Seven US Betrayals of Kurds within a Century… Will It Fail Them Again in Syria?

A US patrol monitors a position between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye in the countryside of Hasakah, east of the Euphrates, in December 2021. (AFP)
A US patrol monitors a position between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye in the countryside of Hasakah, east of the Euphrates, in December 2021. (AFP)
TT

Seven US Betrayals of Kurds within a Century… Will It Fail Them Again in Syria?

A US patrol monitors a position between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye in the countryside of Hasakah, east of the Euphrates, in December 2021. (AFP)
A US patrol monitors a position between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye in the countryside of Hasakah, east of the Euphrates, in December 2021. (AFP)

If the reaction to Turkish incursions or continued aerial bombardment against Kurdish targets in northern Syria does not meet Kurdish expectations and demands, it wouldn’t be the first time Kurds are betrayed by the US or the West.

In the past century, the global and regional balance of power has changed. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, France and Britain retreated in the world and the Arab region, and US influence grew.

However, four issues remained “fixed,” namely:

First, 40 million Kurds continue to dream of establishing landlocked independent entities or administrations in the four countries in which they live: Türkiye, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Second, these four countries, despite the many differences between them, have found consensus on coordinating against the Kurds.

Third, major or regional powers have long used Kurds as a tool in their struggles against each other, and to achieve certain goals. For example, the US-led International Coalition has used the Kurds as an essential component in the war against ISIS.

Fourth, US administrations changed, but the betrayals were repeated. Kurdish leaderships changed in different geographical areas, and the wounds of those betrayals remained.

Disappointments and stings

Here is a reminder of seven Kurdish disappointments and Western-American stings over a hundred years:

1 - After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its defeat in World War I, the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 allocated space for the Kurds in Türkiye to establish autonomy over a region outside Syria, Iraq and Iran.

After Ankara's opposition, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s rise to power and with Washington’s support, the Kurds got a first taste of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which opened the door for Paris and London to share the Fertile Crescent in Syria and Iraq, and the promises of the Treaty of Sevres went unheeded.

The region promised to Kurds by the great powers in eastern Anatolia, had finally gone to the fledgling Republic of Türkiye.

As is the case with the US, Britain flirted with Ataturk by saying that it preferred the relationship with Ankara at the expense of supporting the Kurdish “Republic of Ararat.”

This led to a large exodus of Kurds from southern Türkiye to neighboring countries, especially northeastern Syria.

Later, Baathist Damascus often used the issue of immigration in its rhetoric against the Kurds and repeatedly said: “They are not Syrians.”

2 - After decades of Kurdish revolution and immigration in Türkiye, the US supported Iraqi Kurds against the regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim after he came to power in 1958, and then supported the coup that overthrew him in February 1963.

The new Baathist regime in Iraq took a tough stance on the Kurds. When Iraqi Baathists grew closer to the Soviet Union, Washington cooperated with Tehran, which was ruled at that time by the Shah, in arming and supporting the Kurds with the aim of destabilizing the situation in Iraq.

The support to the Kurds was repeated in the 70’s, not with the aim of establishing a Kurdish state, but rather to create unrest inside Iraq to impede any Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement after the signing of the Camp David Accords and Egypt’s exit from the Arab equation.

According to former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, military support for the Kurds was never aimed at championing the Kurds as much as it aimed at weakening Baghdad’s rule.

The Pike Committee’s report to the US Congress included details like Kissinger’s statement and an assertion that “this policy was not transferred to our clients (the Kurds), whom we encouraged to continue fighting.”

Later, the US sponsored an agreement between Saddam Hussein, who represented President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, and the Shah of Iran in December 1975. Tehran then abandoned its support for the Iraqi Kurds, with the blessing of the administration of the new US President Gerald Ford.

3 - Iraqi Kurds were subjected to more than one blow by the US in the 1980s and 90s. The administration of President Roland Reagan was silent on Baghdad's use of chemical weapons in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Blows of the 1990s

As for the George H. W. Bush administration, it encouraged the Iraqis to move against Baghdad after the Gulf War in 1991, and then abandoned them.

Bush himself called on the Iraqi army and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, to force the Saddam Hussein to step down, but he did not do much when the Shiites in southern Iraq and the Kurds near the borders of Syria rose up.

However, the US imposed an air embargo that allowed the Kurds to flourish in the second half of the 90s.

This rise of Kurds was met with Syrian-Turkish-Iranian coordination to prevent its transformation into a Kurdish “microstate” on the borders that would inspire fellow Kurdish countrymen in Syria, Türkiye and Iran.

4 - After the events of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq. There was coordination with the Kurds and their political leaders, and they became among the main winners from the change of the Iraqi regime. Their gains were further reinforced when the US relied on them in the war against ISIS.

In 2017, the former president of the Kurdistan region, Masoud Barzani, wanted to benefit from the support of the US-led International Coalition by taking a step in establishing a Kurdish entity, so he wanted to organize a referendum for self-determination and independence for the region.

The shock or betrayal came when the US clearly declared its reservations about this step.

5 - After the change in Iraq in 2003 and the emergence of the Kurds, the aspirations of the Syrian Kurds revived and they rose up in March 2004, but their movement did not receive any Western backing.

Years earlier, when Türkiye mobilized its army on the borders of Syria in 1998 and demanded the expulsion of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, from Damascus. Washington and its allies supported Ankara’s position, knowing that the PKK is on Western terrorist lists.

Ocalan left Syria, and the PKK were subjected to strikes by security coordination between Damascus and Ankara. This was until the eruption of protests in Syria in 2011, when Damascus decided to facilitate the emergence of the role of the Kurds against other Syrian opposition.

Plan backfires

6 - Damascus’ plan to use the Kurds backfired. The Kurds became strong and Damascus weakened.

The US joined the Kurds in the fight against ISIS, which expanded after 2014, and provided them with military support and air cover. The US relied mainly on the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which Ankara considers an extension of the PKK.

After ISIS was defeated by the Kurds and the International Coalition, an umbrella was formed that allowed the Kurds to establish a self-administration and a military force that would soon control a quarter of Syria and most of strategic resources found in the country’s northeast.

The emergence of this entity called “Rojava” worried Ankara, Damascus and Tehran.

Türkiye shifted its priorities in Syria, from “toppling the regime” to expanding in Syrian territory.

It concluded settlements with Russia in 2016, 2018 and 2019 that focused on taking apart the Kurdish entity in northern Syria and preventing its access to Mediterranean waters.

This happened with Russian support and under US silence. But the new betrayal happened later.

7 - At the end of 2019, former US President Donald Trump suddenly decided to withdraw his forces from the borders of Syria and Türkiye.

The Kurds considered this decision a betrayal by the US as it allowed a rapid Turkish incursion and shook the pillars of the Rojava, its forces, and its war against ISIS.

After marathon negotiations, US-Turkish and Russian-Turkish agreements were concluded. Ankara obtained commitments from the two major powers to have the YPG withdraw 30 km from borders.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is currently saying that Washington and Moscow did not abide by the 2019 agreements. Consequently, he escalated drone strikes against “Kurdish targets.”

Erdogan is currently betting on the strength of his position due to the Ukraine war and Washington and Moscow’s need for him. This will help him launch a new operation against Syrian Kurds.

Features of a new US “betrayal” are looming on the horizon. The US did not stop Türkiye from launching drone strikes, nor did it stop the heavy aerial bombardment.

The Kurds are betting on ISIS, or on the West’s interest in preventing the terror organization’s resurgence. The Kurds say that a war against them will make them give up fighting ISIS.

There are those who are threatening to open up the Al-Hol camp, which is often referred to as ISIS’ mini-state, to push the US to move in favor of the Kurds.

As for the Russians, they are conveying demands from Ankara to the Kurds in Qamishli.

These demands include the withdrawal of the YPG from the main cities and border areas in northern Syria and welcoming the deployment of Syrian state institutions and border guards.

Damascus, for its part, is relieved by the US betrayals, Russian stabs, and the Turkish strikes.

Although Damascus cannot openly welcome all this and is most likely to issue a statement condemning “Turkish aggression,” the Syrian capital is pleased at heart with what the Kurds are facing.

The least that could happen from these aggressions and betrayals is that Kurds will be forced to the “bitter” negotiating table from a weak position.

The Kurds’ road to Damascus is paved with disappointments and setbacks.



Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
TT

Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)

The sound of gunfire, barrel bombs, and stray bullets is nothing new in Sudan. What’s new is that the violence has moved from the outskirts to the capital, Khartoum. This shift forced the government and military to relocate to a temporary capital in Port Sudan, nearly 1,000 kilometers away on the Red Sea coast.
Past conflicts were seen as rebellions against the state, but they stemmed from a deeper struggle: the “center” holds all the power and resources, while the “margins” are left with nothing.
These wars have always been about demands for rights and equality.
Under Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s wars shifted from demands for rights to a “religious war” between the Muslim north and the Christian or secular south. This led to South Sudan’s secession and the creation of a new state that joined the United Nations. But what drives the conflicts that continue to devastate Sudan?
Analysts say the root cause is the lack of a national vision and the failure to recognize Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Without a unified political and economic framework, this diversity has been ignored.
The current war, though fought between two formal armies, stems from the same issues of marginalization and exclusion. These problems sparked Sudan’s first rebellion in 1955, led by the Anya-Nya 1 forces, named after the cobra snake.
The Naivasha Agreement
Sudan’s first civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but reignited in 1983 after former President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia law. This sparked a rebellion led by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The conflict escalated into a “jihadist” war as Islamist forces framed it as a battle against “enemies of the faith.” The fighting lasted for years, killing more than two million people.
Unable to secure a military victory, the government signed the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. The deal granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, with a five-year transitional period to decide between unity or independence.
John Garang briefly became Sudan’s First Vice President during this period but died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His deputy, Salva Kiir, succeeded him and led South Sudan to a 2011 referendum, where the region voted for independence. South Sudan became a new nation, taking a third of Sudan’s land, a quarter of its people, and most of its resources.
Meanwhile, conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, with rebels accusing the government of marginalization. The war turned ethnic when the government armed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to fight African-origin rebel groups. One Janjaweed leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, later became the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Darfur war claimed 300,000 lives. Al-Bashir’s government was accused of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, leading to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Bashir and three senior officials that remain in effect.
Chasing Peace Across Capitals
In May 2006, Sudan’s government signed a peace deal in Abuja with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Arko Minnawi. However, the movement split, and another faction, led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, rejected the deal and continued fighting from Jebel Marra in central Darfur.
Minnawi briefly joined the government as an assistant to President Omar al-Bashir but later rebelled again, claiming he was treated as a "kitchen helper" rather than a serious political partner.
Efforts to negotiate peace moved between capitals. In 2011, some groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which promised power and wealth-sharing, but fighting continued.
In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government signed a new peace agreement in Juba with key armed groups, including Minnawi’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim.
The deal gave Minnawi the role of Darfur governor and Ibrahim the post of finance minister. Despite these accords, true peace remains out of reach.
A New Southern Conflict
War broke out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two regions given a right to “popular consultation” under the Naivasha Agreement to decide their future. The SPLM-North, an offshoot of the southern SPLM, took up arms again.
The SPLM-N split into two factions: one led by Malik Agar, now a deputy in Sudan’s Sovereign Council, who signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, controls Kauda in South Kordofan and continues sporadic fighting.
Eastern Sudan also saw conflict in the 1990s, with groups like the Beja Congress and Free Lions opposing Bashir’s regime. These groups later signed the Asmara Peace Agreement, gaining shares of power and wealth.
In April 2019, months of protests forced the military to oust President Omar al-Bashir. But sit-ins continued, and a violent crackdown killed hundreds, drawing condemnation as a horrific crime against civilians.
Under public pressure, the military signed a constitutional declaration in August 2019, agreeing to share power with civilians. This led to a transitional government with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti.
War of the Generals
On October 25, 2021, Sudan's army leader overthrew Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s civilian government in a coup. Under pressure from peaceful protests, the general later agreed to a framework agreement with civilian leaders, promising a return to civilian rule and preventing the return of the Islamist regime.
However, supporters of the former regime undermined the deal, causing tensions between the army and the RSF, leading to war.
On April 15, 2023, gunfire broke out in southern Khartoum, marking the start of the ongoing conflict. The RSF accused the army of attacking its camps, while some claim Islamist cells within the army targeted the RSF, forcing it to choose between surrender or war.
Miscalculations
The war was expected to end quickly due to the army’s stronger military. However, the RSF surprised the army by using urban warfare tactics to take control of key military bases and government buildings, including the presidential palace.
The government moved to Port Sudan, while Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was trapped for over three months before escaping.
The RSF expanded its control over Darfur, western Sudan, and the central Gezira region, holding about 70% of the country. After nearly two years of fighting, the army regained some areas, but the RSF still controls large parts of Sudan and continues fierce fighting, with the war still ongoing.
The Worst Humanitarian Crisis
The war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands and triggered what the UN calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in history." More than 11 million people are displaced within Sudan, while around 3 million have fled to neighboring countries. Over half of Sudan’s population, about 25 million people, face severe food insecurity.
Negotiations have failed, with both sides refusing to return to talks after the Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration collapsed, largely due to the army’s and its supporters' refusal to engage.
Root Causes
Former Sovereign Council member and deputy head of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Tagadum,” Al-Hadi Idris blames the war on Sudan’s failure to agree on a “national development plan” since independence.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he says the main reasons for the conflict are the failure to implement fair development, achieve justice, and the lack of resolution on key issues like the role of religion in politics, national identity, and military involvement in government.
Idris argues that addressing these issues is crucial to ending the war for good.
Mohamed Abdel-Hakim, a leader in the Unionist Gathering, believes the wars stem from unequal development and citizenship.
He says resolving issues like marginalization, protecting people’s rights, and replacing oppressive regimes with democratic governance is key to stopping Sudan’s long-running conflicts.
Abdel-Hakim also calls for reforming the military to create a professional, national army focused on protecting the constitution and civilian leadership, with strict oversight to prevent the army from becoming politicized.