Lebanon’s FPM Torn Between Bassil’s Ambitions, Hezbollah’s Pressure 

Lebanese MPs speak prior to the start of the ninth parliamentary session to elect a new president of Lebanon, at the parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, 08 December 2022. (EPA)
Lebanese MPs speak prior to the start of the ninth parliamentary session to elect a new president of Lebanon, at the parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, 08 December 2022. (EPA)
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Lebanon’s FPM Torn Between Bassil’s Ambitions, Hezbollah’s Pressure 

Lebanese MPs speak prior to the start of the ninth parliamentary session to elect a new president of Lebanon, at the parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, 08 December 2022. (EPA)
Lebanese MPs speak prior to the start of the ninth parliamentary session to elect a new president of Lebanon, at the parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, 08 December 2022. (EPA)

A number of lawmakers from Lebanon’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) have acknowledged that the party is in “crisis” over the election of a new president of the republic. 

FPM MPs have submitted blank votes in eight electoral sessions. Tensions reached new heights during the ninth session amid disputes between the FPM, headed by MP Gebran Bassil, and its ally Hezbollah. 

The dispute revolves around Hezbollah ministers taking part in a recent government session in spite of the FPM’s disapproval. The FPM believes that the cabinet cannot convene given that it is operating in a caretaker capacity. 

The FPM consequently retaliated to Hezbollah at the ninth electoral session. Instead of submitting the usual blank votes, some MPs wrote down the name Badri Daher, the former customs chief and close associate of the FPM who has been held in connection to the 2020 Beirut port blast, and others wrote down the name “Michel” and others “Mouawad”, knowing that the ballots would be considered void. 

Michel Mouawad, an opponent of Hezbollah, is running for president. 

Speaking on condition of anonymity, one FPM MP told Asharq Al-Awsat that the movement was in crisis over the presidential elections. 

He stressed that the FPM will not support the nomination of neither Marada movement leader Suleiman Franjieh, who is being backed by Hezbollah, nor Mouawad. 

Any other option besides the blank ballot is “useless as long we can’t secure the right number of votes to elect a candidate,” he added. 

“We will come up with a new option during the next electoral session,” he stated. 

The next session is set for Thursday. 

“We are confident that this crisis can only be resolved through agreement,” added the MP. 

The “Shiite duo” of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, headed by Berri, have both been backing Franjieh’s candidacy and pressuring Bassil to go ahead with their choice. 

Bassil, however, has been rejecting their proposal for numerous considerations, chiefly his yet undeclared ambition to run for president. 

Sources from the FPM told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Bassil believes he is the most deserving of the position because he boasts the largest bloc at parliament.” 

“He will not so easily relinquish his belief that a strong candidate must become president, meaning a figure who enjoys a large popular and parliamentary base,” they explained. 

Bassil is “looking to local and foreign changes that may take place in the coming months that may turn the elections in his favor,” they revealed. 

Moreover, the MP is unlikely to back the nomination of army commander Joseph Aoun given the sharp disputes that had erupted between them during the term of former President Michel Aoun, founder of the FPM and Bassil’s father-in-law. 

Bassil had criticized how the military had managed the situation on the ground during the 2019 anti-government protests. 

Some MPs and prominent FPM figures are leaning towards nominating other figures from the movement, such as MPs Alain Aoun, Ibrahim Kanaan and Nada al-Boustani, as president. 

Bassil has not backed the proposal, saying he would rather support a consensus figure, such as former minister Ziad Baroud, should the FPM choose to stop submitting blank votes. 



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.