Leila Khaled: Rafik Hariri Transferred Wadie Haddad’s Weapons to Europe

Palestinian PFLP Plane Hijacker Leila Khaled to Asharq Al-Awsat: A story of Mossad missiles, Jalal Talabani's reconnaissance trip and the services of Marouf Saad.

Leila Khaled (R) and the Editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper Ghassan Charbel (L) - AAWSAT
Leila Khaled (R) and the Editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper Ghassan Charbel (L) - AAWSAT
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Leila Khaled: Rafik Hariri Transferred Wadie Haddad’s Weapons to Europe

Leila Khaled (R) and the Editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper Ghassan Charbel (L) - AAWSAT
Leila Khaled (R) and the Editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper Ghassan Charbel (L) - AAWSAT

Episode One

Journalists sometimes fall into the trap of being drawn into the story of a thorny, sensual, or cruel man who has a remarkable role at a certain stage. The man’s name could be Vladimir Putin, Saddam Hussein, or Muammar Gaddafi.

I was attracted to stories shrouded in so much malice and mystery. That is how I spent years looking for features, stories, and details.

The story of another man, the Palestinian leader Wadie Haddad, whose name has been associated with hijacking planes and “chasing the enemy everywhere” had caught my attention.

In the 70s of the last century, Haddad, who was responsible for foreign operations at the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” shook the region and the world.

Operations launched by Haddad preoccupied political, security and media circles with two key stars: Carlos the Jackal, whose star shone after the kidnapping of the OPEC ministers in Vienna, and the second was the young Palestinian woman, Leila Khaled, who participated in the 1969 and 1970 hijackings of two planes.

In the summer of 2001, I published a lengthy investigation on Haddad, which also included Carlos’ responses to questions I sent to him in his French prison, where he still resides.

However, circumstances prevented Khaled from being involved in the matter.

Late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, at that time, asked me why I was interested in Haddad's story, and I replied that it was out of journalistic curiosity. I was surprised that a busy prime minister would have enough time to read an interview of this kind.

I later heard from an informed source that during a visit to Haddad’s house in Beirut, a day after it was targeted in the summer of 1970 by Israeli shells, a young Lebanese man was taking part in removing shards of glass.

Curiosity got the better of me and I discovered after repeated attempts that the young man was Hariri. I had many doubts, because at that time Hariri was working in Saudi Arabia. But the source seemed confident of their statement since they knew Hariri personally.

Labneh Sandwiches

Years ago, poet and journalist Zahi Wehbe was giving an interview on Future TV, which Hariri owned, along with Leila Khaled.

During the interview, Wehbe received a call from Hariri's house in Quraitem Palace asking him to extend the ad period, which he did. During the break, Hariri called and asked to speak to Khaled.

“I am Rafik Hariri, the prime minister of Lebanon,” Hariri told Khaled.

“I do not know the Prime Minister of Lebanon. I know the old Rafik (Hariri),” replied Khaled. This is when Hariri requested that Khaled visit him at home.


Rafik Hariri (Getty) - Wadie Haddad - Jalal Talabani (Getty)

Khaled went with Wehbe, and Hariri met with them. They discussed the difficult conditions in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and Khaled stressed the need to ease the restrictions on the lives of camp residents.

Hariri asked his guest if she still remembered the “labneh sandwiches,” and Khaled affirmed that she did.

Wehbe tried to inquire about the sandwiches, but Hariri stopped the conversation with a wave of his hand and moved on to another topic.

The “labneh sandwiches” was Hariri’s most confidential matter.

Hariri hid the secret from the closest people to him, and now the readers of Asharq Al-Awsat are learning about it half a century after it had happened.

To be honest, I did not go to Khaled's house in Amman to ask her about Hariri. I went to collect stories, especially since this woman is about to turn eighty without changing her convictions or regretting what she did.

Khaled unwittingly contributed to saving Haddad from death because of her presence in his apartment when it was targeted by Mossad shells in 1970. She was instructing him about an operation being prepared, keeping him outside the bedroom which was targeted in the attack that injured his wife and son.

When Khaled told me this, I remembered the young man who was said to have collected the shards of glass the next day. I asked her if she saw him the next day, and she replied that she was with Haddad’s family at the American University of Beirut Medical Center, and she did not know who came to the apartment.

When asked if she knew Hariri in those years, she replied: “Yes. I knew him because he lived with my brother during their studies at the Beirut Arab University.”

“A year before he was due to graduate, he came to my sister's house in Mazraa, Beirut.”

“He said he decided to go to work in Saudi Arabia.”

“We tried to persuade him to complete his studies, but he was not convinced.”

“If I remember well, this was in 1965 or soon after. He visited us later in Lebanon, met with Haddad, and got assigned the task of transporting weapons to Europe.”

I pretended not to be surprised and asked where and when he had transferred the weapons, and Khaled’s response was: “To Europe, and he did that more than once between 1970 and 1971.”

“At that time, he was working in Saudi Arabia. I am not aware of how Haddad was asking him to come to Lebanon. He was the one delivering the weapons. After 1972, we no longer saw him,” added Khaled.

I inquired if Hariri - despite his modest capabilities at the time - contributed to any financing for the group, and Khaled’s answer was: “I am not sure, all I witnessed was his assignment to transfer weapons.”

“The rule of thumb was that no one should know anything except for what they have to complete their mission.”

I asked about the reason for assigning Hariri a task of this kind while he was working in Saudi Arabia, and she replied: “I told you what I know. Perhaps because his passport did not arouse suspicion.”

Khaled refused to talk about how Hariri got the weapons to pass through the airports of France, Spain, and Germany.

The tape recorder was on and thoughts started racing through my mind. The young man who was assigned by Haddad to transport weapons to Europe will later appear to be an acceptable player on Arab and international levels.

Hariri would later visit the White House, the Kremlin, and 10 Downing Street. The Elysee master will break the protocol to dine at his Parisian home.

Hariri and Smuggling Publications to Syria

At that moment, I remembered what I heard two decades ago from Zaki Hillo, who worked with Haddad, when he told me that he knew Hariri. Hillo didn’t reveal much. He had trained to live in a world of secrets, and was the one who trained Carlos in marksmanship and small explosives.

I turned to those who accompanied Hariri in his early youth in his hometown of Sidon, southern Lebanon. They said Hariri was an enthusiastic young man who joined the “Movement of Arab Nationalists” as an activist.

At the movement, Hariri got acquainted with the names of George Habash and Haddad and got to know them later. His role was modest.

He participated in a committee headed by Haddad, which was concerned with providing facilities to some members of the movement, such as finding homes for rent and services of this kind. Hariri was also tasked with delivering the movement’s publications secretly to its members in Syria.

He chose to hide these leaflets in the vegetable trucks that were traveling from Sidon to the Syrian cities. Those days were the thread that linked Hariri to some of the movement's symbols before the birth of the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” led by Habash.

Jalal Talabani on a Reconnaissance Mission

Khaled noticed that Haddad was skilled at using some friendships, especially with non-suspicious people, to play roles that serve his work. In this context, he once assigned a young Kurdish leftist to carry out reconnaissance missions in Europe.

I had heard years ago that this Kurdish youth later assumed a high position, so my suspicions went to the late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.

Taking advantage of the opportunity to meet with him during his visit to Damascus, I asked him to confirm the story. He kindly wished not to focus too much on it “so that friends in the US would not say that the president of Iraq is a former terrorist.” Perhaps he was also avoiding saying that his trip was part of a plan to assassinate Shimon Peres.

The truth is that I was not surprised that Talabani played a role of this kind because of his upbringing, his inclinations, and his connections. But it is strange that Hariri transported weapons and that this role remained a secret for five decades.

Haddad used his friendships to serve his cause.

“He used to ask me to go to some personalities and friends, including a number of doctors, to get money from them to cover travel expenses and missions,” revealed Khaled.

“He used to tell me to tell them we want to buy travel tickets,” she explained.

“Once I went to Najib Abu Haidar (former Lebanese minister) and he asked me where Haddad wanted to travel. Of course, I replied, "I don't know."

“They would give us the money and we would buy the tickets.”

“Haddad was dependent on some of his relatives, including those who were at the head of a major company.”

Khaled tells how Haddad used to talk to his friends and relatives. He urged them to fund him because he was fighting for a Palestine that was for all.

“Their confidence in him and the justice of the case prompted them to be responsive,” clarified Khaled.

Another friend of Haddad that was not hesitant to offer his services was the representative of the city of Sidon in the Lebanese parliament, Marouf Saad. One day, Saad was asked to suggest a suitable place for a hijacked plane to land. Saad searched for a place that had Haddad’s approval, but Khaled was afraid that the place would be within reach of the Israeli warplanes, so the matter was dismissed. The search later moved outside Lebanon, and Khaled was tasked with recruiting members and training them to hijack planes, which she did.

Mossad Missiles Postponed the Honeymoon

I asked Khaled to tell the story of the assassination attempt on Haddad at the hands of the Mossad, because she was with him at the moment of the attack.

“Haddad was adhering to strict security measures and all his movements were surrounded by complete secrecy,” she recalled.

“However, they succeeded in hitting his apartment in Al-Zarif in Beirut with six missiles directed at the bedrooms at 2:00 am.”

“Fortunately, I was sitting with him in the dining room.”

“I had to travel in the morning, but I was supposed to write down the details of the operation that was supposed to lead me to Tel Aviv. I was writing the details to send to the leadership when the explosions went off.”

“I was thrust from my place, and we heard the screams of Hani, Haddad’s son.”

“Haddad was not injured, but shrapnel hit his son in more than one place.”

“The glass in the apartment shattered and we felt as if we were suffocating. The closet was on fire and was about to fall on Hani, who was lying in his bed.”

“Haddad came forward and I saw his hands were burning, but he was able to carry Hani and give him to me.”

“The boy was bleeding, so I picked him up. But I didn't know how to open the door.”

“Haddad came with his burning hands and grabbed the lock.”

“The missiles hit, especially the lower and upper floors, and I still remember Haddad’s sentence in those harsh conditions when he said: Their operation failed.”

Khaled added that Haddad had gone into the other room to bring his wife after collecting the papers of the operation’s details and placing them in his pocket.

“He came to his wife and asked her to get up.”

“When she discovered that her son was not near her, she started screaming.”

“I rushed to the hospital and started yelling after the staff demanded money before admitting Hani, knowing that he was bleeding on my hand.”

“I pushed the man who asked for the insurance, entered the hospital, and Haddad followed me with his wife.”

The plan, which was aborted because of the attack, was for Khaled to go with a fake passport to Tel Aviv to spend her honeymoon there, and then carry out the operation.

“In the hospital we had to think of a response, and I brought a book about the flights of Israeli planes to and from Tel Aviv.”

“I spotted three planes that can be hunted almost simultaneously. I presented the idea to Haddad and he liked it.”


General view of a mural of Leila Khaled, on the apartheid wall in Bethlehem, West Bank (Getty)

Did Haddad Die Poisoned

On March 28, 1978, Haddad took his last breath in a police hospital in East Berlin. The man of secrets was gone, leaving behind an outstanding mystery that decades have not succeeded in clearing.

Was he poisoned? No one has a definitive answer.

The painful symptoms that afflicted him in Iraq, Algeria and Berlin led him to believe that he had been subjected to an elaborate poisoning process, but the medical reports did not provide a decisive or definitive answer.

Haddad’s comrades tried to continue their activities after his death. However, a few years were enough to turn the page on foreign operations in the staggering absence of Haddad. Haddad was buried in Baghdad

Khaled mocks the claims of some Mossad agents that Haddad fell victim to the poisoned chocolates they sent him. She confirmed that Haddad “did not like chocolate.”

Haddad’s comrades locked the organization’s secrets in a safe and kept the key in a protected place. They are not in the habit of meeting journalists, leaking news, or selling secrets.

Khaled is a little different because she became a star and a symbol. She later assumed leadership positions in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and participated in successive activities to enhance the role of Palestinian women.

Khaled was born in Haifa in 1944 and immigrated with her family to Lebanon after the Nakba. She resided in Tyre, Sidon and Beirut before later going to Kuwait.



Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destruction

People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
TT

Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destruction

People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)

Hazem Saghieh

The advent of the 21st Century brought with it historic developments. The most significant for Syria and Lebanon took place on June 10, 2000 with the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Many openly mourned his passing. Many having experienced firsthand the cruelty of the ruler. In secret however, they said: “This is the first time Assad does something useful.”

Hafez was in effect the president of two countries. Weeks before his death, he met with US President Bill Clinton in Geneva to discuss resuming negotiations between Syria and Israel. On May 25, 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in line with an electoral pledge made by Ehud Barak.

The day was a calamity to Assad’s Lebanese and Syrian supporters, who saw in the withdrawal the end of their excuses to carry arms outside state control. So, they described the move as a “conspiracy” and suddenly, like a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, they cited Israel’s continued occupation of the long-forgotten Shebaa Farms. Israel had occupied the area from Syria in 1967. Calls for war mounted, demanding that Israel withdraw or suffer the consequences. Soon after, however, tensions eased, and Hezbollah declared the withdrawal a “liberation” achieved with the support of “Syria’s Assad”.

Training Bashar and Lebanese politicians

Syrians recalled the story of a peasant from Daraa who headed to Damascus to attend Hafez’s funeral. On his way, he saw a billboard that read: “The Assad (Arabic for lion) is immortal and does not die.” So the peasant turned back and returned home believing that the news of Hafez’s death were rumors spread by enemies.

The peasant wasn’t completely wrong or so it would seem when Hafez’s son, Bashar, came to power to follow in his father’s footsteps. Despite the changes the new young ruler introduced to the country and his marriage to a “modern” British-born woman, the apple did not fall far from the tree, and he maintained his father’s iron-fisted grip on power.

Bashar forged ahead along his father’s destructive path and where better to gain experience than in Syria’s favorite training ground: Lebanon.

Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and US President Bill Clinton meet in Geneva in 2000. (Getty Images)

In 1998, two years before he came to power and four years after his older brother Bassel’s death, Bashar was put in charge of the Syrian military presence in “brotherly” Lebanon, where 40,000 Syrian soldiers were deployed. As part of Bashar’s training, he documented his relations with Lebanese politicians, the majority of whom bowed their heads to the lowliest of Syrian officers.

Three Lebanese figures stood out for Bashar. Two had his unabashed admiration and one was an abhorred thorn in his side:

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was the leader of the resistance party and enjoyed Bashar’s full support. He was viewed as the man of the 2000 liberation. He represented to Bashar everything that he could not achieve because he inherited power, while Nasrallah earned his way to the top. However, Hafez had the upper hand over Nasrallah when negotiating with Iran; the young inexperienced Bashar did not.

Bashar’s admiration of Nasrallah stemmed from what he could never achieve, while his admiration for Emile Lahoud stemmed from what was possible. The Lebanese army and naval commander was chosen by Damascus to be president in 1998. Lahoud, the commander of the very modest Lebanese navy, was as much a military man as Bashar, the ophthalmologist, was a doctor.

With the very little time needed to run the navy, Lahoud spent his leisure hours oiling himself up to tan under the sun at the Bain Militaire resort in Beirut. In all likelihood, Bashar was drawn to Lahoud because of their shared weakness in articulating words and putting sentences together, following that up with weak laughter, leaving their statements utterly meaningless.

The thorn in Bashar’s side was wealthy businessman and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who lavished gifts on Syrian officers hoping for political leniency in return. This was not the type of wealthy man who Bashar was drawn to. Bashar looked up to the wealthy man whose sole ambition was to keep his riches from being seized.

Articles spoke about how Hariri was the one who was building Syria’s relations with the world, and he was the one who proposed to Damascus that it follow the “Chinese model” whereby power remains in the hands of the rulers, while freedom is introduced to the markets. Bashar resented Hariri for this and his sentiment deepened because Hariri was a Sunni leader and Bashar was Alawite. The Sunnis make up the majority in Lebanon and Syria where Alawites are a minority.

Rumors abounded that Hariri not only wanted to be the leader of the Sunnis in Lebanon, but in Syria as well. No wonder Bashar was suspicious. Rumors also spread that Hariri sought regional peace whereby the Palestinians and Israeli would continue where they left off in Oslo in 1993. Perhaps what irked Bashar the most about Hariri was that he was a self-made man.

From left to right: Former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, slain former PM Rafik al-Hariri and slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (AFP file)

Regional tumult and crimes in Lebanon

The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon removed the Syrian regime’s excuse for keeping its forces deployed in Lebanon. Hafez’s death encouraged people to speak out. The man of the moment was late Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, who in September 2000 sponsored a Maronite call on Syria to pull out its troops. Sfeir forged ahead. In April 2001, he blessed the establishment of the Qornet Shewan gathering that marked the beginning of the emergence of an anti-Syria opposition.

The gathering brought together Christian politicians and helped extend bridges to Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, both of whom were upset with Bashar and his employee in Lebanon, Lahoud. In the summer of 2001, Sfeir sponsored a major reconciliation between the Christians and the Druze. Both sects were seen as the backbone of Lebanon’s national identity.

On August 7, Christian society was rattled by student protests held by supporters of the Lebanese Forces and former army commander Michel Aoun, who was in exile at the time. The protesters were summarily rounded up and imprisoned in shocking scenes. Hundreds were detained without any legal justification and for simply demanding freedom and the withdrawal of Syrian troops.

The region was in store for more tumult. In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and a year later Syria’s Kurds in Qamishli were encouraged to revolt against the regime. Bashar responded to the unrest by shipping terrorists to Iraq where they caused so much death and destruction. Washington soon began to mount its pressure on Bashar to ease meddling in Lebanon.

Bashar responded with a bombshell in Beirut. He remained steadfast in extending Lahoud’s term in office in 2004 despite deep opposition in Lebanon. In September later that year, the UN Security Council issued resolution 1559 that calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the dismantling of all militias. It was as clear as day that Bashar and Hezbollah were the main targets of the resolution.

Bashar and Nasrallah were determined to retaliate against the resolution and Jumblatt and Hariri were seen as the main targets. Jumblatt had joined the opposition, while Hariri, who openly opposed the extension of Lahoud’s term – in what was seen as a direct insult to Bashar – was suspected of having played a major role in the issuance of resolution 1559.

And so, Beirut would be struck with disaster on February 14, 2005. Hariri was assassinated in major car bombing that would also claim the life of minister Bassil Fleihan and 21 people. A slew of crimes and assassinations would ensue against politicians and journalists who were vocal in their opposition to Bashar and Nasrallah.

Lebanon would soon become divided into two camps: one known as “March 8”, named so after holding a large rally on that day in 2005 to “thank Syria’s Assad” for its role in Lebanon, and “March 14”, also named so after a rally on that day that dwarfed the first and that protested against Hariri’s killing and demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian forces.

The forces would eventually withdraw from Lebanon on April 30, 2005. Nasrallah eagerly gifted the head of the Syrian security apparatus in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, the “rifle of resistance” because he wanted the Syrian troops to quit Lebanon with their heads held high, not weak and humiliated. Hariri’s “curse” would haunt Ghazaleh and his predecessor Ghazi Kanaan. Their mysterious fate would be added to countless others who died under the Assad rule.

Syrian forces deployed in Lebanon. (AFP file)

Ghazaleh was named to his post in Lebanon in 2002. He followed in Kanaan’s bloody footsteps of killing and torture. They had set up base in the town of Anjar in the Bekaa and the Beau Rivage Hotel in Beirut, both of which became synonymous with the Syrian regime’s oppression. They also sponsored drug and weapons smuggling networks whose revenues they reaped, along with the regime and their allies in the “Axis of Resistance”.

Ghazaleh was known for his utmost loyalty to the regime. Perhaps it was because he was a Sunni and needed to prove himself to his Alawite masters. Kanaan, a Alawite, didn’t need to go that far and years later would go on record and speak proudly of his friendship with Hariri.

At any rate, with Syrian troops out of Lebanon, the regime feared that all of its plotting to kill Hariri would be revealed. So, Ghazaleh, the regime’s secret keeper and owner of the “rifle of the resistance” was killed in 2015. Kanaan was shot and killed in his office in 2005. He was shot with two or three bullets, but the regime famously preferred to call his death a suicide. A few years later, two of his brothers also committed “suicide” - also using two or three bullets.

Tying the brother to the sister

Throughout the hegemony of “sister” Syria over “brother” Lebanon, the latter was under the Baathist theory of “Lebanon’s Arabism”. Describing what the regime did to Arabism is an insult to the word. In reality, it required that Lebanon stand by Syria and non-Arab Iran, through thick and thin, against Egypt, Iraq and Arab Gulf and Maghreb. For the first time in Lebanon’s modern history, it had an official ideology that identified “friend” and “foe”, replacing freedom of expression that was a hallmark of Lebanon’s official stances.

Hafez had also tightened the bond between Damascus and Beirut with the 1991 treaty of “Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination” that tied Lebanon’s foreign policy to Syria’s. Damascus was also granted the final say in administrative and public appointments, especially security and military ones. It was allowed to name judges and ministers and outline media policies of various outlets.

This form of “Arabism” continued under Bashar, who at first attempted to display some openness towards Syria and Lebanon. He gave some breathing room for civil society activists in Syria and Lebanese banks opened branches in Syria. Bashar also approached Christian Lebanese parties that are traditionally opposed to the Assads.

War with Israel

Bashar’s relative “openness” led to the establishment of the “Beirut-Damascus Declaration” in May 2006. It was signed by hundreds of Syrian and Lebanon intellectuals and activists and called on the Syrian government to “correct” relations with Lebanon and respect its sovereignty and independence and end its series of political assassinations. The declaration marked the end of the openness. The Syrian signatories soon found themselves in jail or fired from their jobs.

Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon left Hezbollah and its allies isolated. They were also confronted with a national agenda championed by the March 14 movement. Syrian voices chimed in solidarity with the Lebanese people. Hezbollah and its allies therefore sensed the need to shift attention elsewhere. And as usual, what best way to do that than sparking a war with Israel? Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, leading Israel to declare war on the party.

Hezbollah would declare “divine victory” some 33 days later. Soon after, Iran-backed Hezbollah would assume in Lebanon the role once played by Ghazaleh. Iran’s role in Lebanon would become more pronounced, while Syria still held sway, albeit in back alleys, instead of the rooftops.

Lebanese mourners hold up a sign during the funeral of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut, Lebanon, February 16, 2005 (Reuters)

A deadly duality emerged: a popular and parliamentary majority represented by Fuad Siniora’s government on the one hand, and the “divine victory” camp whose weapons and alliances would prevent the establishment of any stable form of rule on the other. The camp obstructed the government functioning and crippled the entire capital with a sit-in in Downtown Beirut that extended for over a year.

In May 2007, members of the so-called Fatah al-Islam group killed 27 Lebanese soldiers in their sleep. Clashes soon ensued in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp between the group and the army. Later, it would be revealed that the leader of the group, Shaker al-Absi, was working for Syrian intelligence. He had been imprisoned in Damascus and later released. He was tasked with sending terrorists to Iraq. After the Nahr al-Bared battle, he fled to Damascus and was later unsurprisingly killed in mysterious circumstances.

With Hezbollah and its allies holding sway in Lebanon, meeting constitutional deadlines became impossible. It took six months to elect Michel Suleiman president and that was only after Hezbollah and its allies turned their weapons against the Lebanese people in May 2008. The Doha conference was held to restore calm and end the political impasse and Suleiman was elected president.

Even after the crisis was resolved, Hezbollah continued to obstruct political life when things did not go in its favor even though the 2009 parliamentary elections, just like the 2005 polls, handed the March 14 camp a majority.

Syrian revolution and Assad’s downfall

The Syrian revolution erupted in 2011 and people in Lebanon hoped that it would positively impact their country and sweep away the rot and corruption that had been eating away at it. Voices of solidarity rose with the Syrian people, this time calling for freedom and dignity, not Arabism and resistance. Thugs affiliated with Damascus loyalists and Hezbollah soon cracked down on people expressing solidarity.

The northern city of Tripoli suffered the brunt of the crackdown. Its close proximity to Syria had always made it a prime target for the regime’s oppressive practices. In 2013, two mosques in the city were bombed, leaving 49 people dead and over 800 wounded. Unsurprisingly, the terrorist group that had claimed responsibility for the attack was actually affiliated with Damascus.

In 2012, scandal shook Lebanon when former minister Michel Samaha was busted for smuggling explosives from Syria to Lebanon where he planned on carrying out bombings. Ali al-Mamlouk, Bashar’s security advisor, was the mastermind behind the plot.

Ousted Syrian President Bashar all-Assad. (SANA file)

In 2019, as the sanctions tightened around the regime, it turned to Lebanon to ease the strain. The regime’s financial ties to Hezbollah were deepened during that phase, especially when it came to smuggling captagon.

While Syria kept a low profile in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s role in Syria grew more prominent. It reached a glaring peak in 2013 when it intervened militarily in Syria to help the regime fight the opposition seeking its ouster.

On the official level, Lebanon had sought to distance itself from the conflict in Syria. The Baabda Declaration was issued in 2012, stressing that Lebanon would keep a distance from the unrest. All parties, including Hezbollah, had agreed to it. Iran, Hezbollah’s backer, had other plans and soon the party scrambled to the aid of its ally, sowing death and destruction in Syria.

On August 4, 2020, Beirut was in store for yet another tragedy. Ammonium nitrate unsafely stored at the Beirut port mysteriously detonated, destroying swathes of the capital and killing over 200 people. The explosion was the third largest non-nuclear explosion in history. A lot was written about how associates of the Assad regime, who were complicit in shady deals and smuggling operations, had been storing the nitrate at the port.

The claims gained ground when Hezbollah thwarted investigations into the explosion. The party had no problem dispatching its enforcer and security official Wafik Safa to threaten the judge in charge of the probe to shut it down. And so it was, and the investigations have been stalled for years.

Much can be said about the Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon during their country’s conflict. Strong bonds were forged between them and the locals, but they also strained Lebanon’s already fragile economy, fueling resentment and racism against them.

The Syrian regime collapsed on December 8 and Bashar fled to Moscow. The Lebanese people shared the Syrian people’s delirium in seeing the downfall of their oppressor.

However, Lebanon is not out of the woods yet. Members of the regime fled Syria to Lebanon and local authorities are demanded to arrest them, otherwise risk jeopardizing relations with the new rulers in Damascus. But everyone can safely say, that at the moment, the past 25 years of oppression, death and ruin at the hands of the regime are truly over.