Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
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Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Details of the Late Premier’s Meetings in London

A series of recently declassified British documents reveal details of meetings held by the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with British officials in 1997 and 1999.

According to the documents, Hariri informed his British counterpart Tony Blair that Lebanon and Israel held 11 rounds of negotiations in Washington, but the Hebrew state put forward a series of conditions, including “dissolving Hezbollah.”

The accounts, which are published by Asharq Al-Awsat in two episodes, quoted an official in the French presidency as saying that Paris was upset with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and accused him of reneging on previous promises to deploy the Lebanese army in the south after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. This prompted Paris to freeze steps to increase the number of its troops in the UNIFIL.

The documents confirm that the United Kingdom tried to play a role in the negotiations on the Lebanese and Syrian tracks with Israel, and believed that there was a great possibility of achieving progress in light of the promises made by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999-2001) to withdraw from South Lebanon, and the “courtesy” between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

They also show that a special envoy of Blair met with Assad in this regard, and carried a message to Lahoud on the negotiations with Israel. However, the latter refused to receive him due to pressure exerted on him.

The documents, which were declassified in the British National Archives, show that Blair’s reception of Hariri came at the “insistence” of French President Jacques Chirac.
While the first meeting in 1997 was normal, because it took place between two prime ministers, the second meeting in 1999 was problematic “protocol”. Once again, Chirac insisted on Blair to meet Hariri, who was then a former prime minister after he resigned in 1998, following Lahoud’s election as president to succeed President Elias Hrawi.

On July 17, 1997, Blair received his Lebanese counterpart, Rafik Hariri, at 10 Downing Street. He was then the new prime minister after he led his party, the Labor Party, that year to a landslide victory over the Conservatives. Hariri had been prime minister for years under President Elias Hrawi and was focusing his efforts on rebuilding Lebanon after the long years of civil war.

Hariri visited the prime minister for 35 minutes on July 17. He was accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers of Finance, Information and Trade, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers and Lebanon’s Ambassador in London. The meeting was also attended by Derek Fatchett (Foreign Secretary of State for the Middle East), and other UK officials.

The minutes of the meeting show that Hariri clearly held then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responsible for obstructing progress in the peace talks, and argued that this policy would only lead to the growth of the influence of Hamas and the fundamentalists.

Blair asked about the situation in Lebanon. Hariri said that there was now a monitoring group looking into the April understandings in South Lebanon. The group included Americans, French, Syrians, Israelis and Lebanese. He said that nobody wanted the situation to escalate, adding that the Lebanese were trying to build infrastructure throughout the country and achieve financial stability. There have been dramatic developments over the past five years, he noted.

Hariri invited the British Prime Minister to visit Beirut to see for himself. Fatchett said he visited the Lebanese capital, pointing to significant progress compared to its previous visits the year before. Hariri said that they were now hosting the Arab Games, and that a British company had built a wonderful stadium to host it.

Blair-Hariri... A second meeting in different circumstances

Two years after Blair’s meeting with Hariri, a second meeting took place between the two men, but under different circumstances. Hariri had been outside the Lebanese government after his resignation during the term of Lahoud.
An important change also took place in Israel, with the arrival of Ehud Barak to the premiership, succeeding Benjamin Netanyahu.

On July 5, 1999, Philip Barton wrote to the British prime minister, saying that Hariri, the former premier, would visit him the following day because of Chirac's repeated insistence.

He added that Hariri would be accompanied by some people from his office.

A list attached to Barton’s letter comprised the proposed topics for discussion. Those included the possibility of achieving progress in the Middle East peace process in the wake of Barak’s election; the necessity to reach progress on the Syrian and Lebanese track to achieve a comprehensive peace; the negotiations with the European Union; concern over the recent escalation in southern Lebanon that caused the bombing of Beirut on June 25; and progress in the negotiations of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Lebanon.

The brief explanation provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the following:

South Lebanon

A recent escalation of violence in southern Lebanon culminated in the June 25 Israeli Air Force attacks on Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, which killed 10 civilians, and a Hezbollah attack in northern Israel that killed two. The Israeli Air Force attacks were ordered by the Netanyahu government. Barak was informed of it, but not consulted. The situation is calm, but tense, according to the explanation. Contacts resumed in the Israeli-Lebanese monitoring group set up to monitor the April 1996 understandings.
Some saw the Hezbollah attack as a reminder to both Syria and Barak that they could not be ignored in any peace negotiations…

The Middle East peace process

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it expected that Barak would implement the Wye River memorandum whenever he forms a government. The second redeployment of Israeli forces under Wye will be the starting point for renewed negotiations on all tracks in the peace process. It added that the greatest progress was likely to be made on the Syrian-Lebanese tracks (with Israel). Barak may focus his attention here, according to the explanation.

It also noted that a unilateral withdrawal of the Israelis from South Lebanon would deprive the Syrians of one of their main cards in the negotiations over the Golan Heights, specifically their (implicit) influence regarding Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

The Lebanese will not walk alone without their dominant partner. Nevertheless, we understand that Barak knows the need for Syrian cooperation to ensure a successful withdrawal from Lebanon, the British ministry reported in the documents.

The internal Lebanese situation

The British Foreign Affairs’ Ministry said that Emile Lahoud was inaugurated on November 24, 1998, to succeed Elias Hrawi. In order to enable Lahoud, the former commander of the Lebanese army, to become president, the Lebanese parliament voted to amend Article 49 of the constitution that bars senior civil servants from running for president as long as they are in office or within two years of leaving office. It added that 118 of the 128 Lebanese deputies voted for Lahoud. The ten MPs who boycotted were members of Walid Jumblatt’s party.

The documents added that Hariri was offered the opportunity to continue his work as prime minister under the new president’s rule, but he declined on constitutional grounds, as he put it.

Speculation continued in Lebanon about the reason for Hariri’s “resignation”, but it seemed likely that he did not consider that he could work with Lahoud without playing the minor role in the administration.

Dr. Salim al-Hoss was nominated prime minister on December 2. Lahoud and Hoss appointed a mini-government of 16 ministers (half of the previous government). The government included reform-minded technocrats, in an effort to tackle corruption.

The British Foreign Ministry pointed to disappointment in Lebanon with the limited performance of the Hoss government. It added that a sharp economic slowdown was remarked, noting that an anti-corruption campaign appeared to be directed specifically against political opponents of Lahoud and Hoss and away from friends of the Syrian government.



What’s at Stake in Iraq’s Parliamentary Election?

A young Iraqi worker walks past election campaigning posters ahead of the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, 07 November 2025. (EPA)
A young Iraqi worker walks past election campaigning posters ahead of the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, 07 November 2025. (EPA)
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What’s at Stake in Iraq’s Parliamentary Election?

A young Iraqi worker walks past election campaigning posters ahead of the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, 07 November 2025. (EPA)
A young Iraqi worker walks past election campaigning posters ahead of the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, 07 November 2025. (EPA)

Iraqis will elect a new parliament on November 11, in a key test for Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and for a system seen by the country's young population as merely enriching those already in power.

WHAT IS THE MOOD AMONG IRAQIS?

Many ordinary voters are disillusioned with Iraq's 20-year-old experiment with democracy, saying it has brought only corruption, unemployment and poor public services, while parties, politicians and armed groups divide the spoils of their country's vast oil wealth and distribute jobs to loyalists.

Iraq began voting for its politicians in 2005, after the 2003 US invasion which toppled logtime ruler Saddam Hussein.

Early elections were marred by sectarian violence and boycotted by Sunni Muslims as Saddam's ouster allowed for the political dominance of the majority Shiites, whom he had suppressed during his long rule.

Sectarianism has largely subsided, especially among younger Iraqis, but remains embedded in a political system that shares out government posts among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians and other ethnic and religious groups.

WHO IS RUNNING?

Roughly 40% of the registered candidates are under 40, highlighting attempts by the new generation to challenge the political domination of older power networks.

Sudani, who took office in 2022 and is seeking a second term, leads the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, which groups several Shiite parties and is campaigning on improving services, fighting corruption and consolidating state authority.

He has been a rare strong prime minister who has pushed through reconstruction projects and fostered cordial ties with both Iran and the US, Iraq's main foreign allies.

The State of Law Coalition, led by former premier Nouri al-Maliki whose sectarian policies critics say helped the rise of ISIS in 2014, remains influential and competes with Sudani's camp for dominance within the Shiite establishment.

A collection of parties with ties to Iran and with their own armed groups are running on separate lists.

The main Sunni political force is former parliamentary Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi's Taqaddum (Progress) Party. It draws support from Iraq's mainly Sunni west and north. It calls for rebuilding state institutions and empowering Sunni communities after years of conflict and marginalization.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of veteran leader Masoud Barzani dominates the semi-autonomous government of Iraq's northern Kurdistan Region. It seeks a greater share of the oil revenues that shore up the national budget.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani, rivals the KDP. It traditionally advocates closer ties with Baghdad and has often allied with Shiite factions. It aims to defend its traditional strongholds.

The influential populist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's movement is boycotting the vote, ostensibly over corruption, leaving the field open to others. Sadr's movement still controls large parts of the state through key civil service appointments.

HOW WILL THE VOTE AFFECT IRAQ?

Turnout will be a key measure of Iraqis' confidence in their political system, amid public frustration over endemic graft and poor services.

Low turnout would signal continued disillusionment, while a stronger showing could give reform-minded and younger candidates limited leverage in parliament.

The election is not expected to drastically alter Iraq's political landscape. Negotiations to select a prime minister are often protracted, ending in a compromise among the richest, best-armed and most powerful parties.

Under Iraq's sectarian power-sharing system, the prime minister will be Shiite, the speaker of parliament Sunni, and the president a Kurd.

But Iraq's next government will face intense pressure to deliver tangible improvements in everyday life and prevent public discontent over corruption spilling into unrest.

HOW WILL IT AFFECT THE REGION?

Iraq's next prime minister will need to navigate the delicate balance between US and Iranian influence, and manage dozens of armed groups that are closer to Tehran and answerable more to their own leaders than to the state, all while facing growing pressure from Washington to dismantle those militias.

Iraq has so far avoided the worst of the regional upheaval caused by the Gaza war, but will face US and Israeli wrath if it fails to contain militants aligned with Iran.

WHAT'S NEXT?

Preliminary results are expected within days of the vote, but talks to form a government could take months.

After results are certified by Iraq's Electoral Commission and Supreme Court, the new 329-member parliament meets to elect a speaker, deputies and then a president, who tasks the largest bloc with forming a government.

The nominee has 30 days to win approval for a cabinet - a feat never guaranteed in Iraq.


West Bank’s Ancient Olive Tree a ‘Symbol of Palestinian Endurance’ 

Salah Abu Ali, 52, official guardian of Palestinians alleged oldest olive tree, between 3,000 and 5,000 years old poses for a portrait under it in Al-Walajah, occupied West Bank on November 4, 2025. (AFP)
Salah Abu Ali, 52, official guardian of Palestinians alleged oldest olive tree, between 3,000 and 5,000 years old poses for a portrait under it in Al-Walajah, occupied West Bank on November 4, 2025. (AFP)
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West Bank’s Ancient Olive Tree a ‘Symbol of Palestinian Endurance’ 

Salah Abu Ali, 52, official guardian of Palestinians alleged oldest olive tree, between 3,000 and 5,000 years old poses for a portrait under it in Al-Walajah, occupied West Bank on November 4, 2025. (AFP)
Salah Abu Ali, 52, official guardian of Palestinians alleged oldest olive tree, between 3,000 and 5,000 years old poses for a portrait under it in Al-Walajah, occupied West Bank on November 4, 2025. (AFP)

As guardian of the occupied West Bank's oldest olive tree, Salah Abu Ali prunes its branches and gathers its fruit even as violence plagues the Palestinian territory during this year's harvest.

"This is no ordinary tree. We're talking about history, about civilization, about a symbol," the 52-year-old said proudly, smiling behind his thick beard in the village of Al-Walajah, south of Jerusalem.

Abu Ali said experts had estimated the tree to be between 3,000 and 5,500 years old. It has endured millennia of drought and war in this parched land scarred by conflict.

Around the tree's vast trunk and its dozen offshoots -- some named after his family members -- Abu Ali has cultivated a small oasis of calm.

A few steps away, the Israeli separation wall cutting off the West Bank stands five meters (16 feet) high, crowned with razor wire.

More than half of Al-Walajah's original land now lies on the far side of the Israeli security wall.

Yet so far the village has been spared the settler assaults that have marred this year's olive harvest, leaving many Palestinians injured.

Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967, and some of the 500,000 Israelis living in the Palestinian territory have attacked farmers trying to access their trees almost every day this year since the season began in mid-October.

The Palestinian Authority's Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, based in Ramallah, documented 2,350 such attacks in the West Bank in October.

- 'Rooted in this land' -

Almost none of the perpetrators have been held to account by the Israeli authorities.

Israeli forces often disperse Palestinians with tear gas or block access to their own land, AFP journalists witnessed on several occasions.

But in Al-Walajah for now, Abu Ali is free to care for the tree. In a good year, he said, it can yield from 500 to 600 kilograms (1,100 to 1,300 pounds) of olives.

This year, low rainfall led to slim pickings in the West Bank, including for the tree whose many nicknames include the Elder, the Bedouin Tree and Mother of Olives.

"It has become a symbol of Palestinian endurance. The olive tree represents the Palestinian people themselves, rooted in this land for thousands of years," said Al-Walajah mayor Khader Al-Araj.

The Palestinian Authority's agriculture ministry even recognized the tree as a Palestinian natural landmark and appointed Abu Ali as its official caretaker.

Most olive trees reach about three meters in height when mature. This one towers above the rest, its main trunk nearly two meters wide, flanked by a dozen offshoots as large as regular olive trees.

- 'Green gold' -

"The oil from this tree is exceptional. The older the tree, the richer the oil," said Abu Ali.

He noted that the precious resource, which he called "green gold", costs four to five times more than regular oil.

Tourists once came in droves to see the tree, but numbers have dwindled since the start of the war in Gaza in October 2023, Abu Ali said, with checkpoints tightening across the West Bank.

The village of Al-Walajah is not fully immune from the issues facing other West Bank communities.

In 1949, after the creation of Israel, a large portion of the village's land was taken, and many Palestinian families had to leave their homes to settle on the other side of the so-called armistice line.

After Israel's 1967 occupation, most of what remained was designated Area C -- under full Israeli control -- under the 1993 Oslo Accords, which were meant to lead to peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

But the designation left many homes facing demolition orders for lacking Israeli permits, a common problem in Area C, which covers 66 percent of the West Bank.

"Today, Al-Walajah embodies almost every Israeli policy in the West Bank: settlements, the wall, home demolitions, land confiscations and closures," mayor Al-Araj told AFP.

For now, Abu Ali continues to nurture the tree. He plants herbs and fruit trees around it, and keeps a guest book with messages from visitors in dozens of languages.

"I've become part of the tree. I can't live without it," he said.


French Migrant Unit Faces Quiet Standoff With Damascus

A circulated image shows the Ghuraba camp in Harem in Idlib’s countryside
A circulated image shows the Ghuraba camp in Harem in Idlib’s countryside
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French Migrant Unit Faces Quiet Standoff With Damascus

A circulated image shows the Ghuraba camp in Harem in Idlib’s countryside
A circulated image shows the Ghuraba camp in Harem in Idlib’s countryside

The latest clashes in Idlib’s countryside between a French armed faction known as the Ghuraba and Syrian government forces have revived one of the most sensitive and contentious questions in Syria’s new landscape.

In the Harem area north of Idlib, the fighting was not a standalone security incident. It appeared instead to be a test of Damascus’s approach to thousands of foreign fighters who remained on Syrian territory after years of war.

The clearest reading among analysts is that the events marked the start of a more serious engagement with the foreign fighters file.

The issue has returned to the forefront after the emerging Syrian state moved to build trust with the international community by preventing foreigners from assuming leadership posts in the new Syrian army.

How the Story Began

The incident began on October 22 when internal security forces moved into a camp in the town of Harem, where French fighters under the command of Omar Diaby, known as Omar Omsen, live.

The raid was carried out after complaints of serious violations, including the kidnapping of a girl by a group led by Diaby. Officials said Diaby refused to surrender. The operation, according to the official narrative, aimed to enforce the law and assert state authority over the camp.

Diaby’s Response

Diaby, a French commander of African origin, denied the accusations. He accused French intelligence of orchestrating what he described as political targeting. Paris views Diaby as one of the main recruiters of French-speaking jihadists. Washington designated him a global terrorist in 2016.

Ceasefire and Mediation

The clashes ended after a reconciliation meeting mediated by Uzbek, Tajik and Turkestan faction leaders inside the Harem camp. The Ghuraba announced on Telegram that it had reached a ceasefire and thanked what it called migrant and local brothers who supported them.

The Ghuraba’s Composition

The Ghuraba comprises about 70 French fighters living with their families in a fortified camp directly on the Turkish border.

This made the security raid difficult. The six-point agreement reached after the clashes required a ceasefire, opening the camp to the government, referring Diaby’s case to the Sharia court under the justice ministry, withdrawing heavy weapons and guaranteeing that participants in the clashes would not be pursued.

Foreign Fighters in the New State

The number of foreign fighters is estimated at more than five thousand. Most have joined the ministry of defense within the 84th Division. The Syrian government faces pressure from western capitals to keep them away from senior positions. Officials have sought to reassure global partners that these fighters pose no threat to regional or international stability.

Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharaa said fighters who once fought with the opposition are part of the new society and that Syria will deal with them through reconciliation rather than exclusion.

A number of them have already received military ranks and official posts in the army as part of an integration policy. Military officials later stressed that the Harem incident does not signal a change in this policy.

The Military’s Position

A Syrian army official, who requested anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that what happened in Harem did not target foreign fighters who stood with the revolution. He said relations with them are based on mutual commitment. Many of them have formally joined the ministry of defense.

He denied that the operation was a campaign against them. It was simply enforcement of the law. He added that the new Syrian army operates under a clear system of discipline and military orders that applies to all personnel, whether Syrian or migrant.

The Debate Over Terminology

Away from the official version, observers and former military commanders said the crisis reflects deeper questions about state-building and identity.

Abu Yahya Al Shami, a former commander in an Islamic faction, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the core issue is terminology. He argued that describing the fighters as foreigners is neither accurate nor fair because the term carries negative implications.

He prefers calling them migrants, saying this acknowledges the legitimacy they earned through their sacrifices. He believes they have already integrated socially and politically, and that their concerns mirror those of Syrians.

He said the handling of the Harem incident was flawed. The media and security escalation was a mistake. Reconciliation prevented the situation from sliding into a dangerous confrontation. He stressed the need for calm, noting that migrants have legitimate fears of prosecution, deportation or marginalization after the war.

Al Shami rejected describing what happened as a revolt. He said the French fighters are part of the Syrian army. Dialogue and mediation, he added, strengthen state authority more than armed confrontation.

Structural Challenges

Researcher Wael Alwan said the episode revealed deep structural challenges for the Syrian state. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that integration of migrants into state institutions remains incomplete and that the coming phase will test whether the integration is genuine.

Some foreign fighters may never integrate. The state may have to either facilitate their organized departure or prevent them from becoming a threat to stability. Alwan said the authorities will need to balance security and stability with the goals of integration and disbanding armed formations.

He said the government has no option but to dismantle armed groups, Syrian or migrant, because this is necessary for reasserting state authority. The reconciliation approach in Harem, he said, was deliberate and meant to contain the crisis with minimal cost.

Alwan added that some segments of fighters, Syrian and migrant, are dissatisfied with state policies. He said the state now needs a new religious narrative that speaks to these groups, and that steps in this direction have recently begun.

Diverging Views Among Migrant Fighters

To understand the ideological differences among migrants themselves, Asharq Al-Awsat interviewed two commanders serving under the defense ministry. Their views reflected a clear divide.

Abu Muhajir, an Arab national, said he is part of the ministry and fights under its banner. He said migrants came to defend Syrians, not to rule them. With the revolution victorious and the new state established, he said their role is now to follow state policy. They are now part of the Syrian army and abide by all ministry decisions.

In contrast, Abu Muthanna, also a ministry member, expressed reservations about the state’s direction. He said the state had kept regime loyalists in influential positions and tolerated public wrongdoing.

He said this is the opposite of the goals for which many fighters died. Still, he insisted they would not rebel. Their duty, he said, is to advise and warn from within, not to bear arms against the state.

The Ideological Layer

Abdullah Khaled, a former Sharia official in Hayat Tahrir Al Sham and now an adviser in the new Syrian army, explained the divide between these two camps.

Migrants, he said, are driven by convictions deeply rooted in their faith. This commitment is what led them to leave comfortable lives in Europe for what was once one of the most dangerous places in the world.

During the war, factional religious discourse was emotional and mobilizing, suited to fighting and confrontation. But after the fall of the regime and the transition from revolution to state, the discourse of governance naturally changed.

Khaled said the new approach fits the logic of governing a population rather than commanding a fighting group.

This shift, however, clashes with the deeply held beliefs of many migrants and some Syrians. For those who reject the new direction, the options are limited. According to Khaled, they must choose between confrontation, withdrawal into silence, or acceptance and adaptation. The state will not permit a return to the old factional model.