AFRICOM: Al-Qaeda, ISIS Unity Efforts Threaten Lake Chad Basin

AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend shaking hands with the head of the Libyan unity government, Abdel Hamid Dabaiba, and next to them, Ambassador Richard Norland (US Embassy in Libya)
AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend shaking hands with the head of the Libyan unity government, Abdel Hamid Dabaiba, and next to them, Ambassador Richard Norland (US Embassy in Libya)
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AFRICOM: Al-Qaeda, ISIS Unity Efforts Threaten Lake Chad Basin

AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend shaking hands with the head of the Libyan unity government, Abdel Hamid Dabaiba, and next to them, Ambassador Richard Norland (US Embassy in Libya)
AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend shaking hands with the head of the Libyan unity government, Abdel Hamid Dabaiba, and next to them, Ambassador Richard Norland (US Embassy in Libya)

Last year, the US withdrawal from wars in Somalia and Afghanistan turned attention to other theaters of conflicts around the world to see if they, in turn, would witness similar US regression. Such a scenario poses risks threatening the fall of regimes and the growth of the influence of extremist movements.

The withdrawal of US forces from Somalia in early 2021 prompted an escalation of attacks by Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda’s branch of in the Horn of Africa. The attacks were met by Somali government forces weakened by inner conflict.

In Afghanistan, the picture was clearer and more decisive.

Shortly after the US pulled out in August, the Kabul government fell and was replaced by the Taliban.

Such a scenario can be repeated in other areas from which the Americans decide to withdraw, especially in the African continent, where many countries are witnessing political conflicts and civil wars.

To date, the US remains engaged through its military command in Africa (AFRICOM) as part of Washington’s efforts to counter Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Sahel countries.

Americans have also warned Africans of the “risks” of using mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group, which are now widespread in many African countries, including Mali and Libya.

The US relationship with Sudan, which witnessed remarkable heat during 2020, seems to have turned cold considering the conflict between the military and civil components of the Sudanese government.

In 2021, Tunisia was a focus of US military activity in North Africa.

France has led efforts to confront militants in Mali since 2012, but it has failed in eliminating them despite the support it receives from several countries led by the US.

AFRICOM Spokeswoman told Asharq Al-Awsat that they are aware of reports that Mali may have hired the services of a Russian-backed special military group known as the Wagner Group.

"If we take into account the record of (the Wagner Group), it is clear that any role played by the forces of this group supported by Russia will most likely worsen the delicate and unstable conditions in Mali, and complicate the international response aimed at supporting the transitional government,” she explained.

The US Department of Defense suspended security cooperation and military training for the Malian armed forces following the August 2020 coup.

She noted that they work to encourage the restoration of security and safety for the Malian people and to encourage a successful transition towards legitimate and constitutional governance in Mali.

ISIS and Al-Qaeda have suffered two strong losses in Nigeria during the past year.

Abubakar Shekau, leader of the Boko Haram group, loyal to Al-Qaeda, was killed in May. He blew himself up after his ISIS rivals surrounded him.

However, ISIS did not benefit much from this setback for its opponents as its leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi was also killed later in October.

It is not entirely clear how relations will manifest in the future between these two competing terror organizations and whether the conflict between them will continue. There is a possibility that they will unite their ranks against the Nigerian government.

AFRICOM is aware of the reported death of the two leaders, Shekau and al-Barnawi.

“As troubling as it may be, it is difficult to predict how these two groups will bring their fighters and capabilities together into a more coherent terrorist effort,” warned the command’s spokeswoman.

She explained that a united effort by these two groups could dramatically destabilize the Lake Chad Basin region if there is no substantive and coordinated multinational intervention.

The developing situation in the eastern Sahel region, in addition to the continued expansion of the al-Qaeda affiliate, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, towards the western and central Sahel region, should be a cause for increasing international concern.

According to the spokeswoman, no country alone can solve the problems associated with terrorism.

“We continue to monitor the situation and continue to support our African and international partners who are fighting on the frontlines against violent extremism.”



Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
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Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)

Israel has a world-leading missile interception system but its bank of interceptors is finite. Now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them.

On Thursday, The New York Times reporters spoke to current and former Israeli officials about the strengths and weaknesses of Israeli air defense.

Aside from a potentially game-changing US intervention that shapes the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, two factors will help decide the length of the Israel-Iran war: Israel’s reserve of missile interceptors and Iran’s stock of long-range missiles.

Since Iran started retaliating against Israel’s fire last week, Israel’s world-leading air defense system has intercepted most incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, giving the Israeli Air Force more time to strike Iran without incurring major losses at home.

But now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them. That has raised questions within the Israeli security establishment about whether the country will run low on air defense missiles before Iran uses up its ballistic arsenal, according to eight current and former officials.

Already, Israel’s military has had to conserve its use of interceptors and is giving greater priority to the defense of densely populated areas and strategic infrastructure, according to the officials. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak more freely.

Interceptors are “not grains of rice,” said Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav, who commanded Israel’s air defense system until 2021 and still serves in the military reserve. “The number is finite.”

“If a missile is supposed to hit refineries in Haifa, it’s clear that it’s more important to intercept that missile than one that will hit the Negev desert,” General Kochav said.

Conserving Israel’s interceptors is “a challenge,” he added. “We can make it, but it’s a challenge.”

Asked for comment on the limits of its interceptor arsenal, the Israeli military said in a brief statement that it “is prepared and ready to handle any scenario and is operating defensively and offensively to remove threats to Israeli civilians.”

No Israeli official would divulge the number of interceptors left at Israel’s disposal; the revelation of such a closely guarded secret could give Iran a military advantage.

The answer will affect Israel’s ability to sustain a long-term, attritional war. The nature of the war will partly be decided by whether Trump decides to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear enrichment site at Fordo, in northern Iran, or whether Iran decides to give up its enrichment program to prevent such an intervention.

But the war’s endgame will also be shaped by how long both sides can sustain the damage to their economies, as well as the damage to national morale caused by a growing civilian death toll.

Israel relies on at least seven kinds of air defense. Most of them involve automated systems that use radar to detect incoming missiles and then provide officers with suggestions of how to intercept them.

Military officials have seconds to react to some short-range fire, but minutes to judge the response to long-range attacks. At times, the automated systems do not offer recommendations, leaving officers to make decisions on their own, General Kochav said.

The Arrow system intercepts long-range missiles at higher altitudes; the David’s Sling system intercepts them at lower altitudes; while the Iron Dome takes out shorter-range rockets, usually fired from Gaza, or the fragments of missiles already intercepted by other defense systems.

The United States has supplied at least two more defense systems, some of them fired from ships in the Mediterranean, and Israel is also trying out a new and relatively untested laser beam. Finally, fighter jets are deployed to shoot down slow-moving drones.

Some Israelis feel it is time to wrap up the war before Israel’s defenses are tested too severely.

At least 24 civilians have been killed by Iran’s strikes, and more than 800 have been injured. Some key infrastructure, including oil refineries in northern Israel, has been hit, along with civilian homes. A hospital in southern Israel was struck on Thursday morning.

Already high by Israeli standards, the death toll could rise sharply if the Israeli military is forced to limit its general use of interceptors in order to guarantee the long-term protection of a few strategic sites like the Dimona nuclear reactor in southern Israel or the military headquarters in Tel Aviv.

“Now that Israel has succeeded in striking most of its nuclear targets in Iran, Israel has a window of two or three days to declare the victory and end the war,” said Zohar Palti, a former senior officer in the Mossad, Israel’s spy agency.

“When planning how to defend Israel in future wars, no one envisaged a scenario in which we would be fighting on so many fronts and defending against so many rounds of ballistic missiles,” said Palti, who was for years involved in Israel’s defensive planning.

Others are confident that Israel will be able to solve the problem by destroying most of Iran’s missile launchers, preventing the Iranian military from using the stocks that it still has.

Iran has both fixed and mobile launchers, scattered across its territory, according to two Israeli officials. Some of its missiles are stored underground, where they are harder to destroy, while others are in aboveground caches, the officials said.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed more than a third of the launchers. Officials and experts say that has already limited the number of missiles that Iran can fire in a single attack.

US officials said Israel’s strikes against the launchers have decimated Iran’s ability to fire its missiles and hurt its ability to create large-scale barrages.

“The real issue is the number of launchers, more than the number of missiles,” said Asaf Cohen, a former Israeli commander who led the Iran department in Israel’s military intelligence directorate.

“The more of them that are hit, the harder it will be for them to launch barrages,” Cohen added. “If they realize they have a problem with launch capacity, they’ll shift to harassment: one or two missiles every so often, aimed at two different areas simultaneously.”

The New York Times