'Foreign Volunteers' During War Complicate the 'Conflict'

More than 36,000 foreign fighters have joined the war, 16,000 joined the Ukrainian army, while statistics indicate that over 20,000 "mercenaries" joined the Russian military.
More than 36,000 foreign fighters have joined the war, 16,000 joined the Ukrainian army, while statistics indicate that over 20,000 "mercenaries" joined the Russian military.
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'Foreign Volunteers' During War Complicate the 'Conflict'

More than 36,000 foreign fighters have joined the war, 16,000 joined the Ukrainian army, while statistics indicate that over 20,000 "mercenaries" joined the Russian military.
More than 36,000 foreign fighters have joined the war, 16,000 joined the Ukrainian army, while statistics indicate that over 20,000 "mercenaries" joined the Russian military.

Amid much fanfare, sympathizers flock to Ukraine, which established a legion of foreign volunteers to help the Ukrainian people repel the Russian invasion.

In the lexicon of war, volunteers who join a rebel force or militia are typically called "foreign fighters," while mercenaries are generally employed by a state and fight for profit or personal gain.

More than 36,000 foreign fighters have joined the war, 16,000 joined the Ukrainian army, while statistics indicate that over 20,000 "mercenaries" joined the Russian military.

The Ukrainian army did not accept all the volunteers. Some were refused, while others were sent back to their homelands, and only those who had previous military experience were allowed to join.

President Volodymyr Zelensky made a plea for foreign volunteers on February 27 at the very beginning of the conflict.

"Anyone who wants to join the defense of Ukraine, Europe, and the world can come and fight side by side with the Ukrainians against the Russian war criminals."

Ukraine's foreign minister elaborated on that initial plea a few days later, and Ukraine set up a website in this regard for foreign volunteers.

By early March, Zelensky claimed that 16,000 people had signed up for the foreign legion. Given that the Ukrainian army was only 145,000 strong at the beginning of the conflict, this would have significantly boosted its strength.

The foreign volunteers also provided dramatic evidence of worldwide support for the Ukrainian cause.

"What can history tell us about successful foreign volunteer efforts?" asks Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Cancian explained in an article that in the mid-1930s, Spain was experiencing social chaos after overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a democratic but weak republic. Left and right fought bitterly. In July 1936, the Spanish military revolted and began a civil war.

The Soviet Union supported the republic, and the Soviet Union's international arm, called the Communist International, or COMINTERN, began recruiting party members and others to fight.
They formed national battalions to simplify communication and cohesion and reflect their recruitment by national organizations.

The US formed the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, the French the Commune de Paris Battalion, the Italians the Garibaldi Battalion, the Germans the Thalmann Brigade, and so on.

Cancian said that one purpose of any foreign volunteer operation is political, showing worldwide support for the cause and appearing to distribute "the burdens." Ultimately, however, only a militarily effective force brings both battlefield advantage and international credibility.

"A just cause and individual enthusiasm are not enough. Producing military effectiveness requires a highly organized effort of training, supply, and personnel administration."

Retired Marine Colonel Andrew Milburn went to Ukraine and described how the volunteers were doing. In short, it was a fiasco.

He depicted a scene of inexperience, war tourism, and idealism: "A swarm of Fantasists for everyone candidate with experience in combat. And even combat experience means little in this war—because trading shots with the Taliban or al Qaeda is quite different from crouching in a freezing foxhole being pummeled by artillery fire."

Virtually the entire first crop of recruits was sent home, as Milburn described, "without ceremony or official notification."

Faced with this disappointing result, Ukraine announced limiting participation to those with prior military or medical training.

Meanwhile, Russia announced, through its Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, that about 16,000 fighters from the Middle East have applied to fight alongside Russia.

President Vladimir Putin said that mercenaries from all over the world are being sent to Ukraine, and they do not conceal it, the Western sponsors of Ukraine, the Ukrainian regime, do not hide it.

Speaking at a meeting with top security officials in March, Putin announced that he had opened the door for foreign volunteer fighters willing to help the people in Donbas.

"The infusion of outsiders and "irregular forces" could further complicate an already messy conflict," reported the New Yorker.

"The battlefield in Ukraine is incredibly complex, with a range of violent non-state actors—private military contractors, foreign fighters, volunteers, mercenaries, extremists, and terrorist groups—all in the mix," it concluded.

The US and the UN deemed the tens of thousands who joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq as foreign terrorist fighters, not mercenaries. "But such definitions are tricky—and easily contested."

The Russian Defense Ministry has referred to any foreigners caught in Ukraine's International Legion as mercenaries.

"At best, they can expect to be prosecuted as criminals," the Defense Ministry announced.



100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 sparked a wave of hope for a brighter future in Syria. But 100 days into the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his allies, the political assessment of the new leadership remains mixed.

Before diving into the performance of the new authorities, it's important to recognize the scale of the challenges facing Syria. The country is deeply fragmented—politically and regionally—still grappling with foreign influence and various forms of external occupation. The economic toll is staggering.

Reconstruction is estimated to cost between $250 billion and $400 billion, and more than half the population remains displaced inside and outside the country. According to the United Nations, 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, and 16.7 million people—roughly three out of four—depend on humanitarian aid.

Against this backdrop, any political actor stepping in after Assad faces an uphill battle.

Yet, the new administration has managed to score some diplomatic wins. Despite its controversial background, the al-Sharaa-led government has succeeded in easing some international concerns and opening lines of communication with key regional and global players.

Several governments have formally recognized the new authority and begun to engage with it. The European Union and the United Kingdom have notably suspended sanctions on selected sectors and entities. France, once a vocal critic of Damascus, recently welcomed al-Sharaa to Paris.

However, Washington has yet to outline a coherent Syria policy under President Donald Trump. While the US has not objected to the Biden administration’s January 2025 move to ease restrictions on Syria’s energy and financial sectors, the broader sanctions remain in place.

Still, the first 100 days under the new leadership offer, at best, cautious optimism. The fundamental questions lie in the administration’s broader political and economic orientation, as well as its vision for Syria’s fractured society. There is no guarantee yet that the country is on a path toward long-term stability.

State Institutions, Security Forces

In the wake of Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership—dominated by former members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—moved swiftly to consolidate control over state institutions and security bodies during the transitional phase.

Following the regime’s collapse, an interim government was formed in December 2024, composed almost entirely of HTS members or close affiliates. The caretaker administration held power until a new cabinet was installed at the end of March 2025.

Al-Sharaa, Syria’s new de facto leader, has since appointed new ministers, governors, and security officials—many of whom have ties to HTS or allied armed factions. In a sweeping overhaul of the country’s military and intelligence apparatus, the new authorities established a Syrian army under their command.

Senior leadership positions were handed to HTS veterans, including long-time commander Marhaf Abu Qusra, who was promoted to general and named defense minister.

Beyond the security sphere, the leadership has moved to entrench its influence over Syria’s economic and social sectors. Key appointments have been made across professional syndicates, chambers of commerce, and civil society organizations—often bypassing elections and installing loyalists from within HTS's inner circle.

The moves suggest a systematic effort to centralize power and reshape Syria’s state apparatus under the new order, raising questions about the future of pluralism and institutional independence.

The absence of a comprehensive democratic process has cast a shadow over Syria’s early post-Assad transition, undermining key initiatives meant to lay the foundation for the country’s future—including the much-anticipated Syrian National Dialogue Conference.

Critics say the conference, billed as a cornerstone for participatory dialogue, was marred by poor planning, limited representation, and rushed sessions that left little room for meaningful debate. Political and civil society actors voiced frustration at being sidelined, warning that the process risked entrenching exclusion rather than fostering unity.

Similar concerns were raised over the interim constitution signed by al-Sharaa. The charter faced sharp criticism over the opaque selection of its drafting committee and the lack of public consultation.

New authorities established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs in late March under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Tasked with overseeing political events and activities, the secretariat is also responsible for shaping national policy strategies and coordinating their implementation. One of its more controversial roles includes repurposing the assets and structures of the defunct Baath Party and former National Progressive Front coalition.

The creation of the body signals an effort by the al-Sharaa administration to centralize political planning and regain control over the ideological tools once wielded by the Assad regime—this time under a new banner.

Neoliberal Agenda for the Economy

Syria’s new leadership has also quietly adopted a sweeping neoliberal economic model—without public consultation or parliamentary debate—signaling a long-term shift in the country’s economic trajectory, despite the government's interim mandate.

Since taking power, the al-Sharaa administration has rolled out policies that go beyond the scope of a transitional government. The economic vision, rooted in privatization, market liberalization, and austerity, has drawn sharp criticism for deepening inequality and placing additional strain on already struggling Syrians.

Key state assets are being sold off to the private sector, subsidies for bread and household gas have been slashed, and spending cuts have hit essential public services—measures that disproportionately affect lower-income families. Analysts say the policies largely benefit Syria’s emerging economic elite and business networks aligned with the new ruling class.

In a controversial move, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade announced the dismissal of nearly one-third of the public-sector workforce.

Officials claimed the cuts targeted employees who were “receiving salaries without performing any actual duties.”

No official figures have been released on the total number affected, but some workers were placed on paid leave for three months pending further evaluation of their employment status.

The decision sparked a wave of protests from laid-off and suspended workers in cities across the country, highlighting growing discontent with the government’s top-down reforms and raising questions about the social cost of its economic overhaul.

Since the start of the year, the al-Sharaa administration has repeatedly pledged to raise public sector wages by 400%, setting a new minimum salary at 1,123,560 Syrian pounds—roughly $86.

While welcomed in principle, the measure remains unimplemented and falls far short of meeting basic living needs. By the end of March 2025, the minimum monthly expenses for a family of five in Damascus were estimated at 8 million pounds, or about $666.

Meanwhile, the government’s decision to reduce tariffs on more than 260 Turkish products has triggered backlash from local producers, particularly in the struggling industrial and agricultural sectors.

Critics say the move has undercut domestic output and opened the floodgates to cheaper Turkish imports. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, Turkish exports to Syria rose by 31.2% in the first quarter of 2025, reaching $508 million, up from $387 million in the same period last year.

Political Fragmentation and Rising Sectarian Tensions

The new government has also made little headway in addressing Syria’s deep political and social fractures.

Efforts to build bridges with the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in the northeast and to engage Druze communities in the southern province of Sweida have largely faltered, facing both logistical hurdles and grassroots resistance.

Recent protests in Sweida, sparked by opposition to the interim constitution and broader government policies, highlight the growing public unrest.

The surge in violence along Syria’s coastal regions, where hundreds of civilians have been killed in recent weeks, has further inflamed sectarian tensions and raised alarms over the country’s fragile stability.

While the latest wave of violence in Syria’s coastal regions was initially triggered by remnants of the former Assad regime targeting civilians and security personnel, rights monitors say the government’s response has fueled further sectarian division.

Under the pretext of rooting out so-called regime “holdouts,” retaliatory violence has escalated, often blurring the line between former loyalists and the broader Alawite community.

Analysts warn that this narrative risks fostering collective blame and deepening intercommunal resentment.

Despite efforts by the al-Sharaa administration to de-escalate tensions, it has largely failed to prevent the violence from spiraling. Clashes and reprisals have continued, particularly affecting Alawite-populated areas, where community members have accused security forces of indiscriminate crackdowns.

Authorities in Damascus have described the incidents as isolated and attributed them to “undisciplined elements,” but critics say the lack of accountability and failure to investigate abuses have only emboldened perpetrators.

Despite pledges to usher in a new era of accountability, the al-Sharaa administration has failed to establish a comprehensive process to prosecute individuals and groups involved in war crimes committed over the past decade.

Rights advocates say such a mechanism could have helped prevent the current wave of retaliatory violence and sectarian polarization, but political observers argue that meaningful justice would likely expose actors the new leadership is reluctant to confront.

Regional Powers Stir the Pot

Amid the internal fragmentation, external actors—most notably Iran, Israel—have sought to exploit the country’s ethnic and sectarian divisions to serve their strategic interests.

Israeli officials have stepped up rhetoric in recent weeks, signaling a willingness to intervene militarily under the pretext of “protecting” Syria’s Druze minority. While the move is seen by many as an attempt to extend Tel Aviv’s influence in southern Syria, key Druze political and social leaders have largely rejected such overtures, reaffirming their national identity and support for Syria’s territorial unity.

Meanwhile, Tehran continues to entrench its presence in areas vacated by Assad’s forces, drawing criticism from opposition groups who accuse Iran of exacerbating sectarian fault lines to solidify its influence.

Despite a power-sharing agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Turkish military operations have persisted in the northeast, targeting Kurdish-controlled territories in apparent defiance of diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region.

Finally, what began in December 2024 with widespread optimism is now clouded by political ambiguity, social unrest, and a lack of clear direction—casting doubt on whether Syria’s post-Assad era can deliver the change many had hoped for.