Syria's Kurds Face US, Russian 'Betrayals'

A family collects hay from a field in the Qamishli countryside, in northeastern Syria July 1, 2022. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
A family collects hay from a field in the Qamishli countryside, in northeastern Syria July 1, 2022. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
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Syria's Kurds Face US, Russian 'Betrayals'

A family collects hay from a field in the Qamishli countryside, in northeastern Syria July 1, 2022. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
A family collects hay from a field in the Qamishli countryside, in northeastern Syria July 1, 2022. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

A few days ago, an Arab official asked Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov about the secret behind the unique cooperation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Lavrov answered that Putin and Erdogan enjoyed a "special personal relationship."

Putin believes that Erdogan keeps his promises despite all the difficulties, competition, and the history of hostility between Moscow and Ankara.

Turkey's military influence spans several arenas, including Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and Syria. This made Putin think there was a possibility to find formulas for cooperation with Erdogan.

The latest sample of "hostile cooperation" between Russia and Turkey has to do with Erdogan's plans for a military campaign in northern Syria against the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), the central pillar of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Despite Erdogan's repeated threats and the military readiness of the Turkish army and Ankara loyalist factions in Syria, the cross-border military campaign promised by Turkey has yet to start. This is simply because Moscow still has not green-lit the operation.

All Turkish forays into Syrian territory in 2016,2018, 219, and 2020 were carried out by virtue of Russian-Turkish understandings.

On the sidelines of a tripartite summit with the Iranian president in Tehran and at a bilateral meeting in Sochi, Putin informed Erdogan that matters were different this time.

First, Russia would permit the expansion of drone strikes against the leaders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or the YPG, which Ankara says are linked to the PKK, rather than a military incursion.

Instead of warranting a ground invasion and a direct clash with Syrian and Kurdish forces, Russia's missile systems would allow for Turkish drone strikes. To date, Kurds are talking about the targeting of leaders that don't belong to the PKK.

Second, Moscow would host a series of senior security meetings between Turkish and Syrian officials to investigate the possibility of fulfilling Turkish demands without Ankara having to carry out a ground invasion of Syria.

True to that, the Russian capital hosted those meetings over the past few days.

Third, Moscow is promoting renegotiating the 1998 Adana Agreement between Ankara and Damascus.

Russia wants to help the two countries sign a second version of the Agreement to reflect the new Syrian reality and allow for Syrian-Turkish security coordination.

According to Russia, this will ultimately aid Syria and Turkey in ensuring border security and future political cooperation. It would also allow for the two countries to combat terrorism without clashing.

Here, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu's remarks about "political support" for Damascus against the Kurds were remarkable.

Fourth, Russia is pushing for Damascus and the SDF to cooperate by conducting military coordination and joint maneuvers.

Boosting SDF-Damascus cooperation will set the foundations for the Syrian army to spread in areas of influence east of the Euphrates; continuing incrementally until Damascus has the upper hand over the SDF.

Nevertheless, this is all pending the US withdrawal from northeastern Syria and the "dismantling" of the military presence loyal to Washington.

In a nutshell, Russia is looking to get the SDF to switch its allegiance to Damascus and allow the Syrian army back to the east Euphrates region.

Fifth, there is a possibility of Russia allowing a limited Turkish military operation in Tal Rifaat in the countryside of Syria's Aleppo governorate. The restricted campaign would aim to neutralize the threat of missile platforms attacking the Turkish army and its loyal factions in Afrin.

But the date of such a surgical operation is tightly linked to other Turkish affairs such as elections, and understandings between Moscow and Ankara regarding other files, including the Ukrainian "grain deal."

It may also be tied to the outcome of US-Russian wrestling on the political track in Geneva.

After Moscow insisted that the Syrian Constitutional Committee's assembly not be held in Geneva, Washington is working on hosting a political meeting on Syria in Geneva early next month.

Stuck between polar opposites, Ankara suggested holding the Committee's meetings at UN headquarters in certain countries.

In fact, the veto against the vast Turkish ground operation did not come only from Moscow. Turkey's ambitious ground operation was also vetoed by Tehran and Washington.

For Tehran, its close ties with Damascus prevented it from supporting Erdogan's venture.

As for the US and the West, they rejected Turkey's operation on the grounds that it would lead to a decline in the SDF's involvement in the war against ISIS.

Indeed, Ankara has heard Washington's warnings, especially since it threatened sanctions that Erdogan does not want with elections approaching.

Washington has no objection to Moscow achieving security, political, military, and economic arrangements between Damascus and Qamishli.

With the civil war and the Rojava conflict in 2011, the city of Qamishli grew into a significant political role, being the de facto capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

US officials always remind the Kurds that their military presence in Syria is not eternal.

Despite rejecting the Turkish cross-border operation, the US failed to provide the Kurds with an umbrella against Turkish drone attacks.

Washington's inaction reminded the Kurds of previous US "betrayals" in the Middle East, like their sudden withdrawal from areas east of the Euphrates at the end of 2019. At that time, the Kurds rushed to cooperate with Damascus under Russian sponsorship.

Moscow's behavior also reminded the Kurds of Russian betrayals in 2016 with Operation Euphrates Shield and 2018 with Operation Olive Branch.

Will the US and Russian "betrayals" pave the way for the Kurds to Damascus?



How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Hamas said it recruited and trained thousands of fighters during the 15-month Gaza war, a claim supported by former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, said in July: “We recruited thousands of new fighters, strengthened key capabilities, set up ambushes, and made explosives and rockets.”

The announcement highlights Hamas’ efforts to expand its military strength during the conflict.

In his final address as US Secretary of State on January 14, Blinken confirmed Hamas recruited new fighters during the war.

“Indeed, we assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Blinken revealed. “That is a recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war,” he explained.

The statements from US officials and Hamas have raised questions about how the group managed to recruit and train fighters amid the war.

However, military training manuals belonging to Hamas, discovered by an Asharq Al-Awsat correspondent in the rubble of Jabalia camp in northern Gaza, provided partial insight into the group’s methods for preparing its fighters.

The Jabalia refugee camp was the site of a highly intense Israeli military operation that lasted around 100 days. According to Israeli army statements, the operation resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers.

Hamas, however, has remained silent about its own losses during the battles, leaving questions about the full scale of casualties in the prolonged fighting.

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces.

The documents include instructions on using light weapons, guided rockets, and other munitions, aiming to train new fighters for operations against Israeli troops.

The manuals detail shooting techniques, effective firing ranges, and guidelines for targeting Israeli armored vehicles, particularly weaknesses in Merkava tanks to maximize damage and ensure destruction.

They also explain the use of various projectiles, including RBG rockets, PG-7V, F-7, BG-7M, Yassin rockets, tandem warheads, and both Chinese and Russian munitions, as well as the TBG rocket system.

According to Hamas sources speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, such manuals have long been part of Al-Qassam Brigades’ military training.

Recruits have been trained practically at military sites using these guides. The sources added that the manuals found in Jabalia, where clashes took place, were intended to help fighters, particularly new recruits, deal with the Israeli assault.

Hamas sources said the training manuals significantly aided fighters in battles across Gaza, particularly in the north, which faced the heaviest and most extensive Israeli assaults.

“The military capabilities were being eroded,” the sources said.

“However, field commanders quickly addressed this by recruiting new fighters and finding alternatives to manage the battle effectively,” they added.

The sources noted that many fighters recruited during the Gaza war had undergone only basic, fast-track training before being sent to the battlefield. After losing many experienced fighters, the group relied on trainees and loyalists with minimal preparation.

“These new recruits fought alongside seasoned fighters,” the sources said. “They received basic instructions and were taught to use advanced weapons like guided rockets but were mostly skilled with light arms like Kalashnikov rifles.”

Despite limited training, the recruits played a vital role in the conflict.

Sources acknowledged that new recruits had limited field experience and faced challenges but found urban and guerrilla warfare easier. Most of these fighters were involved in battles in northern Gaza, especially in Jabalia and Beit Lahia, while a smaller group fought in Beit Hanoun and took part in operations that killed Israeli soldiers.

Hamas emphasized its recruitment abilities during the first hostage exchange after last Sunday’s ceasefire. Al-Qassam Brigades members made a public appearance in Gaza City, which is in northern Gaza.

Hamas reportedly used a “deception” tactic, sending out vehicles resembling those used to transport hostages while also deploying decoy vehicles from different areas.

They also instructed their members to gather in Saraya Square to distract from the vehicle carrying female prisoners.

The exact number of new recruits remains unclear, though they have been called “2024 recruits” after a statement by Abu Obaida. Israeli media estimates the number at around 4,000 fighters, with some accusing Mohammad Sinwar, brother of the late Yahya Sinwar, of leading the recruitment.

Blinken criticized Israel’s approach in Gaza, saying Hamas can’t be defeated by military means alone. He stressed the need for a political solution to prevent the group’s return.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Mohammad Sinwar is focused on rebuilding the group's military strength.

Hamas’ recruitment during the war and its continued resistance have made it a tough challenge for Israel, which has had to return to areas it thought were cleared of militants, only to face renewed fighting.

Before the war, Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades had about 30,000 fighters in 24 battalions.

Blinken noted that Hamas had replaced the fighters it lost during the conflict and that militants in northern Gaza continue to regroup after Israeli military operations, showing the ongoing challenge for Israel without a political solution.