Syria's Kurds Face US, Russian 'Betrayals'

A family collects hay from a field in the Qamishli countryside, in northeastern Syria July 1, 2022. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
A family collects hay from a field in the Qamishli countryside, in northeastern Syria July 1, 2022. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
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Syria's Kurds Face US, Russian 'Betrayals'

A family collects hay from a field in the Qamishli countryside, in northeastern Syria July 1, 2022. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
A family collects hay from a field in the Qamishli countryside, in northeastern Syria July 1, 2022. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

A few days ago, an Arab official asked Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov about the secret behind the unique cooperation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Lavrov answered that Putin and Erdogan enjoyed a "special personal relationship."

Putin believes that Erdogan keeps his promises despite all the difficulties, competition, and the history of hostility between Moscow and Ankara.

Turkey's military influence spans several arenas, including Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and Syria. This made Putin think there was a possibility to find formulas for cooperation with Erdogan.

The latest sample of "hostile cooperation" between Russia and Turkey has to do with Erdogan's plans for a military campaign in northern Syria against the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), the central pillar of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Despite Erdogan's repeated threats and the military readiness of the Turkish army and Ankara loyalist factions in Syria, the cross-border military campaign promised by Turkey has yet to start. This is simply because Moscow still has not green-lit the operation.

All Turkish forays into Syrian territory in 2016,2018, 219, and 2020 were carried out by virtue of Russian-Turkish understandings.

On the sidelines of a tripartite summit with the Iranian president in Tehran and at a bilateral meeting in Sochi, Putin informed Erdogan that matters were different this time.

First, Russia would permit the expansion of drone strikes against the leaders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or the YPG, which Ankara says are linked to the PKK, rather than a military incursion.

Instead of warranting a ground invasion and a direct clash with Syrian and Kurdish forces, Russia's missile systems would allow for Turkish drone strikes. To date, Kurds are talking about the targeting of leaders that don't belong to the PKK.

Second, Moscow would host a series of senior security meetings between Turkish and Syrian officials to investigate the possibility of fulfilling Turkish demands without Ankara having to carry out a ground invasion of Syria.

True to that, the Russian capital hosted those meetings over the past few days.

Third, Moscow is promoting renegotiating the 1998 Adana Agreement between Ankara and Damascus.

Russia wants to help the two countries sign a second version of the Agreement to reflect the new Syrian reality and allow for Syrian-Turkish security coordination.

According to Russia, this will ultimately aid Syria and Turkey in ensuring border security and future political cooperation. It would also allow for the two countries to combat terrorism without clashing.

Here, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu's remarks about "political support" for Damascus against the Kurds were remarkable.

Fourth, Russia is pushing for Damascus and the SDF to cooperate by conducting military coordination and joint maneuvers.

Boosting SDF-Damascus cooperation will set the foundations for the Syrian army to spread in areas of influence east of the Euphrates; continuing incrementally until Damascus has the upper hand over the SDF.

Nevertheless, this is all pending the US withdrawal from northeastern Syria and the "dismantling" of the military presence loyal to Washington.

In a nutshell, Russia is looking to get the SDF to switch its allegiance to Damascus and allow the Syrian army back to the east Euphrates region.

Fifth, there is a possibility of Russia allowing a limited Turkish military operation in Tal Rifaat in the countryside of Syria's Aleppo governorate. The restricted campaign would aim to neutralize the threat of missile platforms attacking the Turkish army and its loyal factions in Afrin.

But the date of such a surgical operation is tightly linked to other Turkish affairs such as elections, and understandings between Moscow and Ankara regarding other files, including the Ukrainian "grain deal."

It may also be tied to the outcome of US-Russian wrestling on the political track in Geneva.

After Moscow insisted that the Syrian Constitutional Committee's assembly not be held in Geneva, Washington is working on hosting a political meeting on Syria in Geneva early next month.

Stuck between polar opposites, Ankara suggested holding the Committee's meetings at UN headquarters in certain countries.

In fact, the veto against the vast Turkish ground operation did not come only from Moscow. Turkey's ambitious ground operation was also vetoed by Tehran and Washington.

For Tehran, its close ties with Damascus prevented it from supporting Erdogan's venture.

As for the US and the West, they rejected Turkey's operation on the grounds that it would lead to a decline in the SDF's involvement in the war against ISIS.

Indeed, Ankara has heard Washington's warnings, especially since it threatened sanctions that Erdogan does not want with elections approaching.

Washington has no objection to Moscow achieving security, political, military, and economic arrangements between Damascus and Qamishli.

With the civil war and the Rojava conflict in 2011, the city of Qamishli grew into a significant political role, being the de facto capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

US officials always remind the Kurds that their military presence in Syria is not eternal.

Despite rejecting the Turkish cross-border operation, the US failed to provide the Kurds with an umbrella against Turkish drone attacks.

Washington's inaction reminded the Kurds of previous US "betrayals" in the Middle East, like their sudden withdrawal from areas east of the Euphrates at the end of 2019. At that time, the Kurds rushed to cooperate with Damascus under Russian sponsorship.

Moscow's behavior also reminded the Kurds of Russian betrayals in 2016 with Operation Euphrates Shield and 2018 with Operation Olive Branch.

Will the US and Russian "betrayals" pave the way for the Kurds to Damascus?



Iran-Israel War: A Lifeline for Netanyahu?

FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony on the eve of Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers at the Yad LaBanim Memorial in Jerusalem, on April 29, 2025. (Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP, File)
FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony on the eve of Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers at the Yad LaBanim Memorial in Jerusalem, on April 29, 2025. (Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Iran-Israel War: A Lifeline for Netanyahu?

FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony on the eve of Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers at the Yad LaBanim Memorial in Jerusalem, on April 29, 2025. (Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP, File)
FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony on the eve of Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers at the Yad LaBanim Memorial in Jerusalem, on April 29, 2025. (Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP, File)

The Iran-Israel war has helped strengthen Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu domestically and overseas, just as his grip on power looked vulnerable.

On the eve of launching strikes on Iran, his government looked to be on the verge of collapse, with a drive to conscript ultra-Orthodox Jews threatening to scupper his fragile coalition.

Nearly two years on from Hamas's unprecedented attack in 2023, Netanyahu was under growing domestic criticism for his handling of the war in Gaza, where dozens of hostages remain unaccounted for, said AFP.

Internationally too, he was coming under pressure including from longstanding allies, who since the war with Iran began have gone back to expressing support.

Just days ago, polls were predicting Netanyahu would lose his majority if new elections were held, but now, his fortunes appear to have reversed, and Israelis are seeing in "Bibi" the man of the moment.

– 'Reshape the Middle East' –

For decades, Netanyahu has warned of the risk of a nuclear attack on Israel by Iran -- a fear shared by most Israelis.

Yonatan Freeman, a geopolitics expert at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, said Netanyahu's argument that the pre-emptive strike on Iran was necessary draws "a lot of public support" and that the prime minister has been "greatly strengthened".

Even the opposition has rallied behind him.

"Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is my political rival, but his decision to strike Iran at this moment in time is the right one," opposition leader Yair Lapid wrote in a Jerusalem Post op-ed.

A poll published Saturday by a conservative Israeli channel showed that 54 percent of respondents expressed confidence in the prime minister.

The public had had time to prepare for the possibility of an offensive against Iran, with Netanyahu repeatedly warning that Israel was fighting for its survival and had an opportunity to "reshape the Middle East."

During tit-for-tat military exchanges last year, Israel launched air raids on targets in Iran in October that are thought to have severely damaged Iranian air defenses.

Israel's then-defense minister Yoav Gallant said the strikes had shifted "the balance of power" and had "weakened" Iran.

"In fact, for the past 20 months, Israelis have been thinking about this (a war with Iran)," said Denis Charbit, a political scientist at Israel's Open University.

Since Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, Netanyahu has ordered military action in Gaza, against the Iran-backed Hezbollah group in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as targets in Syria where long-time leader Bashar al-Assad fell in December last year.

"Netanyahu always wants to dominate the agenda, to be the one who reshuffles the deck himself -- not the one who reacts -- and here he is clearly asserting his Churchillian side, which is, incidentally, his model," Charbit said.

"But depending on the outcome and the duration (of the war), everything could change, and Israelis might turn against Bibi and demand answers."

– Silencing critics –

For now, however, people in Israel see the conflict with Iran as a "necessary war," according to Nitzan Perelman, a researcher specialized in Israel at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France.

"Public opinion supports this war, just as it has supported previous ones," she added.

"It's very useful for Netanyahu because it silences criticism, both inside the country and abroad."

In the weeks ahead of the Iran strikes, international criticism of Netanyahu and Israel's military had reached unprecedented levels.

After more than 55,000 deaths in Gaza, according to the health ministry in the Hamas-run territory, and a blockade that has produced famine-like conditions there, Israel has faced growing isolation and the risk of sanctions, while Netanyahu himself is the subject of an international arrest warrant for alleged war crimes.

But on Sunday, two days into the war with Iran, the Israeli leader received a phone call from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, while Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has held talks with numerous counterparts.

"There's more consensus in Europe in how they see Iran, which is more equal to how Israel sees Iran," explained Freeman from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Tuesday that Israel was doing "the dirty work... for all of us."

The idea that a weakened Iran could lead to regional peace and the emergence of a new Middle East is appealing to the United States and some European countries, according to Freeman.

But for Perelman, "Netanyahu is exploiting the Iranian threat, as he always has."