Men fill a private generator, which provide electricity with diesel oil in Beirut, Lebanon January 21, 2022. (Reuters)
Lebanon is suffering an economic meltdown that began in 2019 when the financial system collapsed under colossal state debts and the unsustainable way they were funded, while politicians have yet to come up with a rescue plan.
Just how bad is the situation?
- Gross domestic product has plunged to an estimated $20.5 billion in 2021 from about $55 billion in 2018, the kind of contraction usually associated with wars, the World Bank says, ranking the collapse as one of the worst globally since the mid-19th century.
- The Lebanese pound has lost more than 90% of its value, driving up the cost of almost everything in a country reliant on imports, and demolishing purchasing power. A soldier's monthly wage, once the equivalent of $900, is now worth about $50.
- Poverty rates are sky-rocketing in the population of about 6.5 million, with around 80% of people classed as poor, the UN agency ESCWA says. The situation is worsening. In September, more than half of families had at least one child who skipped a meal, UNICEF has said, compared with just over a third in April.
- The financial system has suffered eye-watering losses, including about $44 billion at the central bank related to failed efforts to prop up the currency, according to 2020 government figures, a level that is roughly twice the size of economic output. Overall losses, including anticipated sovereign debt write-downs, are even bigger.
- Lebanon's banks are paralyzed. Savers have been frozen out of US dollar accounts. Withdrawals in local currency apply exchange rates that erase up to 80% of the value. During an October visit to Beirut, US official Victoria Nuland said the Lebanese people deserved to know where their money had gone.
- Reliant on imported fuel, Lebanon is facing an energy crunch. Even before the crisis, power supplies were in short supply, including in the capital. Now households are lucky to receive more than an hour or so a day. Fuel prices have soared. A ride in a shared taxi, a popular form of transport, cost 2,000 pounds before the crisis but now costs about 30,000 pounds.
- Lebanese are emigrating in the most significant exodus since the 1975-90 civil war. Believing their savings are lost, many Lebanese have no plans to return this time as they start over again.
- Among those leaving are doctors. The World Health Organization has said most hospitals are operating at 50% capacity with around 40% of doctors, mostly specialists, permanently emigrating or working part-time abroad.
- Officials and the media talk of Lebanon becoming a "failed state". Michel Aoun, the president, warned in December that the state was "falling apart". Lebanon's top Sunni cleric said after unrest over fuel shortages in August that the country risked complete collapse unless there was action.
Assad’s ‘Trap’: A Night That Shook Tehran’s Allies in Baghdadhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5217740-assad%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98trap%E2%80%99-night-shook-tehran%E2%80%99s-allies-baghdad
Assad’s ‘Trap’: A Night That Shook Tehran’s Allies in Baghdad
A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)
A senior Iraqi security official urged his driver to pick up speed as they raced toward Damascus airport. He needed to catch a flight back to Baghdad, while alerts kept lighting up his phone.
One message stood out: “The Syrian factions are on their way to the capital.”
It was Saturday evening, December 7, 2024, and the official had just wrapped up a routine mission in northeastern Syria to coordinate border security. But Syria itself was on the edge of a dramatic shift, its old order crumbling and a new one taking shape in the ruins.
At the outskirts of Damascus, the official’s convoy halted, waiting for “extraordinary arrangements” with the emerging authorities. A flurry of sudden, unexpected contacts unfolded between the two sides.
A former Syrian official from the Military Operations Directorate said it was “the first time that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group communicated with an official in the Iraqi government.”
An Iraqi security officer who was present during the arrangements said that “the process went ahead with unexpected ease at the time, and we entered Damascus” alongside members of the group on the morning of December 8, 2024. Then a message arrived like a lightning strike: “Bashar al-Assad has fled.”
Damascus airport was a ghostly stage. Even the officers of the Air Transport Brigade whom the Iraqi official knew had disappeared. No one asked for a ticket or a passport. The diplomatic lane was wide open to the wind. The man boarded a special flight to Baghdad.
As the plane climbed through daylight, the Iraqi security official carried a bag full of questions about the new Syria.
On the same route, but on the ground, Iraqi militias that had been stationed in Syria since 2011 were withdrawing. Convoys moved from the Damascus countryside toward Al-Bukamal near the Iraqi border, making a final one-way journey for hundreds of fighters, leaving behind 15 years of a “Resistance Axis” now collapsing like a mountain of sand.
Exclusive testimonies gathered by Asharq Al-Awsat from Iraqi figures involved in the Syrian file before Assad’s escape reveal how militias withdrew from Syria without coordination or prior arrangements.
The accounts describe what unfolded behind the scenes, including how they viewed the events, and later showed that Tehran, Moscow and Assad had each made separate decisions not to fight in Syria, failing to share essential information with their Iraqi allies until late.
The testimonies also shed light on the reactions of Shiite groups following the collapse of the Assad regime, including calls to strengthen the influence of armed factions in Iraq’s political process and reinforce what became known as “Shiite governance” in Baghdad, in order to “absorb the shock felt by those who had been left behind in Syria.”
Damascus airport after the collapse of the Assad regime. (AFP file)
‘It was not a maneuver... we were deceived’
On November 30, 2024, three days after the launch of Operation Deterrence of Aggression to topple the Syrian regime, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani held a phone call with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
At that time, Syrian opposition factions had seized control of the Aleppo countryside. Sudani told Assad that “Syria’s security is tied to Iraq’s national security.” The following day, the opposition encircled Hama. Sudani did not call Assad again.
In Nineveh, the northern Iraqi province that borders Syria, Shiite militia leaders attempted to send reinforcements to Syria, since “as the Syrian factions advanced, the number of Iran-aligned fighters was far smaller than in previous years.” A militia official in Nineveh said they told their fighters, “You must protect the Shiites and the shrines in Syria,” and many volunteers were eager to join.
Kadhim al-Fartousi, spokesman for Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, which had been active in Syria since 2013, said the group withdrew in late 2023. “Our mission was over,” he said.
Until 2018, Syria was crowded with more than 150,000 fighters from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, according to Iraqi and Syrian security estimates. The Syrian army under the former regime appeared smaller than the foreign forces operating on its territory. By December 2023, something had changed.
The Revolutionary Guard allowed several Shiite groups to leave after consultations with Assad. It was widely said that a “regional deal” had driven this shift.
As part of the partial withdrawal of Iranian-backed forces from Syria in 2023, Assad was attempting to regain Syria’s seat in the Arab League. It required significant time and diplomatic maneuvering to prepare for an almost impossible reintegration with the Arab world, which ultimately did not materialize.
When Operation Deterrence of Aggression began in November 2024, the number of Iranian groups in Syria had fallen to several thousand, but Assad’s return to the Arab fold was not complete.
As opposition factions advanced toward Damascus, the prevailing belief was that Shiite groups were moving to plug a gap that no one had noticed.
On December 2, 2024, dozens of fighters infiltrated Syria at night via an unofficial military road, but United States aircraft struck their convoys near Al-Bukamal. After that, it became clear that those who had been eager to enter Syria were backing off.
The next morning, Syrian opposition forces seized 14 towns in Hama and turned to the battle for Homs. That day, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah said “it is too early to decide on sending military support to Syria.”
A senior member of a Shiite armed group said he asked his superiors in Baghdad about the first days of Operation Deterrence of Aggression. “Do not worry... Syria may fall to the opposition, but Damascus will hold,” they told him, referring to Assad’s grip on the capital.
“A week later,” he added, “we could no longer comprehend what had happened.”
Before the opposition reached Homs, Shiite groups assumed the advance would stop there. A commander said intelligence reports reviewed by officials in Iraq’s National Security Service, the Popular Mobilization Forces leadership and militia commanders indicated that Russia and Iran would halt the opposition’s momentum and that Homs would be the decisive point.
But Russia used its air superiority sparingly. As opposition factions moved from Hama toward Homs on December 6, 2024, aircraft believed to be Russian struck the Al-Rastan bridge linking the two cities with destructive force, but not enough to prevent convoys from crossing.
Later aerial footage showed Sukhoi jets armed with missiles sitting unused at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase as opposition fighters crossed the bridge into Homs, which was fully taken by dawn on December 7.
At this point, many within the so-called Resistance Axis became convinced that the swift advance of the opposition was not a mere maneuver. The militia commander said they realized “the Iranians had given us conflicting signals... maybe they were deceived too.”
Questions about the roles of Tehran and Moscow remained unresolved. Shiite factions had no clear answers in the months following Assad’s escape.
Today, Fartousi, the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada spokesman, believes that “the Russian and Iranian position only shifted after the Assad regime retreated, the forces holding the ground collapsed and the battle turned into a confrontation with the people.”
But sources from factions active in Syria since 2013 spoke of “a decision taken early by Iran not to wage a battle in Syria due to far more complex regional calculations.”
According to these sources, “Iran was not confident of favorable outcomes had it confronted the opposition’s advance, because it realized too late that Moscow was acting independently in Syria.”
In the end, the pillars of the alliance between Moscow, Tehran and Assad appeared to be drifting apart, taking separate battlefield decisions that enabled the opposition’s rapid advance and Assad’s even faster escape. What is certain, the Shiite commander said, is that “the Iraqi groups were not central to the discussions that led to what happened.”
By then, more than ten Iraqi factions had spent over a decade on the Syrian front, during which thousands of fighters were drawn into a sea of blood.
Assad shakes hands with Iraqi PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in Damascus. (File photo)
‘And the wheel turns’
At six in the morning on December 8, 2024, former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdulmahdi posted on X about how tables turn and the “aggressor” is overtaken by events. Shock swept through Shiite political forces in Baghdad. Assad had fled and the regime had fallen.
Two days after the liberation, all factions had left Syrian territory and Assad was in Moscow. On December 12, 2024, Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition and a long-time ally of Assad, declared that “the goal of what happened in Damascus is to stir the street in Baghdad.” Public opinion erupted with questions.
Shiite political circles in Baghdad struggled to absorb the shock. Private discussions intensified around “the future of the Shiites in Iraq,” dominated by deep confusion, according to participants in closed-door meetings held in the weeks following Assad’s escape.
They said Shiite decision-makers found no answers regarding what had happened in Syria or Iran’s role, and many struggled to answer how Iraq and the region would change after Assad.
One participant in a private session held in January 2025 said the crisis in Syria was not about Assad’s escape or the collapse of the Resistance Axis, but for Iraqi Shiites it was about “redefining their role after old alliances and balances had crumbled.”
Secondary effects of this difficult debate emerged within Shiite groups. Many within the resistance environment began promoting the concept of a “Shiite federation” stretching from Iraq’s Samarra to Basra on top of vast oil reserves. The idea faded quickly, like cold ash.
Talk of “Shiite governance” intensified. A militia commander said: “Shiite forces in recent months focused on strengthening the domestic scene and consolidating their presence in political life, which explains their active participation in the elections held on November 11, 2025, and the victory of armed factions in seats in the new parliament.”
It appeared that all those who had fought in Syria won seats in the new legislature. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, secured 28 seats. The Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, won 18. The Rights bloc, linked to Kataib Hezbollah, won six. A list affiliated with Kataib Imam Ali won three. The Services Alliance, led by Shibl al-Zaidi, won nine seats.
These groups are now proposing a transitional project built on new Shiite roles, driven by the growing ambition of leaders such as Khazali to craft an umbrella that shields Shiite groups from fragmentation by expanding their influence in both the legislative and executive branches of the state.
In March 2025, Khazali was asked about the new Syria. He said: “It is the duty and interest of the Iraqi state to engage with it, as long as those governments represent their countries.”
A Shiite leader said the moment Assad fled was not a Syrian event as much as “an earthquake in Shiite consciousness inside Iraq,” pushing everyone to reconsider the alliances that had shaped the region for years.
But beneath this transformation lie lingering questions and doubts about “the future of the Iranian doctrine itself,” now facing major disruption after four decades of uninterrupted influence across the region.
“The answer,” the commander said, “has not yet matured.”
New Political, Military Reality in Lebanon a Year after Assad’s Ouster https://english.aawsat.com/features/5217517-new%C2%A0political-military-reality-lebanon-year-after-assad%E2%80%99s-ouster%C2%A0
New Political, Military Reality in Lebanon a Year after Assad’s Ouster
People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in December 2024 created major political, security and economic changes in Lebanon. Beirut also rid itself of what remained of Damascus’ influence - after Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 2005 following 30 years of military and political hegemony - through Assad’s allies, namely Hezbollah.
With the ouster Assad, Lebanon became free to make its political decisions away from the influence of Damascus and its allies. Lebanon and Syria can establish mutual official relations, secure their shared border and improve the trade exchange between them.
Tehran-Beirut route severed
Head of Lebanon’s Saydet al-Jabal Gathering, former MP Fares Souaid told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Lebanon has changed. The most important thing that happened was that the new Syria severed the Tehran-Beirut route that used to supply Hezbollah with all of its security, military and financial means.”
Now, the party has to resort to smuggling to get what it needs, he added. “That option is not secured by military units working for Iran, forcing Hezbollah to approach the new situation in Lebanon with a lot more pragmatism than before.”
He said the party has been forced to take a “humble” approach to “critical issues.”
“We saw how Hezbollah did not quit the government even though it objected to cabinet decisions, especially the one related to imposing state monopoly over arms,” he explained. The decision effectively calls on Hezbollah to disarm.
The party was unable to take any steps to counter the decision because the “real route that has been feeding it has been cut,” Souaid stressed.
Developments, past and present, have shown that anything negative or positive taking place in Syria will impact Lebanon, he went on to say. “If Syria is well, then Lebanon is well.”
He said Lebanon still believes that Syria under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has a promising future and relations between Beirut and Damascus will also be promising.
The relations are already on the right track with the establishment of joint security and military committees sponsored by Saudi Arabia, he remarked. Efforts have already been exerted to secure the shared border between them ahead of demarcation starting from the Shebaa Farms.
Such coordination between Lebanese and Syrian security and military agencies “never happened under Assad rule. So, this is a new development for both countries,” he revealed.
Treaties with Syria
The neighbors currently appeared focused on reshaping their relations in a way that preserves their mutual interests. Souaid acknowledged, however, that pending complex issues remain.
He underlined the need to annul all political, security and economic treaties that were signed during Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon.
Lebanon has appointed an ambassador to Damascus, while the latter has yet to name an envoy to Beirut, he noted.
He also said that the Syrians are prioritizing resolving the issue of Syrian detainees held in Lebanese jails.
The issue is a “black mark” in the relations between the two countries. Lebanon’s justice minister must resolve this file so that it does not complicate efforts to forge good ties, Souaid urged.
Pending files
Lebanon has been perceived as dealing “coolly” with Syria’s insistence on resolving the detainee file.
Some Lebanese officials have for years also complained about Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the burden they have on the state. An informed security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that with Assad’s collapse, this issue was no longer a “major crisis”.
It revealed that half of the Syrian refugees who were in Arsal and the northern Akkar region in Lebanon have returned to their home country. This has been felt by the drop in the numbers of Syrian laborers in Lebanon.
The shared border is another issue of pressing concern for the neighbors.
After Assad’s ouster, Lebanon’s northern and eastern borders are no longer open to the regime’s allies and outlaws, especially drug and other smugglers.
The source said: “The most important achievement on the security level has been curbing the smuggling of weapons from Syria to Lebanon and money from Lebanon to Syria.”
“Captagon factories along both sides of the border have also been destroyed, leading to the dismantling of drug smuggling networks and culminating in the arrest of Lebanon’s most wanted drug smuggler, Noah Zeiter, who was seeking refuge in Syria before Assad’s ouster,” added the source.
A ‘New Syria’ Becomes the Clearest Example of Israel’s Hostility Toward Its Neighborshttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5217480-%E2%80%98new-syria%E2%80%99-becomes-clearest-example-israel%E2%80%99s-hostility-toward-its-neighbors
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the buffer zone with Syria on Nov. 19, accompanied by senior defense, foreign affairs, and security officials. (Government Press Office)
A ‘New Syria’ Becomes the Clearest Example of Israel’s Hostility Toward Its Neighbors
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the buffer zone with Syria on Nov. 19, accompanied by senior defense, foreign affairs, and security officials. (Government Press Office)
On a rainy November night in 2025, as Ramallah groaned under an Israeli military assault just meters from the presidential compound, a senior Palestinian official smiled bitterly. “I don’t want to talk about Palestine,” he said. “Nor do I wish to repeat slogans about Israel being a colonial state without borders. What I want to talk about now is Syria.”
For this official, Syria has become the starkest proof that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only rejects any genuine peace, but also appears unwilling to tolerate neighboring states at all.
He argued that this is evident even after the new political leadership in Damascus declared openly that it sought neither war nor hostility with Israel. Yet Israel, he said, has continued to violate Syrian sovereignty with increasingly blunt military operations.
The official’s point was simple: Israel’s hostility, in his view, is not confined to Palestinians. “If Hamas launched a war on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and Hezbollah started firing its own strikes, and the Houthis joined Iran’s so-called ‘support front,’ Syria did the opposite: it stayed out of the picture, and even more than that.”
‘No threat to Israel’
After coming to power, Syria’s new leadership declared that it posed “no threat to any neighboring state, including Israel.”
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 cost Iran one of its most important strategic hubs in the region - Syria. This should have created common ground for Syrian-Israeli understandings, the official noted.
“I fear the Israelis have forgotten these facts, especially now that Syrian territory is no longer a playground for Iranian militias,” the Palestinian official said.
The United States, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan offered to mediate talks and expressed readiness to broker security arrangements ensuring a stable border. Even when Israel grumbled about indirect contacts, Damascus agreed to direct meetings. Six rounds were held between Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani and Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer.
According to Israeli sources, Damascus signaled significant flexibility: it was prepared to negotiate a comprehensive peace treaty in exchange for the return of all territory lost in 1967 and 2024, while also showing openness to interim proposals, such as leasing the Golan Heights to Israel for up to 15 years or reverting to 1974 security understandings.
Those same sources also claimed Syria was willing to join the Abraham Accords, effectively extending an unprecedented hand of peace to Israel.
Raids and ground incursions
Israel’s response, however, took a different direction. Since December 2024, before Damascus could stabilize its new order, Israel carried out roughly 500 airstrikes on Syrian military airports and bases, destroying an estimated 85 percent of Syria’s defensive capabilities.
Israeli forces seized around 450 square kilometers of territory, from Mount Hermon’s summit to parts of Daraa province, penetrating up to 20 kilometers inside Syria and establishing nine military sites.
Israel also inflamed internal tensions under the claim of “protecting Druze allies,” despite long-standing accusations of discrimination against Druze citizens inside Israel itself.
Israeli officials questioned the new Syrian leadership’s intentions by invoking old links to the Al-Nusra Front, even though Israeli field hospitals in Safed, Haifa, and Tel Aviv had, in past years, treated numerous Nusra fighters.
Who can restrain Netanyahu?
In recent days, Israeli reports claimed US President Donald Trump “rebuked” Israel and Netanyahu over their approach to the new Syria, urging a strategic shift.
Responding, reportedly, to appeals from Saudi Arabia and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Trump appears inclined to pursue a constructive course with Damascus.
Many now believe the White House is the only actor capable of restraining Netanyahu’s Syria policy.
But until any real change appears on the ground, analysts continue to ask: What message is Israel sending to its region through its handling of Syria?
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