Gulf Countries Confronted by Complex Yemeni Scene that Is Run by Iran

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
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Gulf Countries Confronted by Complex Yemeni Scene that Is Run by Iran

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)
A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon at a frontline position during fighting against Houthis in Marib, Yemen March 28, 2021. (Reuters)

The Iran-backed Houthi militias' widening of their attacks to include the United Arab Emirates reflects the losses they are incurring in their battles in Yemen, said Gulf strategic analysts.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, they said it was Iran who ordered the Houthis to carry out the attacks against the UAE, saying it was a strategic move that serves its strategic interests.

They added that the Saudi and Emirati response to the attacks was decisive, deterrent, strong and immediate, stemming from their understanding of Iran's strategic calculations and the Houthi threat.

The experts warned that the situation in Yemen is becoming increasingly complex on the political, military and humanitarian levels and that the war will not end any time soon.

They held the Houthi militias responsible politically and morally for the ongoing war because of their rejection of all peacemaking efforts.

Bin Sager: Houthis did not take military escalation decision

Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, Dr. Abdulaziz bin Sager said targeting the UAE is one of the critical strategic decisions that cannot be taken by the Houthi leadership alone, especially since it is subordinate to Iran.

Bin Sager stressed that the decision was taken by the Iranian leadership and aimed at serving its strategic interests.

There is no doubt that the Iranian calculations include the situation in Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. They also include Iran's influence in the Arab world and its regional and international relations, he went on to say.

The decision to expand the military operations in the Arabian Peninsula stems from strategic setbacks Iran has faced on several fronts, such as the Vienna nuclear talks and challenges to its influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, he added.

The Iranian leadership is seeking to prove that it can defy the international community, escalate its actions and take risks by expanding its attacks in the region, he explained.

By adopting this behavior, he added, Tehran is attempting to improve its negotiating position on all fronts. It is keen to prove its ability to use its regional proxies to destabilize regional and international security.

Moreover, he charged that Tehran is taking advantage of the international community's shortcomings in understanding its behavior, mindset and calculations.

Bin Sager added, however, that the recent Houthi losses in Yemen have also prompted Iran to lash out.

The militias have been suffering major losses since June 2021. They are on the verge of losing the Marib province and are now on the defense, when they used to be on the offense. The legitimate forces last month liberated the Shabwah province from the militias.

These defeats have alarmed Tehran, which is providing the Houthis with military gear and weapons, bin Sager remarked.

The Iranians are concerned that the loss of Marib will leave the ground open for the legitimate forces to advance on neighboring Sanaa, thereby threatening the Houthis' entire hold on northern Yemen.

Shulaimi: Western Countries’ Interest

President of the Gulf Security and Peace Forum Dr. Fahad al-Shulaimi echoed bin Sager's remarks that the Houthi escalation against the UAE stems from their successive defeats on several internal fronts, including Shabwah, Marib and some areas in Taiz and the al-Bayda provinces.

The Houthis believe that targeting some areas in the UAE may threaten Western interests, such as private companies and the energy market, and may eventually lead the Emirati leadership to halt its support to the southern Giants Brigades, which have dealt the Houthis a series of blows in the years-long conflict.

Furthermore, he stressed that the Houthis could not have launched the missile attacks against the UAE without Tehran's approval.

The attacks were deliberately carried out while Iran was negotiating with world powers in Vienna, he continued. Iran is trying to give off the impression that should the talks fails, it can "blow up" the region through its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.

Dr. Fawaz: Military operations expand and continue

Saudi Strategic and Security Analyst Dr. Fawaz bin Kasib al-Anzi told Asharq Al-Awsat that this wasn't the first time that the Houthis attempted to widen their terrorist operations by launching drone and missile attacks against the UAE.

He revealed that the militias had targeted the UAE with missiles and armed drones since the launch of the military operations in Yemen in 2016.

The attacks stopped eventually, but resumed when the UAE announced its support for the Giants Brigades, which have the proven experience to defeat the Houthis, he added.

The militias have opted to meet escalation with escalation, he stated.

The Giants Brigades achieved significant goals in Shabwah and Marib through direct support from the UAE, prompting the Houthis to retaliate by threatening the Gulf country. He predicted that the Houthi escalation will continue and so will the Giants Brigades operations that have been supported by Yemeni tribes and the Saudi-led Arab coalition.

Fawaz also highlighted the disappearance of Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi from the political and media scenes in Yemen and the death of Iran's so-called ambassador to Sanaa, Hassan Irloo, who was the effective Iranian commander of the Houthi battles.

These developments have had a massive impact on the morale of the militias, said Yemeni analysts.

The coalition forces must take advantage of this situation to strike more victories, urged Fawaz.

Response to Houthi attack

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in agreement over the strategic threat the situation in Yemen poses to the whole Arabian Peninsula, said bin Sager. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will not be spared the risks should the Houthis continue to control Yemen and Iran continue to control the Houthis.

Common risks often lead to unity among those threatened by them, he added.

The Saudi and Emirati leaderships believe that they share a common destiny since the Iranian-Houthi threat is an expansionist risk that is not limited to one country, but covers the entire region.

The Saudi and Emirati decision to defy the Iranian-Houthi threats in Yemen demonstrates that their leaderships have adopted long-term strategic calculations, he continued.

"Ignoring the fact that the Houthi militias illegally seized power in Yemen and that they are gangs that follow the orders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and are crucially linked to the Iranian support and strategy will have a great and long-term impact on the security and stability of the GCC countries," bin Sager warned.

He said it will also affect the freedom and independence of all countries of the region and the GCC states’ political decisions and sovereign rights and turn Yemen into a hub for Iranian aggression and threats in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula.

Bin Sager underscored the importance of deriving lessons from what happened in Lebanon.

"The indifference and failure in confronting the growing influence and control of the Lebanese Hezbollah militias over the ruling authority in Lebanon has turned them into a regional power that interferes and threatens the entire security and stability of the Arab Mashreq region in service of the IRGC and the strategic interests of the expansionist colonial Persian Empire," he noted.

Shulaimi warned that by attacking the UAE, the Houthis may even go further and target other Gulf countries.

Meanwhile, Fawaz expected Saudi Arabia and the UAE to continue their operations in Yemen especially amid the growing political support and changing international position towards the Houthis.

He cited last year's Houthi attack on the American embassy in Sanaa and US President Joe Biden stating in January that his administration was reconsidering restoring the terrorist designation of the Houthis.

These developments will no doubt lead to more pressure on the Houthi militias in the coming period.

How GCC states should address the situation in Yemen

The GCC states still do not acknowledge the dangers and threats posed by Iran’s meddling and expansionist policy, bin Sager lamented.

He pointed to the long-term threats posed by Iran's policies of establishing and supporting armed sectarian militias, weakening official state authorities and creating a state within the state in countries where it wields influence. He noted its undermining of the identity and religious and national loyalties of Arabs by deepening their sectarian affiliation to serve its interests at the expense of their national ones.

Bin Sager expressed regret that some Arab and Gulf states have adopted lenient and perhaps reckless positions towards Iran’s regional policy and have avoided condemning its expansionist and intrusive behavior.

This is both alarming and disappointing, he said.

He said the GCC states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, believe and have publicly declared that the Yemeni conflict should be settled politically and through negotiations.

After successive negotiations with the Houthis, they have come to realize that the militias' real and final decision-making comes from Iran, he continued.

Iran's interest lies in sabotaging any solution or political settlement in Yemen if they undermine its strategic interests, he remarked.

Therefore, the Gulf countries must take a firm and united stance that reflects their deep understanding of the crisis in Yemen. They must adopt a practical policy and stances that reflect their actual understanding of the extent of the threat posed by the conflict in Yemen, he urged.



Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
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Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

Tehran has sought to tighten its grip over the Strait of Hormuz by charging tolls on vessels to ensure safe passage, in conjunction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The following explains law governing toll collections and actions that countries opposed to tolls might take, according to Reuters.

WHAT IS THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ?

The Strait of Hormuz is ‌a waterway connecting the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and located within Iran's and Oman's territorial waters. It is perhaps the world's most important energy shipping lane. About 20% of the world's oil passes through it.

The waterway is about 104 miles (167 km) long. Its width varies, and at its narrowest point provides 2-mile channels for inbound and outbound shipping, separated by a 2-mile buffer zone.

Iran effectively closed the strait following US-Israeli strikes on the country, and has demanded a right ⁠to collect tolls as a precondition to ending the war. The status of any toll collections so far could not immediately be confirmed.

WHAT LAW GOVERNS PASSAGE ON THE STRAIT?

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opens new tab, sometimes known as UNCLOS, was adopted in 1982 and has been in force since 1994.

Article 38 provides vessels a right of unimpeded "transit passage" through more than 100 straits worldwide, including the Strait of Hormuz.

The treaty allows a country bordering a strait to regulate passage within its "territorial sea," up to 12 nautical miles from its border, but shall permit "innocent passage."

Passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to a country's peace, good order and security. Military action, serious pollution, spying and fishing are not permitted. The concept of innocent passage was key to a 1949 International Court ‌of ⁠Justice case concerning the Corfu Channel, along the coasts of Albania and Greece.

Approximately 170 countries and the European Union have ratified UNCLOS. Iran and the United States have not. This raises the question of whether the treaty's rules affording freedom of maritime navigation have become part of customary international law, or bind only ratifying countries.

Experts say UNCLOS has become or is generally viewed as customary international law. Some non-ratifying countries may ⁠argue that they need not follow the treaty because they persistently and consistently object. Iran has argued that it has made such objections. The United States disputes Iran's authority to charge tolls.

HOW CAN TOLLS BE CHALLENGED?

There is no formal mechanism to enforce UNCLOS. The International Tribunal for the Law ⁠of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany, which the treaty established, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands could issue rulings but cannot enforce them.

Countries and businesses have other potential means to counteract tolls.

A willing state or coalition of states could ⁠try to enforce the treaty. The UN Security Council could pass a resolution opposing tolls.

Companies could redirect shipments away from the Strait of Hormuz, and have begun doing so. Countries could expand sanctions targeting financial transactions believed to benefit Iran's government, by sanctioning companies willing to pay tolls.


How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
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How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

Washington: David Pierson

For much of the last two decades, China has maintained a delicate balance in its military relationship with Iran, offering often indirect assistance instead of arms sales.

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after US officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by US intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East.

Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and US sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

China has a major stake in the crisis in Iran. About a third of its total crude oil imports come from the Arabian Gulf.

Here is how China’s military support for Iran has evolved over the years:

The 1980s: The Boom Years

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 coincided with major market reforms in China when the leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, ordered state-owned companies to wean themselves off government support and instead seek commercial profit.

Chinese state-run defense companies were suddenly empowered to export their wares. That resulted in a deluge of Chinese missiles, fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and assault rifles being sold to Iran starting in 1982 and peaking in 1987, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

At the same time, China sold even more arms to Iraq, resulting in a situation in which the two warring sides clashed with each other using the same Chinese weapons.

The Reagan administration opposed China’s arms sales to Iran, particularly Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. Tehran used the missiles in attacks in Kuwaiti waters in 1987 that struck an American-owned tanker and an American-registered tanker.

The United States responded by curbing exports of some high-technology products to China. China denied selling arms directly to Iran, but said it would do more to prevent its military exports from reaching Iran through intermediaries.

The 1990s: Technology Transfers

Following the war, Iran set out to develop its own military-industrial base with the help of China. One of its key products was the Noor anti-ship cruise missile, which had been reverse-engineered through purchases of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles.

“China played a major role in supporting Iran’s military modernization for decades, especially in developing Iran’s missile capabilities,” said Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Iran also received help from China in building missile-production facilities and even in constructing a missile test range east of Tehran, wrote Bates Gill, a longtime China expert, in the Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Under US pressure to curtail its sale of finished weapons, particularly missiles, to Iran, China began increasing exports of machine tools and components that could be used for both military and civilian purposes.

The 2000s to the Present: Dual-Use Technologies

In 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China voted in favor of the resolution and largely pivoted away from new, formal arms contracts with Tehran.

The shift was as much about regional strategy as it was about international law. Starting in the mid-2010s, China began deepening its strategic relationships with Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar.

China continued to supply Iran with dual-use technologies and materials that have helped it amass an arsenal of missiles and drones.

That included chemicals used to produce fuel for ballistic missiles and components for drones, such as radio frequency connectors and turbine blades.

But Mr. Hart said China was still “a critical form of support, given Iran’s reliance on ballistic missiles and drones to attack US and Israeli forces and other countries in the region.”

The US Treasury Department has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong front companies it says were set up to source parts and ingredients for ballistic missiles and drones for Iran.

Suspicions are also growing that Iran is using its access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, an alternative to the US-owned Global Positioning System, for military purposes. Last month, a US congressional agency said BeiDou may have been used to direct Iran’s drone and missile strikes across the Middle East.

The New York Times


A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
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A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)

Sudan is entering a fourth year of war between the military and paramilitary forces.

The fighting has pushed many people into famine, caused a huge displacement crisis and left over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties have been accused of committing atrocities like ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against civilians.

Here's a look at the war by the numbers:

59,000 At least this many people have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, or ACLED. Aid groups say the true toll could be much higher as access to areas of fighting across the vast country remains limited.

4.5 million About this many people have fled the country to places like Egypt, South Sudan, Libya and Chad.

9 million About this many people remain displaced in Sudan.

19 million More than this many people face acute hunger, according to the World Food Program.

24% This is the amount that fuel prices have shot up in Sudan since conflict in the Middle East escalated.

354 This is the number of community kitchens that have closed over the last six months after providing a lifeline for millions of people, according to Islamic Relief.

Over 4,300 About this many children have been killed or maimed in the war, according to UNICEF.

8 million At least this many children are still out of school, according to UNICEF.

11% About this many schools are being used by warring sides or are shelters for displaced people, according to UNICEF.

63% This many of Sudan's health facilities are fully or partially functioning, according to World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

217 This is the number of verified attacks on health facilities since the war began, according to the WHO.

1,032 This was the number of civilians killed by air and drone strikes in 2025, according to ACLED, as a surge in drone strikes took a growing toll.