Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
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Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Details of the Late Premier’s Meetings in London

A series of recently declassified British documents reveal details of meetings held by the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with British officials in 1997 and 1999.

According to the documents, Hariri informed his British counterpart Tony Blair that Lebanon and Israel held 11 rounds of negotiations in Washington, but the Hebrew state put forward a series of conditions, including “dissolving Hezbollah.”

The accounts, which are published by Asharq Al-Awsat in two episodes, quoted an official in the French presidency as saying that Paris was upset with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and accused him of reneging on previous promises to deploy the Lebanese army in the south after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. This prompted Paris to freeze steps to increase the number of its troops in the UNIFIL.

The documents confirm that the United Kingdom tried to play a role in the negotiations on the Lebanese and Syrian tracks with Israel, and believed that there was a great possibility of achieving progress in light of the promises made by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999-2001) to withdraw from South Lebanon, and the “courtesy” between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

They also show that a special envoy of Blair met with Assad in this regard, and carried a message to Lahoud on the negotiations with Israel. However, the latter refused to receive him due to pressure exerted on him.

The documents, which were declassified in the British National Archives, show that Blair’s reception of Hariri came at the “insistence” of French President Jacques Chirac.
While the first meeting in 1997 was normal, because it took place between two prime ministers, the second meeting in 1999 was problematic “protocol”. Once again, Chirac insisted on Blair to meet Hariri, who was then a former prime minister after he resigned in 1998, following Lahoud’s election as president to succeed President Elias Hrawi.

On July 17, 1997, Blair received his Lebanese counterpart, Rafik Hariri, at 10 Downing Street. He was then the new prime minister after he led his party, the Labor Party, that year to a landslide victory over the Conservatives. Hariri had been prime minister for years under President Elias Hrawi and was focusing his efforts on rebuilding Lebanon after the long years of civil war.

Hariri visited the prime minister for 35 minutes on July 17. He was accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers of Finance, Information and Trade, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers and Lebanon’s Ambassador in London. The meeting was also attended by Derek Fatchett (Foreign Secretary of State for the Middle East), and other UK officials.

The minutes of the meeting show that Hariri clearly held then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responsible for obstructing progress in the peace talks, and argued that this policy would only lead to the growth of the influence of Hamas and the fundamentalists.

Blair asked about the situation in Lebanon. Hariri said that there was now a monitoring group looking into the April understandings in South Lebanon. The group included Americans, French, Syrians, Israelis and Lebanese. He said that nobody wanted the situation to escalate, adding that the Lebanese were trying to build infrastructure throughout the country and achieve financial stability. There have been dramatic developments over the past five years, he noted.

Hariri invited the British Prime Minister to visit Beirut to see for himself. Fatchett said he visited the Lebanese capital, pointing to significant progress compared to its previous visits the year before. Hariri said that they were now hosting the Arab Games, and that a British company had built a wonderful stadium to host it.

Blair-Hariri... A second meeting in different circumstances

Two years after Blair’s meeting with Hariri, a second meeting took place between the two men, but under different circumstances. Hariri had been outside the Lebanese government after his resignation during the term of Lahoud.
An important change also took place in Israel, with the arrival of Ehud Barak to the premiership, succeeding Benjamin Netanyahu.

On July 5, 1999, Philip Barton wrote to the British prime minister, saying that Hariri, the former premier, would visit him the following day because of Chirac's repeated insistence.

He added that Hariri would be accompanied by some people from his office.

A list attached to Barton’s letter comprised the proposed topics for discussion. Those included the possibility of achieving progress in the Middle East peace process in the wake of Barak’s election; the necessity to reach progress on the Syrian and Lebanese track to achieve a comprehensive peace; the negotiations with the European Union; concern over the recent escalation in southern Lebanon that caused the bombing of Beirut on June 25; and progress in the negotiations of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Lebanon.

The brief explanation provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the following:

South Lebanon

A recent escalation of violence in southern Lebanon culminated in the June 25 Israeli Air Force attacks on Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, which killed 10 civilians, and a Hezbollah attack in northern Israel that killed two. The Israeli Air Force attacks were ordered by the Netanyahu government. Barak was informed of it, but not consulted. The situation is calm, but tense, according to the explanation. Contacts resumed in the Israeli-Lebanese monitoring group set up to monitor the April 1996 understandings.
Some saw the Hezbollah attack as a reminder to both Syria and Barak that they could not be ignored in any peace negotiations…

The Middle East peace process

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it expected that Barak would implement the Wye River memorandum whenever he forms a government. The second redeployment of Israeli forces under Wye will be the starting point for renewed negotiations on all tracks in the peace process. It added that the greatest progress was likely to be made on the Syrian-Lebanese tracks (with Israel). Barak may focus his attention here, according to the explanation.

It also noted that a unilateral withdrawal of the Israelis from South Lebanon would deprive the Syrians of one of their main cards in the negotiations over the Golan Heights, specifically their (implicit) influence regarding Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

The Lebanese will not walk alone without their dominant partner. Nevertheless, we understand that Barak knows the need for Syrian cooperation to ensure a successful withdrawal from Lebanon, the British ministry reported in the documents.

The internal Lebanese situation

The British Foreign Affairs’ Ministry said that Emile Lahoud was inaugurated on November 24, 1998, to succeed Elias Hrawi. In order to enable Lahoud, the former commander of the Lebanese army, to become president, the Lebanese parliament voted to amend Article 49 of the constitution that bars senior civil servants from running for president as long as they are in office or within two years of leaving office. It added that 118 of the 128 Lebanese deputies voted for Lahoud. The ten MPs who boycotted were members of Walid Jumblatt’s party.

The documents added that Hariri was offered the opportunity to continue his work as prime minister under the new president’s rule, but he declined on constitutional grounds, as he put it.

Speculation continued in Lebanon about the reason for Hariri’s “resignation”, but it seemed likely that he did not consider that he could work with Lahoud without playing the minor role in the administration.

Dr. Salim al-Hoss was nominated prime minister on December 2. Lahoud and Hoss appointed a mini-government of 16 ministers (half of the previous government). The government included reform-minded technocrats, in an effort to tackle corruption.

The British Foreign Ministry pointed to disappointment in Lebanon with the limited performance of the Hoss government. It added that a sharp economic slowdown was remarked, noting that an anti-corruption campaign appeared to be directed specifically against political opponents of Lahoud and Hoss and away from friends of the Syrian government.



Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)

A US defense agreement with Ethiopia was announced days before an important visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Cairo that saw agreements and memorandums of understanding signed in several fields and coincided with joint Egyptian-Chinese air exercises.

The timing raised questions over whether Washington’s military cooperation with Addis Ababa was driven by “US anger at Cairo” and what objectives it serves amid tensions in the Horn of Africa.

The United States and Ethiopia signed a defense agreement on Aug. 21 during an official visit by an Ethiopian military delegation to Washington. Both sides described it as a strategic framework aimed at strengthening military and security cooperation, protecting national interests and securing mutual benefits.

Raafat Mahmoud, head of the African Affairs Research Unit at the Egyptian Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington was seeking to rebuild ties with Addis Ababa after years of tension, particularly over the Tigray war and US criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights record.

He argued that the agreement showed Ethiopia had become part of broader US calculations involving Red Sea security, countering Chinese and Russian influence and combating armed groups in the Horn.

Ethiopian lawmaker Mohammed Al-Arusi noted that Washington views the Horn as directly linked to Red Sea security, international trade and maritime routes, while also facing terrorist threats.

“Ethiopia lies at the heart of this geography, with its demographic, political and military weight across a broad region, and it hosts the permanent headquarters of the African Union,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Washington, he added, was not seeking a temporary stance but it is “rebuilding its position in a region where the balance of power is changing.”

US Republican and strategic affairs expert Adolfo Franco cautioned that the agreement lacks formally binding treaties and direct financial funding, adding that future defense exports remain subject to strict restrictions and case-by-case assessments, including human rights considerations.

Al-Arusi pointed to a US-Ethiopian dialogue launched in May covering economics, trade, investment, defense and security. The defense track advanced just three months later, a sequence he said showed Washington was approaching Ethiopia with long-term considerations.

Mahmoud said growing US support could strengthen Ethiopia’s negotiating position not only on water but also in its efforts to secure maritime access and expand its presence in the Red Sea region.

Recent media reports have portrayed the US-Ethiopian rapprochement as Washington’s response to Egypt’s growing ties with China, highlighted by Xi’s visit to Cairo this week.

Mahmoud countered that Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement was not new, although recent developments naturally raised sensitivities in Washington, particularly amid expanding economic and security cooperation.

In January 2026, Ethiopia and China elevated their relations to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” nearly two years after Egypt and China upgraded their ties to a “strategic partnership” in 2024.

Al-Arusi argued that Washington’s expanding partnership with Addis Ababa should not be viewed as replacing one partner with another, but rather as evidence of Ethiopia’s growing strategic value.

Former US diplomat Henry Ensher told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington wants a security partner in the Horn and that Ethiopia is the best option given its capabilities.

While China and the United States compete in Africa, Egypt is the more important partner, he said, making it unlikely that Washington would use this approach to confront or punish Cairo.


Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
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Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)

Ahmad al-Hilali, deputy governor of Hasakah, told Asharq Al-Awsat on Friday that the integration process stipulated in the “January 29, 2026 Agreement” has moved, following the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the former Kurdish Autonomous Administration, from “the stage of understandings and negotiations to actual implementation, whether in civilian institutions or in the security and military sectors.”

He described the security situation as “much better” and said “stability is gradually strengthening,” stressing that the process “is moving toward completion, and what we want is for it to take place calmly.”

Since SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced from the presidential palace in Damascus on August 25 the dissolution of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, Hasakah has witnessed a series of developments and changes signaling the emergence of a new phase in the governorate. Its defining features are the restoration of state authority across all sectors, stronger security and stability, the unification of institutions, and the end of administrative duplication, in accordance with the January 29 Agreement.

In his remarks, al-Hilali said that “the integration process is not simply a matter of transferring buildings or changing names. It is about reunifying institutional authority, administrative decision-making, and security and military command under the umbrella of the Syrian state.”

He said significant steps had already been completed in this direction, while work was underway to address the remaining files in an orderly manner that would prevent any institutional or security vacuum and preserve stability in the governorate.

Before the announcement of the SDF's dissolution, most cities and areas in Hasakah had experienced security disorder involving the Revolutionary Youth. Such incidents increased after the signing of the January 29 Agreement, when members of the group prevented the handover of institutions to the government. That situation, however, has now disappeared.

Al-Hilali attributed the disappearance of the previous unrest primarily to the fact that “the phase has changed.”

“Previously, there were attempts to obstruct the process of transferring state institutions, and some activities emerged aimed at disrupting this course. But as implementation of the agreement progressed and the direction toward ending institutional and security duplication became clear, these manifestations declined significantly,” he said.

According to al-Hilali, “There is now a growing conviction among everyone that state institutions should not be a subject of conflict or confrontation, and that the integration process is moving toward completion.”

“What we want is for this process to take place calmly, away from provocation and tension, and for all residents of the governorate to feel that the return of state institutions means the return of services, the rule of law and stability, and is not directed against any component of society,” he said.

Asked when the integration of military, security and civilian institutions would be fully completed, the deputy governor said: “I do not want to set an artificial date for a process of this scale and complexity, because some files require technical, administrative and security procedures before they can be formally closed.”

He added: “But I can say that we are at a very advanced stage and that the overall direction is clearly toward completing the integration as soon as possible.”

He noted that “the bulk of the work is now in the implementation phase, while what remains consists of detailed files requiring the completion of arrangements, verification and coordination among the ministries and relevant authorities.”

Women fighters from the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) take part in military traning in Hasakah, Syria, August 22, 2026. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

Pending Files

Al-Hilali said: “What matters most to us is that the integration be complete, genuine and sustainable, rather than merely a political announcement whose impact fades after a short period.”

Asked about the main outstanding issues preventing the completion of the integration process, al-Hilali said the remaining files could be divided into three main tracks.

“First is the military and security file, involving the completion of the restructuring of personnel and cadres and the integration of those who meet the requirements into the Ministries of Defense and Interior in accordance with the established procedures,” he said.

“The second is the administrative and civilian file, particularly the status of employees and staff, the mechanisms for confirming their positions and paying their entitlements, and the integration of institutions and departments whose transfer to the state has not yet been completed.”

“The third involves a number of service-related, technical and administrative files linked to the transfer of powers and the reunification of operating systems, databases and resources.”

Al-Hilali said these issues “do not represent an obstacle to the integration process so much as they are implementation files that need to be completed.”

“The political decision is clear and the overall direction has been settled: state institutions will be unified, authority will rest with the Syrian state, and the rights of all citizens and components of the governorate will be preserved,” he said.

The rise of the Autonomous Administration

The first foundations of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, which sought to establish a “Kurdish project in Syria,” emerged through the formation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee. It was established by Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council following the signing of the Erbil Agreement on July 12, 2012.

A military wing was subsequently established for the committee, comprising the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the Asayish security forces. The SDF was later formed in 2015, under predominantly Kurdish leadership.

The geographic footprint of the Autonomous Administration expanded from three cantons in 2014 to six in 2016 and seven by 2023. This territorial expansion was accompanied by the growth of its military and security apparatus and civilian institutions, which collectively included tens of thousands of personnel.

The SDF subsequently lost a significant portion of its territory during armed clashes that erupted between its fighters and the Syrian army in late 2025 and early 2026. The fighting lasted about two weeks and was followed by the signing of the January 29, 2026 Agreement.

The agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF called for a ceasefire and the gradual integration into Syrian state institutions of the military and civilian institutions established by the Kurds during the years of conflict. It also called for the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, as well as the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the region.


Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
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Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)

Southern Lebanon's Ali al-Taher ridge, which the Israeli army on Thursday said it captured, was a strategic position for Iran-backed Hezbollah, where it was believed to have established a command center.

Hezbollah did not confirm losing the highland, which is around 10 kilometers (six miles) from the border with Israel and was targeted by several Israeli strikes in recent weeks despite a ceasefire.

The ridge, a flashpoint since Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March, lies close to the major city of Nabatieh and the Litani River.

It is just a few kilometers from UNESCO-listed Beaufort castle, another strategic site that Israel captured in recent months and continues to occupy.

Ali al-Taher ridge, on the edge of the Israeli-proclaimed occupied "security zone", overlooks surrounding areas and key districts further north, and sits atop a network of tunnels.

During US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Washington proposed the Lebanese military take over the ridge, but Hezbollah refused, according to a source close to the talks.

Military expert Riad Kahwaji told AFP that the ridge is "in between several villages and adjacent to the city of Nabatieh" with a "web of tunnels (that) connects these villages around it".

On Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the capture "marks the completion of the phase of securing control in the security zone in southern Lebanon", meaning the Lebanese territory Israel occupied during the war.

- 'Command centers' -

The Israeli military on Thursday said that the tunnel network included "command centers (and) weapons storage rooms".

"The infrastructure is a strategic underground network that was built over two decades and funded and planned by the Iranian terror regime," it added.

Kahwaji, who heads the INEGMA military analysis institute, said the hilltops overlook Iqlim al-Tuffah, an area further from the border where Hezbollah holds sway, as well as part of the country's east.

Control of the area would therefore "give the Israelis an easy passage to move on both sides".

Speaking to journalists including AFP last month, Hezbollah spokesman Youssef al-Zein refused to say how many of the group's fighters were at the Ali al-Taher position. He denied any Iranian personnel were there, as had been reported in some media outlets.

He claimed that Israel had "exaggerated the importance of Ali al-Taher" as a military objective but also vowed that Hezbollah would "defend this position as much as it can".

The ridge is located right above the Litani. Hezbollah agreed to disarm in areas south of the river under a 2024 ceasefire that sought to end its previous war with Israel.

Two years later, Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into the broader Middle East war by attacking Israel in support of Iran.

Israel responded with airstrikes and a ground invasion that Lebanon says have killed more than 4,300 people.

The conflict has calmed since a US-Iran memorandum of understanding and a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel agreed in June. But Israeli strikes continue and violence persisted around Ali al-Taher.

On August 15, Israel's army launched its deadliest strikes in weeks in response to what it said was a Hezbollah attack against its soldiers in the area.

In June, Israel's army published an updated map showing the parts of south Lebanon it considers within its "security zone" where its troops are operating, expanding the area to include the Ali al-Taher ridge.