Cairo, Washington to Coordinate over Egypt's Hosting of COP27

Egyptian Environment Minister Yasmine Fouad and US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. (Egyptian Government)
Egyptian Environment Minister Yasmine Fouad and US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. (Egyptian Government)
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Cairo, Washington to Coordinate over Egypt's Hosting of COP27

Egyptian Environment Minister Yasmine Fouad and US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. (Egyptian Government)
Egyptian Environment Minister Yasmine Fouad and US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. (Egyptian Government)

Cairo and Washington expressed on Thursday a desire to cooperate ahead of the 27th session of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP27), expected to be held in Sharm El Sheikh at the end of the year.

During a telephone call, Egyptian Environment Minister Yasmine Fouad and US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry agreed to form a joint working group to prepare for the upcoming Summit.

An Egyptian government statement said Fouad stressed that both sides agreed on the importance of building on the outcomes of COP26, which was held in Glasgow in November 2021.

The two sides tackled the Egypt-US joint cooperation program meant to confront climate change consequences within the framework of the 2050 climate change national strategy.

They agreed on working on implementing climate mitigation and adaptation actions.

“Developed countries need to fulfill their pledges to provide the necessary funding,” the two officials said.

Fouad and Kerry then discussed the prospects of the private sector’s engagement in Egypt’s climate-related projects in the energy sector.

According to the statement, Kerry conveyed the US keenness on supporting Egypt to host the COP27.

He said his country is keen to cooperate with several countries, including Mexico, India, and South Africa, to support their efforts to counter the effects of climate change.



Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
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Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)

As war rages between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Iran may soon need to call upon its network of regional allies - groups it has armed and funded for years. But now, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” looks strained, fragmented, and far from ready.

On June 19, 2025, General Mohammad Reza Naqdi of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard urged Iran’s regional allies to take action to relieve mounting pressure on Tehran. At that point, Iran was entering its second week of heavy Israeli bombardment. Strategically, an Israeli strike on the Iranian capital once seemed unthinkable, but the regional terrain has since shifted. Iran’s supply routes are now disrupted, and its key proxy groups have either been neutralized or weakened.

According to The Times of Israel, Israel launched this war after nearly two years of systematically targeting Iran’s allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. The 2023 Hamas attack on Israel had triggered a chain of retaliation that left many of Iran’s partners damaged or demoralized. With the Assad regime collapsed in Syria, Hezbollah weakened in Lebanon, and Hamas reduced to guerrilla tactics in Gaza, few proxies appear ready for a new confrontation.

In Gaza, Hamas has been forced into small ambushes and urban warfare, its rocket arsenal depleted and many senior leaders killed. Iranian communication channels with the group have also eroded. Israel’s targeted assassination of Mohammad Saeed Izadi, a key Quds Force commander linked to Palestinian factions, further strained coordination. For now, Hamas can offer little more than rhetorical support.

In Iraq, US forces have fortified their embassy in Baghdad, while withdrawing from bases such as Ain al-Asad. Iraqi factions loyal to Iran are posturing, threatening US interests should America enter the war. But most Iraqi leaders remain reluctant to drag the country into open conflict, knowing the consequences could be disastrous. Iran, too, is cautious about sacrificing Iraq’s political and economic value.

Hezbollah, reeling from the death of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in a 2024 Israeli strike, is in disarray. Its military capacity and leadership have been significantly degraded. Though the party retains some strategic capabilities, domestic and regional pressures have so far restrained it from opening a major front.

In Yemen, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s last viable card. They now play a key role in smuggling weapons and expanding Iranian influence into Africa. Should the US directly join Israel’s war, Tehran may finally authorize the Houthis to use their stockpile of ballistic missiles, signaling a decisive and potentially catastrophic new phase of the conflict.