Biden’s Agenda For Palestinians: Economic Support, Halting Settlement, Peace

 President Biden’s visit to Israel and the West Bank carries “messages of peace”. (EPA)
President Biden’s visit to Israel and the West Bank carries “messages of peace”. (EPA)
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Biden’s Agenda For Palestinians: Economic Support, Halting Settlement, Peace

 President Biden’s visit to Israel and the West Bank carries “messages of peace”. (EPA)
President Biden’s visit to Israel and the West Bank carries “messages of peace”. (EPA)

With the approach of US President Joe Biden’s visit to the Middle East, many questions arise about the issues that the American visitor would carry, and the expected outputs of his tour, in light of the escalating tension and instability in the “troubled region.”

In this context, according to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat from the White House, Biden is expected to discuss in Israel and the West Bank several key matters related to security and stability, increased economic support to the Palestinians, and finally, the consolidation of the diplomatic relations and the revival of the peace process.

The information indicates that discussions with Israeli leaders will touch on the security prosperity of Israel and means to boost integration in the wider region, while talks with Palestinian officials will focus on confirming strong US support for the two-state solution, with equal measures of freedom, security and opportunities for the Palestinian people.

US officials are concerned about the mounting violence, which has so far claimed the lives of more than 70 Palestinians, including Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Aqleh, whose killing sparked widespread controversy. The US press releases also reported the concern of Biden and the entire national security team on this issue, which will also be on the agenda.

To correct the US-Palestinian relations, the White House has reportedly adopted three main steps over the course of nearly 18 months of diplomatic contact. The first is restoring diplomatic ties at the highest levels, and allowing the Palestinian diplomatic mission to return to Washington. Second, refinancing grants and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people, through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and UNRWA in Gaza and the West Bank, and finally, demanding Israel to stop settlement operations, and supporting the return of dialogue and the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians.

Washington has allocated half a billion dollars to the Palestinians within the first year of the current administration’s tenure. The president will make some additional funding announcements during his visit.

While the Biden administration supports steps of normalization between some Arab countries and Israel, it has a firm conviction that normalization between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East “is not a substitute for Israeli-Palestinian peace.” The current administration is firmly committed to the two-state solution.

Moreover, the information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat confirms that US officials have made several contacts with their Israeli counterparts, to oppose the demolition of buildings in the settlements and the evacuation of Palestinians. This issue will also be raised during Biden’s upcoming visit, with an emphasis on the need for Israelis and Palestinians to have “equal opportunities for freedom, security, prosperity and dignity.”

The information adds that the Biden administration has announced its opposition to unilateral measures that exacerbate tensions, and include incitement to violence through demolitions, the expulsion of Palestinian families from their homes in East Jerusalem, where they have lived for generations, and the destruction of property. It also demands that the Israeli side provide compensation to individuals, who were imprisoned on false charges of terrorist acts.

The United States has provided more than half a billion dollars to the Palestinians, including more than $417 million in humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees through UNRWA and $75 million in economic support, as well as $41 million for the security sector, including $1 million for demining activities, and more than $20 million in food and humanitarian aid related to COVID-19.



Saudi Arabia Allows Contracting Exceptions for Firms without Regional HQ

The King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Saudi Arabia Allows Contracting Exceptions for Firms without Regional HQ

The King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saudi Arabia has introduced greater flexibility into its investment environment, allowing government entities, under strict controls to safeguard spending efficiency and ensure the delivery of critical projects, to seek exceptions to contract with international companies that do not have regional headquarters in the kingdom.

The Local Content and Government Procurement Authority notified all government bodies of the mechanism to apply for exemptions through the Etimad digital platform.

The step is designed to balance enforcement of the “regional headquarters relocation” decision, in force since early 2024, with the needs of technically specialized projects or those driven by intense price competition.

Under a government decision that took effect at the start of 2024, state entities, including authorities, institutions and government-affiliated funds, are barred from contracting with any foreign commercial company whose regional headquarters in the region is located outside Saudi Arabia.

According to the information, the Local Content and Government Procurement Authority informed all entities of the rules governing contracts with companies that lack a regional headquarters in the kingdom and related parties.

Government entities may request an exemption from the committee for specific projects, multiple projects or a defined time period, provided the application is submitted before launching a tender or initiating direct contracting procedures.

Submission mechanism

In two circulars, the authority detailed how to submit exemption requests and clarified the cases in which contracting is permitted under the controls. It said the exemption service was launched on the Etimad platform in November 2025.

The service is available to entities that float tenders through Etimad. Requests for tenders launched before the service went live, as well as those issued outside the platform, will continue to follow the previously adopted process.

Etimad is the kingdom’s official financial services portal run by the Ministry of Finance, aimed at driving digital transformation of government procedures and boosting transparency and efficiency in managing budgets, contracts, payments, tenders and procurement. The platform streamlines transactions between state entities and the private sector.

Technical criteria

When issuing the contracting controls, the government made clear that companies without a regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia, or related parties, are not barred from bidding for public tenders.

However, their offers can only be accepted in two cases: if there is no more than one technically compliant bid, or if the offer ranks among the best technically and is at least 25% lower in price than the second-best bid after overall evaluation.

Contracts with an estimated value of no more than 1 million riyals ($266,000) are also exempt. The minister may, in the public interest, amend the threshold, cancel the exemption or suspend it temporarily.

More than 700 headquarters

More than 700 multinational companies had relocated their regional headquarters to Riyadh by early 2026, exceeding the initial target of attracting 500 companies by 2030. The program seeks to cement the kingdom’s position as a regional business hub and to localize global expertise.

When announcing the contracting ban, Saudi Arabia said the move was intended to incentivize foreign firms dealing with the government and its affiliated entities to adjust their operations.

It aims to create jobs, curb economic leakage, raise spending efficiency and ensure that key goods and services procured by government entities are delivered inside the kingdom with appropriate local content.

The government said the policy aligns with the objectives of the Riyadh 2030 strategy unveiled during the recent Future Investment Initiative forum, where 24 multinational companies announced plans to move their regional headquarters to the Saudi capital.

It stressed that the decision does not affect any investor’s ability to enter the Saudi economy or continue working with the private sector.

 


Rafah Crossing Traffic Lags Two Weeks after Reopening

Humanitarian and relief aid crosses Rafah Crossing (Egyptian Red Crescent)
Humanitarian and relief aid crosses Rafah Crossing (Egyptian Red Crescent)
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Rafah Crossing Traffic Lags Two Weeks after Reopening

Humanitarian and relief aid crosses Rafah Crossing (Egyptian Red Crescent)
Humanitarian and relief aid crosses Rafah Crossing (Egyptian Red Crescent)

Despite nearly two weeks since the reopening of the Rafah crossing in both directions, the number of people and humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip falls short of what was agreed under the “Gaza ceasefire agreement,” according to an official from the Egyptian Red Crescent in North Sinai.

The daily movement of individuals to and from Gaza does not exceed 50 people, Khaled Zayed, head of the Egyptian Red Crescent in North Sinai, told Asharq Al-Awsat. He said this figure represents only one-third of what was agreed upon in the ceasefire deal.

He added that truck traffic stands at about 100 per day, despite Gaza’s population requiring the entry of around 600 trucks daily.

On Feb. 2, Israel reopened the Rafah crossing on the Palestinian side for individual travel, allowing Palestinians to leave and return to the enclave. Indicators show that most of those departing Gaza are patients and wounded individuals, who are being received at Egyptian hospitals.

This comes as Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty stressed the need to “ensure the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and not obstruct movement through the Rafah crossing.”

In his remarks during a ministerial Security Council session on developments in the Middle East on Wednesday, he underscored the importance of “halting all measures aimed at displacing residents or altering the demographic character of the occupied Palestinian territories.”

Israel took control of the Rafah border crossing in May 2024, about nine months after the outbreak of the war in Gaza. The reopening of the crossing was part of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement that entered into force last October, though the deal remains fragile.

The Egyptian Red Crescent announced the departure of the 14th group of wounded, sick, and injured Palestinians arriving and leaving through the crossing.

In a statement on Thursday, it said humanitarian efforts to receive and see off Palestinians include a comprehensive package of relief services, psychological support for children, distribution of suhoor and iftar meals, and heavy clothing, in addition to providing “return bags” for those heading back to Gaza.

At the same time, the Red Crescent dispatched the 142nd “Zad Al-Ezza” convoy, which includes 197,000 food parcels and more than 235 tons of flour as part of the “Iftar for One Million Fasters” campaign in Gaza.

The convoy also carries more than 390 tons of medicines, relief, and personal care supplies, as well as about 760 tons of fuel, according to the organization’s statement.

Zayed said the daily number of individuals crossing through Rafah over the past two weeks does not compare with what was stipulated in the ceasefire agreement.

With the reopening of the Rafah crossing on the Palestinian side, Israel’s Arabic-language public broadcaster Makan reported that 150 people were expected to leave Gaza, including 50 patients, while 50 people would be allowed to enter the enclave.

Despite what he described as Israeli obstacles, Zayed said allowing the movement of individuals and the wounded represents “an unsatisfactory breakthrough in the humanitarian situation in Gaza,” stressing the need to fulfill the ceasefire’s obligations and advance early recovery efforts inside the territory.

The total number of Palestinians who have left through the Rafah crossing since it reopened on both sides does not exceed 1,000, according to Salah Abdel Ati, head of the International Commission to Support Palestinian Rights.

He said around 20,000 wounded and sick Palestinians require urgent evacuation, and that Israeli restrictions are hindering access to medical care, adding that the humanitarian situation requires continued pressure by mediators on Israel.

Abdelatty told Asharq Al-Awsat he was counting on the outcome of the first meeting of the Board of Peace to adopt easing measures, including lifting Israeli restrictions and establishing guarantees for the ceasefire in the Palestinian territories, as well as securing the funding needed for Gaza’s early recovery, in line with US President Donald Trump’s peace plan for the enclave.

According to a statement by the Egyptian Red Crescent, Egypt continues relief efforts at all logistical hubs to facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid, which has exceeded 800,000 tons, with the participation of more than 65,000 volunteers from the Egyptian Red Crescent.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.