baghdad on Wednesday with a high-level Iranian delegation for an official visit due to end on Thursday with a trip to Najaf after meetings with Iraqi political and religious leaders, particularly the main factions in the Coordination Framework.
His visit comes as the issue of armed factions moves to the center of Iraq’s political agenda ahead of the deadline set by the country’s main political forces for bringing weapons under state control.
The State Administration Coalition, which includes leading Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish political forces, said after an Aug. 5 meeting that weapons must be confined to state institutions.
It described groups operating outside official structures in ways that threaten national security as “illegitimate.”
Visit falls short of its aims
Informed Iraqi sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ghalibaf’s visit “did not achieve all its objectives,” particularly an effort to “soften Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s position” on enforcing the state monopoly on weapons once the deadline expires at the end of September.
While in Baghdad, Ghalibaf met several Shiite leaders and attended a Coordination Framework meeting on Wednesday evening, which was also attended by al-Zaidi.
The talks come as political forces search for a way out of one of the government’s most sensitive disputes, while armed factions, according to the same sources, have begun putting forward new conditions over how their weapons should be handled.
Al-Zaidi, according to prevailing political assessments, remains committed to the deadline for handing weapons over to the state, despite pressure from political forces and armed factions seeking to revise either the deadline or the terms of implementation.
An informed Iraqi politician said Coordination Framework leaders were no longer as well placed to mediate between al-Zaidi and factions rejecting the weapons plan, citing divisions within the alliance and the growing overlap with other political and judicial disputes.
The source also linked that weakness to the role of Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidan, amid the possibility that anti-corruption measures could widen to include other leaders and figures within the Coordination Framework.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in Baghdad, Iraq, August 19, 2026. Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office/Handout via REUTERS
Al-Zaidi digs in
Political assessments suggest al-Zaidi has told lawmakers and officials in private meetings that he does not intend to retreat from the Sept. 30 deadline.
One scenario under discussion is al-Zaidi’s resignation, an option the sources say some forces implicated in corruption cases may favor in hopes of reshuffling the political landscape.
But al-Zaidi could instead take his case directly to the public, a move that could weaken his political opponents, particularly if he wins the backing of Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist movement, one of the most prominent Shiite blocs.
Other sources familiar with discussions inside the Coordination Framework said some parties were seeking to tie the countdown to the Sept. 30 weapons deadline to the anti-corruption campaign, which has no fixed timetable.
Such a move, they said, could open the door to political bargaining between the two issues.
The Iraqi politician who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat said one scenario would see al-Zaidi score gains in the anti-corruption campaign against political, administrative, and government figures, regardless of their level of responsibility, potentially strengthening his standing with the public.
In return, political forces could push to extend the weapons deadline, either by freezing the process, concealing weapons, or moving them outside Iraq.
The proposal has so far failed to persuade al-Zaidi, the source said, citing what he described as international commitments the prime minister made during his visit to the United States.
Dispute over control of key issues
Behind the scenes, some Coordination Framework parties believe al-Zaidi may have gone too far in his handling of the weapons and corruption files.
From their perspective, allowing one side to control both issues would be difficult because of their political overlap and because rival forces do not want a single actor, even the prime minister, to manage them alone.
Those holding that view argue that al-Zaidi reached the premiership with the backing of the main Shiite forces and therefore cannot, in their view, override or challenge them on issues directly tied to their political and security interests.
In that context, comments by Faleh al-Fayyad, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, carried particular significance.
“The choice of Ali al-Zaidi as prime minister was born in this room,” al-Fayyad said in a television interview, referring to the room where the interview was being conducted.
The PMF is an institution linked to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, a position held by al-Zaidi.
Legal route emerges
Legislation specifically aimed at bringing weapons under state control has emerged as one possible route for the government to navigate the political and security complications surrounding the Sept. 30 deadline.
Saif al-Saadi, an expert on political and legislative affairs, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sept. 30 was “not merely a deadline set by the government.”
Rather, he said, it represented “a referendum on the legitimacy of reclaiming the Iraqi state and its institutions from the encroachment of the parallel state.”
He said the deadline would also test al-Zaidi’s decisions: whether they prove strong and enforceable, or strong in wording but weak in implementation.
Saadi said al-Zaidi’s government maintains, in principle, that the decision to bring weapons under state control “is not discussed in the capitals of other countries.”
But he said armed factions have what he described as ideological ties that cross borders and are ideologically linked to Iran’s supreme leader.
Saadi said al-Zaidi’s government was moving toward sending legislation to parliament specifically aimed at restricting weapons to the state, describing the move as highly pragmatic.
Such legislation, he said, would allow the prime minister to move beyond the Sept. 30 deadline, ease external pressure represented by Iranian influence and reduce domestic pressure from political actors with armed wings before “throwing the ball into parliament’s court.”
Asked whether an armed confrontation could erupt after Sept. 30, Saadi ruled out that scenario, saying he did not believe fighting would break out after the deadline because al-Zaidi had warned of the risk of internal collapse.
Saadi also ruled out applying Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005 to anyone who manufactures, uses, or possesses drones without official authorization on the grounds that such acts constitute terrorist crimes subject to the law’s severe penalties.
He said al-Zaidi’s government had, in his view, failed its first test in the case of Abbas al-Yaqubi, a leader in Harakat al-Nujaba who was arrested and released without investigation on Wednesday.
Instead, Saadi said Iraq was more likely to face the risk of financial collapse as a result of US sanctions, while adding that he could not rule out “strikes on selected targets inside Iraq.”
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