Syria’s Tragedy… A Bottomless Abyss

Women walk near rubble inside the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp on the southern outskirts of Damascus, Syria November 2, 2022. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi
Women walk near rubble inside the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp on the southern outskirts of Damascus, Syria November 2, 2022. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi
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Syria’s Tragedy… A Bottomless Abyss

Women walk near rubble inside the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp on the southern outskirts of Damascus, Syria November 2, 2022. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi
Women walk near rubble inside the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp on the southern outskirts of Damascus, Syria November 2, 2022. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi

Every time we think that the Syrian crisis has hit rock bottom, we discover that we’re wrong. The latest cholera outbreak in the war-torn nation and refugee camps in neighboring countries is yet another evidence that the Syrian crisis is a bottomless abyss.

This was a Western diplomat’s comment after returning from Syria, a country he had visited from time to time in recent years as part of his work as an envoy.

According to the diplomat, years of war in Syria resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, half the population abandoning their homes, and more than seven million IDPs. Two million IDPs in Syria are staying at random camps, while around seven million refugees have sought asylum in neighboring countries.

Moreover, Syria’s infrastructure has sustained severe damage, health services are near non-existent, schools remain shut, and the country is divided into three microstates hosting foreign armies and militias.

“We previously thought that the painful stalemate was the Syrian rock bottom, then the situation sank further with the spread of the coronavirus pandemic and the economic collapse in neighboring Lebanon,” the diplomat noted, adding that the war in Ukraine had also increased the suffering of Syrians in all regions.

“The Ukraine crisis had overshadowed the Syrian crisis before the international community,” they explained.

Syria’s new rock bottom is a dire cholera outbreak. According to the UN, this epidemic is spreading rapidly throughout Syria and Syrian refugee camps, especially in Lebanon. More than 24,000 suspected cholera cases have been reported, infections have been confirmed in all 14 Syrian governorates, and at least 80 people have died.

The UN has raised the alarm, appealing to donors to provide funds for health services. But the latest numbers could have been promising. The money donors promised to deliver at the previous conference was about four billion dollars, of which only a third has been deposited. At best, half of the donations will reach Syria by the end of 2022.

Donor countries are preoccupied with economic crises, collapses, and pledges in the Ukrainian war.

Syria is already forgotten. For the first time, the Brussels Conference on Syria was not held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. Also, high-profile political meetings on Syria were not convened.

Even the constitutional committee meeting, which included talks among the Syrian factions in Geneva, was shelved. Moscow had canceled the meeting in protest of the position of Switzerland and the West in Ukraine.

The illusion of a political process with international facilitation faded. The mirage of global sponsorship for the implementation of Resolution 2254 has dissipated.

In the face of US-Western divisions, Ukraine and global economic crises emerge as a priority, leaving no room for significant initiatives in Syria.

The greatest ambition for Syria now lies in small steps here and there. Neighboring countries are looking for steps to stop the Syrian crisis from slipping past borders. They are taking measures to stop drug smuggling, terrorism, and the positioning of militias.

Major powers lowered the ceiling of their Syrian diplomacy, searching for small trade-offs instead.

What can Moscow and Damascus offer if Washington and Brussels agree to increase the share of funds allocated to early recovery projects? What price can be expected if Washington exempts some medical gear from its sanctions list or if a European capital increases the number of visas granted to Syrian diplomats? What guarantees does Damascus provide if some refugees return?

Over ten years, the discourse around enabling “regime change” in Syria shifted to “changing Damascus’ behavior” and “improving the Syrian government’s conduct.”

Talk of dismantling refugee camps shifted toward improving the quality of these camps for the displaced.

As for the reconstruction of Syria, ambitious plans for rebuilding the nation were reduced to repairing a school here and there, renovating rooms in hospitals, extending water networks, or installing faucets in tanks.

Furthermore, UN Security Council permanent members are talking about improving humanitarian aid access across the lines between the three micros-states present in Syria instead of talking about a united Syria and complete sovereignty over borders and airspace.

Military contacts between the major and regional actors are no longer aimed at discussing military withdrawals and exits from Syria. Rather, they are limited to “preventing clashes” between them and finding mechanisms for “coexistence” between rivals.

In the face of such a scene, a cholera outbreak is hardly reaching the bottom line of the Syrian tragedy.



Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
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Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)

The sound of gunfire, barrel bombs, and stray bullets is nothing new in Sudan. What’s new is that the violence has moved from the outskirts to the capital, Khartoum. This shift forced the government and military to relocate to a temporary capital in Port Sudan, nearly 1,000 kilometers away on the Red Sea coast.
Past conflicts were seen as rebellions against the state, but they stemmed from a deeper struggle: the “center” holds all the power and resources, while the “margins” are left with nothing.
These wars have always been about demands for rights and equality.
Under Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s wars shifted from demands for rights to a “religious war” between the Muslim north and the Christian or secular south. This led to South Sudan’s secession and the creation of a new state that joined the United Nations. But what drives the conflicts that continue to devastate Sudan?
Analysts say the root cause is the lack of a national vision and the failure to recognize Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Without a unified political and economic framework, this diversity has been ignored.
The current war, though fought between two formal armies, stems from the same issues of marginalization and exclusion. These problems sparked Sudan’s first rebellion in 1955, led by the Anya-Nya 1 forces, named after the cobra snake.
The Naivasha Agreement
Sudan’s first civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but reignited in 1983 after former President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia law. This sparked a rebellion led by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The conflict escalated into a “jihadist” war as Islamist forces framed it as a battle against “enemies of the faith.” The fighting lasted for years, killing more than two million people.
Unable to secure a military victory, the government signed the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. The deal granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, with a five-year transitional period to decide between unity or independence.
John Garang briefly became Sudan’s First Vice President during this period but died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His deputy, Salva Kiir, succeeded him and led South Sudan to a 2011 referendum, where the region voted for independence. South Sudan became a new nation, taking a third of Sudan’s land, a quarter of its people, and most of its resources.
Meanwhile, conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, with rebels accusing the government of marginalization. The war turned ethnic when the government armed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to fight African-origin rebel groups. One Janjaweed leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, later became the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Darfur war claimed 300,000 lives. Al-Bashir’s government was accused of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, leading to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Bashir and three senior officials that remain in effect.
Chasing Peace Across Capitals
In May 2006, Sudan’s government signed a peace deal in Abuja with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Arko Minnawi. However, the movement split, and another faction, led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, rejected the deal and continued fighting from Jebel Marra in central Darfur.
Minnawi briefly joined the government as an assistant to President Omar al-Bashir but later rebelled again, claiming he was treated as a "kitchen helper" rather than a serious political partner.
Efforts to negotiate peace moved between capitals. In 2011, some groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which promised power and wealth-sharing, but fighting continued.
In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government signed a new peace agreement in Juba with key armed groups, including Minnawi’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim.
The deal gave Minnawi the role of Darfur governor and Ibrahim the post of finance minister. Despite these accords, true peace remains out of reach.
A New Southern Conflict
War broke out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two regions given a right to “popular consultation” under the Naivasha Agreement to decide their future. The SPLM-North, an offshoot of the southern SPLM, took up arms again.
The SPLM-N split into two factions: one led by Malik Agar, now a deputy in Sudan’s Sovereign Council, who signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, controls Kauda in South Kordofan and continues sporadic fighting.
Eastern Sudan also saw conflict in the 1990s, with groups like the Beja Congress and Free Lions opposing Bashir’s regime. These groups later signed the Asmara Peace Agreement, gaining shares of power and wealth.
In April 2019, months of protests forced the military to oust President Omar al-Bashir. But sit-ins continued, and a violent crackdown killed hundreds, drawing condemnation as a horrific crime against civilians.
Under public pressure, the military signed a constitutional declaration in August 2019, agreeing to share power with civilians. This led to a transitional government with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti.
War of the Generals
On October 25, 2021, Sudan's army leader overthrew Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s civilian government in a coup. Under pressure from peaceful protests, the general later agreed to a framework agreement with civilian leaders, promising a return to civilian rule and preventing the return of the Islamist regime.
However, supporters of the former regime undermined the deal, causing tensions between the army and the RSF, leading to war.
On April 15, 2023, gunfire broke out in southern Khartoum, marking the start of the ongoing conflict. The RSF accused the army of attacking its camps, while some claim Islamist cells within the army targeted the RSF, forcing it to choose between surrender or war.
Miscalculations
The war was expected to end quickly due to the army’s stronger military. However, the RSF surprised the army by using urban warfare tactics to take control of key military bases and government buildings, including the presidential palace.
The government moved to Port Sudan, while Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was trapped for over three months before escaping.
The RSF expanded its control over Darfur, western Sudan, and the central Gezira region, holding about 70% of the country. After nearly two years of fighting, the army regained some areas, but the RSF still controls large parts of Sudan and continues fierce fighting, with the war still ongoing.
The Worst Humanitarian Crisis
The war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands and triggered what the UN calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in history." More than 11 million people are displaced within Sudan, while around 3 million have fled to neighboring countries. Over half of Sudan’s population, about 25 million people, face severe food insecurity.
Negotiations have failed, with both sides refusing to return to talks after the Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration collapsed, largely due to the army’s and its supporters' refusal to engage.
Root Causes
Former Sovereign Council member and deputy head of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Tagadum,” Al-Hadi Idris blames the war on Sudan’s failure to agree on a “national development plan” since independence.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he says the main reasons for the conflict are the failure to implement fair development, achieve justice, and the lack of resolution on key issues like the role of religion in politics, national identity, and military involvement in government.
Idris argues that addressing these issues is crucial to ending the war for good.
Mohamed Abdel-Hakim, a leader in the Unionist Gathering, believes the wars stem from unequal development and citizenship.
He says resolving issues like marginalization, protecting people’s rights, and replacing oppressive regimes with democratic governance is key to stopping Sudan’s long-running conflicts.
Abdel-Hakim also calls for reforming the military to create a professional, national army focused on protecting the constitution and civilian leadership, with strict oversight to prevent the army from becoming politicized.