Strategic Political Challenges Facing the US in 2023

US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet at the G20 summit in Bali on November 14. (Reuters)
US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet at the G20 summit in Bali on November 14. (Reuters)
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Strategic Political Challenges Facing the US in 2023

US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet at the G20 summit in Bali on November 14. (Reuters)
US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet at the G20 summit in Bali on November 14. (Reuters)

Iran remains one of the United States’ most pressing national security challenges, even while much of the world’s attention in 2022 has been focused on Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine. Despite this enduring reality, the lack of a consistent American policy on Iran has only served to embolden the Iranian regime. As legislators look ahead to a new year and a new Congress, there is an opportunity to chart a new path forward.

The ever-changing US approach to Iran over the years has called into question our willingness to confront the regime. However, Iran supplying armed drones to Russia, coupled with protests against the Iranian regime, represents a potential “sea change” in American policy. It’s time the United States forge a more comprehensive Iran strategy that goes beyond a nuclear negotiation and encompasses all instruments of national power.

An effective Iran strategy must have clear diplomatic, economic, and military deterrence components, and must address all aspects of the regime’s bad conduct.

As many Americans go about their holiday plans, the Iranian regime is violently quashing protests inside its borders, plotting to kill former and current American officials both at home and abroad, making every effort to provide Lebanese Hezbollah with the means to destroy Israel, dramatically accelerating nuclear enrichment, and flooding the Ukrainian battlefield with armed drones. An effective US strategy must be scoped and resourced to address these problems and more.

On the economic front, Iran’s resistance economy must once again feel the full weight of the international community’s economic pressure. While the Biden Administration has announced additional sanctions against oil smugglers and Chinese purchases of Iranian oil, more must be done to enforce existing sanctions and close sanctions loopholes in coordination with our allies.

The US must also attack drone supply chains, to include components made in the United States and by our partners, and sanction those companies that fail to comply. The US Congress has so far failed to enact the Stop Iranian Drones Act, a powerful sanctions tool which would add Iran’s drone program to the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act. It is critical to demonstrate the political will to address this deficiency as soon as possible.

Military deterrence has been sorely lacking, largely stemming from efforts to keep nuclear negotiations on life support. With only minor exceptions, the Biden Administration has failed to respond to repeated attacks against Americans and our interests. Moving forward, Iranian leadership must understand that the United States and our partners have the capability and the will to respond forcefully to attacks, and that we will not distinguish between attacks from the regime or the proxies it supports.

While deterrence often plays out in Iraq or Syria, the Iranian regime must also understand its borders are no longer sacrosanct. The United States should reach agreement with like-minded partners on appropriate nuclear redlines that would garner an international response. Israel has a clear role to play here, and I’ve welcomed Israel’s participation in joint exercises tailored against Iran.

However, if we’re to achieve true integrated deterrence, the United States must also ensure our partners have the capability and equipment to contain the Iranian threat. The US must expedite arms sales and address critical capability gaps – to include a credible joint US-Israeli military option to take Iran’s nuclear program off the table. 

On the diplomatic front, the death of the nuclear deal and Iran’s rush to enrich uranium provide opportunities for diplomatic incentives and disincentives. Censures of the Iranian regime at International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meetings were a good start. As Iran continues to resist the IAEA’s legitimate oversight functions, the United States should hit the regime with more, stronger censures.

Additionally, Iran must become a renewed topic of discussion at the United Nations Security Council – to include invoking snapback of sanctions under UNSCR 2231. While I do not support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this snapback provision allows any original JCPOA signatory to “snap back” all prior resolutions on Iran by notifying the Security Council that Iran is not compliant with its commitments. Again, the United States and its allies must be on the same page as to what constitutes significant nuclear non-compliance and must advertise these red lines to the regime.

Finally, as protests enter their fourth month, the US government must better support the aspirations of the Iranian people. The American response thus far has been embarrassingly muted. The Biden Administration and international community must signal more full-throated support for the Iranian people who are dying on the streets as they march for freedom. Additionally, we must increase efforts to allow ordinary Iranians to access each other, the internet, and the outside world. These efforts must be paired with effective sanctions against Iranian censors and those who enable the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, and expand sanctions of human rights abusers.

Many of us in Washington have long advocated for a holistic approach to Iran that is more than a nuclear negotiation. It’s time to put the nuclear deal out of its misery and focus on the way ahead. I look forward to advancing these efforts in the next Congress.

*US Senator Jim Risch is a ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.



Satellite Images Suggest North Korea Expanding Missile Plant, Researchers Say

A satellite image shows a suspected missile assembly building under construction (lower center of photo) at the "February 11 Plant" near Hamhung, North Korea in this handout image obtained by Reuters on November 20, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC/Handout via Reuters)
A satellite image shows a suspected missile assembly building under construction (lower center of photo) at the "February 11 Plant" near Hamhung, North Korea in this handout image obtained by Reuters on November 20, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC/Handout via Reuters)
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Satellite Images Suggest North Korea Expanding Missile Plant, Researchers Say

A satellite image shows a suspected missile assembly building under construction (lower center of photo) at the "February 11 Plant" near Hamhung, North Korea in this handout image obtained by Reuters on November 20, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC/Handout via Reuters)
A satellite image shows a suspected missile assembly building under construction (lower center of photo) at the "February 11 Plant" near Hamhung, North Korea in this handout image obtained by Reuters on November 20, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC/Handout via Reuters)

North Korea is expanding a key weapons manufacturing complex that assembles a type of short-range missile used by Russia in Ukraine, researchers at a US-based think tank have concluded, based on satellite images.

The facility, known as the February 11 plant, is part of the Ryongsong Machine Complex in Hamhung, North Korea's second-largest city, on the country's east coast.

Sam Lair, a research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), located at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, said the plant was the only one known to produce the Hwasong-11 class of solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Ukrainian officials say these munitions - known as the KN-23 in the West - have been used by Russian forces in their assault on Ukraine.

The expansion of the complex has not been previously reported.

Both Moscow and Pyongyang have denied that North Korea has transferred weapons for Russia to use against Ukraine, which it invaded in February 2022. Russia and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty at a summit in June and have pledged to boost their military ties.

North Korea's mission to the United Nations did not respond to a request for comment for this story.

The satellite images, taken in early October by the commercial satellite firm Planet Labs, show what appears to be an additional assembly building under construction as well as a new housing facility, likely intended for workers, according to the analysis by researchers at CNS.

It also appears that Pyongyang is improving the entrances for some of the underground facilities at the complex.

A disused bridge crane that was in front of a tunnel entrance, blocking easy access, was removed, suggesting they might be placing an emphasis on that part of the facility, Lair said.

"We see this as a suggestion that they're massively increasing, or they're trying to significantly increase, the throughput of this factory," Lair said.

The new assembly building is about 60 to 70 percent the size of the previous building used to assemble missiles.

In 2023, state media published images, which Reuters has reviewed, showing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un walking through new buildings at the complex in Hamhung, where workers were assembling tail kits and nose cones for what appeared to be the KN-23, according to analysts.

In the past, publicly released videos from North Korean state media show that the complex has produced everything from tank wheels to the casings for rocket motors, Lair said.

LOW-FLYING MISSILES

The KN-23 was first tested in May 2019, and is designed to evade missile defenses by flying on a lower, "depressed" trajectory, experts have told Reuters, making them potentially useful for Russia as it seeks ways to penetrate Ukraine's air defenses.

Russia has fired thousands of missiles since the invasion. Leaning on North Korea for additional supplies could ease the strain on its own production facilities, Lair said.

North Korea's state news agency KCNA has reported that construction is underway at the Ryongsong Machine Complex.

This month, KCNA said the facility "is pushing ahead with the projects for attaining the goal for modernization planned for this year." The work includes rebuilding production facilities as well as assembling and installing equipment at machine workshops and a steel casting workshop, it said.

Researchers at SI Analytics, a South Korean satellite imagery firm that uses AI technology to scour images, also confirmed the new construction at the February 11 plant, saying in a report on Monday that some of the construction near the loading area would likely be used to conceal the future operations of the factory from satellites.

"Considering the presence of numerous construction materials, vehicles, and open-top freight cars loaded with materials around the site, the construction appears to be progressing rapidly," the firm said. The report said the facility was used to produce ballistic missiles, without naming the KN-23.

Michael Duitsman, also a research associate at CNS, said it was possible that the new construction revealed in the satellite images could be a storage facility, but he believed it was more likely a new assembly building.

North Korean missiles account for a fraction of Russia's strikes during its war on Ukraine, but their alleged use has caused alarm in Seoul and Washington because it suggests an end of nearly two-decade consensus among UN Security Council permanent members on preventing Pyongyang from expanding its ballistic missile programs.

SI Analytics said on Monday it had also identified new construction at the nearby February 8 Vinalon Complex, which is believed to produce fuel for ballistic missiles. The construction may be aimed at boosting production of solid propellants or UDMH, an important liquid rocket engine fuel, the report said.

Joseph Dempsey, a military analyst with London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, said that North Korea's expansion of short-range ballistic missile facilities would likely be motivated mainly by a desire to boost the country's own arsenal.

He said it was unclear to what extent Pyongyang may have expanded production capacity to meet the demands of its new cooperation with Moscow.

More than 10,000 North Korean troops have been deployed to the Russian region of Kursk, where Ukraine launched a major cross-border incursion in August, according to Washington, Kyiv and Seoul.

The troops will fight as part of Russia's airborne unit and marines, with some already participating in battles in the Ukraine war, a South Korean lawmaker who sits on the parliamentary intelligence committee said on Wednesday.

Russia has not denied the involvement of North Korean troops in the war, which it has been waging in Ukraine since launching a full-scale invasion in February 2022.