Syria and the Kurds

 Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
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Syria and the Kurds

 Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)

Kurdish leader has said that one of their negotiating counterparts in Damascus questioned whether the registration of Kurdi, the Kurdish language, in the Syrian constitution could one day lead to establishing whistled languages in Syria.

The Syrian-Kurdish negotiator said there shouldn’t be an issue with whistled languages if they could be understood.

This constitutional debate sums up the relationship between Damascus and Qamishli. Over the years, the two sides never came close to each other. Rather, the gap has deepened, suspicion has exacerbated, and the ideology has been imbued with the national dispute.

Presently, Syrian officials heavily doubt the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its primary component, the People's Defense Units (YPG), a mainly Kurdish militia. With US support, the SDF and the YPG control around a quarter of Syria’s territory and most of the country’s wealth.

Syrian officials have accused the SDF and YPG of “treason,” “conspiring with US occupying forces on dividing Syria,” and “having a separatist agenda.”

As for Kurdish officials, they accuse the Syrian regime of “seeking to turn back the clock to pre-2011,” “holding onto a Baathist chauvinistic mentality” and “refusing to make any real political concessions.”

Damascus insists that the SDF and its political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), sign a document that includes a commitment to four key items that include recognizing President Bashar al-Assad as president of the whole country, adhering to Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, respecting the Syrian flag as the only symbol of the country, and supporting the Syrian Army.

Moreover, Damascus is requesting the SDF join the Syrian Army.

This “four-item document” hangs on the gate of the headquarters where negotiations are held, awaiting the signatures.

Meanwhile, Qamishli’s negotiating delegation is clinging to the recognition of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) as a part of Syria and adapting laws, such as the Local Administration Law No. 107, to fit this acknowledgment.

Moreover, they are requesting that the Syrian constitution comes to recognize Kurdi as an official language. Maintaining the SDF’s independence from any future Syrian Army and the equitable distribution of the strategic wealth controlled by the SDF are also among Qamishli’s demands.

In depth, Damascus is betting on time.

It believes that a day will come when the US will withdraw from northeastern Syria as it withdrew from Afghanistan. It is convinced that a day will come when Washington will betray the Kurds, as it has throughout history.

Damascus is also betting on its allies in Tehran and Moscow and its opponents in Ankara.

The Kurds are also counting on time and allies. With the passage of time, they expect for temporary realities to turn into “permanent solutions.”

Additionally, the Kurds are depending on their military might, organizational nerve and ideological stock.

Their agenda is also hinged on Western concerns about the return of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Developments in the Damascus-Qamishli relationship are contingent on what is happening between the Syrian capital and Ankara.

Thanks to Russia, the winds of normalization of ties are blowing hard between Syria and Türkiye. This is a major concern to the Kurds.

During secret negotiations in Moscow, Syrian and Turkish security officials exchanged many conditions that could lead up to the normalization of ties.

Damascus wants Ankara to present a timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. It also wants Türkiye to quit supporting Syrian opposition factions. Retaking Idlib and reopening the strategic M4 highway connecting Aleppo to Latakia, are also among Damascus’ demands.

Moreover, the Syrian capital is asking Türkiye to help in supporting reconstruction efforts and circumventing Western sanctions.

Ankara wants to work against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its Syrian wing, the “YPG.”

The Turkish capital is also seeking to set up security cooperation to control borders. It also wants the return of Syrian refugees, the establishment of safe areas 30 kilometers deep into Syrian territory, and the facilitation of the work of the Syrian Constitutional Committee.

There are demands, counterclaims and deep disputes. But what is certain is that the level of Kurdish concern is growing against the background of preparations to start coordination between Damascus and Ankara to fight the “Kurdish separatist entity.”

A secret Syrian-Turkish-Iranian agreement under Russian auspices on the sidelines of a summit in Tehran last July has seen the three countries exchanging security information.

This allowed for the escalation of Turkish drone strikes against SDF and PKK leaders.

Some strikes even hit the outskirts of US bases east of the Euphrates. For its part, the US kept silent on the strikes because it is unwilling to anger Ankara, a key player whose role is growing in the Ukrainian war.

Moscow’s mediation has also been active between Damascus and Qamishli. However, Moscow has called on SDF leader Mazloum Abdi to head to Damascus to accept and sign the four-item document. It also urged coordinating military deployments between the SDF and the Syrian Army east of the Euphrates.

Moscow is seeking to open a debate between the Syrian government and the opposition through the constitutional gate.

Russia’s latest proposal is to abandon Geneva as a venue for the meetings of the Constitutional Committee, facilitated by the international community and UN envoy Geir Pedersen.

Instead, Russia wants to hold constitutional meetings in a sequential form in Ankara, Moscow, and Isfahan.

Russia’s goal is to turn the constitutional debate into a platform for normalization of ties between Damascus and Ankara, excluding Washington and its allies from the Syrian political track.



This Is How Ukraine Has Countered Russia’s Iran-Designed Drones

An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
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This Is How Ukraine Has Countered Russia’s Iran-Designed Drones

An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)

Ukraine is preparing to dispatch military drone specialists to Gulf states to help them fend off Iranian-designed drones -- something the Ukrainian army has been doing since the start of Russia's invasion.

The military assault launched in February 2022 spawned a cat-and-mouse game of aerial drone warfare that has forced both sides to constantly innovate -- or perish.

Moscow has dramatically scaled-up the production and sophistication of its drones, based on Iranian-designed Shaheds drones that Tehran has launched at Israel and Gulf states over the last week.

That has forced Ukraine to develop cheap and versatile defense systems that allows it to down hundreds of drones in a single barrage -- experience Kyiv says is unmatched anywhere in the world.

- Interceptors vs Shaheds -

Private Ukrainian arms companies have spearheaded the development of drone interceptors -- cheap, light single-use drones that are designed to knock Russian unmanned aerial vehicles out of the sky.

The interceptors -- usually winged or propeller-like helicopters -- are mainly controlled with inbuilt cameras that beam real-time images to pilots on the ground.

Late last year, President Volodymyr Zelensky released grainy, black-and-white images recorded from interceptors as they crashed into Shaheds. He has instructed manufacturers to produce up to 1,000 a day.

This method of air defense is becoming increasingly prevalent: Ukraine's commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky said this week that some 70 percent of all drones launched by Russia at Kyiv and its surrounding region in February were downed by interceptors.

Individual interceptors can cost around as little as $700 or as much as $12,000. But even the most expensive varieties are a fraction of the price of a single missile fired from US Patriot air defense batteries, which are estimated to cost more than $1 million.

"The warfare shifted a lot. First it was drones against humans, soldiers and tanks. Now it's mostly drones against drones," Konstantyn, a deputy commander of an anti-aerial unit deployed in eastern Ukraine recently explained to AFP.

- Anti-aircraft guns, pick-ups -

Ukrainian air defense units also deploy traditional, tried-and-tested weapons: anti-aircraft guns.

These come both in the form of heavy machine guns set on wheels, and make-shift solutions, where troops attach any high-caliber weapon they have onto the back of a pick-up truck.

AFP journalists in Kyiv have seen -- and heard -- these air defense units work during nighttime Russian attacks.

Ukrainian troops also deploy man-portable air-defense systems: guided surface-to-air missiles that are shoulder-launched and originally designed to take down low flying aerial targets.

These portable weapons are used alongside tracking and radar systems.

- F-16s, choppers, Yaks -

Ukraine lobbied its Western allies for supplies of advanced fighter jets for months before finally receiving its first batch of F-16s in mid-2024.

Kyiv has not received many F-16s and there have been reports of issues in training Ukrainian pilots but they are among the aerial arsenal that Ukraine uses to down Shaheds.

The Ukrainian air force also deploys ageing Soviet-era aircraft to down Russian drones, including helicopters like the Mi-24 and Mi-8 or the Yak-52 plane.

- Electronic jamming -

Ukraine has for years deployed a variety of electronic systems that disorientate the navigation systems used by Shaheds to lock onto and fly towards their targets.

By scrambling the networks used by Shaheds inside Ukraine's borders, these means of electronic warfare force Moscow's drones to alter their course and fly back towards Russia.

According to Ukraine air force data, the military has been consistently intercepting or shooting down more than 80 percent of all incoming Russian drones -- hundreds of which are fired every night.


A Son of Iran’s Late Supreme Leader Is a Possible Candidate to Replace His Father as War Rages

Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, center, attends the annual Quds, or Jerusalem Day rally in Tehran, Iran, on May 31, 2019. (AP)
Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, center, attends the annual Quds, or Jerusalem Day rally in Tehran, Iran, on May 31, 2019. (AP)
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A Son of Iran’s Late Supreme Leader Is a Possible Candidate to Replace His Father as War Rages

Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, center, attends the annual Quds, or Jerusalem Day rally in Tehran, Iran, on May 31, 2019. (AP)
Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, center, attends the annual Quds, or Jerusalem Day rally in Tehran, Iran, on May 31, 2019. (AP)

Mojtaba Khamenei, a son of Iran's late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has long been considered a contender to the post of the country's next paramount ruler — even before an Israeli strike killed his father at the start of the war last week and despite the fact he's has never been elected or appointed to a government position.

A secretive figure within the Islamic Republic, Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen publicly since Saturday, when the Israeli airstrike targeting the supreme leader's offices killed his 86-year-old father. Also killed were the younger Khamenei's wife, Zahra Haddad Adel, who came from a family long associated with the country's theocracy.

Khamenei is believed to still be alive and has likely has gone into hiding as American and Israeli airstrikes continue to pound Iran, though state-run Iranian media have not reported on his whereabouts.

Profile of Khamenei's son rises after airstrike

Mojtaba Khamenei's name continues to circulate as a possible candidate to replace his father, something that had been criticized in the past as potentially creating a theocratic version of Iran's former hereditary monarchy.

But now with his father and wife considered by hard-liners as martyrs in the war against America and Israel, Khamenei's stock likely has risen with the aging clerics of the 88-seat Assembly of Experts who will select the country's next supreme leader.

Whoever becomes the leader will gain control of an Iranian military now at war and a stockpile of highly enriched uranium that could be used to build a nuclear weapon — should he choose to decree it.

Khamenei had occupied a similar role to that of Ahmad Khomeini, a son of Iran's first Supreme Leader Khomeini — "a combination of aide-de-camp, confidant, gatekeeper and power broker,” according to United Against Nuclear Iran, a US-based pressure group.

Born into dissent

Born in 1969 in the city of Mashhad, some 10 years before the 1979 revolution that would sweep Iran, Khamenei grew up as his father agitated against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran.

An official biography on Ali Khamenei's life recounts one moment when the shah's secret police, the SAVAK, broke into their home and beat the cleric. Woken up after, Mojtaba and the rest of Khamenei's children were told their father was going on vacation.

“But I told them, ‘There is no need to lie.’ I told them the truth,” the elder Khamenei was quoted as saying.

After the fall of the shah, Khamenei's family moved to Tehran, Iran's capital. Khamenei would go on to fight in the Iran-Iraq war with the Habib ibn Mazahir Battalion, a division of Iran's paramilitary Revolutionary Guard that would see several of its members ascend to powerful intelligence positions within the force, likely with the backing of the Khamenei family.

His father became supreme leader in 1989 and soon Mojtaba Khamenei and his family had access to the billions of dollars and business assets spread across Iran's many bonyads, or foundations funded from state industries and other wealth once held by the shah.

Power rises with his father's

His own power rose alongside his father's, working within his offices in downtown Tehran. US diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks in the late 2000s began referring to the younger Khamenei as “the power behind the robes.” One recounted an allegation that Khamenei actually tapped his own father's phone, served as his “principal gatekeeper” and had been forming his own power base within the country.

Khamenei “is widely viewed within the regime as a capable and forceful leader and manager who may someday succeed to at least a share of national leadership; his father may also see him in that light,” a 2008 cable read, also noting his lack of theological qualifications and age.

“Mojtaba is, however, due to his skills, wealth, and unmatched alliances, reportedly seen by a number of regime insiders as a plausible candidate for shared leadership of Iran upon his father’s demise, whether that demise is soon or years in the future,” it said.

Khamenei has worked closely with Iran's paramilitary Revolutionary Guard, both with commanders of its expeditionary Quds Force and its all-volunteer Basij that violently suppressed nationwide protests in January, the US Treasury has said.

The United States sanctioned him in 2019 during the first term of USPresident Donald Trump over working to “advance his father’s destabilizing regional ambitions and oppressive domestic objectives.”

That includes allegations that Khamenei from behind the scenes supported the election of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 and his disputed re-election in 2009 that sparked the Green Movement protests.

Mahdi Karroubi, who was a presidential candidate in 2005 and 2009, denounced Khamenei as “a master's son” and alleged he interfered in both votes. His father reportedly at the time said Khamenei was “a master himself, not a master’s son."

Powers of supreme leader at stake

There has been only one other transfer of power in the office of supreme leader of Iran, the paramount decision-maker since the country’s 1979 revolution. Khomeini died at age 86 after being the figurehead of the revolution and leading Iran through its eight-year war with Iraq.

Now the new leader will come on board after the 12-day war with Israel and as a US-Israeli war with Iran is seeking to eliminate Iran's nuclear threat and military power, hoping also the Iranian people will rise up against the Iranian theocracy.

The supreme leader is at the heart of Iran’s complex power-sharing theocracy and has final say over all matters of state. He also serves as the commander-in-chief of the country’s military and the Guard, a paramilitary force that the United States designated a terrorist organization in 2019, and which his father empowered during his rule.

The Guard, which has led the self-described “Axis of Resistance,” a series of militant groups and allies across the Middle East meant to counter the US and Israel, also has extensive wealth and holdings in Iran. It also controls the country's ballistic missile arsenal.


Iran's 'Axis of Resistance' under Threat after US-Israeli War

Members of Iraq's pro-Iran paramilitary group Kataib Hezbollah march with the group's banners in a funeral for slain fighters killed in a US-Israeli airstrike on their headquarters in al-Qaim near the border with Syria, during a ceremony in Baghdad on March 2, 2026. (AFP)
Members of Iraq's pro-Iran paramilitary group Kataib Hezbollah march with the group's banners in a funeral for slain fighters killed in a US-Israeli airstrike on their headquarters in al-Qaim near the border with Syria, during a ceremony in Baghdad on March 2, 2026. (AFP)
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Iran's 'Axis of Resistance' under Threat after US-Israeli War

Members of Iraq's pro-Iran paramilitary group Kataib Hezbollah march with the group's banners in a funeral for slain fighters killed in a US-Israeli airstrike on their headquarters in al-Qaim near the border with Syria, during a ceremony in Baghdad on March 2, 2026. (AFP)
Members of Iraq's pro-Iran paramilitary group Kataib Hezbollah march with the group's banners in a funeral for slain fighters killed in a US-Israeli airstrike on their headquarters in al-Qaim near the border with Syria, during a ceremony in Baghdad on March 2, 2026. (AFP)

Iran once boasted that it controlled four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sanaa in an alliance dubbed the "Axis of Resistance".

But the network -- long used as a regional force against Israel -- has been weakened since the Gaza war and now risks collapse, upending the regional balance, analysts said.

"The axis of resistance is over," said Atlantic Council researcher Nicholas Blanford.

Two days after Hamas launched its October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said his country's response would "change the Middle East".

Backed by Israel's powerful ally, the United States, the Israeli leader did not just intend to defeat the Iran-backed Palestinian group, but the entire axis.

The weakening of Lebanon's Hezbollah after its 2024 war with Israel and the fall of Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad paved the way for Israel to aim directly at Iran.

Since Saturday, the country has been the target of a major US-Israeli offensive, which even killed Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei.

Most of the axis's members like Hezbollah, Yemen's Houthis or Iraqi Shiite groups are "trying to understand how to survive", Renad Mansour, senior research fellow at the Chatham House international affairs think-tank, told AFP.

- 'Defensive approach' -

Since deciding to enter the war by launching rockets at Israel on Monday, Hezbollah brought a major Israeli retaliation, which saw bombings across Lebanon and an Israeli ground incursion to create a buffer zone.

"Naim Qassem doesn't want to get involved in this fight," Blanford, who wrote a book on Hezbollah, said, referring to the group's chief.

However, the analyst said Tehran may have forced Qassem to intervene.

Iraq, a longtime battlefield between Washington and Tehran, saw Iran-backed groups claim dozens of drone attacks on US bases, though many were downed.

To Mansour, these groups lack "the necessary military capabilities to inflict significant damage" while the most prominent ones are now "intertwined in the Iraqi state".

The Houthis in Yemen have so far stayed away from the conflict.

"The Houthis are in a calculated holding pattern, or perhaps a defensive approach," said Ahmed Nagi, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group.

However, Nagi believes that while the axis "is facing an existential threat, that does not necessarily mean it will disintegrate".

"The network operates on more than a military level; its political, social and religious ties remain deeply rooted among its groups and are unlikely to unravel because of battlefield setbacks alone."

The regional upheavals will depend on the outcome of this war, particularly the collapse or survival of the Iranian regime.