Iran Guards, Lebanese Hezbollah, Sadr Rivals Discussed Confronting him with Arms

Supporters of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protest at the Green Zone, in Baghdad, Iraq August 29, 2022. (Reuters)
Supporters of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protest at the Green Zone, in Baghdad, Iraq August 29, 2022. (Reuters)
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Iran Guards, Lebanese Hezbollah, Sadr Rivals Discussed Confronting him with Arms

Supporters of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protest at the Green Zone, in Baghdad, Iraq August 29, 2022. (Reuters)
Supporters of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protest at the Green Zone, in Baghdad, Iraq August 29, 2022. (Reuters)

Four leaders of Iraqi Shiite factions met with two members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah party at a house in Baghdad in mid-August.

Just outside, in the heavily fortified Green Zone, supporters of influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were collecting thousands of signatures for a “legal petition” demanding that the judiciary dissolve the parliament.

The meeting tackled the possible scenarios should an armed clash erupt with Sadr.

List of targets
A source informed on the proceedings of the talks said the gatherers reviewed a list of dozens of political and military targets related to the Sadrist movement. Among them were arms depots of the Saraya al-Salam, the armed wing of the movement.

The gatherers had hoped that attacking any of these targets would force Sadr to end his “rebellion” against the state, which he started by allowing his loyalists to storm parliament.

At the meeting, the Iran Guards representative expressed eagerness to “prepare” for a confrontation with Sadr, but he requested that it actually “serve” the interests of the pro-Iran Coordination Framework in “defending the system and legitimacy.”

The Hezbollah representative asked about the repercussions such a confrontation would have on Iraq and whether the situation would unravel further.

Hours later, the gatherers received a brief message from an Iranian official at Tehran’s embassy in Iraq, warning them against going ahead with the plans they shared with the IRGC.

A week later, the gatherers at the meeting would learn that one of the participants had divulged their plans of a confrontation to Sadrists.

On August 20, Sadr would for the first time speak of a plot to kill him. Since then, the cleric and his spokesman would always underscore the term “peaceful revolution” during their statements.

A leading Sadrist, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the Framework has tried to lure the Sadrists into a bloody confrontation

Intra-Iranian division

Meanwhile, four politicians from Framework parties spoke of division inside the IRGC, circles at the Tehran embassy and the intelligence ministry over how to deal with the situation in Iraq.

One of the politicians, a member of Hadi al-Ameri's Badr organization, said Sadr managed to exploit this division in prolonging his “revolt against the system.” The Iranians, meanwhile, tested various means to address the Shiite disputes.

Tehran has resorted to its various means to influence the two main sides of the divide, but the IRGC often obstructed “possibilities drawn up by diplomats at the embassy or by the intelligence agency.”

An Iraqi politician revealed that Iraqi groups have expressed their concern over Iran’s “hesitation” in coming up with a unified stance on how to handle Sadr.

He also revealed that hardline factions had adamantly refused the idea of negotiating with the cleric.

Fickle positions

Members of Shiite armed factions spoke of how Iranian officials have had “fickle and changeable ideas” since the October parliamentary elections in Iraq.

They debated abandoning the “hawks of the Framework and negotiating with Sadr to see where his coup would lead.” They wondered whether they should instead continue to protect the Framework and push it to end Sadr’s political future.

They soon found out that they were dealing with different parties that had contradictory positions on how to manage Iraq.

A faction member, who had fought alongside the Iranians against ISIS in Syria and Iraq’s Tikrit, said the Shiite factions have been “improvising” ever since the killing of Iran’s Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, in a US drone strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

It appears that the Iranians, who have been calling on their Iraqi allies for more patience, do not have a “secret recipe” to resolve the deep dispute between the Shiites, especially since Sadr is seemingly improvising his “revolution” against the Iraqi system that is sponsored by Tehran.

Al-Sistani
Sadr’s actions have laid bare the Iranian divisions. A Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) official warned that the tensions between the pro-Iran factions and the Sadrists may lead to a “street war.”

He said members of armed factions expect that the eruption of clashes between the Framework and Sadrists may lead to similar fighting witnessed in Beirut during Lebanon’s 1975-90 civil war.

Asharq Al-Awsat had spoken with this official in March, two days after the Sadrist movement announced the formation of an alliance with the Sunnis and Kurds to form a new government.

He noted that the Iraqi factions, since their defeat of ISIS, had entrenched themselves in Iraqi institutions and the private sector. Sadr’s actions were threatening to strip them of their vast interests, he warned.

So, negotiations over the formation of a new government at the time would have gone beyond that scope and posed a serious threat to Shiite interests in Iraq, he explained.

Political activists have ruled out the possibility of the eruption of all-out war between the Shiites given how close their bonds are in the community. But Iraqi politicians believe that nearly a year of high tensions is enough to force both sides of the divide to turn to arms.

Asharq Al-Awsat asked five political figures from the Sadrist movement and Framework about the possibility of clashes. They said they were confident that the Religious Authority, Ali al-Sistani, had a decisive stance in store to avert the worst.

Financial and regional interests
Before the Sadr MPs resigned from parliament, main members of the Framework were discussing the fate of their interests should the cleric succeed in upending the Shiite equation in Iraq.

Framework member Hadi al-Ameri was in favor of a more measured approach and refused to escalate the situation when former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Qais Khazali advocated the formation of a government of Framework members that excludes Sadr.

Associates close to Ameri said he believed that this was a “swift way to put an end to the Framework.”

Maliki and his allies boast vast economic interests that they share with Iraqi businessmen and government officials. They believe that these interests will be threatened by Sadr’s political ambitions.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke with businessmen who run major activities in seven Iraqi cities. Some of these activities are tied to influential armed factions and cover hotels, hospitals, residential compounds, malls, farms and others.

“The ball is now in Sadr’s court. Everyone is on alert to protect these interests in any way,” he stressed.

Another businessman revealed that Shiite factions have acquired major investment contracts that would provide Iranians profits in hard currency.

A local investor said Lebanese figures are a “vital” part of the economic activity controlled by the factions, most notably in running tourist companies, malls and hotels.

A member of the Framework said investors active along the network stretching from Tehran to Baghdad to Beirut are worried that the situation in Iraq would deteriorate. This has prompted internal and regional powers to intervene to resolve the political crisis.

He added that he has received hundreds of calls from businessmen and mediators, who are close to the Framework, to inquire about the safety of their interests in the market.

Hezbollah mediation and Maliki’s PhD

Before Sadr’s supporters stormed parliament, a leading member of the Lebanese Hezbollah party had paid a visit to Iraq’s Najaf to mediate between the Framework and Sadrists.

Two Iraqi and Lebanese sources said the party can manage a “temporary settlement until elections, demanded by Sadr, are held.”

The mediation calls for the formation of an interim government that would rule with “enough” powers for two years. Neither the Sadrists nor Maliki would be part of the cabinet.

In return, Hezbollah would offer Maliki a political “lifeline” and allow him to spend a brief break in Beirut’s southern suburbs – a party stronghold – so that he can earn a doctorate in the Arabic language.

He could use his time to deliver lectures to party members and academics to keep him relevant to the political scene.

Sources confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Sadr did not meet with the Hezbollah official. A mediator did, however, deliver the cleric’s firm rejection of the party’s mediation because it allows Maliki to take part in the upcoming elections.

The Hezbollah initiative stirred a heated debate within the framework because the grouping refuses to offer such concessions to Sadr.

Informed sources revealed that the Hezbollah official received a clear message from a Shiite faction that “it was better not to visit Iraq at this time.”

The Iraqi file has since been handed by Hezbollah over to a figure close to the IRGC.



100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 sparked a wave of hope for a brighter future in Syria. But 100 days into the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his allies, the political assessment of the new leadership remains mixed.

Before diving into the performance of the new authorities, it's important to recognize the scale of the challenges facing Syria. The country is deeply fragmented—politically and regionally—still grappling with foreign influence and various forms of external occupation. The economic toll is staggering.

Reconstruction is estimated to cost between $250 billion and $400 billion, and more than half the population remains displaced inside and outside the country. According to the United Nations, 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, and 16.7 million people—roughly three out of four—depend on humanitarian aid.

Against this backdrop, any political actor stepping in after Assad faces an uphill battle.

Yet, the new administration has managed to score some diplomatic wins. Despite its controversial background, the al-Sharaa-led government has succeeded in easing some international concerns and opening lines of communication with key regional and global players.

Several governments have formally recognized the new authority and begun to engage with it. The European Union and the United Kingdom have notably suspended sanctions on selected sectors and entities. France, once a vocal critic of Damascus, recently welcomed al-Sharaa to Paris.

However, Washington has yet to outline a coherent Syria policy under President Donald Trump. While the US has not objected to the Biden administration’s January 2025 move to ease restrictions on Syria’s energy and financial sectors, the broader sanctions remain in place.

Still, the first 100 days under the new leadership offer, at best, cautious optimism. The fundamental questions lie in the administration’s broader political and economic orientation, as well as its vision for Syria’s fractured society. There is no guarantee yet that the country is on a path toward long-term stability.

State Institutions, Security Forces

In the wake of Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership—dominated by former members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—moved swiftly to consolidate control over state institutions and security bodies during the transitional phase.

Following the regime’s collapse, an interim government was formed in December 2024, composed almost entirely of HTS members or close affiliates. The caretaker administration held power until a new cabinet was installed at the end of March 2025.

Al-Sharaa, Syria’s new de facto leader, has since appointed new ministers, governors, and security officials—many of whom have ties to HTS or allied armed factions. In a sweeping overhaul of the country’s military and intelligence apparatus, the new authorities established a Syrian army under their command.

Senior leadership positions were handed to HTS veterans, including long-time commander Marhaf Abu Qusra, who was promoted to general and named defense minister.

Beyond the security sphere, the leadership has moved to entrench its influence over Syria’s economic and social sectors. Key appointments have been made across professional syndicates, chambers of commerce, and civil society organizations—often bypassing elections and installing loyalists from within HTS's inner circle.

The moves suggest a systematic effort to centralize power and reshape Syria’s state apparatus under the new order, raising questions about the future of pluralism and institutional independence.

The absence of a comprehensive democratic process has cast a shadow over Syria’s early post-Assad transition, undermining key initiatives meant to lay the foundation for the country’s future—including the much-anticipated Syrian National Dialogue Conference.

Critics say the conference, billed as a cornerstone for participatory dialogue, was marred by poor planning, limited representation, and rushed sessions that left little room for meaningful debate. Political and civil society actors voiced frustration at being sidelined, warning that the process risked entrenching exclusion rather than fostering unity.

Similar concerns were raised over the interim constitution signed by al-Sharaa. The charter faced sharp criticism over the opaque selection of its drafting committee and the lack of public consultation.

New authorities established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs in late March under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Tasked with overseeing political events and activities, the secretariat is also responsible for shaping national policy strategies and coordinating their implementation. One of its more controversial roles includes repurposing the assets and structures of the defunct Baath Party and former National Progressive Front coalition.

The creation of the body signals an effort by the al-Sharaa administration to centralize political planning and regain control over the ideological tools once wielded by the Assad regime—this time under a new banner.

Neoliberal Agenda for the Economy

Syria’s new leadership has also quietly adopted a sweeping neoliberal economic model—without public consultation or parliamentary debate—signaling a long-term shift in the country’s economic trajectory, despite the government's interim mandate.

Since taking power, the al-Sharaa administration has rolled out policies that go beyond the scope of a transitional government. The economic vision, rooted in privatization, market liberalization, and austerity, has drawn sharp criticism for deepening inequality and placing additional strain on already struggling Syrians.

Key state assets are being sold off to the private sector, subsidies for bread and household gas have been slashed, and spending cuts have hit essential public services—measures that disproportionately affect lower-income families. Analysts say the policies largely benefit Syria’s emerging economic elite and business networks aligned with the new ruling class.

In a controversial move, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade announced the dismissal of nearly one-third of the public-sector workforce.

Officials claimed the cuts targeted employees who were “receiving salaries without performing any actual duties.”

No official figures have been released on the total number affected, but some workers were placed on paid leave for three months pending further evaluation of their employment status.

The decision sparked a wave of protests from laid-off and suspended workers in cities across the country, highlighting growing discontent with the government’s top-down reforms and raising questions about the social cost of its economic overhaul.

Since the start of the year, the al-Sharaa administration has repeatedly pledged to raise public sector wages by 400%, setting a new minimum salary at 1,123,560 Syrian pounds—roughly $86.

While welcomed in principle, the measure remains unimplemented and falls far short of meeting basic living needs. By the end of March 2025, the minimum monthly expenses for a family of five in Damascus were estimated at 8 million pounds, or about $666.

Meanwhile, the government’s decision to reduce tariffs on more than 260 Turkish products has triggered backlash from local producers, particularly in the struggling industrial and agricultural sectors.

Critics say the move has undercut domestic output and opened the floodgates to cheaper Turkish imports. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, Turkish exports to Syria rose by 31.2% in the first quarter of 2025, reaching $508 million, up from $387 million in the same period last year.

Political Fragmentation and Rising Sectarian Tensions

The new government has also made little headway in addressing Syria’s deep political and social fractures.

Efforts to build bridges with the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in the northeast and to engage Druze communities in the southern province of Sweida have largely faltered, facing both logistical hurdles and grassroots resistance.

Recent protests in Sweida, sparked by opposition to the interim constitution and broader government policies, highlight the growing public unrest.

The surge in violence along Syria’s coastal regions, where hundreds of civilians have been killed in recent weeks, has further inflamed sectarian tensions and raised alarms over the country’s fragile stability.

While the latest wave of violence in Syria’s coastal regions was initially triggered by remnants of the former Assad regime targeting civilians and security personnel, rights monitors say the government’s response has fueled further sectarian division.

Under the pretext of rooting out so-called regime “holdouts,” retaliatory violence has escalated, often blurring the line between former loyalists and the broader Alawite community.

Analysts warn that this narrative risks fostering collective blame and deepening intercommunal resentment.

Despite efforts by the al-Sharaa administration to de-escalate tensions, it has largely failed to prevent the violence from spiraling. Clashes and reprisals have continued, particularly affecting Alawite-populated areas, where community members have accused security forces of indiscriminate crackdowns.

Authorities in Damascus have described the incidents as isolated and attributed them to “undisciplined elements,” but critics say the lack of accountability and failure to investigate abuses have only emboldened perpetrators.

Despite pledges to usher in a new era of accountability, the al-Sharaa administration has failed to establish a comprehensive process to prosecute individuals and groups involved in war crimes committed over the past decade.

Rights advocates say such a mechanism could have helped prevent the current wave of retaliatory violence and sectarian polarization, but political observers argue that meaningful justice would likely expose actors the new leadership is reluctant to confront.

Regional Powers Stir the Pot

Amid the internal fragmentation, external actors—most notably Iran, Israel—have sought to exploit the country’s ethnic and sectarian divisions to serve their strategic interests.

Israeli officials have stepped up rhetoric in recent weeks, signaling a willingness to intervene militarily under the pretext of “protecting” Syria’s Druze minority. While the move is seen by many as an attempt to extend Tel Aviv’s influence in southern Syria, key Druze political and social leaders have largely rejected such overtures, reaffirming their national identity and support for Syria’s territorial unity.

Meanwhile, Tehran continues to entrench its presence in areas vacated by Assad’s forces, drawing criticism from opposition groups who accuse Iran of exacerbating sectarian fault lines to solidify its influence.

Despite a power-sharing agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Turkish military operations have persisted in the northeast, targeting Kurdish-controlled territories in apparent defiance of diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region.

Finally, what began in December 2024 with widespread optimism is now clouded by political ambiguity, social unrest, and a lack of clear direction—casting doubt on whether Syria’s post-Assad era can deliver the change many had hoped for.