Leila Khaled: Rafik Hariri Transferred Wadie Haddad’s Weapons to Europe

Palestinian PFLP Plane Hijacker Leila Khaled to Asharq Al-Awsat: A story of Mossad missiles, Jalal Talabani's reconnaissance trip and the services of Marouf Saad.

Leila Khaled (R) and the Editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper Ghassan Charbel (L) - AAWSAT
Leila Khaled (R) and the Editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper Ghassan Charbel (L) - AAWSAT
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Leila Khaled: Rafik Hariri Transferred Wadie Haddad’s Weapons to Europe

Leila Khaled (R) and the Editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper Ghassan Charbel (L) - AAWSAT
Leila Khaled (R) and the Editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper Ghassan Charbel (L) - AAWSAT

Episode One

Journalists sometimes fall into the trap of being drawn into the story of a thorny, sensual, or cruel man who has a remarkable role at a certain stage. The man’s name could be Vladimir Putin, Saddam Hussein, or Muammar Gaddafi.

I was attracted to stories shrouded in so much malice and mystery. That is how I spent years looking for features, stories, and details.

The story of another man, the Palestinian leader Wadie Haddad, whose name has been associated with hijacking planes and “chasing the enemy everywhere” had caught my attention.

In the 70s of the last century, Haddad, who was responsible for foreign operations at the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” shook the region and the world.

Operations launched by Haddad preoccupied political, security and media circles with two key stars: Carlos the Jackal, whose star shone after the kidnapping of the OPEC ministers in Vienna, and the second was the young Palestinian woman, Leila Khaled, who participated in the 1969 and 1970 hijackings of two planes.

In the summer of 2001, I published a lengthy investigation on Haddad, which also included Carlos’ responses to questions I sent to him in his French prison, where he still resides.

However, circumstances prevented Khaled from being involved in the matter.

Late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, at that time, asked me why I was interested in Haddad's story, and I replied that it was out of journalistic curiosity. I was surprised that a busy prime minister would have enough time to read an interview of this kind.

I later heard from an informed source that during a visit to Haddad’s house in Beirut, a day after it was targeted in the summer of 1970 by Israeli shells, a young Lebanese man was taking part in removing shards of glass.

Curiosity got the better of me and I discovered after repeated attempts that the young man was Hariri. I had many doubts, because at that time Hariri was working in Saudi Arabia. But the source seemed confident of their statement since they knew Hariri personally.

Labneh Sandwiches

Years ago, poet and journalist Zahi Wehbe was giving an interview on Future TV, which Hariri owned, along with Leila Khaled.

During the interview, Wehbe received a call from Hariri's house in Quraitem Palace asking him to extend the ad period, which he did. During the break, Hariri called and asked to speak to Khaled.

“I am Rafik Hariri, the prime minister of Lebanon,” Hariri told Khaled.

“I do not know the Prime Minister of Lebanon. I know the old Rafik (Hariri),” replied Khaled. This is when Hariri requested that Khaled visit him at home.


Rafik Hariri (Getty) - Wadie Haddad - Jalal Talabani (Getty)

Khaled went with Wehbe, and Hariri met with them. They discussed the difficult conditions in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and Khaled stressed the need to ease the restrictions on the lives of camp residents.

Hariri asked his guest if she still remembered the “labneh sandwiches,” and Khaled affirmed that she did.

Wehbe tried to inquire about the sandwiches, but Hariri stopped the conversation with a wave of his hand and moved on to another topic.

The “labneh sandwiches” was Hariri’s most confidential matter.

Hariri hid the secret from the closest people to him, and now the readers of Asharq Al-Awsat are learning about it half a century after it had happened.

To be honest, I did not go to Khaled's house in Amman to ask her about Hariri. I went to collect stories, especially since this woman is about to turn eighty without changing her convictions or regretting what she did.

Khaled unwittingly contributed to saving Haddad from death because of her presence in his apartment when it was targeted by Mossad shells in 1970. She was instructing him about an operation being prepared, keeping him outside the bedroom which was targeted in the attack that injured his wife and son.

When Khaled told me this, I remembered the young man who was said to have collected the shards of glass the next day. I asked her if she saw him the next day, and she replied that she was with Haddad’s family at the American University of Beirut Medical Center, and she did not know who came to the apartment.

When asked if she knew Hariri in those years, she replied: “Yes. I knew him because he lived with my brother during their studies at the Beirut Arab University.”

“A year before he was due to graduate, he came to my sister's house in Mazraa, Beirut.”

“He said he decided to go to work in Saudi Arabia.”

“We tried to persuade him to complete his studies, but he was not convinced.”

“If I remember well, this was in 1965 or soon after. He visited us later in Lebanon, met with Haddad, and got assigned the task of transporting weapons to Europe.”

I pretended not to be surprised and asked where and when he had transferred the weapons, and Khaled’s response was: “To Europe, and he did that more than once between 1970 and 1971.”

“At that time, he was working in Saudi Arabia. I am not aware of how Haddad was asking him to come to Lebanon. He was the one delivering the weapons. After 1972, we no longer saw him,” added Khaled.

I inquired if Hariri - despite his modest capabilities at the time - contributed to any financing for the group, and Khaled’s answer was: “I am not sure, all I witnessed was his assignment to transfer weapons.”

“The rule of thumb was that no one should know anything except for what they have to complete their mission.”

I asked about the reason for assigning Hariri a task of this kind while he was working in Saudi Arabia, and she replied: “I told you what I know. Perhaps because his passport did not arouse suspicion.”

Khaled refused to talk about how Hariri got the weapons to pass through the airports of France, Spain, and Germany.

The tape recorder was on and thoughts started racing through my mind. The young man who was assigned by Haddad to transport weapons to Europe will later appear to be an acceptable player on Arab and international levels.

Hariri would later visit the White House, the Kremlin, and 10 Downing Street. The Elysee master will break the protocol to dine at his Parisian home.

Hariri and Smuggling Publications to Syria

At that moment, I remembered what I heard two decades ago from Zaki Hillo, who worked with Haddad, when he told me that he knew Hariri. Hillo didn’t reveal much. He had trained to live in a world of secrets, and was the one who trained Carlos in marksmanship and small explosives.

I turned to those who accompanied Hariri in his early youth in his hometown of Sidon, southern Lebanon. They said Hariri was an enthusiastic young man who joined the “Movement of Arab Nationalists” as an activist.

At the movement, Hariri got acquainted with the names of George Habash and Haddad and got to know them later. His role was modest.

He participated in a committee headed by Haddad, which was concerned with providing facilities to some members of the movement, such as finding homes for rent and services of this kind. Hariri was also tasked with delivering the movement’s publications secretly to its members in Syria.

He chose to hide these leaflets in the vegetable trucks that were traveling from Sidon to the Syrian cities. Those days were the thread that linked Hariri to some of the movement's symbols before the birth of the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” led by Habash.

Jalal Talabani on a Reconnaissance Mission

Khaled noticed that Haddad was skilled at using some friendships, especially with non-suspicious people, to play roles that serve his work. In this context, he once assigned a young Kurdish leftist to carry out reconnaissance missions in Europe.

I had heard years ago that this Kurdish youth later assumed a high position, so my suspicions went to the late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.

Taking advantage of the opportunity to meet with him during his visit to Damascus, I asked him to confirm the story. He kindly wished not to focus too much on it “so that friends in the US would not say that the president of Iraq is a former terrorist.” Perhaps he was also avoiding saying that his trip was part of a plan to assassinate Shimon Peres.

The truth is that I was not surprised that Talabani played a role of this kind because of his upbringing, his inclinations, and his connections. But it is strange that Hariri transported weapons and that this role remained a secret for five decades.

Haddad used his friendships to serve his cause.

“He used to ask me to go to some personalities and friends, including a number of doctors, to get money from them to cover travel expenses and missions,” revealed Khaled.

“He used to tell me to tell them we want to buy travel tickets,” she explained.

“Once I went to Najib Abu Haidar (former Lebanese minister) and he asked me where Haddad wanted to travel. Of course, I replied, "I don't know."

“They would give us the money and we would buy the tickets.”

“Haddad was dependent on some of his relatives, including those who were at the head of a major company.”

Khaled tells how Haddad used to talk to his friends and relatives. He urged them to fund him because he was fighting for a Palestine that was for all.

“Their confidence in him and the justice of the case prompted them to be responsive,” clarified Khaled.

Another friend of Haddad that was not hesitant to offer his services was the representative of the city of Sidon in the Lebanese parliament, Marouf Saad. One day, Saad was asked to suggest a suitable place for a hijacked plane to land. Saad searched for a place that had Haddad’s approval, but Khaled was afraid that the place would be within reach of the Israeli warplanes, so the matter was dismissed. The search later moved outside Lebanon, and Khaled was tasked with recruiting members and training them to hijack planes, which she did.

Mossad Missiles Postponed the Honeymoon

I asked Khaled to tell the story of the assassination attempt on Haddad at the hands of the Mossad, because she was with him at the moment of the attack.

“Haddad was adhering to strict security measures and all his movements were surrounded by complete secrecy,” she recalled.

“However, they succeeded in hitting his apartment in Al-Zarif in Beirut with six missiles directed at the bedrooms at 2:00 am.”

“Fortunately, I was sitting with him in the dining room.”

“I had to travel in the morning, but I was supposed to write down the details of the operation that was supposed to lead me to Tel Aviv. I was writing the details to send to the leadership when the explosions went off.”

“I was thrust from my place, and we heard the screams of Hani, Haddad’s son.”

“Haddad was not injured, but shrapnel hit his son in more than one place.”

“The glass in the apartment shattered and we felt as if we were suffocating. The closet was on fire and was about to fall on Hani, who was lying in his bed.”

“Haddad came forward and I saw his hands were burning, but he was able to carry Hani and give him to me.”

“The boy was bleeding, so I picked him up. But I didn't know how to open the door.”

“Haddad came with his burning hands and grabbed the lock.”

“The missiles hit, especially the lower and upper floors, and I still remember Haddad’s sentence in those harsh conditions when he said: Their operation failed.”

Khaled added that Haddad had gone into the other room to bring his wife after collecting the papers of the operation’s details and placing them in his pocket.

“He came to his wife and asked her to get up.”

“When she discovered that her son was not near her, she started screaming.”

“I rushed to the hospital and started yelling after the staff demanded money before admitting Hani, knowing that he was bleeding on my hand.”

“I pushed the man who asked for the insurance, entered the hospital, and Haddad followed me with his wife.”

The plan, which was aborted because of the attack, was for Khaled to go with a fake passport to Tel Aviv to spend her honeymoon there, and then carry out the operation.

“In the hospital we had to think of a response, and I brought a book about the flights of Israeli planes to and from Tel Aviv.”

“I spotted three planes that can be hunted almost simultaneously. I presented the idea to Haddad and he liked it.”


General view of a mural of Leila Khaled, on the apartheid wall in Bethlehem, West Bank (Getty)

Did Haddad Die Poisoned

On March 28, 1978, Haddad took his last breath in a police hospital in East Berlin. The man of secrets was gone, leaving behind an outstanding mystery that decades have not succeeded in clearing.

Was he poisoned? No one has a definitive answer.

The painful symptoms that afflicted him in Iraq, Algeria and Berlin led him to believe that he had been subjected to an elaborate poisoning process, but the medical reports did not provide a decisive or definitive answer.

Haddad’s comrades tried to continue their activities after his death. However, a few years were enough to turn the page on foreign operations in the staggering absence of Haddad. Haddad was buried in Baghdad

Khaled mocks the claims of some Mossad agents that Haddad fell victim to the poisoned chocolates they sent him. She confirmed that Haddad “did not like chocolate.”

Haddad’s comrades locked the organization’s secrets in a safe and kept the key in a protected place. They are not in the habit of meeting journalists, leaking news, or selling secrets.

Khaled is a little different because she became a star and a symbol. She later assumed leadership positions in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and participated in successive activities to enhance the role of Palestinian women.

Khaled was born in Haifa in 1944 and immigrated with her family to Lebanon after the Nakba. She resided in Tyre, Sidon and Beirut before later going to Kuwait.



Shadow Battles in Syria: Fighting ISIS, Rebuilding the State 

An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
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Shadow Battles in Syria: Fighting ISIS, Rebuilding the State 

An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)

At the entrances to Damascus branching off the Mezzeh highway, just before Umayyad Square, young men with a quasi-military appearance line both sides of the road, selling flags and banners for “Liberation Day.”

In narrower streets and at intersections leading deeper into the city, they are met by women in long dresses, some with headscarves pulled halfway across their faces. The women drag one or two children behind them and carry loaves of bread for sale, stacking them openly and thrusting them toward passersby and car windows — unwrapped, exposed to diesel fumes and the dust rising from the rubble encircling the capital.

Selling bread in this manner has gradually become a “profession,” largely female, expanding as poverty deepens. Women queue at bakeries to purchase their ration, resell it for a small margin, then return to the lines, repeating the cycle late into the night.

This scene is not confined to Damascus; it recurs across Syrian cities and regions I visited, from Homs and Idlib to Aleppo. Over time, this female presence has become woven into the landscape of a prolonged crisis, a quiet pillar of daily survival.

Widespread destruction

If women’s exhausted faces and roughened hands are the clearest witnesses to a catastrophe now nearing its fifteenth year, the unrelenting destruction bears equally stark testimony. Entire neighborhoods and suburbs, flattened to the ground, ring Damascus, choking it in dust and debris.

The same gray desolation dominates major cities and their surrounding countryside, stretching across vast expanses of the country. Driving more than 350 kilometers without encountering a single intact tree, neighborhood, or home offers a visceral sense of what over a decade of killing, destruction, and vengeance has left behind.

The scale of devastation reflects not only military confrontations or the superiority of one side, but a deliberate effort to annihilate people and livelihoods, to extinguish even the faintest hope of return. What bombs spared was often burned, looted, or rendered uninhabitable. And yet, returns are taking place slowly, haltingly, through sheer individual persistence.

Only a few enclaves have endured in Damascus and its markets, or beyond in certain towns and districts, some even prospering, driven by sectarian calculations or political and commercial interests, most notably those tied to the production and trafficking of captagon.

A view of Damascus, Syria. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Damascus: The polished façade

Damascus was preparing for exceptional celebrations marking the first anniversary of Bashar al-Assad’s ouster. Preparations were extensive: stages erected, loudspeakers installed, traffic rerouted, and banners raised proclaiming national unity, “One people... one nation”, and announcing that “the dark era has ended.”

Programs circulated via text messages urging citizens to participate and “celebrate freedom and hope... and complete the story.” But which story? The question reverberates through streets where bread is sold on bare asphalt while victory celebrations unfold.

Here, narratives multiply and diverge, sometimes to the point of contradiction, like neighboring bubbles that coexist without touching. A sharp vertical divide in perspectives remains, recalling 2011, when Syrians split to the brink between supporters and opponents, even as official discourse insists on projecting a seamless image of a new phase.

Silent security battle

Behind the celebratory façade, another battle is underway, which is quieter and more complex. “ISIS, especially the muhajireen [foreign fighters], poses our most serious challenge,” a senior Syrian security source who requested anonymity told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that arrests and “neutralizations” are carried out regularly.

Another source explained that “security operations are conducted with precision and professionalism. Lists of those affiliated with extremist organizations under the broad ISIS umbrella are already in the hands of the security services.”

He added: “We know them individually. We monitor them closely. The former regime left behind an extremely detailed surveillance system that we continue to rely on.”

I met both sources days before the recent Palmyra incident. When it occurred, it appeared unsurprising; officials and those in sensitive positions had anticipated such scenarios as among several looming security risks, especially after Syria formally joined the counterterrorism coalition.

One source summarized these risks as three simultaneous confrontations: “First, the fight against ISIS and its offshoots, handled with extreme caution because it poses a personal threat to President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Second, the confrontation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which threatens the emerging state and its identity over the long term. Third, a colder, less intense standoff with Israel linked to developments in Sweida.”

In a semi-official assessment, the security source did not rule out that those released from al-Hol camp could become “time bombs,” exploited to destabilize internal security and serve the agendas of extremists rejecting the current transition of power.

Such incidents could also signal abroad that stripping the SDF of its “counterterrorism” duties would be futile, potentially “opening the door to packs of lone wolves.”

Destruction from fighting between the regime forces and opposition is seen in the Yarmuk camp on the outskirts of Damascus. (EPA)

Is a security approach enough?

The challenge confronting the state is not purely a security one, and a strictly securitized approach lacks consensus even within governing circles.

Contrary to those who view ISIS and extremism as a “technical problem” solvable through force alone, a figure close to the political leadership argues that “the core issue lies in absorbing a massive human bloc that spent years outside any normal social framework, without education, stable families, or organized structures of life.”

“The real challenge,” he added, “is integrating them into the idea of the state and rehabilitating them accordingly. Just as these adolescents were once pulled toward a specific form of extremism, today we must work to move them toward a middle ground.”

“If the president says we are leaving a factional phase and entering a state-based one, how does that happen at the grassroots level? Is it merely individual and security-driven, or is it societal as well?” he wondered.

In this light, one observer interpreted al-Sharaa’s statement — “Obey me so long as I obey God among you” — delivered from the Umayyad Mosque on the night of the grand celebration and widely criticized by civil and secular circles, as a message aimed at a different audience: a segment the state seeks to reassure through a religious call to obedience and rejection of rebellion.

If words come easily, lived reality does not.

Security is tightly enforced in major cities, such as Damascus and Aleppo, through heavy deployments and modern technologies, including drones, especially during sensitive periods like mass anniversary celebrations.

Beyond the cities, however, vast rural areas remain largely neglected, marked by immense destruction, extreme poverty, and rampant unemployment. Checkpoints line major inter-provincial roads, but side towns and village alleys are often left to fend for themselves.

Idlib, once cited as an exception for its services and administrative capacity, has lost much of that distinction since liberation. Opening to the rest of Syria exposed the city and its devastated countryside to the demands of ordinary life, revealing governance that had amounted largely to crisis management. That legacy persists even in everyday language: soldiers addressing civilians as “sheikh,” or telling them to “seek God’s help” as shorthand for “move along.”

Between Idlib’s countryside and Aleppo, villages and small towns are known for particular loyalties and affiliations — some far removed from the moderation celebrated on Damascus stages. Their reputations lead drivers to take longer routes considered “safer.”

In this belt, young men, especially the youngest, have long served as fuel for armed factions. In recent years, only Hayat Tahrir al-Sham maintained dominance on the ground.

After the fall of the regime, thousands joined the general security forces or the army, often for lack of alternatives. Many cannot afford to rebuild destroyed homes or recover looted livelihoods; barracks, offering food and shelter, remain preferable to civilian life.

A fabric of clashing identities

These identities crystallized during years of militarization, particularly after 2013, though their social roots run deeper. Today, anyone associated with the new authority is often labeled “Idlibi,” after Idlib — the stronghold of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham for nine years — a term frequently tinged with condescension in Damascus and Aleppo. Understanding the social and economic distinctions among these rural communities helps explain their divergent political and military choices.

Some towns, organized around extended families, land ownership, and later labor migration beginning in the mid-1980s, invested in education and professional paths while maintaining a socially rooted religiosity. These communities had previously experienced nationalist and Arabist currents before Baathist authoritarianism took hold.

Others, smaller towns built around sub-clans, relied on seasonal agriculture and service in the police and security apparatus of the former regime. They welcomed their sons’ joining the Nusra Front when it began recruiting, seeing in it both as an organized military path against Assad and a religious identity long suppressed.

Added to this are vast desert regions governed by tribal structures and shifting systems of mutual aid.

Though all are Arab Sunnis, their behaviors, loyalties, and alignments differed, shaping how radical factions penetrated some communities while failing in others, often setting one group against another.

Syrian security forces detain a suspect during an anti-ISIS operation in the Idlib countryside on December 1. (Syrian Interior Ministry)

Idlib and the keys to Damascus

When security officials say today they know extremists “one by one,” they rely partly on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s security apparatus and its accumulated knowledge of radical factions it fought in recent years, such as Jund al-Aqsa and the al-Qaeda-aligned Hurras al-Din, along with informant networks.

Idlib remains, to a significant extent, a secure stronghold holding key levers of power. Courts, administrative bodies, and civil registries still operate under the “Sharia courts” established in mid-2013, unlike other regions, especially Damascus, where transactions are centralized.

Sources identify three main recruitment pathways used by ISIS and its offshoots: ideological recruitment, the fastest and most effective, especially among youth who embraced extremism and have yet to absorb Syria’s rapid changes; recruitment driven by money and revenge amid pervasive poverty and lost status; and recruitment among foreign fighters, embittered by abandonment and with little left to lose.

The emerging state and the ‘Sahwa’ model

When President al-Sharaa returned from Washington, he carried a daunting mandate: to “confront and dismantle terrorist networks” linked to remnants of ISIS, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, and Hamas, according to US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack.

While Israel has targeted Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, Syria must contend with their residual networks. Yet the greater challenge remains ISIS and its offshoots, fighters who, until recently, were close “brothers in arms” to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

As observers await the form this confrontation will take, particularly in the absence of a unified army with a clear doctrine, Washington’s earlier experiment in post-Saddam Iraq looms large: the Sunni-on-Sunni “Awakening” (Sahwa).

The Sahwa rested on what an informed Iraqi source described as a “coalition of the harmed” from al-Qaeda, centered in Anbar province with its Sunni Arab identity and traditional religiosity. A similar model could emerge in Syria through an alliance of communities damaged by ISIS in the north and northeast, led by the emerging state that wants to fight extremism.

The Iraqi source, who closely followed the Sahwa’s rise and subsequent decline under then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, noted that tribes around Ramadi, especially al-Bourisha, al-Buallwan, al-Bou Fahd, and to a lesser extent al-Dulaim, formed the backbone of the fight after al-Qaeda devastated their trade and social fabric.

Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, greets people as he attends celebrations marking the first anniversary of the ousting of former President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, Syria, Monday, Dec. 8, 2025. (AP)

Though some were coerced into allegiance, clashes never fully ceased, culminating in atrocities such as the massacre of the al-Bu Nimr tribe, where nearly 2,000 men were executed. A Syrian parallel is the al-Shaitat tribe, which resisted ISIS and suffered one of the largest massacres, with around 1,800 young men killed.

Those who joined the Sahwa were required to publicly renounce al-Qaeda and integrate into security forces coordinated with US troops, in hopes of transforming that tribal bloc into a political actor.

From arms to politics

The Iraqi source highlighted a central lesson: despite the Sahwa’s security successes, it failed to transition into meaningful political participation. When its leaders entered elections, they achieved little representation and failed to build durable popular support.

That failure mirrors Syria’s core dilemma today: the collective transition from a factional, militarized reality confined to limited geography toward a state defined by broader political and administrative principles — and, militarily, by the monopoly of force within a single national army.

Between a woman selling bread on a street corner, a young man dancing in a public square, and institutions struggling to impose order and define the state, Syria appears as a country of overlapping bubbles: a glossy façade prepared for celebration, like a carefully designed postcard, and beneath it a fragile social and security depth whose battles remain unresolved.


Iraq’s Dreams of Wheat Independence Dashed by Water Crisis 

A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
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Iraq’s Dreams of Wheat Independence Dashed by Water Crisis 

A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)

Iraqi wheat farmer Ma'an al-Fatlawi has long depended on the nearby Euphrates River to feed his fields near the city of Najaf. But this year, those waters, which made the Fertile Crescent a cradle of ancient civilization 10,000 years ago, are drying up, and he sees few options.

"Drilling wells is not successful in our land, because the water is saline," al-Fatlawi said, as he stood by an irrigation canal near his parched fields awaiting the release of his allotted water supply.

A push by Iraq - historically among the Middle East's biggest wheat importers - to guarantee food security by ensuring wheat production covers the country's needs has led to three successive annual surpluses of the staple grain.

But those hard-won advances are now under threat as the driest year in modern history and record-low water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have reduced planting and could slash the harvest by up to 50% this season.

"Iraq is facing one of the most severe droughts that has been observed in decades," the UN Food and Agriculture Organization's Iraq representative Salah El Hajj Hassan told Reuters.

VULNERABLE TO NATURE AND NEIGHBORS

The crisis is laying bare Iraq's vulnerability.

A largely desert nation, Iraq ranks fifth globally for climate risk, according to the UN's Global Environment Outlook. Average temperatures in Iraq have risen nearly half a degree Celsius per decade since 2000 and could climb by up to 5.6 C by the end of the century compared to the period before industrialization, according to the International Energy Agency. Rainfall is projected to decline.

But Iraq is also at the mercy of its neighbors for 70% of its water supply. And Türkiye and Iran have been using upstream dams to take a greater share of the region's shared resource.

The FAO says the diminishing amount of water that has trickled down to Iraq is the biggest factor behind the current crisis, which has forced Baghdad to introduce rationing.

Iraq's water reserves have plunged from 60 billion cubic meters in 2020 to less than 4 billion today, said El Hajj Hassan, who expects wheat production this season to drop by 30% to 50%.

"Rain-fed and irrigated agriculture are directly affected nationwide," he said.

EFFORTS TO END IMPORT DEPENDENCE UNDER THREAT

To wean the country off its dependence on imports, Iraq's government has in recent years paid for high-yield seeds and inputs, promoted modern irrigation and desert farming to expand cultivation, and subsidized grain purchases to offer farmers more than double global wheat prices.

It is a plan that, though expensive, has boosted strategic wheat reserves to over 6 million metric tons in some seasons, overwhelming Iraq's silo capacity. The government, which purchased around 5.1 million tons of the 2025 harvest, said in September that those reserves could meet up to a year of demand.

Others, however, including Harry Istepanian - a water expert and founder of Iraq Climate Change Center - now expect imports to rise again, putting the country at greater risk of higher food prices with knock-on effects for trade and government budgets.

"Iraq's water and food security crisis is no longer just an environmental problem; it has immediate economic and security spillovers," Istepanian told Reuters.

A preliminary FAO forecast anticipates wheat import needs for the 2025/26 marketing year to increase to about 2.4 million tons.

Global wheat markets are currently oversupplied, offering cheaper options, but Iraq could once again face price volatility.

A person walks along the edge of uncultivated farmland on the outskirts of Najaf, where dry soil stretches across fields left unplanted due to water shortages, in Najaf, Iraq, November 29, 2025. (Reuters)

Iraq's trade ministry did not respond to a request for comment on the likelihood of increased imports.

In response to the crisis, the ministry of agriculture capped river-irrigated wheat at 1 million dunams in the 2025/26 season - half last season's level - and mandated modern irrigation techniques including drip and sprinkler systems to replace flood irrigation through open canals, which loses water through evaporation and seepage.

A dunam is a measurement of area roughly equivalent to a quarter acre.

The ministry is allocating 3.5 million dunams in desert areas using groundwater. That too is contingent on the use of modern irrigation.

"The plan was implemented in two phases," said Mahdi Dhamad al-Qaisi, an advisor to the agriculture minister. "Both require modern irrigation."

Rice cultivation, meanwhile, which is far more water-intensive than wheat, was banned nationwide.

RURAL LIVELIHOODS AT RISK

One ton of wheat production in Iraq requires about 1,100 cubic meters of water, said Ammar Abdul-Khaliq, head of the Wells and Groundwater Authority in southern Iraq. Pivoting to more dependence on wells to replace river water is risky.

"If water extraction continues without scientific study, groundwater reserves will decline," he said.

Basra aquifers, he said, have already fallen by three to five meters.

Groundwater irrigation systems are also expensive due to the required infrastructure like sprinklers and concrete basins. That presents a further economic challenge to rural Iraqis, who make up around 30% of the population.

Some 170,000 people have already been displaced in rural areas due to water scarcity, the FAO's El Hajj Hassan said.

"This is not a matter of only food security," he said. "It's worse when we look at it from the perspective of livelihoods."

At his farm in Najaf, al-Fatlawi is now experiencing that first-hand, having cut his wheat acreage to a fifth of its normal level this season and laid off all but two of his 10 workers.

"We rely on river water," he said.


Report: Assad Returns to Ophthalmology, His Family Lives in Russian Luxury  

Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, walk with their children in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in 2022. (Former Syrian presidency Facebook page/AFP/Getty Images)
Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, walk with their children in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in 2022. (Former Syrian presidency Facebook page/AFP/Getty Images)
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Report: Assad Returns to Ophthalmology, His Family Lives in Russian Luxury  

Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, walk with their children in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in 2022. (Former Syrian presidency Facebook page/AFP/Getty Images)
Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, walk with their children in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in 2022. (Former Syrian presidency Facebook page/AFP/Getty Images)

A year after his regime was toppled in Syria, Bashar al-Assad's family is living an isolated, quiet life of luxury in Moscow.

A friend of the family, sources in Russia and Syria, as well as leaked data, helped give rare insight into the lives of the now reclusive family who once ruled over Syria with an iron fist.

Bashar now sits in the classroom, taking ophthalmology lessons, according to a well-placed source.

“He’s studying Russian and brushing up on his ophthalmology again,” a friend of the Assad family, who has kept in touch with them, told The Guardian.

“It’s a passion of his, he obviously doesn’t need the money. Even before the war in Syria began, he used to regularly practice his ophthalmology in Damascus,” they continued, suggesting the wealthy elite in Moscow could be his target clientele.

The family are likely to reside in the prestigious Rublyovka, a gated community of Moscow’s elite, according to two sources with knowledge of the situation. There they would rub shoulders with the likes of the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who fled Kyiv in 2014 and is believed to live in the area, according to The Guardian.

The Assads are not wanting for money. After being cut off from much of the world’s financial system by western sanctions in 2011 after Assad’s bloody crackdown on protesters, the family put much of their wealth in Moscow, where western regulators could not touch it.

Despite their cushy abode, the family are cut off from the elite Syrian and Russian circles they once enjoyed. Bashar’s 11th-hour flight from Syria left his cronies feeling abandoned and his Russian handlers prevent him from contacting senior regime officials.

Assad fled with his sons out of Damascus in the early hours of December 8, 2024, as Syrian opposition fighters approached the capital from the north and the south. They were met by a Russian military escort and were taken to the Russian Hmeimim airbase, where they were flown out of the country.

Assad did not warn his extended family or close regime allies of the impending collapse, instead leaving them to fend for themselves.

A friend of Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother and a top military official, who knows many former members of the palace said: “Maher had been calling Bashar for days but he wouldn’t pick up.”

“He stayed in the palace until the last second, opposition fighters found his shisha coals still warm. It was Maher, not Bashar, who helped others escape. Bashar only cared about himself.”

“It’s a very quiet life,” said the family friend. “He has very little, if any, contact with the outside world. He’s only in touch with a couple of people who were in his palace, like Mansour Azzam [former Syrian minister of presidency affairs] and Yassar Ibrahim [Assad’s top economic crony].”

‘Irrelevant’ to Putin

A source close to the Kremlin said Assad was also largely “irrelevant” to Putin and Russia’s political elite. “Putin has little patience for leaders who lose their grip on power, and Assad is no longer seen as a figure of influence or even an interesting guest to invite to dinner,” the source said.

In the first months after the Assads’ escape, his former regime allies were not on Bashar’s mind. The family gathered in Moscow to support Asma, the British-born former first lady of Syria, who had had leukemia for years and whose condition had become critical. She had been receiving treatment in Moscow before the fall of the Assad regime.

According to a source familiar with the details of Asma’s health, the former first lady has recovered after experimental therapy under the supervision of Russia’s security services

With Asma’s health stabilized, the former dictator is keen to get his side of the story out. He has lined up interviews with RT and a popular rightwing American podcaster, but is waiting for approval from Russian authorities to make a media appearance.

Russia appears to have blocked Assad from any public appearance. In a rare November interview with Iraqi media about Assad’s life in Moscow, Russia’s ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev, confirmed that the toppled dictator was barred from any public activity.

“Assad may live here but cannot engage in political activities ... He has no right to engage in any media or political activity. Have you heard anything from him? You haven’t, because he is not allowed to – but he is safe and alive,” Kutrashev said.

Assad children dazed

Life for the Assad children in contrast seems to continue with relatively little disruption, as they adjust to a new life as Moscow elite.

The family friend, who met some of the children a few months ago, said: “They’re kind of dazed. I think they’re still in a bit of a shock. They’re just kind of getting used to life without being the first family.”

The only time the Assad family – without Bashar – have been seen together in public since the end of their regime was at his daughter Zein al-Assad’s graduation on June 30, where she received a degree in international relations from MGIMO, the elite Moscow university attended by much of Russia’s ruling class.

A photograph on MGIMO’s official website shows the 22-year-old Zein standing with other graduates. In a blurry separate video from the event, members of the Assad family, including Asma and her two sons Hafez, 24, and Karim, 21, can be seen in the audience.

Two of Zein’s classmates who attended the ceremony confirmed that parts of the Assad family were present, but said they kept a low profile. “The family did not stay long and did not take any pictures with Zein on stage like other families,” said one of the former classmates, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Hafez, once groomed as Bashar’s potential successor, has largely withdrawn from public view since posting a Telegram video in February in which he offered his own account of the family’s flight from Damascus, denying they had abandoned their allies and claiming it was Moscow that ordered them to leave Syria.

Syrians quickly geolocated Hafez, who took the video while walking the streets of Moscow.

Hafez has closed most of his social media, instead registering accounts under a pseudonym taken from an American children’s series about a young detective with dyslexia, according to leaked data. The children and their mother spend much of their time shopping, filling their new Russian home with luxury goods, according to the source close to the family.