Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
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Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Details of the Late Premier’s Meetings in London

A series of recently declassified British documents reveal details of meetings held by the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with British officials in 1997 and 1999.

According to the documents, Hariri informed his British counterpart Tony Blair that Lebanon and Israel held 11 rounds of negotiations in Washington, but the Hebrew state put forward a series of conditions, including “dissolving Hezbollah.”

The accounts, which are published by Asharq Al-Awsat in two episodes, quoted an official in the French presidency as saying that Paris was upset with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and accused him of reneging on previous promises to deploy the Lebanese army in the south after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. This prompted Paris to freeze steps to increase the number of its troops in the UNIFIL.

The documents confirm that the United Kingdom tried to play a role in the negotiations on the Lebanese and Syrian tracks with Israel, and believed that there was a great possibility of achieving progress in light of the promises made by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999-2001) to withdraw from South Lebanon, and the “courtesy” between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

They also show that a special envoy of Blair met with Assad in this regard, and carried a message to Lahoud on the negotiations with Israel. However, the latter refused to receive him due to pressure exerted on him.

The documents, which were declassified in the British National Archives, show that Blair’s reception of Hariri came at the “insistence” of French President Jacques Chirac.
While the first meeting in 1997 was normal, because it took place between two prime ministers, the second meeting in 1999 was problematic “protocol”. Once again, Chirac insisted on Blair to meet Hariri, who was then a former prime minister after he resigned in 1998, following Lahoud’s election as president to succeed President Elias Hrawi.

On July 17, 1997, Blair received his Lebanese counterpart, Rafik Hariri, at 10 Downing Street. He was then the new prime minister after he led his party, the Labor Party, that year to a landslide victory over the Conservatives. Hariri had been prime minister for years under President Elias Hrawi and was focusing his efforts on rebuilding Lebanon after the long years of civil war.

Hariri visited the prime minister for 35 minutes on July 17. He was accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers of Finance, Information and Trade, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers and Lebanon’s Ambassador in London. The meeting was also attended by Derek Fatchett (Foreign Secretary of State for the Middle East), and other UK officials.

The minutes of the meeting show that Hariri clearly held then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responsible for obstructing progress in the peace talks, and argued that this policy would only lead to the growth of the influence of Hamas and the fundamentalists.

Blair asked about the situation in Lebanon. Hariri said that there was now a monitoring group looking into the April understandings in South Lebanon. The group included Americans, French, Syrians, Israelis and Lebanese. He said that nobody wanted the situation to escalate, adding that the Lebanese were trying to build infrastructure throughout the country and achieve financial stability. There have been dramatic developments over the past five years, he noted.

Hariri invited the British Prime Minister to visit Beirut to see for himself. Fatchett said he visited the Lebanese capital, pointing to significant progress compared to its previous visits the year before. Hariri said that they were now hosting the Arab Games, and that a British company had built a wonderful stadium to host it.

Blair-Hariri... A second meeting in different circumstances

Two years after Blair’s meeting with Hariri, a second meeting took place between the two men, but under different circumstances. Hariri had been outside the Lebanese government after his resignation during the term of Lahoud.
An important change also took place in Israel, with the arrival of Ehud Barak to the premiership, succeeding Benjamin Netanyahu.

On July 5, 1999, Philip Barton wrote to the British prime minister, saying that Hariri, the former premier, would visit him the following day because of Chirac's repeated insistence.

He added that Hariri would be accompanied by some people from his office.

A list attached to Barton’s letter comprised the proposed topics for discussion. Those included the possibility of achieving progress in the Middle East peace process in the wake of Barak’s election; the necessity to reach progress on the Syrian and Lebanese track to achieve a comprehensive peace; the negotiations with the European Union; concern over the recent escalation in southern Lebanon that caused the bombing of Beirut on June 25; and progress in the negotiations of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Lebanon.

The brief explanation provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the following:

South Lebanon

A recent escalation of violence in southern Lebanon culminated in the June 25 Israeli Air Force attacks on Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, which killed 10 civilians, and a Hezbollah attack in northern Israel that killed two. The Israeli Air Force attacks were ordered by the Netanyahu government. Barak was informed of it, but not consulted. The situation is calm, but tense, according to the explanation. Contacts resumed in the Israeli-Lebanese monitoring group set up to monitor the April 1996 understandings.
Some saw the Hezbollah attack as a reminder to both Syria and Barak that they could not be ignored in any peace negotiations…

The Middle East peace process

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it expected that Barak would implement the Wye River memorandum whenever he forms a government. The second redeployment of Israeli forces under Wye will be the starting point for renewed negotiations on all tracks in the peace process. It added that the greatest progress was likely to be made on the Syrian-Lebanese tracks (with Israel). Barak may focus his attention here, according to the explanation.

It also noted that a unilateral withdrawal of the Israelis from South Lebanon would deprive the Syrians of one of their main cards in the negotiations over the Golan Heights, specifically their (implicit) influence regarding Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

The Lebanese will not walk alone without their dominant partner. Nevertheless, we understand that Barak knows the need for Syrian cooperation to ensure a successful withdrawal from Lebanon, the British ministry reported in the documents.

The internal Lebanese situation

The British Foreign Affairs’ Ministry said that Emile Lahoud was inaugurated on November 24, 1998, to succeed Elias Hrawi. In order to enable Lahoud, the former commander of the Lebanese army, to become president, the Lebanese parliament voted to amend Article 49 of the constitution that bars senior civil servants from running for president as long as they are in office or within two years of leaving office. It added that 118 of the 128 Lebanese deputies voted for Lahoud. The ten MPs who boycotted were members of Walid Jumblatt’s party.

The documents added that Hariri was offered the opportunity to continue his work as prime minister under the new president’s rule, but he declined on constitutional grounds, as he put it.

Speculation continued in Lebanon about the reason for Hariri’s “resignation”, but it seemed likely that he did not consider that he could work with Lahoud without playing the minor role in the administration.

Dr. Salim al-Hoss was nominated prime minister on December 2. Lahoud and Hoss appointed a mini-government of 16 ministers (half of the previous government). The government included reform-minded technocrats, in an effort to tackle corruption.

The British Foreign Ministry pointed to disappointment in Lebanon with the limited performance of the Hoss government. It added that a sharp economic slowdown was remarked, noting that an anti-corruption campaign appeared to be directed specifically against political opponents of Lahoud and Hoss and away from friends of the Syrian government.



Israel’s Election May Change Its Leader, but Not Iran War Policy

A woman passes by an election billboard of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Hebrew slogan reading "will not surrender" in Jerusalem, 21 October 2026. (EPA)
A woman passes by an election billboard of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Hebrew slogan reading "will not surrender" in Jerusalem, 21 October 2026. (EPA)
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Israel’s Election May Change Its Leader, but Not Iran War Policy

A woman passes by an election billboard of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Hebrew slogan reading "will not surrender" in Jerusalem, 21 October 2026. (EPA)
A woman passes by an election billboard of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Hebrew slogan reading "will not surrender" in Jerusalem, 21 October 2026. (EPA)

Israel's election next week may change its leader, but not its strategy: Iran will remain its chief adversary, military force will continue to be its preferred tool and Palestinian statehood a distant prospect, regional policymakers and analysts say.

That is because the strategic assumptions underpinning Israeli policy were hardened by the October 7, 2023, attacks on southern Israeli communities by Palestinian group Hamas and by the wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

If anything, Israel could toughen its security policy, the analysts said, as victory for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the backing of far-right coalition partners could embolden him to step up the war with Iran, tighten Israel's grip on the occupied West Bank and push diplomacy further to the margins.

Israel's security doctrine now rests on three pillars: breaking Iran, holding buffer zones beyond its borders and using force to deter enemies.

The real divide is one of degree rather than direction — how aggressively Israel fights its wars, how far it expands Jewish settlements in the West Bank and whether any leader opts for diplomacy, the analysts said.

From Tehran to ‌Riyadh, Tuesday's election ‌is not seen as a potential turning point but as a test of whether the Middle East is ‌settling ⁠into a long ⁠confrontation, where wars ebb and flow while the underlying conflicts are unresolved.

"If Netanyahu is elected, he'll do whatever he thinks he wants to do," said Aviv Bushinsky, a former adviser to Netanyahu. "Expansion of the settlements will continue. The wars against Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah will continue."

"What you see now is what you'll see after the election, maybe even more aggressively," he said. "As long as Iran is in such a situation, it's a waste of time talking about Palestine.”

Netanyahu said on Sunday that Israel must prioritize “prevention and offence over containment and defense”, including pre-emptive strikes to thwart emerging threats, while establishing Israel as a regional power and maximizing its independence in armaments.

WHY THE COURSE IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE

The election pits Netanyahu's right-wing Likud and its ultranationalist allies against an opposition led ⁠by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot's Yashar party.

Palestinian analyst Ghassan al-Khatib sees no prospect of a fundamental shift ‌in policy towards the Palestinians, with Israeli political parties competing to project harder-line positions as public opinion ‌moves further to the right.

“The substance of the policy remains the same: No to a Palestinian state and yes to further settlement expansion. On this, they ‌are all in agreement,” he said.

A government led by Netanyahu's opponents might seek to repair Israel's international standing by curbing some settler violence or ‌pursuing settlement expansion with less fanfare. But such changes would be a shift in style rather than substance, al-Khatib said.

Michael Young of the Carnegie Middle East Center said Israel's security establishment and much of its political class share a common strategic outlook, centered on confronting Iran, maintaining "forward defense" and preserving military deterrence, reducing the scope for big policy shifts.

Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, who has conducted research in the West Bank, said growing settler violence, mounting Palestinian frustration and the absence ‌of a "political horizon" had created combustible conditions, where even a minor trigger could spark a wider uprising.

'VENOMOUS OCTOPUS'

Some regional policymakers ask whether Israel's confrontation with Iran has become the organizing principle of Middle East security, ⁠regardless of who wins the ⁠election.

US President Donald Trump's praise of Netanyahu as a "great warrior prime minister" has reinforced expectations that the Israeli leader will try to finish the campaign against Tehran if he retains power.

Netanyahu has made clear his ambitions extend beyond containing Iran to toppling its clerical rulers.

“Completing the task means toppling the terrorist regime in Iran, the head of the venomous octopus,” he said in a speech this week.

But military and political analysts question whether anything short of a US-Israeli ground invasion would force Tehran to abandon what it views as its core security interests in what it sees as an existential fight.

After surviving months of war, Iran may be betting it can outlast its opponents while continuing to exert pressure through regional allies.

"This is a quagmire," Young said. "The Iranians can outlast Trump."

Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza have been weakened, but the broader network of Iran-aligned groups has survived and the conflict could strengthen Tehran's determination to pursue a nuclear deterrent, the analysts said.

"Netanyahu's policies in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon are damaging," said Abdulaziz Sager, chairman of the Gulf Research Center. "As for Iran, a settlement is needed before the conflict escalates further. If Iran's role is not curbed, the region could be heading toward 50 years of Iranian hegemony."


Israel’s Elections: Four Possible Scenarios

A partially-torn billboard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party is displayed in southern Tel Aviv on October 20, 2026. (AFP)
A partially-torn billboard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party is displayed in southern Tel Aviv on October 20, 2026. (AFP)
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Israel’s Elections: Four Possible Scenarios

A partially-torn billboard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party is displayed in southern Tel Aviv on October 20, 2026. (AFP)
A partially-torn billboard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party is displayed in southern Tel Aviv on October 20, 2026. (AFP)

Israel goes to the polls on October 27 with results forecast to be close, meaning that the next government will be determined by whoever can cobble together a coalition in a fragmented political landscape.

Israel votes through proportional representation based on the nationwide vote and it is highly unlikely that any single party would come even close to the 61 seats needed for a majority in the 120-seat parliament, or Knesset.

Here are four possible scenarios:

Coalition

Immediately after the election, the parties will begin negotiations to try to reach the 61-seat threshold.

After the official announcement of the results, President Isaac Herzog will consult with party representatives and name a candidate who has the chance to form a government -- not necessarily the party with the most seats, but the one deemed best positioned to secure enough seats in parliament.

The negotiations can be arduous and lengthy, with parties insisting on parochial interests, and can produce unstable governments.

Following the previous election in November 2022, it took Benjamin Netanyahu 58 days to form his government.

People walk past a Likud party campaign billboard featuring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu alongside opposition party leaders and bearing the Hebrew slogan "Right or Palestine," ahead of Israel's general election, in Beni Brak, Israel, Sunday, Oct. 18, 2026. (AP)

Polls show that Netanyahu's right-wing and far-right coalition and the opposition bloc, whose most prominent figure is former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, are neck and neck, with approximately 50 to 52 seats each.

The two sides have been nearly even in polls for weeks, foreshadowing a mathematical puzzle that both sides will have to solve to find the 10 or so seats needed for a coalition.

Israeli political history is full of twists and turns, with defections and other unexpected shifts in alliances.

Israel also has two new right-wing parties that are seen as scratching the threshold of entering parliament, where they could throw their decisive support to one of the two blocs.

Minority government

If no bloc manages to secure 61 seats, a candidate could attempt to govern without a majority but rather through support on an ad hoc basis by other lawmakers.

In this scenario, lawmakers from Israel's Arab minority -- who make up 20 percent of the population and generally identify as Palestinians -- could play a critical role. Polls show that two Arab-Israeli lists, the Joint List and Raam, could win 12 to 14 seats in total.

Raam, led by Mansour Abbas, a kingmaker in the past, has stated its willingness to work with Eisenkot's bloc, and the Joint List has offered to provide a "safety net" for any coalition that ousts Netanyahu from power.

But the leading figures in the opposition bloc are reluctant to publicly acknowledge such a possibility, due to the hostility of a large segment of the Jewish electorate towards any form of alliance with Israeli Arabs.

This has not prevented Netanyahu from focusing his campaign on the possibility of Eisenkot working with Arab parties, campaigning on the slogan, "Either the right wing or Palestine."

Gadi Eisenkot, former Israeli military chief of staff and leader of the centrist Yashar "Straight" party delivers a statement ahead of Israel's general election near Israel-Gaza border, southern Israel, Thursday, Oct. 15, 2026. (AP)

National unity government

Considering Israel's extreme polarization, a national unity government would appear fanciful, but it could theoretically create a less extreme government.

Israeli commentators have often mused on the possibility of a national unity government in which Netanyahu would jettison his provocative far-right allies as well as ultra-Orthodox parties and team up with Eisenkot, who shares Netanyahu's views on many security issues.

The grand coalition would also exclude Arab parties.

A poll published on October 16 found that 55 percent of Israelis would prefer a national unity government over new elections if the vote did not produce a clear majority.

This scenario has a recent precedent. In 2020, Netanyahu and Benny Gantz, like Eisenkot a retired general appealing to the center, reached a power-sharing agreement after three elections in less than a year, which stipulated a rotation of the prime ministership.

But the partnership fell apart after a year, triggering a new election. According to media reports, Herzog is working behind the scenes to bring Netanyahu and Eisenkot together to repeat the experiment should a deadlock occur after October 27.

However, the scenario would face strong opposition from both sides, particularly from the opposition bloc, which is treating the election as a referendum against Netanyahu and has questioned his character.

Deadlock and new elections

If no candidate manages to form a government, Israel will have to return to the polls.

The country held four elections between April 2019 and March 2021 due to the inability of politicians to forge a lasting coalition.

The candidate designated by the president will, in principle, have 28 days to form a coalition, with a possible 14-day extension, although there are other procedural ways to prevent an immediate calling of new elections.


Iran Prolongs Talks in Stalemate to Influence US Midterms, Officials Say

An Iranian woman walks past a mural of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on a street in Tehran, Iran, 14 October 2026, amid the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States. (EPA)
An Iranian woman walks past a mural of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on a street in Tehran, Iran, 14 October 2026, amid the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States. (EPA)
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Iran Prolongs Talks in Stalemate to Influence US Midterms, Officials Say

An Iranian woman walks past a mural of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on a street in Tehran, Iran, 14 October 2026, amid the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States. (EPA)
An Iranian woman walks past a mural of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on a street in Tehran, Iran, 14 October 2026, amid the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States. (EPA)

Iran has deliberately prolonged talks with the US to try to weaken Donald Trump politically ahead of November's US midterm elections, senior officials say, while fears of renewed military action and deep distrust of Washington have reinforced Tehran's reluctance to strike a quick deal to end the war.

Three senior Iranian officials and an Iranian insider, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said Tehran was convinced the US president was ready to resort to renewed attacks to try to break the stalemate in the eight-month-old war.

"Iran is preparing for renewed Israeli and US attacks, not for a deal with America to end the war," one of the officials said. "The clerical establishment is determined not to give Trump a political victory."

Tehran analyst Saeed Leylaz said that, by prolonging the talks, "Iran is influencing the US election without taking any unlawful action".

IRAN CAN EXPLOIT TRUMP'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The war, which began in February when the US and its ally Israel launched strikes on Iran, has helped drive Trump’s approval rating to a record low as polls suggest that Americans worried about high gasoline prices will punish his Republican Party in the November 3 congressional elections.

Trump has repeatedly said he expects oil prices to drop after the ‌elections, but has ‌not offered a detailed plan to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a vital ‌global ⁠energy shipping route effectively ⁠closed by Iran since the war began.

Iranian attacks both threatened and real have kept ship traffic through the strait to a trickle, while a US maritime blockade and trade sanctions have cut off Iran's oil export revenues and exacerbated growing domestic economic woes.

With Tehran refusing to make concessions it believes could benefit Trump politically, there is little chance of a breakthrough before the elections, the officials said.

Under pressure from Israel, Washington wants Iran’s decades-long nuclear program - which Iran says is purely peaceful and Western powers allege has military dimensions - on the table from the outset.

For its part, Tehran insists that its conditions under a "seven-day plan" must be met before nuclear negotiations begin. It offers no prospect of giving up the leverage over the Strait of Hormuz that the conflict prompted it to ⁠seize.

Iran's Foreign Ministry and the US White House did not respond to Reuters requests for comment.

An Iranian couple walks near an anti-Israel billboard featuring Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu and a sentence reading in Persian “Day by day isolated” at the Enghelab square in Tehran, Iran, 12 October 2026. (EPA)

IRAN CANNOT ‌TRUST WASHINGTON, OFFICIALS SAY

Iran’s proposal, conveyed through Qatari mediators, offered to reopen the strait within seven ‌days, albeit under Iranian control, provided that Washington lifted its maritime blockade, eased restrictions on Iranian oil exports, released frozen assets and ended hostilities on all fronts.

Iranian Foreign ‌Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Sunday that the offer remained on the table, with messages being exchanged through mediators.

Tehran's view that Washington cannot be ‌trusted to commit to diplomacy stems from the attacks on Iran that have derailed previous negotiations, one Iranian official said.

In June 2025, an Israeli attack wrecked plans for a sixth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman. And last February, the US and Israel launched their war just after another round of talks ended, with further technical discussions scheduled.

Maintaining a state somewhere between war and peace through the US midterms allows Iran to sustain pressure on Washington while reiterating its commitment to diplomacy.

Trump has ‌said the US will not bomb Iran again before November 3. However, the officials said Tehran continues to expect that bombing will resume, sooner or later.

Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran program at the ⁠Middle East Institute in Washington, said the ⁠clerical establishment clearly wanted to hurt Trump politically.

"But the fundamental issue is that Tehran believes that Trump is interested in regime change ... and following Israeli Prime Minister (Benjamin) Netanyahu’s policy of seeking to bring down Iran’s ruling establishment," he said.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth discussed Iran with Netanyahu on Monday, three Israeli officials said, in an unannounced visit to Israel a week before a parliamentary election in which Netanyahu's position is at risk.

US President Donald Trump looks on during a campaign rally at the Heartland Credit Union Arena in Park City, Kansas, a suburb of Wichita, on October 19, 2026. (AFP)

RETURN TO PRE-WAR STATUS IMPOSSIBLE FOR IRAN, SAYS ANALYST

Iran’s strategy of keeping negotiations alive without rushing towards agreement comes at a cost.

Prolonged uncertainty is weighing on Iran’s already crippled economy and wearing down public patience. Thousands were killed at the turn of the year when the security forces crushed spiraling anti-government protests.

Annual inflation hit 73.6% in September, according to the Statistical Centre of Iran, and the rial currency has fallen nearly 35% against the dollar since Washington reapplied its naval blockade in July.

Iran’s seaborne crude exports fell to zero in the second week of September from a 14-day average of 230,000 barrels per day at the start of the month, and remained there as of October 5, according to energy intelligence platform Vortexa.

But the leadership's distrust of Washington extends beyond the current conflict to existential concerns. Iran believes the US has repeatedly broken agreements even when Tehran honored its commitments, Leylaz said, leaving little confidence that any comprehensive deal would endure.

“Reaching a sustainable deal with the US, even after the Trump administration, is no longer possible because of the deepened distrust,” Leylaz said. "Nothing will go back to the pre-war status quo."