The current and clear state of discrepancy between the Arabs and their neighboring countries did not suddenly emerge. It simply reflected a path that affected almost most of the interactions of the past decade and was expressed by the growing appetite of Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia, to interfere in various ways in the scope of Arab national security as a whole, and the security of certain countries in particular.
We can describe the Iranian intervention, for example, as a rough one. While the Turkish interference was initially soft, it has gradually taken a stricter form, as we saw in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.
Here, it is necessary to point out that there is an enormous amount of intertwining and parallel and overlapping relations between the four active countries in the region, namely: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, and the neighboring countries, including Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Ethiopia.
Because of these intersections, we can observe a direct impact from each neighboring country on the chronic problems in the Arab region. In other words, the last ten years witnessed a reshuffle of the axes of power in the region.
At the present moment, we will find that Iran and Turkey have gained influence and presence in Syria and Iraq, while Tehran’s role has increased in Lebanon and Yemen. Ankara has also been able to express its influence in Libya and Somalia and to a lesser extent in Lebanon. Not to mention the relentless attempts to influence Tunisia.
At the onset of the Arab Quartet boycott crisis, Turkey sought to appear in the position of a partner supporting Doha, and also joined Iran in efforts to influence the Hamas movement.
As for Ethiopia, it threatened the security of two Arab countries, namely: Egypt and Sudan, through the gateway to water security, and continued building the Renaissance Dam, ignoring attempts to reach a final and binding legal agreement. Addis Ababa also sought to lure Ankara and Tehran to support it against Cairo and Khartoum, leading to the subsequent consolidation of Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia and Djibouti.
On the other hand, Israel was almost experiencing strategic reassurance over the past decade, which was evident in its achievement of some gains by expanding the scope of normalization with new Arab countries, including active ones.
Only the Iranian nuclear program, about which Tel Aviv expressed its deep strategic concern, disturbed this Israeli comfort.
Returning to analyzing the nature of Iranian interference in Arab national security, we will find that within Yemen and Lebanon, such involvement poses a threat to Saudi national security and the safety of vital sea lanes. On another level, this interference can be considered a major challenge to Egyptian national security, which is threatened to the west by the direct and indirect Turkish presence in Libya, not to mention Ankara’s support for Ethiopia.
However, the end of 2021 witnessed some developments in the interaction between regional powers. We have followed the signs of Turkish flirtation to resume relations with Egypt, although it has not reached specific results yet. We also monitored an Emirati rapprochement with Turkey and Iran and developments of the new path of normalization with Israel.
Qatar was also able to assume an active role with Afghanistan and Turkey while maintaining normal relations with Iran.
Saudi Arabia, in turn, has restored, through discreet moves, the cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) system, in the face of regional and international obstacles. As for Egyptian diplomacy, it has calmly dealt with national security challenges in the four directions.
What’s Next?
Given the interdependence between Arab countries and their neighborhood, we can consider the year 2022 the foundation for the next decade, through which we can anticipate the future of the region in the coming phase.
Based on the current facts and the consequences of the repositioning of international powers engaged in the region, as well as their involvement in conflicts geographically far from the Arab and Middle Eastern spheres, I expect the appetite of the four neighboring countries to decline, in parallel with an increasing willingness of Arab actors to enter into the new decade with a more pragmatic and coherent policy.
As for the reasons behind an expected decline in the appetite of regional countries for rough interventions, they are mainly due to high hopes in the implementation of an efficient joint Arab strategic action, and the mounting international pressure on neighboring countries “because each of them has a file that disturbs the international community.”
Another reason is that international relations are being reformulated, which means that the current problems will no longer be a priority, as international attention will shift towards more pressing issues, such as climate change and Chinese-Western competition. Energy and water files will also emerge as a major concern of the international community.
There is no doubt that stability in the region has become an urgent matter for active countries, which will push towards achieving development and cooperation for all parties. Thus, the coming year will be the beginning of turmoil and weakness in the neighboring countries, especially: Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia.
Perhaps one of the determinants of the New Year and decade is that zero-sum problems will have no place in the region. The different strategic directions will push Arab and regional actors to search for a way to exploit the intertwining and different trends, to create a new system, based on each country’s knowledge of the red lines that should not be crossed and by excluding military confrontation, whether on Arab or neighboring land, the Red Sea or the eastern Mediterranean.
In conclusion, we can say that the year 2022 will bring warmer approaches, but without expanding the policy of normalization with Israel, with the expectation of some rationalization in Turkey’s policy towards the region, and the exertion of Gulf pressure on Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam. But the turmoil in Sudan and Ethiopia itself may delay attempts to reach a final agreement on the file.
As for the Arab files of Palestine, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, they are likely to linger and not be included in the framework of the final comprehensive solution.
