Syria and the Kurds

 Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
TT

Syria and the Kurds

 Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)

Kurdish leader has said that one of their negotiating counterparts in Damascus questioned whether the registration of Kurdi, the Kurdish language, in the Syrian constitution could one day lead to establishing whistled languages in Syria.

The Syrian-Kurdish negotiator said there shouldn’t be an issue with whistled languages if they could be understood.

This constitutional debate sums up the relationship between Damascus and Qamishli. Over the years, the two sides never came close to each other. Rather, the gap has deepened, suspicion has exacerbated, and the ideology has been imbued with the national dispute.

Presently, Syrian officials heavily doubt the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its primary component, the People's Defense Units (YPG), a mainly Kurdish militia. With US support, the SDF and the YPG control around a quarter of Syria’s territory and most of the country’s wealth.

Syrian officials have accused the SDF and YPG of “treason,” “conspiring with US occupying forces on dividing Syria,” and “having a separatist agenda.”

As for Kurdish officials, they accuse the Syrian regime of “seeking to turn back the clock to pre-2011,” “holding onto a Baathist chauvinistic mentality” and “refusing to make any real political concessions.”

Damascus insists that the SDF and its political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), sign a document that includes a commitment to four key items that include recognizing President Bashar al-Assad as president of the whole country, adhering to Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, respecting the Syrian flag as the only symbol of the country, and supporting the Syrian Army.

Moreover, Damascus is requesting the SDF join the Syrian Army.

This “four-item document” hangs on the gate of the headquarters where negotiations are held, awaiting the signatures.

Meanwhile, Qamishli’s negotiating delegation is clinging to the recognition of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) as a part of Syria and adapting laws, such as the Local Administration Law No. 107, to fit this acknowledgment.

Moreover, they are requesting that the Syrian constitution comes to recognize Kurdi as an official language. Maintaining the SDF’s independence from any future Syrian Army and the equitable distribution of the strategic wealth controlled by the SDF are also among Qamishli’s demands.

In depth, Damascus is betting on time.

It believes that a day will come when the US will withdraw from northeastern Syria as it withdrew from Afghanistan. It is convinced that a day will come when Washington will betray the Kurds, as it has throughout history.

Damascus is also betting on its allies in Tehran and Moscow and its opponents in Ankara.

The Kurds are also counting on time and allies. With the passage of time, they expect for temporary realities to turn into “permanent solutions.”

Additionally, the Kurds are depending on their military might, organizational nerve and ideological stock.

Their agenda is also hinged on Western concerns about the return of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Developments in the Damascus-Qamishli relationship are contingent on what is happening between the Syrian capital and Ankara.

Thanks to Russia, the winds of normalization of ties are blowing hard between Syria and Türkiye. This is a major concern to the Kurds.

During secret negotiations in Moscow, Syrian and Turkish security officials exchanged many conditions that could lead up to the normalization of ties.

Damascus wants Ankara to present a timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. It also wants Türkiye to quit supporting Syrian opposition factions. Retaking Idlib and reopening the strategic M4 highway connecting Aleppo to Latakia, are also among Damascus’ demands.

Moreover, the Syrian capital is asking Türkiye to help in supporting reconstruction efforts and circumventing Western sanctions.

Ankara wants to work against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its Syrian wing, the “YPG.”

The Turkish capital is also seeking to set up security cooperation to control borders. It also wants the return of Syrian refugees, the establishment of safe areas 30 kilometers deep into Syrian territory, and the facilitation of the work of the Syrian Constitutional Committee.

There are demands, counterclaims and deep disputes. But what is certain is that the level of Kurdish concern is growing against the background of preparations to start coordination between Damascus and Ankara to fight the “Kurdish separatist entity.”

A secret Syrian-Turkish-Iranian agreement under Russian auspices on the sidelines of a summit in Tehran last July has seen the three countries exchanging security information.

This allowed for the escalation of Turkish drone strikes against SDF and PKK leaders.

Some strikes even hit the outskirts of US bases east of the Euphrates. For its part, the US kept silent on the strikes because it is unwilling to anger Ankara, a key player whose role is growing in the Ukrainian war.

Moscow’s mediation has also been active between Damascus and Qamishli. However, Moscow has called on SDF leader Mazloum Abdi to head to Damascus to accept and sign the four-item document. It also urged coordinating military deployments between the SDF and the Syrian Army east of the Euphrates.

Moscow is seeking to open a debate between the Syrian government and the opposition through the constitutional gate.

Russia’s latest proposal is to abandon Geneva as a venue for the meetings of the Constitutional Committee, facilitated by the international community and UN envoy Geir Pedersen.

Instead, Russia wants to hold constitutional meetings in a sequential form in Ankara, Moscow, and Isfahan.

Russia’s goal is to turn the constitutional debate into a platform for normalization of ties between Damascus and Ankara, excluding Washington and its allies from the Syrian political track.



Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
TT

Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-affiliated media accounts posted a video showing several of the group’s prominent leaders outside Gaza falling into a “prostration of thanks” as they watched on television the start of the unprecedented assault on Israel -- what Hamas called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.”

The video, recorded in a spacious office, appeared to show Hamas’s top brass monitoring an event they clearly anticipated. Figures like Ismail Haniyeh, then head of the political bureau; his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri; and senior leaders Khaled Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya were all seen in the footage. At the time, the scene fueled speculation about whether the political leadership had prior knowledge or direct involvement in planning the attack.

Yet, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, many of those in the video were unaware of the operation’s exact timing or scope. They knew the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, were preparing a preemptive strike in response to Israeli plans for a limited military campaign -- but the leaders abroad had not been briefed on the final execution.

The sources revealed that the video was filmed in Hamas’s office in Türkiye, where leaders were preparing to travel to Iraq, part of a broader diplomatic initiative. The delegation, which had recently visited Lebanon, was set to engage with other Arab and Islamic countries, including Iran, Kuwait, and Oman, in an effort to widen Hamas’s political footprint. This diplomatic offensive was seen by some in the Palestinian Authority as an attempt to position Hamas as an alternative to the PA and the PLO --an accusation the group denied.

However, without the knowledge of most of the political wing, Hamas’s military leadership in Gaza had a different agenda -one that was kept tightly guarded and may have contributed to the operation’s initial success. In the early hours of the attack, leaders outside Gaza scrambled to contact counterparts in the Strip, asking, “What’s happening?” Some of those asked reportedly responded with confusion or claimed ignorance.

Only a small inner circle knew the full scope of the plan, and even among Gaza-based leadership, not all were informed. Some received instructions before the attack to leave their homes and relocate to secure areas.

As Israel’s war on Gaza enters its twentieth month and continues to target Hamas leaders, the question now is: who remains from the core of October 7, and who truly knew what?

While most of Hamas’s political leadership was excluded from operational details, some senior figures had given strategic backing to the idea of a preemptive strike. Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Mahmoud al-Zahar were among those who supported military action to derail reported Israeli assassination plans targeting Hamas figures.

The name most closely linked to the attack remains Yahya Sinwar, who headed Hamas in Gaza at the time. Though not the originator of the idea, he was the operation’s chief engineer and maintained strict control over its planning. He handpicked those who were fully briefed and sanctioned the final plan.

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, Sinwar was elevated to head of the political bureau -- a symbolic challenge to Israel. But just months later, in October 2024, Sinwar was killed in a surprise clash in Tel al-Sultan, western Rafah, alongside members of his inner circle.

Haniyeh, for his part, had been focused on expanding Hamas’s diplomatic reach. He had only a vague idea about the October 7 operation, believing it would be limited. He was assassinated in Tehran as well, in the same month as his successor.

Khalil al-Hayya, now leading the political bureau and negotiations, was better informed than many of his peers but not to the extent of the military planners. Ruhi Mushtaha, one of the few civilians aware of the operation’s breadth and timing, was killed in July 2024, as was Saleh al-Arouri, who was targeted earlier that year in Lebanon.

Nizar Awadallah, who left Gaza shortly before the attack, remains active in back-channel negotiations and is considered a hardline figure inside Hamas. Though largely behind the scenes, he was reportedly better informed than most on the political level.

On the military front, few names carry as much weight as Mohammed Deif, long-time commander of the Qassam Brigades. Deif, who survived numerous Israeli assassination attempts over the years, was finally killed in July 2024. Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s younger brother, was considered the true mastermind of the operation and played a central role in its planning and execution. He too was killed in a targeted strike in Khan Younis, alongside his brother.

Other key figures, like Marwan Issa, who had long served as Deif’s deputy, died in March 2024 after being sidelined by illness. Several brigade commanders who oversaw preparations and joint drills with other factions, including the Islamic Jihad, were also eliminated. Only one high-ranking commander, Ezzedine al-Haddad of Gaza City, is believed to still be alive. Known as “The Fox” for his ability to evade Israeli intelligence, he continues to operate underground.