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Russia, Syria and the ‘Ukrainian Volcano’

A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
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Russia, Syria and the ‘Ukrainian Volcano’

A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)

Two new developments in Syria unveiled once again the extent to which the country is affected by the Russian war in Ukraine. This time, the wind is blowing through the doors of UN political and humanitarian institutions.

The connection between the crises in Syria and Ukraine dates back to 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea in retaliation to a change of Ukrainian presidents and its ally, Viktor Yanukovych, fleeing the Ukrainian presidential palace.

At the time, Moscow demanded that Damascus show toughness towards the UN Geneva track. That was before it finally decided to have its military intervene directly in Syria by the end of 2015.

With the start of war in Ukraine, the economic suffering of the Syrians worsened and indications of a military entanglement between the two “arenas” appeared: Russia’s military role in Syria declined due to its preoccupation with Ukraine, leaving space for Iranian attempts to fill the vacuum in Syria, which was met with escalated Israeli strikes against Tehran’s interests there.

Moreover, several Russian-US military tests have taken place in Syrian airspace.

For its part, Turkey tried to take advantage of these developments by launching a new incursion in northern Syria.

Presently, there are two developments: the first is that Moscow has informed Damascus not to participate in the UN-sponsored meetings of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva, and the other is that Russia has informed the Western parties that it will not extend the international resolution on cross-border aid delivery when its term expires on July 10.

Damascus has always been uncomfortable with the UN track since the issuance of the “Geneva Declaration” in 2012 and the convening of the international conference in early 2014.

It opposes transforming the Syrian crises into an international issue and wants to implement a local agenda with local priorities, considerations, and calculations.

Moscow, for various reasons, had pushed Damascus to accept the UN track in Geneva because this gives legitimacy to Russian efforts and presence in Syria. The track also provides Moscow with a platform for its international calculations and trade-offs.

Despite this, Russia has preserved its options and has continued its attempts to “dismantle Western influence at the UN.”

Russia has added two other tracks to the equation: the first in Astana, in cooperation with Iran and Turkey, to discuss military matters, and the other in Sochi, to discuss political matters and hold a conference for Syrian national dialogue.

Moscow sometimes thought of attacking the Geneva track and the international efforts, but it waited and negotiated, and then pressured Damascus to send its delegations to meetings in Europe.

Also, Moscow was sending presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentiev to meet with the Turkish and Iranian “guarantors,” and US and European interlocutors. Geneva has become a platform for Russia's international outlook on Syria. This path has become an urgent need for all parties to achieve gains or justify shortfalls.

What changed now?

The eruption of the Ukrainian volcano changed everything. Some UN institutions, backed by the West, have punished Russia for its war. Also, the US-Russian back-track that existed in Geneva has come to a stop. Before the last round of the Constitutional Committee's meetings at the end of May, Lavrentiev did not get the same welcome he usually received.

Russia declared that Switzerland is “not a neutral territory,” and demanded that Damascus ask the UN to find a new place to host the committee meetings. Four alternatives were offered: Moscow, Sochi, Damascus or Algiers.

Russia understands that the possibility of Western envoys and the Syrian opposition traveling to Russia or Damascus is not on possible. Also Algiers, which will host the Arab League summit in November, to discuss the return of Damascus' membership in the organization, is not realistic.

The Geneva track for the Constitutional Committee is now faced with two options: either freeze negotiations or succumb to Russia’s conditions.

The Geneva track file has become, more or less, a paper that is added to another development which pertains to the international resolution on cross-border aid delivery.

A year ago, Moscow signaled several times that it would not extend the resolution and pressured donors to knock on the doors of Damascus.

As for Washington, it raised the bar by talking about opening three border crossings, two of them with Turkey and the third with Iraq, and considered extending the resolution a priority for the new administration of President Joe Biden.

Secret negotiations between the envoys of Putin and Biden, which took place in mid-June last year, were able to produce a new draft resolution that included an extension for a single crossing between Turkey and Syria’s Idlib.

The drafted resolution, which was worded differently, also included US setbacks and support for funding early recovery and aid delivery across the lines of contact.

The situation has changed a lot. Contact between the two superpowers has stopped, there is a military escalation in Ukraine, and signs are emerging of a military clash between the US and Russian armies in Syria.

With the end of the resolution's mandate approaching, there is a possibility that Russia will initiate a request for a draft resolution regarding cross-border humanitarian aid to eastern Ukraine in return for passing the resolution for northern Syria.

Once again, the link between the two files is clear.

Another possibility is that the resolution remains without extension and alternative plans get reviewed. Indeed, the envoy of Western countries discussed alternative plans.

Can Turkish organizations be relied upon as an alternative? Western countries do not want to give it this advantage.

Is it possible to establish a Western-funded trust that uses existing institutions and lines? This prospect is being seriously considered.

Faced with the humanitarian options and the two Syrian developments, the UN sharpened its rhetoric and used new vocabulary.

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres intervened by presenting a detailed statement on the importance of preserving the role of the UN, extending the international resolution to provide relief to more than four million people, and to provide aid to 14 million people in a country where 90% of its people live below the poverty line.

“It is a moral imperative to address the suffering and vulnerability of 4.1 million people in the area who need aid and protection,” he said.

Aside from what is moral and humane, what about the strategic and geopolitical aspect? Most likely, the two new tests will show that Syria has become a hostage to an international-regional game and that the Syrians may pay the price of the “Ukrainian volcano.”

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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)

For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.

Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.

Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.

Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.

Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.

Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)

Khatami and shift in the conflict

The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.

The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.

Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.

Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.

Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)

IRGC and the regional role

The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.

In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.

Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)

Nuclear file and internal tensions

The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.

In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.

The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.

Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.

Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.

Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)

Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’

On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.

With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.

On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.

The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.

Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.

The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)

Patience in handling pressure

In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.

Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.

In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.

Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.

When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.

18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)

Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’

Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.

His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.

Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.

Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.

On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.

Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation

Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.

Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.

Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.